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THE THEAETETUS OF PLATO

CAMPBELL

London

HENRY FROWDE



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE

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THE THEAETETUS

OF

PLATO

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES

BY

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IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS

SECOND EDITION

Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1883

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PA4279.T3 1883

TO

EDMUND LAW LUSHINGTON,

EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW,

THIS EDITION OF PLATO'S THEÆTETUS

IS ONCE MORE GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED.

L. C.

January, 1883.



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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

SINCE the first edition of this work was published in 1861, there have been several important additions to Platonic literature in England. Mr. Grote's book on Plato and the other companions of Socrates appeared in 1865; Professor Jowett's translation, with the analyses and introductions, in 1871 (the second edition in 1875). These great and monumental works had been preceded by the less important effort of Dr. Whewell, who, in 1861, attempted, not without success, to popularize the dialogues in part, and to assert their educational value. Of critical editions, Riddell's *Apology*, with the valuable *Digest of Idioms*, was published in 1867 (after the author's death), Dr. Thompson's *Phædrus* in 1868, his *Gorgias* in 1871, and the edition of the *Sophistes* and *Politicus*, which forms the continuation of this *Theætetetus*, came out in 1867. An edition of the *Parmenides*, by Professor Maguire, published at Dublin in 1882, is remarkable for clearness of arrangement, and also for a point of view which I venture to think more idealistic than Plato's

own. Mr. F. A. Paley published a translation of the *Theætetus*, with some notes, in 1875. The recent edition of this dialogue by Professor Kennedy of Cambridge is also accompanied with a translation.

Mr. Grote's intensely real conception of Hellenic, and especially of Athenian life, his personal interest in the Sophists and in Socrates, have enabled him to throw a powerful cross-light on Plato, bringing out some features which would otherwise have remained in shadow. His intellectual sympathy with Protagoras in particular gives great piquancy to his analysis of the *Theætetus*. But his steadfast utilitarian point of view has made it hard for him to do real justice to Plato's meaning here. No part of Mr. Grote's singular exposition is more paradoxical, or has called forth more criticism, than his account of this dialogue. Mr. Cope's just and clear rejoinder may be alluded to in passing; and an article in the *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1865, which contains a powerful refutation of Mr. Grote's 'theory of Knowledge,' is the more noteworthy, as it is known to have been written by his friend and fellow-disciple Mr. John Stuart Mill, who, although not a Platonist in philosophy, was a warm admirer of Plato. An excerpt from the *Quarterly Review* for January, 1866, on the same subject, is reprinted, with Mr. Murray's permission, as an Appendix to the present volume.

Several interesting papers on Plato have appeared in the Journal of Philology, of which those by Mr. Henry Jackson, ‘On Plato’s later theory of Ideas,’ are the most recent and in some ways the most important.

It is needless to refer at length to the many works on Plato which have appeared in other countries since 1861. Of books dealing generally in a critical spirit with the whole body of the dialogues, that of Schaarschmidt (1866), of which more will be said presently, is probably the most remarkable. The voluminous work of Peipers (1874) deals so far principally with the *Theætetus*. His exposition is learned and thoughtful, but is only occasionally referred to in this volume. On the other hand, I have made constant use, in revising my notes, of three important helps to the study of the *Theætetus* which have appeared in recent years:—the critical and exegetical commentaries of Hermann Schmidt (1877), the revision of Stallbaum’s edition (in the case of the *Theætetus* amounting to a new edition) by Wohlrab (1869), and the critical edition of Martinus Schanz (1880), who has in many ways done good service to the text of Plato.

It has been no small satisfaction to me to find that many of the views advanced in my former edition have been since endorsed by writers of so

much authority. To H. Schmidt, especially, my acknowledgments are due for the close attention which he has given to my observations, and for the subtlety and acuteness which he has often expended in examining them.

A full *apparatus criticus* has never formed part of the plan of this edition. But in the year 1856, being still at Oxford, and having undertaken to edit the *Theætetus*, I collated the dialogue in the Bodleian MS. with the Zurich edition of 1839, and with Gaisford's collation in his *Lectiones Platonicae* (1820). Bekker in his *Commentaria Critica* (1823) had written with reference to this work of the Oxford Professor of Greek:—‘Cogat agmen, quem solum non ipse exploravi, (¶) codex Clarkianus. Eius enim causa Oxonium profectus cum Thomæ Gaisfordi lectiones Platonicas prelo paratas invenissem, nolui actum agere, totumque viri diligentissimi libellum in mea commentaria ita recepi, ut quæ ad sententiam, ad syntaxin, ad flexionem quoquo modo pertinerent, transcriberem omnia, quæ orthographica essent, ea fere speciminis loco semel atque iterum posita deinde omitterem.’ Bekker's confidence in Gaisford's accuracy was sufficiently well-grounded, but finality in dealing with MSS. is not soon reached, and I was able in several places to correct or supplement Gaisford's report. To place on record every ν ἐφελκυστικόν, every accent

or breathing supplied by a later hand, was no part of my intention, nor has it yet been done. Any one who turns from the *Theætetus* in the MS. to the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, or *Parmenides*, which have been much less read, and are therefore more nearly as the scribe left them, will see at once how many accents in particular must have been added by later hands.

I left Oxford in 1858, and was therefore unable, at the time of bringing out my edition in 1861, personally to verify my notes. I might else have avoided one somewhat serious error, viz. that of printing $\epsilon\pi\grave{\imath}$ πολύ instead of $\epsilon\pi\grave{\imath}$ τὸ πολύ, as the Bodleian reading in 153 B. How easily such an error might arise under the circumstances may be illustrated by a simple instance. Dindorf's critical note on *Œd. Tyr.* 11, at least in the editions of 1861 and 1868, is as follows:—‘ $\sigma\tau\acute{e}\rho\xi\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ pro $\sigma\tau\acute{e}\xi\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ a m. rec.’ This is the reverse of the fact, and M. Schanz may perhaps conjecture that Dübner, who collated for Dindorf, ‘merely inspected’ the Medicean MS. But it must be evident to a candid mind,—to borrow for a moment the language of constructive criticism,—that Dübner wrote $\sigma\tau\acute{e}\rho\xi\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ pr.: $\sigma\tau\acute{e}\xi\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ a m. rec., and that Dindorf misread Dübner's note.

Schanz collated the MS. in 1870, and having tested his work on this dialogue I can bear witness to its great accuracy. He tells us that he went on

the principle of registering everything, however slight. Yet even a Schanz is compelled to place limits to minutiae. Not only are there still many changes of accent unregistered, not only is the resolution of σ , $\sigma\tau$, etc., by correctors unobserved in places where it affects the reading, but the distinction between early and late corrections (b and *recens* b) is by no means completely noted. Also, if Schanz were supposed to have transcribed everything however slight, it might be inferred that the MS. was not punctuated. Now the Bodleian MS. as it stands has three distinct sorts of punctuation:—1. the double colon, by which in this, as in other MSS. of Plato, the speeches of the different interlocutors are kept apart. These divisions are right in some places where the earlier editors went wrong. 2. The colon, often marking even insignificant pauses. This, as well as the mark of a new speaker, has been generally inserted by the first hand. 3. The comma, frequently added by an early diorthotes so as to indicate a slight break in the sentence. This sometimes amounts to an interpretation. The same hand has often added a comma beneath the double colon, thus ; where the preceding sentence is interrogative. These three marks—in different degrees certainly, and none of them in a significant degree, but still appreciably,—form part of the traditional deposit which the MS. contains. None of them, least of all the first,

should be ignored by those who undertake to register every difference however apparently unimportant.

Having reperused the MS. side by side with Schanz's edition, I may be permitted to register a few points (certainly of the very slightest moment) where his observation seems to have been at fault.

N.B.—*The references are to Schanz's edition of the Theætetus, published at Leipzig in 1880.*

Schanz, page 1, line 5. $\piοῦ\ μήν$; Here as below p. 2, l. 9, b has added τ for $\tauερψίων$, which was however unnecessary, as the double colon (:) marks the new persons—hence τ is not continued.

2. 9. ‘καὶ . . εἰπεν Terpsioni tribuit b.’ This is not true in the sense that B had omitted to distinguish the persons with the colon (:); τ is added, as before, $\epsilonκ περιουσίας$.

2. 15. $\epsilonπηνορθούμην$ BT, corr. bt. $\ddot{\alpha}στέ$ BT (so also in 15, l. 22 $μήτέ$).

3. 6. $\tauὰ \epsilonκεῖ ἀν σε, καὶ περὶ \epsilonκείνων ἀν' ἡρώτων$ interp. B vel b.

4. 11. $\epsilonὐδοκίμου$ Tb. (rec.): $\epsilonὐδόκιμον$ B.

10. 35. ‘ἀτόκοις BT, sed κ ex emend. B.’ The correction is by a recent hand. The note should run therefore ‘ἀτόκοις b rec. T: ἀτόποις B et apogr. V.’

12. 22. Post $\gammaεγονὸς$ commate distinxit b vetus.

12. 26. Post $\epsilonναργὲς$ distinguit B.

13. 29. $\dot{\alpha}\phiαιρῶμαι$ bt: $\dot{\alpha}\phiαιρωμαὶ$ BT.

16. 23. ‘ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ revera B.’ This is so, but $\epsilonπιτοπολὺ$ b should be added.

17. 8. $\tauὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω$. $\piροσβιβάζων τὴν χρυσῆν σειράν$. ω s sic distinxit b.

19. 7. ἔγωγε is written in space of fewer letters by first hand. The former word was oxytone: qy. ἔγώ?

20. 9. ‘θαύμαντος BT, sed ν in ras. B.’ Imo ν erasit b.

22. 1. ὅτουν οὖν (in the note) is an obvious misprint.

23. 16. ᾑπερ (accent uncertain) B: ᾑπερ b.

24. 15. Post ὄναρ distinguit B.

27. 4. ‘τε add. T. om. B.’ It should be observed that ἐμέ is at the end of a line (ἐμέ | τινος).

27. 16, 17. 16. ‘οὗτ’ ἄλλον λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον om. BD, add. bd. 17. ἀποδεκτέον T: ἀπολεκτέον B.’ This is not quite accurate. The note should run οὐ | τάντῳ λεκτέον B: Litteras τ' αὐτῷ erasit, τ' αὐτῷ λεκτέον, οὗτ' ἄλλον λέγον in margine sinistra supplevit, τος ἀπό in rasura scripsit, λ in δ mutavit, b. (The vox nihili ἀπολεκτέον was never written.)

28. 14. τίστον B: the corrector erased the stroke which made the τ, changed ο to σ and ν to γ.

29. 9. ‘λέγομεν’ recens ‘b.’

31. 1. ‘πιθανολογίᾳ TV et ut videtur B: πιθανολογίαις ex emend. B.’

πιθανολογίαις is the reading of B p. m.: only, as in numberless other places, στ has been corrected by a recent hand to στ.

31. 9. ‘ἡ ἔτερον T’ et recens ‘b.’

32. 29. ὁρῶη (sic) (not ὁρᾶ) b.

35. 24. οἶων τε ‘in marg.’ recens ‘b.’

36. 26. παρ’ ἀ ἀν etiam b.

37. 22. ἄλλα’ ḥ (not ἄλλα’ ḥ) B.

38. 19. ‘ἐβοήθησαν B, corr.’ recens ‘b.’

39. 1. αῦ τοῦτὸν τὸν (sic) B pr.

39. 16. τὸν σκίρρων (?) B.

40. 3. The confusion in B is increased by το having no accent:—νπήρειτο.

43. 7. ταυτὰ B.

43. 13. ḥ b.

44. 20. ‘ἥ* B.’—Fuit ḥi.

45. 15. ḥ B pr. (?).

46. 5. ḥ τι τῷ B pr.

46. 18. θρατ τά B pr.

47. 27. *μυρία* BT: *μύρια* b.

48. 23. *τ' αῦ* B: *τ' ἀ* b.

49. 15. ‘ἐπιδέξια B.’ The accent is not by the first hand.

50. 15. *καὶ σοφαῖ* B (Schanz has here corrected his own error).

51. 34–52. 1. B omits the division of the persons after *πάντων γέ*, and the second *μὴ γάρ*.

52. 27. B has *αὐτῶι*.

53. 16. I read *ἀκυροτέρα* in B.

54. 9. ‘ἢ* B.’ Fuit *ἢ*.

55. 4. Post *ὑπερβάλλει* commate distinxit b.

55. 18. *αὐτοῖς* B: *αὐτοῖς* b.

55. 24. *ὅπεριηι ἀέρων* B: *ὅπεριηλαέρων* vetus b.

57. 15. *ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν* statim post *δοκεῖ* sine puncto infert et Theodoro tribuit B.

59. 7. *αὐτῶι* B:—the breathing is by a second hand.

59. 16. ‘*ταῦτὰ* ut videtur in margine voluit b’—recentior.

61. 33. *δ· τι* B (sic).

61. 34. ‘*όργάνων* B, sed *ν* postea additum.’ B wrote *όργάνωι*, and the *i* has since been changed to *ν*—probably not by the first hand.

62. 34. ‘*ἀμφοτέρως* T, apogr. V et ut videtur B.’ The last statement is erroneous. What may have looked like a sigma over the line is a mark of reference to the marginal note *φωνὴν καὶ χρόαν*, which has a corresponding mark.

63. 4. *τό, τε* (sic) b.

64. 3. *ἢ ψυχὴ* (recens b) is not a v. r., but an interlinear gloss.

64. 10. Here is a similar error, *τούτων δηλονότι* (not *δὴ*) is an interlinear gloss.

64. 24. ‘*οὐδὲ* B’ (cum rasura supra *v*), ‘*εἰ* in marg.’ (recens) ‘b.’

64. 29, 30. The Bodleian while reading *οὐ* for *οὖν*, also loses the distinction of persons, appearing to drop a speech of Theætetus, thus:—*ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον φαίνεται ἢ οὐ*: *ταῦτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖσθαι*. There is this mark of uncertainty ∴ in the margin.

65. 1. δὴ (η in rasura) B.

66. 11. ὅπηγοῦν (not ὅπηγοῦν) B.

69. 18. (Herc in Schanz's text the second Σω. should be deleted and Κάλλιστα. τὸ δέ, κ.τ.λ. should be continued. There has been an oversight in proof-correcting). ‘ἥτοι . . μέρει Θεατητο, κάλλιστα Σοκρατίου tribuit Hirzel.’ B reads as Schanz intends to do, only with a superfluous colon (:) after ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν. But the lower dot is probably by a second hand.

71. 6. ‘ἀναγκάζοιτο . . δοξάζει primus Θεατητο tribuit Heindorf.’ Here B is not clear about the persons, placing the colon (:) after both λέγεις and δοξάζει. But the Cesena MS. divides with Heindorf.

71. 23. ḥ revera B : ḥ vetus b, sed ḥ iterum in marg. b.

72. 4. νῷ B with :: in marg.

73. 10. αἰσθανεται sine accentu B.

73. 21. Dele ‘ἄντοῖς B.’

73. 24. δὴ B. Fuit δή ::.

74. 11. In the marginal reading of b, which is prefaced with ἐν ἄλλοις οὗτως, τούτων is read for τοῦτο.

75. 15. το sine accentu B.

75. 21. αὐτοῦ sine spiritu B.

76. 4. B probably wrote επειθετο ἐπησθετο. The corrector has erased all but the last five letters, and clumsily corrected to ἐπῆσθετο.

76. 26. διαβαινουσιν b (not B). The β and ν are written over erasures of ν and μ, and the αι is cramped into the space of ε.

77. 8. ἔτεν τοῦ B pr.

78. 5. αὐτὸν B (? or b ?).

80. 19. ‘φορῶν’ recens ‘b.’

81. 24. ἄλλω (not ἄλλωι) b.

85. 11. B began to write a colon (:) after ἀπεροῦμεν, then added γέπω instead, without the colon (:), and without accentuating μεν of ἀπεροῦμεν.

85. 12. ‘ἀπαγορεύης B, scd η ex cmend.’ Fuit ει.

85. 28. αὕτη : τῶν (not αὕτη τῶν) B.

86. 14. δικαστηρία sine accentu B pr.

87. 11. αὐτῶν sine spiritu B.

88. 31. ‘ἐνεργέστατα B.’ Sed alterum ε correctum ex a.

92. 9. b (marg.) would add ἔχης (sic) after μέρη. What Schanz reads ἔστιν is the mark of reference √. corresponding to the mark over μέρη √: in the text.

93. 6. αὐτὴ B.

93. 9. The ἄ of ἄγνωστον seems to have been blotted off by the first hand.

99. 7. There is no division of the persons, and the accents in B are even fewer than is noticed by Schanz. ἐσκοτωμένωι ει γε δη τι νυν δη ὠσερῶν B pr.

99. 23. ή B : ՚ b.

More really important than Schanz's re-collation of the Bodleian is the work which he has done at Venice. By singling out the Venetian MS. App. 4, 1, (T), as the archetype of all MSS. of the lesser dialogues not copied from the Bodleian, he has greatly simplified the task of settling the text of this part of Plato. And his use of Ven. II (Schanz's D) as a witness to the earlier reading, where the Bodleian has been made illegible by correction or otherwise, is also very judicious.

While consulting Schanz throughout, however, I have by no means always followed him. He has introduced into the text, without marking them, several conjectural readings, which appear to me unnecessary. And he has adopted some rules of orthography, which, even if proved correct, would hardly be convenient in a work like the present.

Dr. W. H. Thompson, the Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, is so high an authority on the interpretation of Plato, that an opinion which he has kindly communicated to me must not be neglected, although his expression of it came too late to be inserted in the proper place. In the difficult passage 153 C: *Kai ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, κ.τ.λ.*, he agrees with the late Mr. James Riddell and myself in taking *τὸν κολοφῶνα* as an ‘accusative of the effect:’—(he would print *καὶ—ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα—ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων*):—but he prefers to understand *ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων*, sc. *σε*, ‘I get or force you to admit.’ He observes that *προσβιβάζειν* in the sense of *πείθειν* is not unfrequent, and that the accumulation of *ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων*, when either seems sufficient, is characteristic of Plato. Dr. Thompson concurs in rejecting the old interpretation, which made *τὸν κολοφῶνα* accusative in regimen, and *προσβιβάζων = ἐπιτιθεῖς*.

I have also to acknowledge the kindness of Professor Jebb, of the University of Glasgow, in calling my attention to the oration of Lysias *pro Mantitheo* (xvi. §§ 13–17),—referred to also by Grote,—as an illustration of the keen interest which the Athenians of all classes felt in the battle of Corinth (B.C. 394), in which Dexilaus fell and Theætetus probably received his wounds. The inscription on the monument of Dexilaus, by naming the archonship of Eubulides, leaves no doubt as to

the year in which he died; although we may never know in what way he and his four comrades were distinguished from the rest of the Athenian six hundred.

Mr. F. A. Paley, in a note on 202 A, says that *αὐτός* is ‘necessarily emphatic, being in the nominative.’ This is hard to understand. Why may not the construction be the same as in Rep. 5. 472 D: ‘Ως καὶ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα?’—Mr. Paley adopts the readings of 204 C, 209 C, suggested by me in 1861.

Lastly, I may be allowed to make here a correction in the text of the Sophist, which had not occurred to me at the time of publishing my edition of that dialogue. In Soph. 226 C, the word *διακρίνειν* has rightly been condemned as introducing the general notion inopportunely, and where a specific term is obviously required. Read *δινεῖν*, ‘to thresh out corn,’ and compare Hesiod, Op. et D. 595, 6,

δμωσὶ δ' ἐποτρύνειν Δημήτερος ἵερὸν ἀκτὴν
δινέμεν.

This emendation, although conjectural, has had the rare felicity of being adopted by Professor Jowett.

ST. ANDREWS, January, 1883.

INTRODUCTION.

ALTHOUGH the three chief lines of thought in Plato, whether to be described as practical, speculative, mystical, or as ethical, theoretical, erotic¹, are rarely quite separate, and are blended in different proportions, yet the distinction between them affords a convenient enough ground for a rough classification of his dialogues. Even the simplest, which are also presumably the earliest, of Plato's writings, such as the Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, may, without violence, be thus distinguished.

In trying to ascertain the point of view from which a particular dialogue was composed, we should therefore study it, *in the first instance*, less in relation to those of the same period but different subject matter, than to those before and after it which dwell upon a cognate theme:—(just as a student of Shakespeare may learn more in comparing Mids. N. Dream with the Tempest than with Romeo and Juliet, or Romeo and Juliet with Ant. and Cleo. than with Rich. II).

Now as the Gorgias is a clear sample of the ethical and the Symposium of the mystical aspect of Plato's thought, so in the Theætetus the purely scientific tendency is in the ascendent.

Socrates' confession of ignorance was felt by Plato to General imply a certain ideal of knowledge. His eager persistent ^{aim.} search for an irrefragable definition of each term of human interest, implied that this ideal was not merely transcendent, but must be applicable to the world and to human life. His acceptance of knowledge as the sole test of authority pointed the same way. And his resolution of blameworthy

¹ More generally one might speak of the good, the true, the beautiful, or of conduct, knowledge, and æsthetic enthusiasm. But the words used in the text are more directly descriptive of Plato.

conduct into intellectual error added a religious sanction to the pursuit of Truth.

In the simpler dialogues Plato is contented with representing Socrates as engaged in his life-work of detecting contradiction in others, and so bringing into strong relief at once their ignorance and his own,—pointing only from afar off to the conception of a Science which shall be an infallible guide. The questions, Can Virtue be taught? Are the Virtues many or one? are dimly felt to run up into the higher question, Is Virtue one with Knowledge? Once in the Charmides, where Temperance has been defined as Self-Knowledge, some difficulties concerning Knowledge itself are started by the way, as whether there can be a Knowledge of Knowledge—must not this be a Knowledge of ignorance as well?—and so on. But the problem is merely incidental and the treatment of it paradoxical and verbal. Plato knew, however, that underneath these inquiries, and behind the contrast between the Socratic and Sophistic methods, there lay deeper problems, which Socrates had not distinctly formulated, and still less fully discussed: viz. What is teaching? What is the nature of Knowledge? What is the standard of Truth? What is meant by the distinction of One and Many? In approaching the concentrated investigation of these higher problems, Plato is not content with idealizing Socrates, but enters anew into relations with the older philosophies which had possibly impressed his youth and certainly went far to constitute the intellectual atmosphere in which he lived.

In dwelling afresh upon the work of Socrates he (in common probably with Euclides) saw in it a striving towards certain general forms, which, in their perfect abstraction, could only be thought of as eternal. To Plato that was a vision which enlightened all his subsequent thoughts: but on any theory except that which denies all growth and change in him, it must be acknowledged that there was progress also in his conception of the Ideas. How far he was ever satisfied with the half-mythological presentation of them which appears in the Cratylus, Meno, and Phædo, may be left for those to determine who seem to know him better than he knew himself. However this may have been, we need not wonder, if, in passages avowedly mythical, like those in the Phædrus,

Timæus, and Politicus, such crude unscientific notions tend to reappear.

But the new vision of Truth, however inspiring, was sometimes felt to ‘raise more questions than it solved.’ And it was in consequence of these questionings that Plato was led to reconsider his own and his master’s relation to Hellenic thought. In order to interpret Socrates and to advance beyond the position gained by him, it was necessary to draw back in order to spring forwards, *reculer pour mieux sauter*, and to examine into the first principles not only of the inquiries of Socrates, but of all inquiry. In undertaking this new ‘Kritik of Pure Reason,’ Plato did not desert the Socratic spirit. He only carried into a region which Socrates had declined to enter, the same process of self-examination and of unwearied converse with others which Socrates practised and enjoined. In destroying dogmatism Socrates had seemed to get rid of metaphysics; but he had only made more fruitful the metaphysics of the future. In exposing the conceit without the reality of Knowledge he had only provoked the question, ‘What, then, is the reality?’ In controverting particular fallacies, he had set one at least of his disciples thinking, ‘What then is the $\pi\rho\hat{\omega}\tau\circ\psi\epsilon\hat{v}\delta\circ$ —the main source of error?’

While passing his hand, so to speak, over the tangle which he had to solve, Plato found two main threads, which were often twisted into one:—the tendency to postulate in all inquiry either the non-existence or the absoluteness of difference,—the identity of opposites, or the incommunicability of attributes: either to say, Black is white, or That which is white can have no tinge of yellow.

In this more condensed treatment of first principles, Plato still retains much of the spirit as well as the form of dramatic dialogue. In the Theætetus, indeed, they are retained to the full. Only the conversation is now not merely between Socrates and his respondent for the hour, but also between Plato and other philosophers old and new. They are brought upon the stage and made to explain themselves. They are confronted with each other. They are treated with the utmost urbanity, and with a searching criticism, ironical and unsparing, until they are compelled, as it were, to give in their contributions to the sum of Truth. Philosophic

Dialogue thus becomes the vehicle of a sort of historic fiction, containing, with the criticism of the present, at once a reproduction and an interpretation of the past. This 'History of Philosophy' is, however, penetrated with original thought, and each actual phase is represented as typical of a universal tendency and necessary moment in the realization of true ideas.

Dialectical dialogues.

The dialogues in which Plato adopts this comprehensive standpoint are thought by some to indicate a later phase of Greek speculation generally, which is supposed to have passed out of a rhetorical into a more logical mode. But Plato's conception of what is opposed to philosophy may naturally have moved together with the aspect of philosophy which was uppermost in his own mind. And until it can be shown by some independent proof that the *Euthydemus* is later than the *Phædrus*¹, it is best to steer clear of such assumptions. It is antecedently by no means improbable that the *Phædrus* and the *Parmenides* represent, not different periods, but different moods. The less known cannot throw light on the more known: and Plato's thoughts are better known to us than the particular incidents of Athenian life which gave occasion to them.

The *Euthydemus* and *Parmenides* may be regarded as, in different ways, preparatory to the dialectical effort which is commenced in the *Theætetus*, and continued in the *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus*.

The *Euthydemus* is a broad caricature of reigning logical fallacies.

The *Parmenides*.

The *Parmenides* is a serious statement of the difficulties which beset Idealism, whether (1) in the post-Socratic, or (2) in the Eleatic form. At the same time it contains the most uncompromising assertion of Idealism.

This is not the place for a full exposition of the *Parmenides*, which Professor Jowett's Introduction has rendered superfluous. But it may not be amiss to point out the significance of the dramatic situation in that dialogue.

Socrates is there represented as in early youth anticipating the theory of $\epsilon i\delta\eta$, which has since been generally associated

¹ From the allusion to Isocrates in the *Phædrus* L. Spengel infers a very early date. But this presumption is balanced by other considerations.

with the name of Plato, and would be naturally attributed to him by the reader of the *Cratylus*, or the *Phædo*, or of the fifth and tenth books of the *Republic*.

By means of this theory the young Socrates successfully refutes the thesis of Zeno, which that philosopher blushingly acknowledges to have been a polemical effort of his own early youth. But the aged Parmenides subjects Socrates in turn to criticism, and the wonderful boy, whose speculative impulse is praised by the old philosopher as Divine, answers each objection with a new hypothesis, which always corresponds to some actual form of idealism. He fails, however, to establish any of them : whereupon Parmenides puts him through an exercise not unknown to Zeno, in which, by the application of ordinary logic to his own transcendental theory of the One Being, he develops a series of antinomies, which Socrates is compelled at once to admit, and to declare impossible.

Is it reading too much between the lines to understand Plato here to mean : (1) that the current mode of applying the principle of contradiction, however much it might rest on the authority of Zeno, was, as he says in the *Sophist* (259 D), unworthy of any one who is come to man's estate ; (2) that although the Platonic theory based on the practice of Socrates gave promise of a mighty grasp on truth, yet, as hitherto held and stated, it was still immature ; and (3) that, in order to complete and strengthen it, it was necessary to go back once more to the great fountain of speculative thought, and appeal from the disciple to the master, from the method of Zeno to the spirit of Parmenides, who must be approached in the truth-seeking temper of Socrates ?

In the *Theætetus*, Socrates declines to examine Parmenides. That task is reserved for the Neo-Eleatic friend who appears with Theodorus and Theætetus on the following day. The present dialogue is chiefly occupied with the consideration of what may be loosely spoken of as Heraclitean doctrines, but which, as Plato says, are really 'older than Homer.' In developing these doctrines Socrates makes use of more than one saying which is still to be found amongst the fragments of Heraclitus.

It is remarkable that Plato nowhere speaks of Heraclitus

with unqualified respect, although much in his own teaching was consciously or unconsciously a repetition or expansion of truths stated or anticipated by that great mind¹. If we may trust Aristotle, Plato had first known Heracliteanism in the exaggerated form in which it was taught by Cratylus, and certainly he has more to tell us of the followers, whether in Ephesus or Athens, than of their master.

Yet it is not fanciful to say that in idealizing Socrates, and connecting the remembrance of him with the great thoughts of the first philosophic age, he saw in the Elenchus an illustration in the sphere of mind, on the one hand of actual mutability and fluctuation, and on the other of an absolute standard,—in so far justifying both Heraclitus and Parmenides. Socrates can make any opinions move; no position remains fixed when he comes near. But he cannot and will not argue unless allowed to assume the reality of knowledge.

Genuine-
ness of
disputed
dialogues.

In the foregoing general exposition it has been assumed that the main body of the Platonic writings, and the dialectical dialogues in particular, are from the hand of the master.

The position so held is intermediate between that of Mr. Grote, who maintains the Alexandrian tradition in its integrity and defends even the Axiochus and the Epistles, and that of Schaarschmidt, who acknowledges only nine dialogues. The work of Schaarschmidt appeared in 1866, when my edition of the Sophistes and Politicus was in the press. He had previously given some indication of his views in the pages of *Rheinische Museum* and elsewhere. He, and Socher before him, have succeeded in showing the remarkable disparity which exists between the purely dialectical dialogues and those which these writers leave unquestioned²—a disparity both in the mode of handling and in the substance of the thought. The difference is not here denied,

¹ The following statement of Platonic doctrine, by one of the most zealous of modern Platonists, contains the sum and substance of Heraclitus' teaching: ‘Ohne Stillstand in fortwährenden Kriegen wie in Schachspielen Alles in geregelte Weise seine Plätze Wechselt, so dass das Lebende zum Todten, das Todte zum Lebendens wird und nichts verlängert,

indem nichts sich gleich bleibt. In diesen ewigen Prozesse des Werdens ist das einzige Constante das Gesetz.’ Teichmüller, *Die Platonische Frage*, p. 54. Only, in the inchoate thought of Heraclitus, the Law is not distinguishable from the Process.

² Schaarschmidt carries his scepticism much further than Ast or Socher did.

but, as in the edition of the *Sophist*, etc. (1867) and in Professor Jowett's introductions (1st ed. 1871), the dialogues in question are assigned to a different period of Plato's literary activity, in which, as Professor Jowett observes¹, 'the style begins to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the *Protagoras* and the *Phædrus*, and even on the *Republic*. But there is a corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design.' . . . 'The play of humour and the charm of poetry have departed never to return'².

Schaarschmidt's three great tests, viz. literary excellence, the presence of a moral purpose, and quotation by Aristotle, are more plausible than some which previous critics have applied. And in his application of his method there is much acute criticism, although a suspicion now and then arises that insufficient grounds are being eked out by vigorous writing.

But (1) (to take first the external test) the argument from silence is especially fallacious in the criticism of ancient writings, and the question of Aristotle's testimony to Platonic dialogues is complicated with doubts as to the genuineness of the Aristotelian treatises³.

(2) For masterly skill in composition, is there any comparison, for example, between the *Symposium* or *Republic* and the *Timæus* or the *Laws*? Is there not also in both of these last named 'a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design?' The cumbrousness and prolixity, which are so evident in the *Laws*, are accounted for on the ground that Plato is reported to have left his last work in an unfinished state. Without cavilling about the possible origin of the story, may it not be observed, in the spirit of Goethe's pregnant saying⁴, 'It is a sketch which never could have been finished?' On the other hand, if the subject is taken into account, the literary skill shown in the *Parmenides* is very great.

¹ Introd. to *Philebus*, sub init.

² Introd. to the *Statesman*.

³ The third book of the *Rhetoric*

and the eleventh of the *Metaphysics*
are rejected by Schaarschmidt.

⁴ *Conversations with Eckermann*.

(3) That Plato at the meridian of his powers wrote with the consciousness of a great practical aim, may be at once conceded. But is it inconceivable that a time may have arrived when experience had shown him the distance of the goal, and, without relinquishing the end, he may have applied himself for a while to the speculative treatment of intermediate problems? There are not wanting traces, even in the Republic, of a belief that if 'Geist' was ever to be the ruling power, a severer training than Glaucon could bear must be prepared for the Kings of the future. And if the legend embodied in the Epistles is not absolutely baseless, we are led by it to conceive of a time when Plato's hopes for the Hellenic world had been rudely checked,—when he was 'wearied of the hateful confusion'¹ of Greek politics. And what is more natural than that, at such a time, he should reconsider his whole position; and that even in bitterness and isolation, still remembering his practical aim, he should bethink him of a δεύτερος πλοῦς, a second best polity, which mankind might possibly receive to their advantage, though they rejected the highest and best?

For the writer of the Politicus at least, although estranged from his contemporaries, is fully bent on bettering the world through a science of Politics. And the lines sketched out by him are precisely those which Plato in his old age, with renewed calmness and mellowness of insight, carried out at length in his last great writing—the Laws².

Protagoras. The most brilliant representative of 'ordinary thinking,' or rather of popular philosophizing, in the age of Socrates was Protagoras, whose assertion of relativity was the counterpart of Gorgias' denial of the absolute. As, in the dialogue which bears his name, he powerfully defends Hellenic education and morality against the criticism of Socrates, so here his doctrine³ is made to serve as the type of all doctrines of sensationalism and subjective relativity.

In the absence of external evidence it is difficult to determine (1) how much of what is here assigned to Protagoras is really

¹ Μεμισηκῶς τὴν . . . πλάνην καὶ ἀτυχίαν. Ep. 7, 350 D.

² For a more detailed attempt to support these views see the edition of the Sophistes and Politicus already referred

to. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1867.)

³ On the real value of Protagoras, saying ἄνθρωπος μέτρον see Appendix B: also Jowett's Introduction, 2nd edition, iv. 256-9.

his, or again (2) whether those unnamed philosophers who are called his ‘disciples’ were really so or not.

(1) In three places at least we may point with some confidence to traces of the real Protagoras :—(a) in the interpretation of his saying *ἄνθρωπος μέτρον*,—*ώς οὖτα μὲν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μέν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οὖτα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖτις σοί*, which recurs almost verbatim in the Cratylus, and which Plato would hardly have repeated so nearly in the same language if he were not quoting :—(b) in the defence of Protagoras (167, 8), where he contends that the bettering of mankind is possible without assuming an absolute standard of knowledge and truth ;—the agreement even of the language here with the representation in the Protagoras is an ‘undesigned coincidence,’ which may fairly strengthen our belief in the fidelity of both :—and (c) in the confession of ‘agnosticism’ which is introduced casually at 162 D. So much being clear, it is natural to infer that some other points, such as the illustration of ‘the wind blowing hot and cold,’ may be Protagoras’ own. But here it becomes impossible to speak with any approach to certainty. Of one thing, however, we may be quite certain, viz. that what Protagoras is said to have ‘told as a secret,’ was not to be found in his writings. When he is represented as saying that Being is an unscientific term, and should be replaced by Becoming, that is only a dialectical inference from his words¹. He had asserted the Reality of Appearance, but would have been surprised to find his assertion construed into the denial of Reality.

(2) That some actual persons are alluded to as the ‘disciples of Protagoras,’ and that they held a sensationalist theory, is rendered probable by the further reference, which can only be construed as a sober statement of fact, to those who maintain a modified Protagoreanism. But it would be rash to assume that the *μαθηταὶ Πρωταγόρου* held the doctrine which Plato assigns to them with anything like the clearness and consistency with which it is developed by him. It is far more probable that from scattered and inarticulate hints he has evolved the subtly woven theory which he criticises. This probability is greatly enhanced by the passage of the Sophist (246 A B) in which the contest between idealism

¹ Kennedy’s *Theætetus*, p. 231.

and materialism is described. ‘The idealist in defending his serene invisible height, breaks down the earthworks of his opponents bit by bit, until what they maintain for true reality (*ἀλήθεια*) is shown by his destructive arguments as a moving process of becoming, and not as being.’ This is really the manœuvre, only veiled with irony, which Plato here employs against the disciples of Protagoras. In attributing to them the refinement of acknowledging unseen processes, he ‘takes them for better men than they are,’ and assumes that they would make a similar admission to that which is wrung from them in Soph. 247¹. Those whose ease is hopeless (the *αὐτόχθονες*) are left out in the cold as *ἀμνητοί*. Plato says, in short, to the sensationalist, ‘You are a kind of idealist, if you only knew it. Let me take you with me as far as you can go: and then (like the dog in Jules Verne’s Voyage to the Moon) you shall be left hanging between Earth and Heaven.’

Aristippus. In favour of supposing that Aristippus was at least included amongst the men thus designated may be urged (1) the general resemblance of the doctrine of sense to later statements of Cyrenaic theory;—it is not necessary, as Peipers imagines, that the men alluded to by Plato were so thorough-going as he represents them to be:—(2) the person of Theodorus, who is connected both with Protagoras and Cyrene (not that he is himself inclined to hedonism). But this point, like many others in the historical environment of the *Theætetus*, must be left uncertain.

Aristippus is mentioned by name only once in Plato. In the *Phædo* it is emphatically remarked that he and Cleombrotus were not present at the death of Socrates. If we connect this with the strong language in which the position that pleasure is the chief good (which Aristippus held), is met in the *Republic* (6. 509 B : Οὐ γὰρ δῆπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις. Εὐφήμει, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ), it is natural to infer that he was regarded by Plato with little sympathy, and that he was probably one of those who left Socrates too early, and gave themselves the credit of their discoveries². The tone of Xenophon’s representation conveys a similar impression. Attend-

¹ J. S. Mill may in like manner be said to have made admissions against which his father and Bentham (the true *γηγενεῖς*) would have protested.

² To say (with Schleiermacher)

that Aristides in *Theæt.* 150 E is a sort of paronomasia for Aristippus may seem an extravagant suspicion, and yet it is difficult to banish it altogether.

ing, like Socrates, to the theory of human life, of knowledge and of the chief good, he seems to have been enabled, by the impulse of Socratic inquiry, to give a philosophical form to the popular doctrine, to which his easy temper and indolent life inclined him, that the Good is nothing else but pleasure. With this he consistently enough combined the sceptical assertion, The impression of the moment is the only Knowledge. He probably supported both these principles with certain physical and logical theories : adding that nothing was by nature just, but by custom and usage, and that the same word used by different men represents a different idea.

Whether his doctrine had fully developed itself into the distinct form which is given in the *Theætetus* to the hypothesis, Sense is Knowledge, it is impossible to say. That he is pointedly alluded to amongst the ‘disciples of Protagoras,’ if not as their chief, there seems little doubt, from what is recorded of his opinions. A comparison of the following extracts tends to establish this : although it must be remembered that the discussion of these questions by Plato and Aristotle may be supposed in some degree to modify the statements of later writers :—

Diog. L. 2. 86 : Δύο πάθη ὑφίσταντο, πόνον καὶ ἡδονήν· τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, τὸν δὲ πόνον τραχείαν κίνησιν.

Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. 14. 18 : Τρεῖς γὰρ ἔφη καταστάσεις εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύγκρασιν· μίαν μὲν καθ' ἥν ἀλγοῦμεν, ἐοικνίαν τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν χειμῶνι, ἔτεραν δέ, καθ' ἥν ἡδόμεθα, τῷ λείῳ κύματι ἀφομοιούμενοι· εἶναι γὰρ λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐρίῳ παραβαλλομένην ἀνέμῳ· τὴν δὲ τρίτην μέσην εἶναι κατάστασιν καθ' ἥν οὔτε ἀλγοῦμεν οὔτε ἡδόμεθα, γαλήνῃ παραπλησίαν οὖσαν.

Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 7. 191 : Φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖκοὶ κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα, φασί,

Plat. Theæt. 152 D : Ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα. 153 C : Εἴτιοῦν σοι λέγω νημείας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δὲ ἔτερα σώζει;

See also Phileb. 42 E : Μὴ κινούμενον τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἐκάτερα.. οὕτ' ἀν ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτ' ἀν οὕτ' ἀν τις λύπη.

Plat. Theæt. 152 C : Αἰσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ ἔστι καὶ ἀψευδές, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα. 157 A B : Τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὡς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. . . ἔάν τι τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος δὲ τοῦτο ποιῶν. 153 D : Ὁ δὴ

καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατὸν λέγειν ἀδια-
ψεύστως καὶ ἀνεξελέγκτως· ὅτι δὲ τὸ
ἐμποιητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκόν ἐστιν
ἡ γλυκύν ἐστιν, οὐχ οἶνόν τ' ἀποφαί-
νεσθαι.

192 : Καθὰ γὰρ δὲ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς
καὶ ἱκτεριῶν ὁχραντικῶς ὑπὸ πάντων
κινεῖται, δὲ δὲ ὁφθαλμιῶν ἐρυθαίνεται,
δὲ παραπιέσας τὸν ὁφθαλμὸν ὡς
ὑπὸ δυοῖν κινεῖται¹, δὲ δὲ μεμηνῶς
διστὰς ὥρᾳ τὰς Θήβας καὶ διστὸν
φαντάζεται τὸν ἥλιον, ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ
τούτων τὸ μὲν ὅτι τόδε τι πάσχοντιν,
οἷον ὡχραίνονται ἢ ἐρυθαίνονται ἢ δυά-
ζονται, ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὡχρόν ἐστι
τὸ κινοῦν αὐτὸν ἢ ἐνερευθὲς ἢ διπλοῦν
ψεῦδος εἴναι νενόμισται, οὖτως καὶ ἡμᾶς
εὐλογώτατόν ἐστι πλέον τῶν οἰκείων
παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι.
195 : "Ενθεν οὐδὲ κριτήριον φασιν εἰ-
ναι κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων, ὄνόματα δὲ κοινὰ
τίθεσθαι τοῖς κρίμασιν. 196 : Λευ-
κὸν μὲν γάρ τι καὶ γλυκὺ καλοῦσι
κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δέ τι λευκὸν ἢ
γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔχουσιν· ἔκαστος γὰρ τοῦ
ἰδίου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται.

Diog. L. 2. 87 : Ἀλλὰ μὲν οὐδὲ
κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσδο-
κίαν ἡδονῆν φασιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, διπερ
ηρεσκεν Ἐπικούρῳ, ἐκλύεσθαι γὰρ τῷ
χρόνῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα.

Diog. L. 2. 88 : Μηδέν τε εἴναι
φύσει δίκαιον ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν,
ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει.

The apparent force of the above parallel must be slightly qualified by two observations. (1) Very similar language about the

¹ This argument is met by Aristotle, when he is discussing the theories of Heraclitus and Protagoras, Met. 10. 6. 1063 a: Οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτ' ἀξιοῦν ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ὑπο-

καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, κ.τ.λ. 156 E :
Λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη. 159 C :
"Οταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, κ.τ.λ.
167 A : Οὕτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν
δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἀν πάσχῃ.
ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. 178 B : "Εχων γὰρ
αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα πάσχει
τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἴεται αὐτῷ
καὶ ὄντα.

157 E : Λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε
πέρι καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ
μανίας, δσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν
ἢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται.
158 A : Δοκεῖ.. πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινό-
μενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἴναι, ἄλλὰ
πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδὲν ὃν φαίνεται εἰ-
ναι. 156 : Δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος
οὗτον λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροι-
σθέντων, ὡς δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἄνθρωπόν
τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ καθ' ἔκαστον
ζῷον τε καὶ εἴδος. 154 : Τί δέ; ἄλλῳ
ἄνθρωπῳ ἀρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται
διτοῦν;

Theæt. 166 : Αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς
τινά σοι ἔνγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρ-
εῖναι τῷ ὃν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὖσαν
πάθος, οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πά-
σχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ.

Theæt. 172 : Καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ
καὶ δίκαια, κ.τ.λ.

senses is ascribed to Democritus. Some of the expressions and illustrations, as well as the argument itself in different aspects, are thus proved to have had a wider currency. (2) In the early part of the *Theætetus*, motion is said to be good, and rest evil. In the *Cyrenaic* theory, and in the *Philebus*, three states are spoken of, smooth motion, which is pleasure, rough motion, which is pain, and the absence of both, which is a state of indifference, ‘like the sea in a calm.’

But while these considerations should be allowed their full weight, it must be remembered that Aristippus and those who thought with him did resolve knowledge into shifting impressions of a changing world. And here the parallel of the *Philebus* affords a strong confirmation of the hypothesis we are considering. Nothing was more natural than that the boy *Theætetus* should attribute certainty to momentary impressions, and that the boy *Philebus* should petulantly assert that pleasure is the only good. Each in doing so presents a different aspect of a necessary phase of mind. But when they both (or rather Socrates for them) attempt to strengthen their theory by a peculiar doctrine of motion, which, however popular, must have had limits to its reception, it becomes highly probable that the two speakers drew some of their inspiration from a third, who is found to have upheld both pleasure and sensation, and to have supported them with this same doctrine of motion.

There remains therefore some ground for the hypothesis that, in the earlier part of this dialogue, Plato has these Pseudo-Socratics in his eye, together possibly with others. Whether Aristippus was really, or only by implication, a ‘disciple of Protagoras,’ and whether or not he consciously based his doctrine on the Heraclitean theory of the Universe, are questions which it is wisest to leave undecided.

It is more distinctly obvious that throughout the dialogue Megarians Plato is holding close converse with his friends of Megara. The elenchus of Socrates is whetted for the occasion by contact with Megarian logic. Both in the attack upon Protagoras and in his defence, weapons are plied which bear the distinct brand of that neighbouring workshop, and it is often hard to say whether Plato is laughing most at the doctrine refuted or at the method of the refutation. For reasons which will appear presently it suited his purpose to make the ‘negative arm’ preponderate in this dialogue. And the Megarian dialectic was adapted to this aim.

It may be noticed generally, that there is a peculiarity in Plato's manner of alluding to the thinkers of his own time. He speaks not of definite schools, but of 'a certain theory,' or of 'certain men.' We do not read of the friends of Antisthenes, or the disciples of Aristippus, or of Euclides and his band (*οι ἀμφὶ Εὐκλείδην*), but 'I have met many such men,' 'there are numbers who keep saying this,' or more familiarly, 'there are certain refined persons, to whom we must show courtesy.' Allowance must no doubt be made for the natural reticence of Plato, and for the irony of the philosopher, who 'knows nothing of his neighbour.' But it is also reasonable to infer that the schools which claimed affinity with Socrates were only in process of formation, and that their boundaries were not yet well defined. It is from later writers, and not from Plato, that we learn which of the other philosophers then living exercised an influence that could survive their age.

Euclides.

Euclides of Megara, Plato's contemporary and fellow-disciple, seems in his method to have combined the negative dialectic of the Eleatics with the cross-questioning and with the ethical definitions of Socrates. The dialogue, written and spoken, seems to have assumed with him something of a controversial form. His *ἐρωτική* must have been more earnest and philosophical than the vulgar *ἀντιλογική* so often ridiculed by Plato; but it was subject to the same defects, though in a less degree. We are told further, that he used to attack the conclusion and not the premisses of an opponent.—One other fragment of his logic remains. He is said to have objected to definition by comparison, because if things are unlike, they should not be compared; and if like, it is better to deal with the thing itself than its resemblances¹.

The centre of his positive teaching was the Good, which he said was one, called by many names, as Wisdom, God, Intelligence; and to what was opposed to this he denied existence. Here also the teaching of Socrates is engrafted on that of Parmenides and Zeno. The One Being, which is above growth and decay, is to be sought for, not in the universe, but in wisdom, the mind, and virtue. The non-existent is that which is opposite to, or other than the Good.

His theory of knowledge was probably less absolute than that of Parmenides, denying reality to the impressions of sense, but relying upon a sort of dialectic and upon certain ideas or forms, amongst which some diversity was allowed, so far at least as they entered into human language.

¹ Cp. Plat. Rep. 476: Τὸ δνειρώτερον ἀρά οὐ τόδε ἔστιν, ἐάν τ' ἐν ὑπνῷ τις ἐάν τε ἐγρηγορῶς τὸ ὅμοιόν τῷ μῆδομιν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἡγῆται εἶναι φέουκεν. Ar. Eth. N. 6. 3: Ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὅμοιότησιν.

It is not easy to determine to what extent the teaching of Euclides contained the germs of the sophisms of Eubulides, or of the paradoxes of Diodorus and Stilpo. If it had such a tendency, he must have approached Antisthenes more nearly than would otherwise appear. It seems not unreasonable, however, to suppose that Eubulides may have introduced a new element into the Megarian school. At all events he gave a new and not altogether wholesome impulse to its paradoxical side.

The following are the chief points in which the Thætetetus affords indications of its connection with the school of Megara.

(1) Its controversial tone.

Socrates more than once expresses the consciousness of such a tendency. We start indeed with the virtuous determination to conduct the argument, not as professors of word-fencing, but as lovers of knowledge, and yet presently we find ourselves in danger of being on a par with ‘those skilful men¹.’ Protagoras is imagined as reiterating this reproach, and confirming it by the reflection, which is dwelt upon also in the Phædo, that controversy leads to the hatred of inquiry. We are moreover oppressed throughout the discussion with the fear of an imaginary adversary, skilled at the same sophistical weapons². And on reflecting, at each stage of the argument, what it is that has ruled throughout, and that remains triumphant, we are compelled to answer ‘a negative dialectic.’ The first impression of the youth, the maxims of the old philosophers, even our second thoughts and the strained effort of the imagination to substantiate them, are raised, only to be parted from the sphere of knowledge by this sharp weapon ; which in another aspect is the liberating though still dividing instrument of the man-widwife Socrates. In this sense the Thætetetus may fairly be regarded as an ‘eristic’ or Megarian dialogue ; since, although it is no mere sophistical sham-fight, it is characterized by the predominance of that dialectical exercise which consists in refuting theories. This is noticed by Plato himself in the passages just referred to, and is implied in the image of *μαιευτική*.

And the form of refutation used corresponds to that ‘reductio ad absurdum’ which is described as characteristic of Euclides. In each case the proof is not impugned, but the thing proved is laid hold of and annihilated. Man is not the measure, for, if so, then why not every other creature endowed with sense ? Motion cannot be the sole principle, for, if so, language would be impossible. Protagoras is made to object to this mode of treatment. Socrates imagines him as challenging them to disprove his premiss, and complaining that they use only negative proof.

¹ Thæt. 164 D.

² 200 A-C.

(2) Besides this correspondence of method, there are also some coincidences of idea.

(a) The turning-point of the whole dialogue, the fulcrum, by means of which the mind is finally lifted out of the region of sense, is the mention of the good, or expedient, which Theætetus had at first unwarily included amongst the things which are not, but become. The knowledge of what is good cannot be resolved into sensation, nor into those motions on which the doctrine of sense was founded, because it regards the future.

This thought arises simultaneously with the eloquent digression, in which a just and holy life accompanied with wisdom (*μετὰ φρονήσεως*) is set forth as the way from Earth to Heaven. And the form in which this idea of good occurs, is not transcendent, as in the Republic¹, nor, as in the Philebus, arrived at by a process of reasoning upon the combination of finite and infinite in the world. It is more simple and Socratic than in either of these. And while it is conceived of as one, Socrates is not afraid of varying the name (*ἀγαθόν, καλόν, ὡφέλιμον, δίκαιον, δστον, φρόνησις*).

(β) In its general aspect the Theætetus affords only a partial escape from the relative world of sense and opinion towards absolute being, terminating with the conception of *λόγος* as definition by the distinctive difference. Where it may be noticed, by the way, that the stress laid upon the perception of individual peculiarities (*πρὶν ή σιμότης αὐτῇ τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων . . . διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον . . . κατάθηται*) is parallel to the saying of Euclides, that comparison does not convey knowledge.

This intermediate character of the Theætetus is indicated by Plato's own remark, that we are wavering between two factions, not siding wholly with either. Such a position is still in harmony with the philosophy of Euclides, who made some attempt to hold unity and diversity in solution together, and who rested ultimately on some form of reasoning (*λόγος*). It may be added, that the two conceptions with which the dialogue closes, of the separation of a whole into its elementary parts, and of the power of distinguishing the thing in question from all others, belong to the tendency combated in the Sophist, but more or less embodied in the Theætetus, to acquiesce in difference, falling short of the highest unity.

(3) In one or two points we are reminded of the later Megarian subtleties, and are led to suspect that they may have had their counterpart in the school of Euclides.

The humorous account of the man, from whom there is no escape, who shuts your eye, and asks if you see his cloak with it², may be

¹ 509: Οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

² 165 B.

compared with the ἐγκεκαλυμμένος of Eubulides. And when we are asked whether any one ever said to himself τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον εἶναι¹, we may find a later parallel in the paradox of Stilpo, ἔτερον ἔτέρου μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι. Such casual hints confirm the suspicion that the tendency already existed at Megara, though in a milder form than afterwards, ‘to part everything from everything,’ τὸ διαλύειν ἔκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων (Soph. 259 E). A more pleasing instance of the same analytical bias appears in the three φάσματα² or axioms of the mind, by which it suffers itself to be bound; or in the repeated difficulty, ³Αρ' οἶον τε τὸν εἰδότα μὴ εἰδέναι, which in fact underlies many of the later paradoxes.

There is often no more satisfactory account to be given of variations and inconsistencies in Plato, than that in different dialogues he is consciously approaching and examining different contemporary theories, adopting their tone, putting on their dress, as it were proving their armour, not without a latent confidence in the unaided strength of Mind.

This philosophical side of the dramatic genius of Plato is as real as and more important than the poetical. The dialogue is not only a convenient artistic form for bringing out the different aspects of a question; Plato is himself continually holding converse with some one: and dramatic propriety is preserved not only in minute points, but in the tone pervading a whole dialogue. Those in which an Eleatic stranger is the chief spokesman may still be Plato's, although they seem pervaded by a pedantic consciousness of method not found in others: a similar remark applies to the Parmenides: and even amongst those in which Socrates holds the first place a marked difference is perceptible; which may be accounted for by saying, (1) that Socrates is not Socrates, but Plato becoming all things to all philosophies: (2) that Socrates is not altogether Plato, but a part-representation, part-creation of Plato's, which he contemplates and converses with, and even criticises: (3) that Socrates himself has different faces, reflected partially in his different followers, the most characteristic of which, the negative ‘elenchus,’ was reflected in Euclides of Megara.

Recent critics, both in England and Germany, have denied all connection between the part played by Euclides in the Preface and the Megarian element of the dialogue which is generally admitted. And yet the significance of such indications in other dialogues can hardly be questioned.

¹ 190 A.

² 155 A.

The prominence of Simmias and other Pythagorizing Socrates in the Phædo affords an obvious parallel. And supposing that the Preface were merely equivalent to a dedication, even a dedication often implies the acknowledgment of special affinities. That one motive is to awaken interest in the person of Theætetus is perfectly true; but this could have been done equally by other means, for Theætetus had many friends in Athens. In representing this dialogue as having been preserved and read at Megara by the head of the Megarian school, Plato makes a departure from his usual practice analogous to the more striking innovation of making a friend from Elea the chief speaker in the dialogues which follow.

Plato's criticism of Protagoras, both here and in the Protagoras, is friendly and respectful,—rather indicating certain necessary stages in the pursuit of truth, than destroying fatal error. But for other professed thinkers he has less tolerance. And if it were possible to ascertain who those were with whom he found it impossible to argue,—who were beyond the pale of dialectic, in short,—the fact would be of no less interest than the evidence of his close intercourse with the school of Megara.

Heraclitans.

(1) Of the enthusiasts of Ephesus, who profess to be deeply read in the wisdom of Heraclitus, it is unnecessary to say more than is contained in the description of Theodorus, whose exact soul is naturally vexed by their inconsecutiveness. ‘They support their master’s theory of a flux, only by the absence of fixity in their own thoughts. They are fond of explaining “*ignotum per ignotius*;” each follows his own inward light, regardless of the rest, and every one of them despises his fellow.’ This picture, the oriental features of which are noticeable, may be illustrated from the Cratylus,—which is partly written in imitation of the same school,—where Socrates professes himself puzzled to determine what is intended by their symbol, Fire. By one it is interpreted to mean the Sun, by another the principle of Heat, by another Mind¹.

Antisthenes.

(2) The Cynics are probably the *δψιμαθεῖς* of Soph. 251,

¹ Crat. 43.

who are admitted to discussion *ex gratia* for form's sake, who deny predication, and 'will not have it that a man is to be called good. Man, they insist, is man, and good is good.' And it has been usual to identify these persons with the men from whom Socrates has heard 'in a dream' that prime elements cannot be defined¹. But the latter doctrine is surely very different from such crude nominalism, and belongs to some one who believed too much rather than too little in the 'formal cause,' since he asserts that the essence which corresponds to definition is a definite ratio between units which are undefinable. The opinion quoted, if properly examined, is not a denial of predication, but rather the denial that anything can be predicated of *the prime elements*, $\epsilon\xi\ \hat{\omega}\nu\ \hat{\eta}\mu\hat{e}\iota\tau\epsilon$ $\sigma\nu\gamma\kappa\epsilon\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha\ kai\ \tau\hat{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$, which is by no means the same thing, and merely amounts to saying that matter is formless, or that substance in the abstract is without attributes.

The conjecture which identifies notions so different would hardly have been entertained but for some misunderstanding of a passage of Aristotle, Metaph. 2. 3. 1043 b, where 'the Antisthenians and such rude persons' are mentioned in connection with a theory of essence as a complex ($\sigma\nu\lambda\lambda\alpha\beta\eta$) of elements ($\epsilon\kappa\ \tau\hat{\omega}\nu\ \sigma\tau\alpha\chi\epsilon\iota\omega\nu$). Aristotle says that his own view, in which *oὐσία* is the concrete, of which matter and form are the component elements, may be thought to give a certain colour to the error of those coarse thinkers who denied the possibility of definition. But *oὐσία* (the object of definition) is really neither matter nor form, although these elements in their separate abstractedness are undefinable.

Aristotle in writing thus may have had this part of the Theætetus in his mind. But the allusion to the Cynics is a mere excrescence on his argument, and, if closely examined, is seen to have but a remote bearing on the distinction of $\sigma\tau\alpha\chi\epsilon\iota\omega\nu$ and $\sigma\nu\lambda\lambda\alpha\beta\eta$. A suggestion put forth by the present editor in 1861 is more defensible, viz. that Socrates here as in other places, where he 'speaks from hearsay' (Phæd. 62, Phil. 20), is quoting some Pythagorean. The whole tenor of the passage, and the illustrations from number, measure, and music in the pages which follow, are in favour of this. He and Theætetus, however, have not heard from

¹ 201, 2.

the same source, and the man who, using the term *ἐπιστητά*, said that what was definable was knowable, but that the undefinable was also unknowable, must have been a Socrate philosopher, and probably (as Schleiermacher also thought) was a Megarian.

Another thesis of Antisthenes, the denial of contradiction, *μὴ εἴναι ἀντίλεγειν*, has a certain bearing on several parts of the Thætetus, and in particular on the question, ‘Is false opinion possible?’ But a fallacy which entered so deeply into all the controversies of the time, and which Socrates acknowledges to have had a disturbing influence on his own (i. e. on Plato’s) mind, is not to be exclusively attributed to men of whom Plato speaks as he does of the *δψιμαθεῖς* in the Sophist. It is safer and more profitable to pass by Antisthenes and his master Gorgias, and to refer the fallacy at once to its origin in the Eleatic logic. The same may be said of the ‘eristic’ difficulty which occurs both here and in the Meno, ‘How will you inquire about that which you do not know?’

If the deniers of predication, who are introduced under protest, in Soph. 251, are the followers of Antisthenes, it is beforehand highly improbable that the same persons had been spoken of under another aspect in Soph. 246. And if it is true that the Cynics preferred logical and ethical discussion to physical inquiries, their nominalism can hardly be made to represent downright materialism. Thus, on two independent grounds, it is unlikely that the *αὐτόχθονες* of the Sophist, and the *σκληροὶ καὶ ἀντέτυποι ἀνθρωποι* of Theæt. 155 E, who are, to say the least, closely related to each other, have any connection with Antisthenes.

More features of the personal character of Antisthenes are preserved than of Euelides and Aristippus, but fewer of his philosophy. From the way in which the grave Xenophon treats him, and from the calm epithets of Aristotle, he seems to have been the butt of the Socratic school, a sort of mixture of Ajax and Thersites. He regarded Socrates with a rude half-appreciating fondness, which was reciprocated with good-humoured pleasantry. But he boasted, justly enough, of a certain strength of character, which was in fact the piece of Socrates that was continued in him. He is praised for his pure and nervous Attic style, of which we have a specimen,

possibly genuine, in a rhetorical contest between Ajax and Ulysses. His genius, however, seems to have been opposed to abstract speculation. Hence he followed rather the form than the spirit of the Socratic teaching, both on human life and on the significance of terms. His views on the latter subject were probably influenced also by his previous intercourse with Gorgias.

There are, as might have been expected, several points of outward coincidence between his teaching and that of Euclides on the ethical side. They agree that virtue is one, that wisdom (*φρόνησις*) is the chief good, and so on.

But the dialectic of Antisthenes seems to have been at once more rhetorical and more sceptical : approaching much more nearly to the later Megarian paradoxes, with which it finally coalesced in the teaching of the Stoics. He has been called a materialist, and no doubt the term applies to him so far as he denied ideas, but his scepticism had nothing to do with physical inquiries, which he abjured. It was a part-practical, part-logical nominalism. ‘I see a horse, equine properties I cannot see.’—‘There is only one term applicable to one thing¹.’ Hence controversy is impossible, and every assertion equally true. Definition is only a complex term², and accordingly no single thing can be defined, except in the imperfect way of comparison. You cannot say what a thing is, except by naming it, but only what it is like. Connected in some way with this theory was the saying, in which he agrees with Prodicus, that the first principle of education is the study of names. He was thus related to Aristippus in philosophy much as Gorgias had been to Protagoras : denying the absolute, while the other asserted the relative, —or rather contending that nothing existed absolutely but facts and individual things.

The one great philosophy of which Plato takes no account is Atomism. Democritus, though a contemporary of Socrates^{tus.}

¹ See Isocrates, ‘Ελένης ἐγκώμιον ad init. καταγεγράκαστον οἱ μὲν οὐ φάσκοντες οἶόν τ’ εἶναι ψευδῆ λέγειν, οὐδὲ ἀντιλέγειν, οὐδὲ δύο λόγω περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀντεπεῖν, οἱ δὲ διεξιόντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταῦτόν ἔστι, καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μία δ’ ἐπιστήμη καθ’ ἀπάντων

ἐστίν. Socrates seems to be alluded to in the latter part of this. In the former part Protagoras and Antisthenes seem to be opposed.

² Μακρὸς λόγος. In which there is probably the same derisive force as in Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος, ὅταν μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγωσιν, Ar. Met. N. 3.

and Protagoras, is nowhere named by him, although he is continually quoted by Aristotle, who speaks of him as ‘comprising in his definitions the material only.’ The question is at least worth raising, whether the believers in *gross matter*, whose views Plato felt to be so alien to his own, were followers of Democritus and Leucippus in whole or in part. If the passage of the *Theætetus* only were in question, the ‘uninitiated’ might be supposed to be mere ordinary thinkers, the unregenerate mass of mankind. But the men in the *Sophist* are clearly philosophers who are ready to maintain their principles against the world, although the description may be generalized from more than one school.

The supposition that the Atomists are referred to in these passages has been rejected on the ground that according to Ar. Met. 1. 4, in upholding their ‘Void,’ they asserted the existence of ‘Not-Being,’ and not-being is of course bodiless and unseen.

The collection of the very numerous allusions to Democritus in Aristotle would be a valuable contribution to the History of the earlier Greek Philosophy. They would be found to present the student with this difficulty, that while occasionally, as in the passage above quoted, the Atomistic doctrine is spoken of as a kind of purely speculative dualism, it is much more frequently referred to in terms which indicate a distinctly physical theory. It is happily unnecessary to argue here at length a point which has been clearly established by Dr. Zeller in his History of Greek Philosophy (2nd edition), that the chief characteristic of the Atomistic philosophy from the first was the firm grasp with which it held the ideas (which to most contemporary schools were so unreal) of space, extension, solidity, and weight.

It is not hard to believe that the abstract foundation of mechanical science should thus have been laid in an age when geometry was rapidly growing to maturity : the real difficulty for us is to conceive in what manner a mechanical theory was united with, if not occasioned by, the dialectical recoil from the Eleatic Undivided Whole. Yet in the earlier stages even of modern science such a confusion of physic and metaphysic was not impossible. The ‘Plenum’ of Descartes has probably not been without its influence on the Interpretation of Nature.

The Absolute Being of the Eleatics, although the object of Pure Mind and identical with it, was not yet free from the associations of extension. ‘Being is full of being, it is continuous, for being touches being.’ Against this aspect of their doctrine the polemic of the Atomists was directed, when they asserted the existence of the non-existent. It was the non-existent, as the space in which the existent moves: and their Existence, while uncreated and unchangeable, was also that which has extension, solidity, and weight. Parmenides and Democritus both sought for something absolute behind phenomena: the Eleatic found it in the Unity of Being: the Atomist resolved this into Space and body. The relations between these made it possible to conceive of motion and of primordial differences of bulk and form.—The weight of atoms of equal bulk was supposed uniform.—All else was relative and subjective (*νόμως*): depending on the impression produced on us by the Atoms in various combinations.

How far is this view of their theory consistent with the conjecture that some friends of Democritus may be alluded to in the passages of the *Theætetus* and *Sophist* already mentioned?

(1) It does not seem impossible that Plato should accuse such persons of denying the existence of anything ‘bodiless’ or ‘unseen.’ For the ‘bodiless existence’ which they are represented as denying is the ‘immaterial essence’ of the *εἰδῶν φύλοι*; and the ‘unseen process,’ which they will not believe in, is the movement of the Heraclitean fire which annihilates all that is stable or tangible. Both these are very different from the ‘void space’ of the Atomist, which is only asserted as the necessary condition of matter and motion. And (except polemically) he would rather say that *ἄτομον* and *κενόν* together constitute the reality of sensible existence, than that Being exists and Not-being also exists. Aristotle speaks of the Atomistic principle as *τὸ ὑποκείμενον σῶμα*. And this, to use Plato’s language, is at least *κατὰ φύσιν ὄρατόν* (*Tim.* 30 B).

(2) A presumption in favour of such an allusion is afforded by the manner in which the sense of touch and of resistance is dwelt upon. It is true that the atoms could not literally

be either seen or handled : but they had all the mechanical properties of things visible and tangible, and Plato was at least as likely as Aristotle to represent them as the objects of sense. See Ar. de Sensu, 4: *Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατόν τι ποιοῦσι· πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπτὰ ποιοῦσι.*

The sense of touch or resistance (which the Ancients hardly distinguished) is naturally referred to those ‘primary’ qualities of body which the Atomists upheld. Now these are dwelt upon in the two passages in question more than in the whole discussion of the doctrine of sense in the Theætetus, and in language which is much more suggestive of something *hard*. Note especially the words, Theæt. 155 E: *Ἄπρὶς τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι.* Soph. 246: *Εἰς γῆν . . ἔλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες.* *τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διῆσχυρίζονται τοῦτ' εἶναι μόνον ὁ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα.* 247: *Πότερον ὄρατὸν καὶ ἀπτόν τι αὐτῶν;* Ib.: *Πᾶν ὁ μὴ δυνατὸν ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν εἰσί.*

(3) It may be observed further that in the Sophist the men are driven into a corner by being pressed to define (*a*) whether the Soul is material, which they are not afraid to admit, and (*b*) whether justice and wisdom are so. Might not this mode of attack be suggested to a Socratic philosopher by the apparent contradiction between the moral sayings of Democritus and his material system ?

The materialists are then imagined as retiring upon a more abstract conception of Being:—‘Everything in which there is either an active or a passive *power*;’—i.e. they are supposed to rise from the idea of matter to that of force. The tendency thus recognized surely indicates a different materialism from that of Antisthenes, and the close sequence of the reasoning by which it is developed is not unworthy of the tenacity and penetration which seem to be justly ascribed to Democritus. See Ar. de An. 1. 2: *Δημόκριτος περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων γλαφυρωτέρως εἴρηκεν*:—an expression which anticipates Bacon’s praise of him.

(4) It may be urged against the above conjecture (*a*) that, although Democritus might fairly (from Plato’s standpoint) be called *ἄμονος*, as the spirit of his inquiry was alien to

rhetoric and poetry, and *ἀμύντος*, for he is known to have written against the Protagorean maxim, yet the imputation of coarseness which Plato's picture conveys could not attach to him.—This objection may be partly met, however, by supposing his theory to have degenerated in the hands of his followers.—(b) That the elenchus of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* is described as levelled at the *ἀλήθεια* of these materialists, who would thus seem to be identified with the disciples of Protagoras in the Theætetus. To which it may be replied, that the account in the Sophist appears to be generalized from more schools than one, not all of whom would deserve the title of ‘sprung from the ground’ (*σπαρτοὶ καὶ αὐτόχθονες*). This last therefore alone strictly answers to the title ‘hard and repellent’ in the Theætetus. The difficulty must, however, be acknowledged, and it remains, whatever hypothesis with regard to the allusion is adopted¹.

If these passages really contain any allusion even to degenerate followers of Democritus (who might be related to him as the Ephesian enthusiasts to Heraclitus), the fact is interesting as confirming the anticipation that no Greek thought of any permanent value failed to obtain some recognition from Plato, though it might be recognized only to be rejected. We are also reminded of Aristotle's saying, that Plato's dialectical bias unfitted him for physical studies; and of Lord Bacon's, that Time brings down the lighter goods of antiquity but drowns what is of solid worth, which may be thought no unfitting comment from the physical point of view.

(5) Democritus would also rank with those who argued from dreams and madness that nothing which appears is real (*οὐδὲν ὅν φαίνεται εἶναι*)².

Plato's relation to other Greek thinkers, although of great importance, especially in connection with the dialectical dia-

¹ Another *ἀλήθεια* is spoken of in the Cratylus, which may perhaps be that of Antisthenes, but the reference there is evidently to a logical and not a physical theory.

² It is possible that the *δυσχερεῖς* of the Philebus, 44, 46, who are said to be very clever in physical science, and have an account to give of pleasure while they deny its reality, may

also have been in some way related to the Atomistic school. Compare, for instance, the fragment *Ξυόμενοι ἀνθρώποι ηδονται, κ.τ.λ.* and the minute way in which the causes of sensation are analyzed by Democritus while its reality is denied: also the words *τὰ συγκεκριμένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν η τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν*, Phil. 46 ad fin.

logues, ought not to be conceived of in a narrow or literal way. Contemporary theories must not be suffered to crowd in upon him, so as to cramp the freedom and originality of his thoughts, of which they are not the substance but the occasion. It may be impossible always to trace the threads which he has taken up and woven into the fabric of his philosophy, but this defect in our knowledge need seldom leave us in doubt of his meaning. He views existing opinions in different lights and in different combinations as he moves amongst them, just as natural objects group themselves differently according to the point at which we stand. The materialist and sensationalist, who in the *Theætetus* are ironically contrasted, in the *Sophist* appear to be combined as the enemies of ideas, differing only in the degree of their unregenerate hardness. In the *Cratylus*, again, Heraclitus and Protagoras are opposed.

Plato had certain men in his eye, but what interested him far more were the different aspects of philosophy. And these could not be limited to this or that individual, or extended so as to embrace his inconsistencies. A great name in the past might be wholly identified with one of the great streams of thought; but from the speculative height whence Plato surveyed the present, rival doctrines might at one time be generalized in a single view, and at another time by a change of position might be seen as wholly distinct.

The general significance of the *Theætetus* has been fully treated by Professor Jowett in his Introduction. In what follows I propose to touch separately on the following points : (1) Philosophy and Education, (2) The Doctrine of Sense, (3) Plato's appeal to Experience, (4) the Ideas as Categories, (5) Connection of *Theætetus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, (6) Plato's psychology, (7) The digression or episode in pp. 172-7, (8) The date assigned by Plato to the reading of the dialogue at the house of Euclides.

The discussion of these topics will give an opportunity of illustrating the *Theætetus* from other dialogues besides those already quoted.

1. Philosophy in Plato is inseparable from the higher education, i.e. from the evolution of true thought by the action of mind on mind. This general notion is expressed under various imagery, in each case symbolizing the development of an inherent power. (*a*) ἀνάμυησις (Meno, Phædo, Phædrus). The soul is led by questions, or by the sense of imperfection, or by the vision of beauty, or by intercourse with a sympathetic mind, to the reminiscence of ideas or of an ideal, perceived by her in her prenatal state. (*b*) τόκος ἐν καλῷ (Symp.). The soul of man when he approaches maturity aspires to break the limits of the individual being. This is a kind of puberty or potential pregnancy of the soul, which, through contact with what is beautiful either in persons, actions, or thoughts, attains to the object of her longing, the birth of lasting truth. (*c*) κάθαρσις, λύσις (Phædo, Republic). The soul is bound by the force of desire in a prison of sense, until philosophy or dialectic gradually breaks her bonds, and purifies her from the earthly elements amidst which she has been compelled to live, and also lifts the eye of the soul from looking downwards on dark shadows to contemplate the ideas, as they are illumined by the good. Then thought attains its highest energy, the light within is married to its kindred light, and Reason and Truth are born. (*d*) Harmonie motion (Timæus). The soul is plunged in a turbid stream of growth and decay, and the circle of the Diverse in her is wheeling all ways, until she is steadied by the perception of number in the movements of the planets as organs of Time, and this perception gives predominance to the motion of the Same in her.

The humorous image of ματευτική, ‘the art of delivering,’ which is peculiar to the Theætetus, brings several of these different figures into a single form. It combines more completely than any of them the positive and negative aspect of the elenchus, the stimulating and the benumbing effect of Socrates. These no longer appear separately, as in the Charmides and Meno, but exist together in harmonious unity. The Charmides ends with the contradiction that temperance or modesty is inconceivable, and yet Charmides, the modest youth, is ready to commit violence upon Soerates, that he may gain modesty from him.

(a) Theætetus, like the slave in the *Meno*, is led by questions to express what is not merely his own private thought, but, as appears from the history of Philosophy, a necessary step in the progress from unconsciousness to the possession of truth. As each hypothesis is evolved and put away, he is prepared and indued to rise naturally to the stage next following. And as he becomes more aware of the difficulty of the subject, he is more eager to proceed with the inquiry.

Soerates, who has the discernment of spirits whieh the *Phædrus* requires in the educator, perceives in Theætetus the true philosophie nature. Although ‘there is no reason to doubt that Theætetus was a real person¹,’ yet we may suppose that, like Soerates, he is more or less idealized. The qualities whieh are postulated in the sixth book of the *Republie* as neeessary for the pupils of philosophy are one and all expressly attributed to him. And when he acknowledges the unity of the mind as the organ for perceiving general truths, Soerates—although the features of the youth are far from regular—deelares him to be beautiful as well as good. On the other hand, the figure of Socrates himself, as the man-midwife, combines with the familiar eharaacteristics of the real man much that is Platonic and ideal. Whilst he holds in reserve the sharp dividing instrument of the Elenehus, which separates between the mind and her offspring and dis-cerns the false birth from the true, he also presides, as the Spirit of Dialeetic, over the mental intercourse whieh alone can satisfy the legitimate longings of the soul.

(b) The condition whieh Soerates by his art perceives in Theætetus, is that on which Diotima expatiates in the *Symposium* :—κνοῦσι γάρ, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἀνθρωποι . . . , καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἐν τινι ἡλικίᾳ γένωνται, τίκτειν ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις. The signs of this travail (whieh Soerates alternately aggravates and allays) are the discontented consciousness of ignoranec and the irrepressible desire of knowing the Truth. In Theætetus it already takes the highest form, not love or ambition, but a passion for ideas, and Socrates, with a skill whieh is eomparable to that of Diotima, sets before him suecessive eourses of wisdom, which excite or slake his

¹ Jowett’s *Plato*, iv. 226.

'fancies,' but do not appease them. The humour of this conception is kept up to the end¹.

(c) At the same time Socrates is liberating Theætetus from the prison of sense and clearing his vision that he may look steadily at the Ideas.

At first he is only permitted to distinguish each individual sensation from every other, though binding them together in bundles for the convenience of naming them. Presently, perception and memory are shown to be separable from sensation; but they are still occasioned by it. The bonds are further loosened by the observation that in judging what is expedient for the future, the present impression of sense is worthless in comparison with reflection: but still the future is relative to the present and the past, and the test of past wisdom is the impression of the moment when it arrives.—Theætetus now seizes the great truth that the mind does perceive some things (unity, number, sameness, difference, etc.), without the instrumentality of the senses; but still it perceives them as attributes of the object of sense. Further inquiry is made into this process of thought. The mind can think truly and also falsely. What difference is implied in this? An attempt is made to conceive of it by reasoning from an abstract alternative,—(knowledge or ignorance, being or not-being), but we are compelled to fall back upon the conception of a process between sensation and the re-collection of former sensations, or between different abstractions of the world of sense laid up in the memory. Lastly, there is allowed to float before the mind the thought of an abstract whole; first as consisting of the combination of indefinite elements, then as an indivisible elementary unit arising out of them. But if the combination is known, the elements must also be known. And even the power of analysis is an inadequate test of Knowledge. Nor is the desired criterion fully attained, even when the complete whole

¹ In the notes on p. 143 a doubt has been raised concerning the description of the appearance of Socrates, which adds piquancy to the humorous image of his 'art,'—viz. whether *τὸς ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων* means 'prominence of the eyes,' or 'width between the eyes.' It is true that in Xen. *Eqv.* 1.

i. 9 *ἔξοφθαλμος* is opposed to *κοιλόφθαλμος*. But in Ar. *H.A.* i. 8. 5 the words *ἐκτός* and *ἐντός* seem to refer more naturally to the position of the eyes in the face. And the new meaning suggested is rather more in accordance with the allusions in Aristophanes and in Plato's *Symposium*.

which is the object of thought, has been distinguished, by its characteristic difference, from every other.

Socrates (in the language of Rep. B. 7) has gone down into the cave, and is leading Theætetus upwards, step by step, till towards the end he gives him just a far-off glimpse of the summit to be attained hereafter,—*μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ’ ἔξ εκείνων ἐν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, οἴεσθαι μάλιστα αὐτῷ αἰτοῦ ἔχον.* But he is not himself groping his way. Each footstep is firmly planted, as by one who has tried every inch of the path and knows the country well. In other words, Plato is no longer satisfied with anticipations of truth, but is striving to bridge the chasm between ideas and facts, between crude experience and complete theory. But of this more presently. Here only remains to say (*d*) that in this upward progress that which most steadies the thought of Theætetus, who is a trained geometer, is the perception of number and an adumbration of the idea of good.

2. Much of what is rejected in the Theætetus as a theory of Knowledge reappears in the Timæus as a ‘probable’ account of the physiology of sense. The same interflow of active and passive motions, especially in vision, of which the same phenomena are mentioned, the carrying about of qualities from place to place, and several points even of minute terminology, are repeated there. This helps to show that the theory here developed as that of the disciples of Protagoras who rest their doctrine on Heraclitean principles, is not a mere occasional Essay written for the special purpose of this dialogue, but a serious piece of work having a real place in the history of thought.

There is one point of this doctrine as stated in the Theætetus, on which some obscurity still rests, viz. the distinction between quicker and slower motions in 156 C D. The text is not quite free from uncertainty, although the reading of Cornarius is probably a consequence and not merely a cause of confused interpretation. The Scholiast not unnaturally understood the slower motions to be the sensations of touch and taste as distinguished from those of sight and hearing. Sight might naturally be supposed to have more of fire, and touch more of the nature of earth. But this distinction has no relevancy to what precedes, and is nowhere applied in

what follows. And in the MS. text the words *φέρεται γάρ . . πέφυκεν* appear to refer, not to all the motions, but to the swifter only. Now in the example of wine being distasteful to the sick palate (159 D), the term *φέρεσθαι*, which is here introduced in formulating the theory, is deliberately applied. So that if the MSS. are right, the sensation of taste is not one of the slower motions. And the same illustration makes it manifest that in any case the subject and object, *πάσχον* and *ποιοῦν*, on the one hand, and on the other hand the sensation and quality together, are opposed, if not as slow and swift, yet certainly as producer and produced (*γεννῶντα καὶ γεννώμενα*). And the word *πλησιάζω*, which belongs to the slower elements, is applied not to the tongue, but to the eye.

Recent editors are agreed (even Dr. Kennedy yielding a ^{Elimination of} doubtful assent) in adopting another interpretation, according ^{Sub-} to which the slower elements are the *ποιοῦντα* and *πάσχοντα*, ^{stance,} the quicker elements being the qualities and sensations. Professor Kennedy's doubt is thus expressed: 'I am unable to discern the use of discriminating between agent-patient and their products as to slowness and swiftness.' This remark hits the point of the obscurity, and ought to be met. The answer turns upon the motive which Socrates here attributes to the Protagoreans, viz. to develop a sensational doctrine that shall not too obviously violate common experience. With this motive, for example, they are supposed to invent the term *ἀθροισμα*, and to speak of each kind of concrete objects as 'an aggregate of motions.' Thus, to speak with Aristotle for the sake of clearness, they get rid of the categories of quantity and quality. But there is another category, not less surely given in experience, which they find it still more difficult to dispose of, the category of substance. There is an incurable prejudice in favour of thinking that *I* am more lasting than my impressions, the chameleon than his colours, the moon than her phases, etc. Thus, when sensations and attributes have been shown to be ever so momentary, the doubt lingers, whether there is not still something permanent, viz. the subject and object in which these severally inhere (in the language of Scoto-German Metaphysics, the Ego and the External World). To which doubt the theorists reply by saying, 'Oh, substance is only a slower motion.' It would

have been clearer certainly to have introduced the distinction between *ἄλλοιώσις* and *φορά*, and to have said expressly that substance is altered, while sensation and quality are in locomotion. But this distinction is wanted afterwards for a serious use, and would have taken from the humour of the present passage, where the Protagorean is represented as simply bent on reducing all as far as possible to motion as such. Where he is obliged to admit a difference, it suits his purpose to call it a difference of degree. For it is not his cue in any case to recognize differences of kind. But the implied admission is turned against him by the Elenchus in the passage referred to (181 D).

Mr. J. S. Mill's 'Permanent Possibilities' may be cited as a metaphysical expedient having a similar motive.

Philosophy
and Expe-
rience.

3. Plato is well aware that philosophy, to be fruitful, must begin and end with experience. This is the note, which chiefly distinguishes his method, not only from the dogmatic anticipations of the fifth century, but still more from the comparatively barren idealism of his Megarian friends. The whole spirit of Socrates, with his common instances and his resolute preference for human questions, in spite of his love of paradox, pointed in this direction. And the reader of the Platonic dialogues is often surprised, when he seems to have been carried into a region of mere abstractions, to be suddenly met by an argument drawn directly from the facts of ordinary life. The truth is that Plato is perpetually striving to reconcile thought with reality both in the individual and in the world. And although in spite of all his efforts his thought remains abstract still, and never entirely penetrates the subtlety of Nature, he continually acknowledges in practice that while all things are to be tested by logic, the conclusions of logic must be tested again by fact. 'That sensations differ is a matter of fact' (154 A), 'the illusions of dreams and madness are facts of experience' (157 E), 'Protagoras must be wiser than others, else he would have no fees' (161 D), 'the world is full of examples of the truth that knowledge is power' (170 A, B), 'any one must acknowledge this' (171 D), 'States make laws with a view to future expediency' (177 E), 'Protagoras himself knows better than his pupil the effect which will be produced

by a particular speech' (178 E). All these are direct appeals to experience. And therefore the student need not be surprised when, after the subtle inconclusive argument about false opinion, the claims of true opinion are cut short with the example of the law-courts (201 A), or the question whether the knowledge of the simple or the compound comes first is settled by the experience of Theætetus in learning to read (206 A). A similar collocation of fact and logic occurs in Soph. 264 A, where, after it has been proved with incredible difficulty by a long chain of metaphysical proof that communion is possible between not-being and some kinds of being, the further question, whether not-being in the shape of falsehood enters into speech, is decided in a moment by the mere repetition of the statement 'Theætetus is flying.' So in the Republic, when the definition of justice has been reached, it is tested by vulgar instances,—*τὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες* (4. 442 E).

It is said in the Parmenides, and the thought recurs in the Sophist and Politicus, that the mature mind despises no phenomenon in which there are the traces of a law. In the Philebus the dialectician is said to carry subdivision as far as there are forms to guide him. In the Phædrus—where Plato's transcendentalism is most apparent—individual experience is not forgotten : Δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρωπὸν συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἵὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον—δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἴκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὅντα καὶ πραττόμενα, δξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν (271 E). Indeed the Phædrus sounds every note in Plato's compass. And his struggle to reach the individual while holding fast the universal is nowhere more evident than in the passage just quoted. The same purpose is evinced in the remark at the end of the Theætetus : 'Αλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἔμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὗτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὥν ἔγὼ ἔωρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ' ἔμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη καταθῆται, καὶ τἄλλα οὕτως ἐξ ὧν εἴ σύ, κ.τ.λ.'

4. In accordance with this clinging to experience, Plato's ideal theory, so far as it is allowed to appear in the Theætetus, deals not with hypostatized entities, but rather with necessary forms of thought, which are as inseparable from percep-

tion as from reasoning. In the digression indeed, which, however luminous, has still something of a mythical tone, the philosopher is described in language which recalls the Republic, as contemplating everything as a whole and as taking men up out of the sphere of personal questions into the higher region, where justice and injustice, kingship as kingship, human nature as human nature, are discussed apart from particulars. But in the dialectical argument, the relative aspect which has been suggested by Protagoras is nowhere lost sight of. The mind perceives by herself the being of *objects*, their identity, difference, likeness and unlikeness, also unity and number *concerning them*. She also reaches after the good and beautiful, *reviewing and comparing her perceptions* with this aim. Knowledge is not to be sought for in particular impressions, but in generalizations *drawn from them*. The numbers eleven and twelve are forms upon the waxen block, i.e. they are remembered, or rather abstracted from perceptions of sense. In the aviary there fly innumerable birds, some gathered in groups (*καὶ εἴδη*), some flying everywhere about (i.e. modes of thought universally applicable). Whether the whole is separable from the parts or not (*χωριστόν* or *ἀχωριστόν*) it bears some relation to them, and for the present we are disposed to think that the parts must be included in perfect knowledge.

This manner of conceiving knowledge and being is not a mere concession to Protagoras or Heraclitus, nor is it only due to the intentionally subjective aspect of the whole dialogue. It rather marks Plato's advance to a more definite conception of his own meaning.

He is not now engaged, as in the Republic, with sketching a vague outline of philosophic method, but has entered upon the 'longer way' of dialectical inquiry, in which the highest generalizations, when he really grapples with them, are found to be conceivable, if at all, only in relation to an actual world to which they give light and order, and where affirmation and negation, to have any meaning, must have reference to one another, and to the content as well as to the form of propositions¹.

¹ The obvious fact, that *οὐσία* in the Theætetus is equivalent to *Daseyn* rather than to *Wesen* has not been sufficiently observed by those who

question the genuineness of the Sophist because there Being = the sum of positive realities.

5. This aspect of the Theætetus is closely connected with Relation to
the Sophistes and Politicus which follow it.

Sophist and
Politicus.

In the Sophistes the criticism of sense and motion is followed up with a no less thorough criticism of the Immutable Being, and the question ‘How is falsehood possible?’ is answered through an examination of the idea of falsehood and of negation. In the Politicus an attempt is made to sketch an ideal outline of the application of Science to human societies, and of the false or imperfect forms of society, from which the immediate guidance of Science is withdrawn. These dialogues were to have led up to the Philosopher, in which, probably apart from controversy, Plato’s ideal of Theory and Practice would have been bodied forth.

It does not appear that at the time of writing the Theætetus Plato had distinctly planned the other three. The terms in which Socrates declines to examine Parmenides might certainly lead the reader to expect a separate treatment of the Eleatic principle. And the conversation ends with an appointment to meet at the same palaestra on the following day. But the Preface only contemplates Socrates, Theætetus, and Theodorus as the interlocutors. These alone are mentioned by Euclides as having taken part. Still less is there any hint of another than Socrates having taken the lead. And although the opening of the Sophist links on that dialogue to the conversation of the previous day, yet there is no direct reference to the unfinished talk about Parmenides, nor is the figure of *μαieutikή* in any way kept up, while the concrete form in which the question is bluntly put by Socrates, ‘What are the Sophist, Statesman, Philosopher?’ is strikingly different from the ‘What is Knowledge?’ of the previous day. Had Plato written the Theætetus and Sophist continuously, it is hardly to be supposed that he would not have woven them together with more art.

There are other grounds for believing that the Sophistes and Politicus were written somewhat later than the Theætetus. In my edition of those two dialogues (Oxford, 1867) I have proved by ‘quantitative criticism’ that in point of diction, as well as in other important respects, they are intermediate between the Republic and the Laws, while the Theætetus stands between the Phædrus and Republic. And in a more

general way Professor Jowett, whose judgment on such a question is of the highest value, remarks emphatically on the difference of style which separates the *Philebus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Laws*, and in some degree the *Timæus*, from the earlier dialogues. (See his Introduction to the *Sophist*, sub init.) Pure Eleaticism has no doubt a great effect in drying up the springs of imaginative expression. The second part of the *Parmenides*, and the passage in the *Theætetus* about the whole and its parts, may be contrasted in this way with other portions of the same dialogues. But this remark does not dispose of the criticisms here referred to, which relate to the whole tenour of the dialogues now in question, nor does it account for the change of manner both in *Theætetus* and Socrates.

These and other reasons have led some to doubt the genuineness of the *Sophistes* and *Politicus*. I have attempted to meet such doubts by showing, as above stated, that in the same degree in which these writings diverge from the *Gorgias* or *Republic*, they approximate to the *Laws*. The discussion may now be summed up in the words of the English translator of Plato: ‘There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness of the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, if they had been compared with the *Laws* rather than with the *Republic*, and the *Laws* had been received, as they ought to be, on the authority of Aristotle, as an undoubted work of Plato.’ Schaarschmidt, the latest enemy of the two dialogues, is as inconsistent in accepting the *Laws*, as he is consistent (however paradoxical) in rejecting the *Philebus*¹.

But to return. However different from the *Theætetus* in style and external treatment, the *Sophist* and *Statesman* are connected with it in subject, and also in their point of view.

The theory of Knowledge, which at the end of the *Theætetus* remains indeterminate, is completed by the discussion of first principles in the *Sophist*. And although the subject of the *Statesman* is not the nature, but the

¹ An important contribution to the more exact definition both of the place of the dialectical dialogues and of the growth of Plato's central doctrine has been made quite recently by Mr. H.

Jackson, in his elaborate papers on the *Philebus* and the *Parmenides* in the *Journal of Philology*, Nos. 21 and 22: ‘Plato's later Theory of Ideas.’

application of Knowledge, yet there is a distinct advance in the conception of Knowledge or Science, on which the discussion is based.

The relation of Knowledge to Experience, and the nature of the ideas as categories (supr. 4, 5), have come out in the *Theætetus*. But the chief conceptions of Knowledge there put forth are those (*a*) of rising from particulars to universals and so contemplating each thing as a whole, (*b*) of analyzing a whole into its parts, and (*c*) of being able to describe an object by its difference.

In the *Sophist* it is shown that to generalize, distinguish, and analyze is not enough. Ideas must not be seen only in their separate abstraction, but also in their combinations and correlations. And in the course of the *Politicus* it appears further that Knowledge, in order to be fruitful, must take a grasp of the actual world, where the ideas are not found in elementary simplicity, but are transferred into the long and difficult syllables of action. Logical analysis must follow the lines of nature. Dichotomy must not be forced where it is inapplicable. And rash generalization (misplaced *συναγωγή*) is to be equally avoided. Every nature is to be separately interrogated, until each has yielded all that its peculiar experience enables it to contribute to the sum of wisdom. It is not enough to define an art by some distinguishing mark. To know its boundaries aright, we must also know the kindred arts from which it is distinguished. There are categories not only of things in general, but of social facts: seven departments, for example, of human industry. Plato nowhere shows a deeper conviction of the extent and comprehensiveness of Science.

6. Another growth which may be traced in these three *Psychological* dialogues, and also in the *Philebus* and *Timæus*, is the increasing clearness and minuteness of Plato's psychology. Such hints towards a study of the phenomena of mind as occur in the *Phædo*, *Meno*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, or even in the *Phædrus*, are comparatively vague. In the *Theætetus* Plato is for the first time continuously employed in the close analysis of mental operations. The nearest parallel in the *Republic* is the description, in Book 7, of the effect of number

in awakening reason by giving distinctness to contradictory perceptions. But in the *Theætetus* we have a whole series of similar observations:—the connection of *αἴσθησις* and *φαντασία* in the case of the wind (p. 152), the analysis of vision (153 E foll.), the logical postulates, which we are asked to contemplate steadily as ‘facts of consciousness’ (155), the further analysis of vision (156, 7), the account given of illusory perceptions (158, 159), the case of letters and sounds seen and heard but not understood (163), the relation of *μνήμη* to *αἴσθησις* (*ibid.*), the illustration of degrees of perception (165), the distinction between the organ and the percipient mind (184), the whole attempt to give a subjective account of false opinion (187–200), and, in particular, the description of thought as self-dialogue (189, 190), the image of the waxen-block, accounting for confusions of sense and memory (191 foll.), that of the aviary, for confusions of pure thought, (198 foll.), the three definitions of *λόγος* (206 foll.);—all these are instances of the working of a new spirit, which is not found in equal strength in the *Republie* or *Phædrus*.

Now to the same reflective tendency may be referred several passages of the *Sophist* and *Philebus*, and the effect of it may be traced also in the *Politicus* and *Timæus*. The following points may be especially noted:—the acknowledgment obtained from the idealists that Knowledge is a *process* (*Soph.* 248), the description of the process of dialectic (254), the meaning of denial (*ἀπόφασις*) (257), the distinction of *λόγος*, *διάροια*, *φαντασία*, *αἴσθησις* (263, 4):—the origin of *γραμματική* (*Phil.* 8), the description of *ἡδονὴ*, *δόξα*, *μνήμη*, *ἀνάμνησις*, *φαντασία* (37–39):—the passage about *μετρητική* (*Polit.* 285), the reason for the argument from example (277):—the account of sensation, and the distinction of *νοῦς* from *δόξα* *ἀληθῆς* in the *Timæus*.

The question raised towards the end of the *Theætetus*, whether knowledge is not of simple parts as well as of the complex whole, corresponds to various *ἀπορίαι* in the *Parmenides*, and also to the place in the *Sophist* (245) where it is shown that Becoming as well as Being partakes of completeness and unity. A cognate point is also touched upon, viz. whether the *εἶδη* are *χωριστὰ* or *ἀχώριστα*. The theory that the Element (or simple idea) is unknowable, forms

the opposite extreme to the ‘Protagorean’ assertion that single impressions only are known. The truth is indicated that an apprehension of unity and universality is present even in the simplest distinct perception. The passage which prepares the way for this conclusion may be compared with the similar ‘propædeutik’ in Rep. 4. 436.

7. The Episode or Digression, 172–177.

The Di-
gression in
172–7.

Throughout the earlier part of the dialogue Plato’s moral enthusiasm has been held under a severe restraint. It here bursts forth in a passage of still chastened and subdued eloquence. Socrates is represented as having hitherto found it difficult to be quite serious, while delivering the boyish mind of Theætetus of its first crude notions, and refuting with indirect arguments, which he himself occasionally suspects of sophistry, a popular philosophy which dressed up men’s ordinary thoughts with subtle notions borrowed from past thinkers. He has accordingly been using various arts to draw the grave Theodorus into the discussion. In this he at last succeeds. But even so, his attempt at seriousness at first breaks down. He is still haunted by the humour of the previous argument, and Theodorus rebukes him for ‘running Protagoras too hard.’ On this Socrates lays hold of the admission, implied in Protagoras’ teaching, that there is a difference, if not between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, yet between better and worse conditions of individuals and communities. On this he is about to base the argument that since legislation aims at bettering the condition of states, it is proved true or false, right or wrong, as it succeeds or fails. But at this point he seems to catch the tone of his respondent, and indulges the inclination of Theodorus by interposing a pause in the game of question and answer. In the presence of the deeper subject which now awaits discussion he suspends the argument for a while, and allows his eye to range over the whole position,—reconnoitring as it were before engaging at close quarters,—contrasting the life of the philosopher with that of the lawyer and the man of the world. After this (177 D) he resumes the argument at the point where it was broken off, and, still in conversation with Theodorus, disposes finally of Protagoras and the Heracliteans. And in all that follows, although

Soerates does not relinquish his playfulness, a deeper note is clearly perceptible. The productive power of Knowledge, the universal striving toward the good, the independence of mind in perceiving the true relations of things, the difficulty about false opinion, and other weighty topics, are handled with essential gravity and sobriety.

Thus the poetical and dialectical aspects are fused together more completely than in the Phædrus. And the correspondence is unmistakable between the contrasted lives on the one hand and the contrasted theories on the other:—as the philosopher is to the lawyer, so is the *ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* to the *φαντασία τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ*. But Peipers (*Untersuchungen*, i. pp. 472 ff.) is too matter-of-fact, when he treats the digression as an integral part of the discussion, and as directly suggested by the mention of *δίκαια καὶ καλά*.

Teichmüller, on the other hand, would treat such semi-mythical passages in Plato as wholly secondary and subordinate to the dialectical, concessions to popular sentiment, or to ‘the child in us.’ I cannot think that Plato would endorse this view of the imaginative portions of his own writings. They express a different but not a lower aspect of the truth; and at least equally vindicate his claim to have surveyed ‘all time and all existence.’ ‘Reason touched with emotion’ need not have less hold of reality than reason pure and simple. And abstract thought without such aid is not merely less effectual (*διάνοια γὰρ αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ’ ή ἔνεκά του καὶ πρακτική*), but is also less complete.

The digression approaches very closely in style and substance to many passages in the Republic, as will appear in the notes. But it contains no allusion to the philosopher’s relation to an ideal state, whether (as in the Gorgias) because Plato had not yet enounced his conception of the philosopher-king, or because he had withdrawn again into isolation,—or more probably because of the difference of the subject. The philosopher here is not merely useless to his city, but looks down upon it as from a distant height. He knows nothing of his neighbour, but is engaged in contemplating human nature in general. The conception is more ironical than in the Sophist (in this approaching the Republic), and less embittered than in the Politicus; although the con-

tempt with whieh the legal spirit is deseribed is suffieiently biting.

8. The solemnity of this passage, and the shadow whieh it casts over the remainder of the dialogue, is in keeping with the time when the whole eonversation is imagined to have taken placee. Soerates, as he tells Theodorus easually at the end, is going presently to answer the indietment of Meletus ; —to show, therefore, in his own person what a poor figure the philosopher makes in a law-court. This life-and-death oeeasion, however (*ὅλιγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ*), sits very lightly on him, and he is as ready as at any moment of his life to engage in philosophieal discussion. Not only so, but his inexhaustible humour, if less irrepressibly exuberant than in his intereourse with Phædrus by the Ilissus, is no less ready to spring forth in the presenee of a youth who is gifted with the philosophie nature. Yet there is an undereurrent of more than usual earnestness, whieh takes advantage from the grave presenee of Theodorus, but is profoundly in keeping with the actuel erisis.

Another shadow mingles with that east by the death of Soerates, and helps to give a further personal interest to the disoourse. For the reader is to imagine that at the moment when this record of his brilliant promise is being read at Megara, Theætetus himself, who has been wounded in battle at Corinth, has just been earried baek to Athens, that he may die at home. The memory of one thus distinguished in action as well as in thought is intended to conseerate the whole dialogue.

The date of the battle mentioned in the Prefacee can only be fixed within eertain limits. The suggestion of E. Munk (whose arrangement of the dialogues in the order of the lifetime of Soerates of course gives a late place to the Theætetus) that the oecasion meant was in the year 369, when the allied forces under Chabrias disputed the Isthmus with Epaminnondas, is suffieiently disposed of by the remark¹ that Terpsion cannot be supposed to have waited thirty years before ful-

¹ Wohlrab, 1869.

filling his intention of asking to see the writing of Euclides. So late a date also, as Professor Jowett observes, ‘a little impairs the beauty of Socrates’ remark, “that he would be a great man if he lived.”’ These are strong reasons for preferring the battle of B.C. 394, which seems to have stirred the hearts of the Athenians in a peculiar way, as the first great national effort after the restoration of the democracy¹. In that year Theætetus would be at most twenty-one. And this date does not seem impossible, for the praise of his conduct in the fight would be all the louder if he then saw service for the first time. The supposition which alone remains, that of an uncertain date between B.C. 390 and 387 (the limits of the Corinthian war), has the doubtful advantage of giving time for the distinctions mentioned by later writers as attaching to Theætetus,—at all events for the discovery of the five regular solids, which he might have hit upon even sooner than this (*μαθητὸς γὰρ καν πάντας γένοιται ἀντίτυπα*²).

Time of composition.

9. In any case, therefore, the Preface cannot have been written earlier than B.C. 394, when Plato was about thirty-five, and in all probability was written much later, for in fiction (unlike polities) the mention of an event is none the worse for being ‘ancient history.’ But even so much cannot be decisively maintained respecting the dialogue as a whole,—for the preface, and the concluding words, and other passages, may *possibly* have been written long after the main portion had been composed. Internal evidence, however, as has been already indicated, would seem to assign to the Theætetus a place, though earlier than the Sophist, yet not much, if at all, earlier than the Republic.

Teichmüller has recently, with great confidence, set up a new criterion, by which he thinks to separate once for all between the earlier and later writings of Plato. This is afforded by the simple statement of Euclides, that in finishing his transcript of the conversation he has omitted the interlocutory words. By which Teichmüller understands Plato

¹ The beautiful monument to the young knight Dexilaus in the Ceraunieus at Athens (*ἀπέθανεν επ' Εὐβοϊ* λίδον ἐν Κορίνθῳ, τῶν πέντε ιππέων) is commonly attributed to this year.

² Ar. Eth. N. 1.

to signify that the admixture of narrative in the *Parmenides*, *Symposium*, and *Republic* had been a mistake, and that this method should be abandoned by him henceforth. Our critic also assumes that Plato kept this resolution, and that consequently no narrated dialogue is later than the *Theætetus*, and no dialogue in which the several persons are directly introduced is to be considered as earlier. The form of the *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras*, and *Phædo*, where a narrated dialogue is enclosed in a dramatic setting, is regarded as intermediate, and these dialogues are therefore assumed to come shortly before the *Theætetus*.

That the words of Euclides are not without significance may at once be admitted. The *Theætetus* is the only dialogue which is supposed to have been written down¹. This takes from the improbability of so close and subtle an argument being repeated from memory. And the omission of ‘said I’ and ‘said he’ certainly adds to the continuity of the effect, without destroying the illusion that we have the authority of Socrates for the minute accuracy of the report. It may further be conceded that of the dialogues which are similarly dramatic in form, several of the most important are on other grounds probably the last of all,—the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timæus*, *Laws*. But, not for the present to state objections to an hypothesis which makes the *Gorgias* a later dialogue than the *Republic*,—not only is the *Phædrus* thus placed inordinately late, but the *Laches*, *Io*, *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, *Meno*, and *Cratylus* must either be rejected, or assumed to belong to the later half of Plato’s career. A theory which undertakes so much is somewhat heavily weighted, and this one happens to be not very securely based. For the Preface shows, not that the *Theætetus* is like some dialogues in its dramatic form, but that (in having a formal introduction) it is unlike all. And the inference to be drawn from this is rather that Plato was willing to vary his style in such external respects, than that he now adopted a hitherto unthought of plan to be henceforward uniformly followed by him. Indeed, if he had laid so much stress upon this point as Teichmüller supposes, there was nothing

¹ Jowett’s *Plato*, iv. 225.

to prevent him from revising the whole series of his writings in the same sense.

Genuine-
ness, and
place in
the series
of the
Platonic
Dialogues.

10. In the *Theætetus*, the various *notes* of the most undoubted of Plato's writings are present in felicitous harmony. While rivalling the *Symposium* in perfection of form, and containing touches of humour and of enthusiastic insight which recall the *Phædrus*, it is, of all the dialectical dialogues, the most exact in philosophical expression. And in the subdued eloquence of moral earnestness it is comparable only to the *Phædo*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*.

To return once more to the vexed question of its position in the series. The *Symposium* cannot have been written before the division of Arcadia in b.c. 384. But in the *Symposium*, Plato has not yet broken with the poets (p. 209), and the *Republic* is therefore later than the *Symposium*. Now it has been seen that the indications of style in the *Theætetus* bring it very near indeed to the *Republic*, while it has close relations with dialogues which are later still. The combined maturity and freshness, complexity, subtlety, and lightness of the *Theætetus* are consistent with the result thus indicated, that when he wrote it Plato 'had on his back' years (at least) forty-eight. He has himself indicated (at 180 E) the point of view from which the dialogue was composed. The battle of the philosophies was not yet over. Socrates had set up a standard of knowledge, which, supported by his dialectic as preserved at Megara, was sufficient to overthrow the popular doctrine of mere relativity, and to cast a shadow of 'philosophic doubt' over the scepticism of the day. But the ground gained hitherto had been mainly in the region of negative proof. In order to win an entrance for Science upon the 'terra firma' of positive reality, it was still necessary to criticise afresh the first principles of dialectic itself, and to come to a final reckoning with Parmenides.

What came of this final reckoning need not be considered here. But it may be observed that the difficulties raised in the *Theætetus*, no less than those in the *Parmenides*, tend to show the inadequacy of merely formal reasoning, and to prepare the way for a provisional solution, in which an indeterminate element, whether to be known as *θἀτερον*, *ἄπειρον*,

πολλά, or ἀπειρος δυάς, is to be admitted into the region of speculative truth ;—in which the composite nature of *οὐσία* is also to be admitted, and the correlation of or communion of different categories postulated¹. In working out this problem, ‘new weapons’ have to be introduced into the Platonic armoury, while some of those here exhibited are retained in use.

¹ See H. Jackson, On Plato’s later Theory of Ideas, *Journal of Philology*, Nos. 21 and 22. This discussion throws additional light on *Theæt.* 201, 2.

CONSPECTUS.

THE dialogue has been written down by Euclides and is produced by him on the occasion of Theætetus' expected death. The persons are, SOCRATES, THEODORUS of Cyrene, and the boy THEÆTETUS.

Time, just before the trial of Socrates.

Theodorus introduces Theætetus to Socrates as a youth who has all the essential qualities of the philosophic nature. Socrates acknowledges the authority on such a point of Theodorus as an accomplished teacher. He begins to question Theætetus. 'You go to Theodorus for wisdom, i. e. Knowledge. But what is Knowledge?' 'Geometry, arithmetic, astronomy; shoemaking and other handicrafts.' 'That is an enumeration of Knowledges, not a definition of Knowledge.' 'I see, you want a general expression, such as I and young Socrates here lately invented for irrational quantities.' 'Excellent, only try.' 'I want to do so all the while, but cannot.' 'Then come to me, who am the man-midwife of young minds.'

Socrates proceeds to expound the nature of his art in such a way as effectually to encourage Theætetus, whom he once more exhorts to try his best. The youth now answers,

I. KNOWLEDGE IS SENSATION.

This (1) is shown to be the same with the dictum of Protagoras, 'Man the Measure,' i. e. Things *are* to each man as they *appear* to him:—which again is proved to rest (2) on the mysterious doctrine of Heraclitus and other great men that *All is Motion* and that things *are not* but *become*.

(3) Sensible perception is then explained as the momentary outcome of the meeting of action and passive motions. Sensation is an instantaneous process; all attributes are absolutely relative.

(4) Sensation and quality are twin vibrations, perpetually shifting from place to place, whilst agent and patient (object and subject) change their attributes indeed, but are comparatively (though never entirely) stationary. They are slow motions, whereas the others are swift.

(5) What are known as the illusions of dreams and madness and the disordered taste of the sick palate are accounted for by this hypothesis. The unpleasantness of wine is as real to Socrates ill, as its pleasantness is to Socrates when well.

(6) Thus the doctrines of Heraclitus and Protagoras unite to substantiate the answer of Theætetus, of which they are the objective and subjective counterparts.

I. (a) 1. But the theory, if consistent, is somewhat strange.

Does it not make all percipients equally wise, and make discussion purposeless? Protagoras is no wiser than an ape: Theætetus is as wise as any god.

(2) This is perhaps a superficial objection. Let us examine the statement 'Knowledge is Sensation.'

Then to see without understanding is to know: to remember without seeing is not to know.

Further, one may know and not know the same thing, know it near but not far off, know it faintly and strongly, dimly and vividly, and the like.

(3) To this Protagoras would reply by deprecating mere verbal quibbles, and boldly accepting the facts, that memory is indistinct, that each man differs infinitely from himself, and may at the same moment both know and not know the same thing.

In supporting his thesis, he would maintain that men's perceptions differ not as *true* and *false*, since all alike are real; but as *better* and *worse*. And the wise man is he who can change them from worse to better, whether in men or vegetables, in individuals or states.

I. (β) Theodorus being now the respondent, Protagoras' own maxim is examined, as explained by himself:—What seems to each man is real to him to whom it seems.

Does it not seem to each man that other men are wiser than he?

If all think always truly, some think falsely.

Theodorus has trouble in maintaining his opinions. Are they false to his opponents, but true to him?

Most men dissent from the opinion of Protagoras. But his opinion justifies them in their dissent. Is the one 'measure'

here to be preferred to the many? Or does not the one confirm the many, by asserting that they are right in thinking him wrong?

I. (γ) Protagoras is not in life, and would not be convinced if he were. But his followers will hardly maintain that all men are equally wise in knowing what is *wholesome* for the individual or *expedient* for the state. So much indeed has been already hinted in Socrates' defence of Protagoras (I. (a) 3).—

(At this point the argument is interrupted with an eloquent digression, in which the life of the philosopher, who has leisure for many arguments, which he can drop and take up again at will, is contrasted with the life of the politician).

—Well, the state makes laws with a view to expediency, of which experience is the only test. And the same is true of every judgment which regards the *future*. Protagoras professed himself a better judge than his disciple could be of the persuasiveness of a rhetorical speech. So far, then, the doctrine of absolute subjectivity is disproved.

I. (δ) But what of the immediate perceptions of warmth, white, and sweetness? Are they always true for the percipient at the moment? Even this cannot be maintained by those (I. (3)), who base the doctrine of Sensation upon the doctrine of Motion.

All motion is either change of place ($\phi\circ\rho\acute{a}$) or change of nature ($\delta\lambda\lambdao\imath\omega\sigma\acute{a}$). And if motion is absolute, all things are always moved in both these ways. Therefore the perception and the quality which fit between subject and object, as before described, must also change their nature in the instant of sensation, so that they cannot be so much as named. Each thing no sooner *is*, but it *is not*; it is no more *thus* than *not thus*; or rather it is anyhow and nohow.

In the course of this argument Theodorus has expressed his abhorrence of the Heracliteans of Ephesus, whose doctrine is as unstable as the Universe in their conception of it. Theætetus now asks that the opposite doctrine,—that of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus, may be discussed.

II. Socrates avoids this task for the present, but takes Theætetus again in hand and resumes the previous question about the nature of Perception. The sensible qualities of objects are perceived not *with* but *through* the organs of sense. And there are some attributes which the mind herself perceives without a separate organ,—number, difference, sameness, being. The mind's own judgment of these things is called Opinion.

Now Opinion is either true or false, and KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE OPINION.

But how is false opinion possible? We have already felt this difficulty within the sphere of sense. It now returns upon us in a more abstract form.

Three answers are proposed, and each is followed into various ramifications. False opinion is (1) to think without Knowledge, or (2) to think what is not, or (3) to mistake one thing for another. For thought is the mind's dialogue, and opinion is a silent proposition.

But each of these answers leads to insuperable difficulties, and, finding ourselves in a strait, we are driven to seek aid from the imagination.

(a) Shall we say that the mind takes impressions like a waxen block, and that mistake occurs in the process of identifying new impressions with the old, i. e. at the meeting-point of sensation and memory?

✓ — This image does not extend to mistakes in abstract reasoning.

(β) Then shall we compare the mind to an aviary containing birds, some of which are gregarious, some grouped in families, some solitary and ranging over all? We have caught them all, and have them all within the mind, but as they fly about we may get the wrong bird by the wing, and so may take a rock-pigeon for a turtle-dove, and this is false opinion. Even here the image comes short of the reality. For so far as we take hold of the wild pigeon we have it actually in hand as known, and cannot err about it.

However, leaving this subsidiary question unsolved, we find a short cut to answering the main question, whether True Opinion is or is not Knowledge. The judges in a law-court have often been brought by rhetoric to form a true opinion of matters of fact, which no arguments can demonstrate. They have True Opinion but not Knowledge, which in such cases cannot exist without ocular demonstration.

III. Wherein then does Knowledge differ from True Opinion? If we can find this, perhaps we shall at last find the definition of Knowledge.

✓ (a) KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE OPINION WITH AN ACCOUNT of the object. That of which no account can be given is unknowable.

(β) The prime elements are unknowable, while their complex or combination is known. The element can only be named. The

nature of language implies that an *account* comprises more elements than one.

Here are two statements, which may be considered together.

True Opinion with an account or reason is a plausible definition of Knowledge. But how can the complex be known if the element is unknown? In learning to read, we learned the letters first, then syllables. In learning music, we first learn the notes.

Yet, on the other hand, the syllable may be regarded as an independent unity springing from this combination of the letters. And this leads up to the general question of the relation of parts to a whole. Is the whole identical with all the parts, or separable from them? Is 'All' in the singular identical with 'All' in the plural? So far from simple unity being unknowable, we find that the object of Knowledge is always one and indissoluble.

But, to return to the former of our two statements, If Knowledge is true Opinion with an *account*, what is meant by the latter term? Three answers are again proposed:—

1. Statement in words. But this is universally attainable.

2. Enumeration of parts or elements. (Definition by analysis.)

But I may enumerate the parts, having only true opinion of them and not Knowledge.

3. Definition by the characteristic difference.

But here again the question rises, Does such definition rest on Knowledge or on True Opinion? And if the former, then we have once more to ask ourselves, What is Knowledge?

The art of Socrates condemns all the answers hitherto given. But Theætetus, who has been delivered of more than he knew was in him, will be more fruitfully inventive, or at least more intellectually modest, in the time to come.

ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

T. I.
ed. Steph.
P. 142.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

"ΑΡΤΙ, ὃ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι ἔξ ἀγροῦ ;
ΤΕΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σέ γε ἐζῆτουν κατ'
ἀγορὰν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον, ὅτι οὐχ οἶστ τ' ἡ εύρειν.

ΕΥ. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ κατὰ πόλιν.

ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μήν;

ΕΥ. Εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον ιο
φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθή-
ναζε.

3. ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ] Euclides and Terpsion appear also in the Phædo as the Megarians who were present at the death of Socrates, p. 59 C : Καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων. Compare with the preservation of this dialogue by Euclides, and the introduction of Theodorus of Cyrene, the preservation of the Pythagorean dialogue by Phædo, and the introduction in it of Simmias and Cebes (*Φιλολάφ συγγεγονότων*). See also Tim. 27 A.

5. For the ellipse (of *ἡκεις* or some such word) cp. the omission of *εἰ* with *ἄξιος*, infr. 143

E. This idiom suits the conversational style.

6. 'Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι] 'A good while ago.' Cp. Phæd. 80 C : ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον.

7. καὶ ἐθαύμαζον] It is perhaps intimated that Euclides, like his master Socrates, was to be found daily in the market-place.

9. 'Where, then?' *μήν* expresses surprise.

11. ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου] For the expression compare Charm. 153 A : 'Εκ Ποτιδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου. For the probable date of this battle see Introduction.

The Preface.
Terpsion and Euclides meet before Euclides' house in Megara. They converse about the dangerous state of Theætetus,

of whom Socrates had truly prophesied great things. Euclides has preserved the conversation, which Socrates a little while before his death held with Theætetus, who was then a boy.

TERP. Ζῶντι ἡ τετελευτηκότι;

p. 142.

EY. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ^B ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἴρει τὸ γεγονὸς νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.

5 TERP. Μῶν ἡ δυσεντερία;

EY. Ναί.

TERP. Οἶον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.

EY. Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὡς Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ νῦν ἥκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ ¹⁰ τὴν μάχην.

TERP. Καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ αὐτοῦ ^C Μεγαροῖ κατέλυεν;

EY. Ἡπείγετο οἴκαδε. ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ' ἐδεόμην καὶ ¹⁵ συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἥθελε. καὶ δῆτα προπέμψας

1. Ζῶντι ἡ τετελευτηκότι]

Terpsion's fears are excited by the word φερομένῳ.

2. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις]

'Indeed, only just alive.'

χαλεπῶς . . τινῶν]

Observe the anticipatory *καὶ*, contrasting the wounds with the disease.

3. μήν]

'However.'

4. αἴρει]

'Affects him.' Compare Soph. Ant. 606 : Τὰν οὕθ' ὑπνος αἴρει ποθ' ὁ παντογήρως. *ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι* completes the sense of γεγονός : i.e. τὸ νόσημα τὸ *ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι γεγονός* : but the expression is less formal.

7. Οἶον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ *εἶναι*]

'What a noble life is then in peril !' The worth of Thætetus is acknowledged by his Megarian friends, and is further confirmed (though confirmation was needless, ll. 11, 12) by the praise of him which Euclides has just heard (*καὶ*

^{νῦν}, l. 9).

9. ἥκουον]

The imperfects here and below, ll. 14, 15, refer to the time spent by Euclides in company with Theætetus and those who carried him.

11. θαυμαστότερον]

Sc. *ἡν* *ἄν*. The conversational ellipse, continuing the idiom from οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον, avoids the awkwardness of repeating *ἡν*. (θαυμαστότερον *ἡν* Schol., Thom. Mag.)

14. ἐπεὶ . . ἐδεόμην]

Wohlrab compares infr. 150 A B, 158 A, 167 A, etc. *ἐπεὶ . . γε* in such places marks the necessity of the foregoing explanation. It was not for want of friendly insistence that Theætetus did not stay, but because he longed to be at home.

15. δῆτα implies that there is something important to be said. 'And, I may tell you.'

p. 142. αὐτόν, ἀπιὰν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἔθαύμασα Σωκράτους, ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἰπε καὶ περὶ τούτου. δοκεῖ γάρ μοὶ ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ μειρακίῳ ὅντι, καὶ συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μοὶ 5 ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναζε τούς τε λόγους οὓς διελέχθη αὐτῷ διηγήσατο, καὶ μάλα ἀξίους ἀκοῆς, εἰπέ τε ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἴη τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἥλικιαν ἐλθοι.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες 10 ἥσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἀν διηγήσασθαι;

ΕΥ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὔκουν οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος· ἀλλ' ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότ' εὐθὺς οἴκαδ' ἐλθὼν

I. ἀπιὰν πάλιν] ‘As I returned.’

ἀνεμνήσθην] Sc. ἀ εἰπε Σ. περὶ τούτου. The sentence is modified by the introduction of the verb ἔθαύμασα. ‘I recalled the words of Socrates about him, and marvelled at the prophetic insight, which, like many sayings of Socrates, they showed.’

3. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι] δοκεῖ gives a slight uncertainty to the expression. It here qualifies rather the mark of time δὲ λίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου than the infinitive ἐντυχεῖν. So below, 144 C, δοκοῦσι belongs more in sense to ἀλειφάμενοι than to λέναι. ‘I think it was a little while before his death that he met with him.’

8. εἴπερ εἰς ἥλικιαν ἐλθοι] ‘If he lived long enough.’ These words also, as interpreted by the event, have a prophetic sound.

εἰς ἥλικιαν] Sc. τοῦ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι.

10. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε . . εἰπεν] In the editions before Heindorf these words were given to ΕΥ. But in the Bodleian MS. they are properly assigned to Terpion.

12. The particles οὔκουν . . γε imply, ‘Not, at least, in the way you mean.’

οὕτω] Compare the use of νῦν οὕτως. Heindorf quotes Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 9: Οὐκ ἀν ἔχομεῖ σοι οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεν.

13. ἐγραψάμην . . ἐγραφον] ‘I wrote for my own use—I went on writing.’ So the change of voice may be rendered. But ἐγραψάμην . . τὸν λόγον below, 143 B, has a different force, ‘I made my transcript.’ And in 143 C, where the notion of writing recurs without any personal reference, the middle voice is dropped. Such variations belong to the freedom of Greek idiom, and must be noticed, although of slight significance. The Bodleian MS. omits μέν, and Schanz formerly

ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμιμνησκό- p. 143.
μενος ἔγραφον, καὶ ὄσάκις Ἀθήναξέ ἀφικοίμην, ἐπα-
νηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη ὁ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ δεῦρο
ἐλθὼν ἐπηνωρθούμην· ὥστε μοι σχεδόν τι πᾶς ὁ
λόγος γέγραπται.

ΤΕΡ. Ἀληθῆ· ἡκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μέν-
τοι ἀεὶ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδεῖξαι διατέτριφα δεῦρο.
ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἔγωγε
καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὡς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἡκων.

(1871) proposed ἔγραψα μέν. But both the middle voice and the particle are idiomatic and expressive. And although μέν at first opposes the written notes to an extempore repetition, it is quite Greek, though not quite logical, to utilize it for the minor opposition (with ὕστερον δέ) of the fair copy to the notes or rough draft.

1. ὑπομνήματα] ‘Notes.’ See Phaedr. 275 A, where letters are called ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον : ib. 276 D.

3. ὁ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην] = εἰ τι μὴ ἐμεμνήμην. μὴ gives indefiniteness to ὁ.

6. Ἀληθῆ· ἡκουσα] The clauses are parallel and not consequent; hence the ἀσύνδετον. Heindorf’s conjecture, adopted by Schanz, ἀλλ’ ἡδη ἡκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, although most ingenious, is less idiomatic than the MS. text.

καὶ μέντοι, κ. τ. λ.] μέντοι opposes Terpsion’s present confession to his question in 142 D, which implied ignorance of the story. ‘And, now I think of it, I have always meant to ask you to show it me, but have let opportunities slip till now.’ That which is really most emphatic is expressed by the participle. It has been

objected to this rendering, (α) that δεῦρο is not used as an adverb of time except with μέχρις or ἀεὶ, (β) that διατρίβειν, meaning ‘to delay,’ could not have been used here without an adverb of place. But, (α) such transference of adverbs from place to time is not unusual, and it occurs in the case of δεῦρο in Plat. Tim. 21 D: Ἡν ἦδε ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε μέν, διὰ δὲ χρόνον καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ἔργα-
σαμένων οὐ διήρκεσε δεῦρο ὁ λόγος. In the present passage, the deviation from common use is softened by the neighbourhood of ἀεὶ. Comp. Aesch. Eum. 596: Καὶ δεῦρο γ’ ἀεὶ τὴν τύχην οὐ μέμ-
φομαι. Such a refinement upon a common phrase is in the manner of Plato. And (β) διατρίβειν is elsewhere used absolutely, with a touch of blame in it, as meaning not simply ‘to delay,’ but ‘to waste time.’ See Rep. 5. 472 B: Λέγε, καὶ μὴ διάτριβε: Thuc. 7. 42, 43, 47: also Aristoph. Eq. 515: Φησὶ γὰρ ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπ’ ἀνοίας τοῦτο πεπονθὼς διατρίβειν, where it occurs together with a participle, as here.

8. πάντως ἔγωγε . . δέομαι] ‘Besides, as I have walked in from the country, I should in

p. 143. ΕΥ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἐρωοῦ Θεαί-
^Β τητον προύπεμψα, ὥστε οὐκ ἀν ἀηδῶς ἀναπανοίμην.
 ἀλλ’ ἴωμεν, καὶ ήμūν ἄμα ἀναπανομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀν-
 γνώσεται.

ΤΕΡ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ΕΥ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὃ Τερψίων, τουτό· ἐγρα-
 ψάμην δὲ δὴ οὐτωσὶ τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη
 διηγούμενον ὡς διηγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη
 διαλεχθῆναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ
 τῷ Θεατήτῳ. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν ^{ιο}
 πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὐ-
 τοῦ τε, ὅπότε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης οἶν Κάγὼ ἔφην ἦ

any case be glad of a rest.' This asyndeton is frequent, πάντως having the force of a particle. Infr. 162 A: Πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλ' ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαί-
 νετο ὑπακούειν. Polit. 268 E:
 Πάντως οὐ πολλὰ ἐκφεύγεις παιδιᾶς
 ἔτη.

1. [Ἐρινοῦ] Ἐρινεόν was a spot on the Cephisus, close to Eleusis, where it was fabled that Pluto had descended with Proserpine. Paus. 1. 92. There were other places of the name.

3. ὁ παῖς] Euclides' servant.

7. οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον
^{κ.τ.λ.}] These words are parallel to οὐτωσὶ τὸν λόγον, depending on ἐγραψάμην. Compare Apol. 19 C: Ταῦτα . . . ἐωράτε . . . Σωκράτη . . . περιφερόμενον.

9. τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ]
 Theodorus the mathematician of Cyrene, with whom, according to a doubtful tradition, Plato once studied. He is a geometer, and stands thus on the threshold of philosophy; and he is of Cyrene, the city of Aristippus, with

whom he may be also connected as being one of the friends of Protagoras. See infr. 164 E: Οἱ ἐπίτροποι οὓς Πρωταγόρας κατ-
 ἐλιπεν . . . δῶν Θεόδωρος εἰς δόθε.

10. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, κ.τ.λ.] Imitated by Cicero, de Amic. c. 1: 'Quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne inquam et inquit saepius interponerentur.' Teichmüller finds in these words the transition from the earlier to the later manner of Plato. But this seems to prove too much. See Introduction.

11. αἱ μεταξὺ . . . διηγήσεις]
 'The bits of narration interrupting the dialogue.'

περὶ αὐτοῦ τε] περὶ αὐτοῦ depends immediately on διηγήσεις, and ὅπότε λέγοι is exegetic. Editors have preferred αὐτοῦ, placing the comma at διηγήσεις, which makes the syntax more regular, though with an awkward inversion. The MSS. often err in reading αὐτοῦ for αἵτοῦ, but it is safer to follow them where there is no manifest error.

They enter
 the house,
 and Eu-
 clides pro-
 duces the
 roll, which
 his servant
 reads to
 them.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἰπον, ἡ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, ὅτι p. 143.
Συνέφη ἡ Οὐχ ώμολόγει, τούτων ἔνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄπο τρόπου, ὥς Εὔκλείδη.

5 ΕΥ. Ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

The
Dialogue.
Socrates
meeting

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, ^δ
ῳ Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἂν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἀνηρώτων,

1. ἡ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου] sc. λέγοι. ἡ, κ.τ.λ. referring to ὄπότε λέγοι is introduced instead of the regular καί, κ.τ.λ. answering to περὶ αὐτοῦ τε. This helps to confirm the reading and punctuation, for the change from καί to ἡ is more natural, if the epexegesis begins with ὄπότε. ‘The interruptions both concerning Socrates himself,—when he said, for instance, “I remarked,” or “I replied;”—or again, when he told of the respondent, that “he assented,” or “he did not agree.”’ Cp. infr. 203 B. The forms here quoted are commonly reserved for the more emphatic places in narrated dialogue: cp. esp. Rep. 427 B, Prot. 317 D.

4. οὐδέν γε ἄπο τρόπου] Comp. Rep. 5. 470 B: Καὶ οὐδέν γε, ἔφη, ἄπο τρόπου λέγεις . . . Όρα δὴ καὶ τόδε εἰ πρὸς τρόπου λέγω. Also the emphatic use of the prep. ‘from’ in Elizabethan poetry: e. g. Jul. Cæs. 2. 3, ‘Why bird and beast *from*’ (i. e. contrary to) ‘quality and kind.’ (*ἄπο* is the Bodleian reading.)

5. λέγε] ‘Let us hear.’ Not said facetiously, as Wohlhab supposes, but more vivid and conversational than ἀναγίγνωσκε.

In this Preface we have been introduced to Theætetus as a man already distinguished among his fellow-citizens. In what follows we are to see the promise of his youth. We are told of Theætetus by late writers (besides the fact that he heard Socrates and followed Plato) that he taught mathematics at Heracleia, and that he was the author of the first treatise on the five regular solids. The interval which this seems to require between the trial of Socrates and the death of Theætetus (to which it is difficult not to suppose an allusion here) increases the uncertainty of the date. But see Introduction.

6. Εἰ μὲν . . .] ‘If my heart were in Cyrene.’ There is an imperfect sequence of clauses, arising out of the interpolation of the clause ἦττον γάρ . . . ἐπιεικεῖς. The last words form a transition to the main thought, to which the speaker gradually returns. The opening is characteristic of Socrates. He begins by putting an analogous case, in which the person addressed is interested.

7. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἂν . . . ἀνηρώτων]

p. 143. εἴ τινες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι· νῦν δέ — ἥττον γὰρ ἔκείνους ἢ τούσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτός τε σκοπῶ καθ' ὅσον 5 δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ οἷς ἀν ὄρῳ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας ξυγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγιστοι επλησιάζουσι, καὶ δικαίως· ἀξιος γὰρ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἔνεκα. εἰ δὴ οὖν τινι ἐνέτυχες ἀξιώ λόγου, 10 ηδέως ἀν πυθοίμην.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ

'I should have examined you about things there and persons there.' *ἔκείνων* is mase. The Bodleian MS. reads *ἄν* *ἡρώτων* (*sic*), in which the repetition of *ἄν* may be defended by comparing Rep. 7. 526 C: *οὐκ ἀν ἥραδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἀν εὔροις*. But the other reading, which is supported by T, is on the whole more probable, and the compound is expressive of the thorough-going,persistent questioning of Soerates.

1. ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν] 'Or other liberal pursuit.' Comp. Tim. 88 C: *Μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσχρώμενοι*. This word, like *ἐπιστήμη*, *σοφιστής* and others, is used by Plato sometimes in the more general and familiar, and sometimes in a more restricted and technical sense.

2. *νῦν δέ, κ. τ. λ.*] It makes little difference whether *νῦν δέ* is joined immediately with *ταῦτα δή*, *κ. τ. λ.*, or with a suppressed apodosis of which these words are a resumption. In the latter case we should omit the break with Wohlrb, Sehanz and H. Schmidt.

4. *τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων]* *ἡμῖν* (se. *τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις*) is not emphatic. The emphasis is anticipated in *τούσδε*.

ἡμῖν τῶν νέων . . (8.) 1. ἡμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν] Comp. Thue. 1. 6: *Οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων.*

γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς] 'To make a good figure.' *ἐπιεικῆς* in Plato seems frequently to mean simply 'excellent' (*laudabilis*, Ast. Lex.), ep. Legg. 12. 957A: "Εστ' ἐν πόλεσιν οὐκ ἀσχήμονα ἐπιεικῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ὀλίγα νομοθέτηματα. Symp. 210 B: "Ωστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικῆς ἀν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐὰν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, ἔξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ. Rep. 3. 398 E: "Αχρηστοι γὰρ καὶ γυναιξὶν ἀσ δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μὴ δτι ἀνδράσιν. (Cp. 387 E: Γυναιξὶ δὲ ἀποδιδοίμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦται σπουδαῖας.)

8. *ἀξιος γάρ]* The adjective receives greater emphasis by the omission of the substantive verb. Comp. Soph. Ed. Col. 758: *Τήνδε τὴν πόλιν φίλως Εἰπών, ἐπαξία γάρ*. Also Rep. 6. 499 D: *Περὶ τούτου ἔτομοι* (se. *ἔσμεν*) *τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι*.

11. *εἰπεῖν* refers to λόγον in l. 9.

Theodorus in an Athenian palæstra, asks what youth of promise he has met with, not in Cyrene, but in Athens.

Theodorus speaks warmly in praise of Theatetus, who, though not beautiful, is at once bold and

gentle and intelligent,
a rare combination!
Like a
stream of
oil, flowing
smoothly
and swiftly
without a
murmur.

*σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάννυ ἔξιον, οἵῳ ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μει- p. 143.
ρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλός, ἐφοβούμην
ἀν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ
εἶναι· νῦν δέ, καὶ μή μοι ἄχθου, οὐκ ἔστι καλός,
5 προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν
ὅμματων ἥπτον δὲ ἡ σὺ ταῦτ’ ἔχει. ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω.
εὖ γὰρ ἵσθι ὅτι ὡν δὴ πώποτε ἐνέτυχον, καὶ πάννυ p. 144.
πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα, οὐδένα πω ἡσθόμην οὕτω
θαυμαστῶς εὖ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὔμαθῆ ὄντα, ὡς*

3. *μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξῳ*] The expression is softened by the impersonal *τῷ*. ‘Lest it should be thought.’ This indirect reference to persons is common in Plato, as in other Greek. Cp. infr. 175 B: “Οταν δέ γέ τινα . . ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω, viz. τὸν δικαιικὸν ἔκεινον. Phaed. 63 A: ’Αεὶ δὲ Κέ-
βης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾶ, sc. ἐμούς.

4. *καὶ μή μοι ἄχθου*] καὶ introduces what is suddenly interposed. Comp. l. 7, and Gorg. 486 A: *Καίτοι, ὁ φίλε Σώκρατες—καὶ μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῆσ-* εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐκ αἰσχ-
ρὸν δοκεῖ σοι, κ. τ. λ. The outline of the sentence is *εἰ μὲν ἦν . . , ἐφοβούμην ἀν . . νῦν δὲ . . οὐκ ἔστι . . : ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω.* δὴ has an illative force=‘wherefore.’ In *οὐκ ἔστι* the sentence breaks from the subordinate form. Cp. Euthyphr. 11 C: *καὶ εἰ μὲν . . σκώμματος.*

5. *τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὅμματων*] This passage and the speech of Alcibiades in the Symposium, p. 215: “Οτι μὲν τὸ εἶδος ὅμοιος εἴ τούτοις (τοῖς Σειλη-
νοῖς . . καὶ τῷ Μαρσύᾳ) οὐδὲν αὐτὸς δὴ που ἀμφισβήτησεις—are the chief allusions to Socrates’ personal appearance in Plato. Cp. infr. 209 C: *Τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ*

ἔξοφθαλμον. An imitation of this passage occurs in the Symposium attributed to Xenophon, c. 5.

τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὅμματων] (1) ‘In having prominent eyes.’ So this point in the description of Socrates has been commonly understood. But may it not rather mean (2) ‘in the width between the eyes,—a confor-
mation sometimes accompanying a powerful brain?’ This suits with the *τῶφθαλμὸν παραβάλλων* of Aristophanes quoted by Plato in Symp. 221 B (cp. Phaed. 86 D). As *ἔξω* with the article takes the place of an adjective, so it is used here, like a neuter adjective, for the abstract notion of ‘outwardness.’ Cp. *τὸ σφόδρα*, Symp. 210 B, Phil. 45 C.

9. *τὸ γὰρ εὔμαθῆ ὄντα . . γιγνο-
μένους*] The anacoluthon adds to the expression of surprise. Comp. Protag. 317 A: *Τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀπο-
δρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ
μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος.* Parm. 128 B: *Τὸ οὖν . . οὗτος ἐκάτε-
ρον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν
εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέ-
γοντας ταῦτα, ὑπέρ ήμᾶς τοὺς
ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑπὲν τὰ εἰρημένα
εἰρῆσθαι.*

ώς ἄλλῳ χαλεπόν] The simple

p. 144. ἄλλω χαλεπόν, πρᾶον αὐτὸν εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεῖον παρ' ὄντων, ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' ἀν φόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνομένους· ἀλλ' οἵ τε ὁξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὄργας ὁξύρροποί εἰσι, καὶ ἄττον-

and obvious meaning of these words, ‘as it is hard for another to be,’ i.e. ‘in a degree hardly to be equalled,’ has been questioned by critics because it was thought that *χαλεπόν* could not be applied to qualities that are not acquired. But the word is not tied down to this preciseness of meaning. It has passed out of it even in Homer. Cp. Od. 11. 156: Χαλεπὸν δὲ τάδε ζωῖσιν ὁρᾶσθαι (which may be similarly explained as = *χαλεπόν* ἔστι τοὺς ζωῖσιν τάδε ὁρᾶσθαι). So elsewhere in Plato *χαλεπός* occurs where human agency is not in question to signify ‘next to impossible.’ See Rep. 6. 502 C: Χαλεπὰ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε—viz. that philosophers should be kings, a consummation requiring, as a precedent condition, the combination of qualities which is indicated here. What Plato would think of this grammatical refinement may be inferred from his eariature of it in the Protagoras, 344 E: Σὺ δὲ φύς, ὃ Πίττακε, χαλεπὸν ἔσθλὸν ἔμμεναι· τὸ δὲ . . . ἀδύνατον.

3. γενέσθαι (*τοιοῦτον τινα*), ‘I should not have thought there could have been an instance of this combination, nor do I find it usual.’

γιγνομένους] Se. *τοιούτους*. Cf. Rep. 6. 492 E: Οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτ' οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἥθος, κ. τ. λ.

ἀλλ' οἵ τε, κ. τ. λ.] The

thought is exactly paralleled in the Republic, where the same combination of qualities is described as essential to the philosophic nature, and its rarity is dwelt upon in similar words. Rep. 6. 503 C: Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὁξεῖς οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἄμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας, οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὁξύτητος φέρονται ὅπῃ ἀν τύχωσι, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἀπαν αὐτῶν ἔξοιχεται. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὐτὸν ταῦτα ἥθη καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοῖς χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὐτὸν ποιεῖ ταῦτον, δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς, καὶ ὑπὸν τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίπλανται, ὅταν τι δέῃ τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν; So the difficulty of combining bravery with gentleness is dwelt upon, ib. 375, 6. See also Polit. 309, 310, Legg. 6. 773. The essentials of the philosophic nature enumerated in the 6th Book of the Republic are, love of truth, quickness in learning, good memory, liberality, justice and gentleness, temperance, courage. Thicætetus is the embodiment of this nature.

4. ὁξεῖς] ‘Quick.’ Cp. Rep. 6. 503 C: Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὁξεῖς—quoted above.

5. πρὸς τὰς ὄργας ὁξύρροποι] ‘Impetuous.’ ‘Quick in temper as in mind.’

τες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μανι- p. 144.
κώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρειότεροι φύονται, οἵ τε αὖ ἐμβριθεστε-^β
ροι νωθροί πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λή-
θης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὗτος λείως τε καὶ ἀπταίστως καὶ
5 ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις
μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἑλαίου ρέῦμα ἀψοφητὶ^γ
ρέοντος, ὡστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον ὅντα οὗτο
ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Εὖ ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἔστι τῶν πολι-
10 τῶν;

Theætetus
(son of Eu-
phronius of
Sunium)
now enters

ΘΕΟ. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὕ-
ἀλλὰ γάρ ἔστι τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. c
ἄρτι γάρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἡλείφοντο ἐταῖροί τέ τινες

2. φύονται] Rep. 6. 503 C :
Οὐκ ἐθέλουσι.. φύεσθαι. ‘Have
more the nature of madmen
than of courageous men.’

3. λήθης γέμοντες] Rep. 6. 486
C : Εἰ μηδὲν ὅν μάθοι σώξειν δύ-
νατο, λήθης ὁν πλέως, ἀρ' ὁν οἴος
τ' εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι.

5. ἀνυσίμως] ‘Successfully’—
‘Making rapid progress.’

7. ὡστε θαυμάσαι] Soph. El.
394 : Καλὸς γὰρ οὐμὸς βίοτος,
ὡστε θαυμάσαι. Aristoph. Plut.
810 : Τὰ σκενάρια πλήρη στίν,
ὡστε θαυμάσαι. By an ex-
pansion, the particular cause of
wonder is here expressed and
made to depend on θαυμάσαι.

9. καὶ asks for further in-
formation.

11. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημο-
νεύω δὲ οὕ] Theodorus takes the
interest of a teacher in the
youth himself, Socrates that
of a fellow-citizen in his father.

12. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἔστι.. ἀλλὰ σκό-
πει] This double ἀλλά is fre-
quent in Plato. Comp. also
Soph. Phil. 520 : Ἄλλ' αἰσχρὰ

μέντοι σοῦ γ' ἔμ' ἐνδεέστερον | ξένῳ
φανῆναι πρὸς τὸ καίριον πονεῖν. |
ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, πλέωμεν. The second
ἀλλά puts definitely forward the
proposition for which the first
ἀλλά has cleared the way.

13. ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ] The
seenē then is a gymnasium,
perhaps the Lyceum. Compare
Euthyphr. 2 A : Σὺ τὰς ἐν
Δυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε
νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασι-
λέως στοάν; taken in connection
with infr. 210 D : Νῦν ..
ἀπαντήσοντο μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασι-
λέως στοάν. Theodorus had
seen the young men in the
portico as he entered. The
word δρόμος seems to have been
applied to several parts of the
gymnasium. Euthyd. 273 A :
Ἐν τῷ καταστέγῳ δρόμῳ. (See
the whole passage.) Aristias
ap. Polluc. 9. 43 : Ἡν μοι
παλαιότρα καὶ δρόμος ξυστὸς πέλας.
Archæologists are not agreed
as to the exact part of the pa-
lästra which is here indicated.

ἐταῖροί τέ τινες] One of these,

p. 144. οὗτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψάμενοι δεῦρο ἔναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν.

the gymnasium with some companions. Theodorus adds that, although impoverished, the youth is most liberal. He is made to sit by Socrates. They converse.

ΣΩ. Γιγνώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουνιέως Εὐφρονίου ἐστί, καὶ πάνυ γε, ὡς φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἶον καὶ σὺ τοῦτον διηγεῖ, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα 5 πολλὴν κατέλιπε. τὸ δὲ ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.

ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὡς Σώκρατες, τό γε ὄνομα· τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποί τινες διεφθαρκέναι· ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα θαυμαστός, ὡς Σώκρατες.

10

ΣΩ. Γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καί μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σωκράτη.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ὥντα κάγὼ ἐμαυτὸν 15 ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποῖον τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον. φησὶ γὰρ Ε Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοὶ ὅμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῷν ἔχόντοις ἔκατέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι ὅμοιώς, πότερον εὐθὺς ἀν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ ἀν εἰ μουσικὸς ὡν λέγει;

'If Theodorus were a draughtsman, he would be an authority on the subject of our personal appearance.'

20

Néos Σωκράτης, is named in this dialogue, and is an interlocutor in the Politicus. The others remain mute. Such *káphα πρόσωπα* occur in many dialogues; e.g. Lysias, Charmantides, etc., in the Republic. Observe the idiomatic use of *δοκεῖν* here and infr. D. Cp. supr. 142 C.

σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλῃς ψυχὴν φιλόσοφον τε καὶ μή. Τὸ ποῖον; Μή σε λάθη μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας.

II. τὸν ἄνδρα] Not μειράκιον. 'He must be a capital fellow.' καί, as elsewhere, adds a touch of earnestness to the imperative.

13. Θεαίτητε] The abrupt vocative, without ὡς, is the address of the master to the pupil.

15. κάγὼ] καί is to be taken closely with ὥν and the verb. Cf. Soph. Antig. 280: Παῦσαι, πρὶν ὀργῆς κάμε μεστῶσαι λέγων (where join πρὶν καὶ μεστῶσαι).

19. εἰ μουσικὸς ὡν λέγει] The

4. καὶ πάνυ] καί is intensive.
5. καὶ μέντοι] 'And surely, now I think of it.' This is a reason why the youth should have been better known. The construction returns to the indicative.

9. ἐλευθεριότητα] Rep. 6.485
E: Καὶ μήν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ

'As he is a cultivated man, we must respect his judgment of our mental endowments.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἄν.

p. 144

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εύρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἄν,
ἄμουσον δέ, ἡπιστοῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

5 ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γ' οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν
προσώπων ὁμοιότητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὢν λέγει p. 145
ἢ οὐ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔχ, ὅστον γ' ἔμε εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δή που, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ
μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοίους
φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πη ἢ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ
ἀξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰσως οὐ.

20 ΣΩ. Τί δ', εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῦ πρὸς _β

man then is not the measure of
the likeness of musical sounds!
Yet afterwards Theætetus is
wholly unconscious of contradicting
this his first admission.

I. [Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἄν] Cp. esp.
Crit. 47 B: Γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ

τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀν-
δρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ φύγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν
νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου,
ὅς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἵτρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης
ών; Laeh. 184 D E.

10. Οὔχ, ὅστον γ' ἔμε εἰδέναι]
The Cesena MS., with a few
others, has γ' ἔμε, but the
greatest number (including the
Bodl.) read γέ με. ἔμε seems
more pointed, 'not that I know

of,' but με is possibly right.

11. [Ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός;]
'Nor a geometriean, neither,
eh?' There is an arghness in
the question, which affects to
make doubtful what is matter
of notoriety.

13. [Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικός]
'I wonder if he is also an astro-
nomer.'

20. [εἰ ποτέρου]
'The mind of
one of us two.' The indefinite
πότερος occurs several times
in Plato. Cp. Soph. 252 A:
"Ἐσται πότερον αὐτῶν, οὐσίας μὴ
προσκουνώντων; Though not
common in other writers, it
is precisely analogous to the

p. 145. ἀρετήν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἀρ' οὐκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὡρα τοίνυν, ὡς φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπι- 5 δεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι· ως εὖ ἔσθι ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρός με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπήνεσεν ως σὲ νῦν δή.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εὖ ἀν ἔχοι, ὡς Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ 10 παιζων ἐλεγεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὡμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παιζόντα λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν· πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ.

'Therefore,
Theætetus,
you must
be cate-
chized by
me; for he
has praised
you to me
very
highly.'

10

15

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι· μανθάνεις πον παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἄττα;

'You learn
from Theodo-
dorus seve-
ral things.'

indefinite use of *τὶς*, *πού*, *ποθέν*, etc.

9. Εὖ ἀν ἔχοι] 'That is good!'—'I am glad to hear it.' Or rather, perhaps, more hypothetically, 'It is well, if it is so.' For (1) cp. Menex. 249 E: Χάριν ἔχω τῷ εἰπόντι. Σ. Εὖ ἀν ἔχοι. ἀλλ' ὅπως μου μὴ κατερεῖς. And for (2) Polit. 277 A: Κινδυνεύει τέλεως ἀν ἥμιν ἔχειν. Σ. Καλῶς ἀν, ὡς Σ., ἥμιν ἔχοι. δεῖ δὲ μὴ σοὶ μόνῳ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μοι—ξυνδοκεῖν.

11. μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὡμολογημένα] 'Do not shrink from what you have agreed to.' Cp. Hom. Il.

13. 225: Οὔτε τις ὄκνῳ Εἴκων ἀνδύεται πολέμου κακοῦ. Euthyd.

302 E: Οὐκ ἔστι γάρ μοι ἀνάδυσις.

14. ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ] 'Will be found to impugn him.' The verb *ἐπισκήπτειν*, to accuse of murder or false witness (*φόνον*, *ψευδομαρτυρίων*), is commonly found in the middle voice, because the accuser in such cases is generally an interested party. The passage of Aeschines contr. Timarch., formerly quoted in support of the active, is found to have the middle in the best MSS., and Wohlrab tries to substantiate a different meaning here, while Schanz writes *ἐπισκήψεται* αὐτῷ from conjecture. Neither is really necessary.

17. μανθάνεις] There is a stress upon the word, preparing for what follows.

To learn is
to become
wiser. To
be wise is
to know.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγέ.

p. 145.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἀρμονίας δικαὶ λογισμούς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμοῦμαι γε δή.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὡς πᾶς, παρά γε τούτου καὶ παρ' ἄλλων, οὓς ἀν οἰωμαί τι τούτων ἐπαίειν. ἀλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, μικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ, ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καί μοι λέγε· ἀρ' οὐ τὸ μανθάνειν ἔστι τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεται σθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει τις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Σοφίᾳ δέ γ' οἴμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἀπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτὸν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τούννυν ἔστιν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύ-

2. τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν] 'Astronomy, and what relates to it.'

4. Προθυμοῦμαι γε δή] 'I certainly do my endeavour.' He is more modest about these higher subjects.

5. παρά γε τούτου] γε (the MS. reading) may be defended: 'certainly when I have such a master,' referring to προθυμοῦμαι: 'although τε, the correction of Heindorf, which is supported by the version of Ficinus, perhaps reads more harmoniously; and the change is slight. Cp. Crat. 384 E.

6. ἀλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα . . μικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ] For the parataxis cp. Rep. 2. 367 E: Καὶ ἐγώ ἀκούσας, ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ—ἡγάμην, ἀταρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἥσθην.

7. For the ironical μικρὸν τι cp. Charm. 154 D.

16. ἀπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί] For the indefinite plural cp. Georg. 457 C: Οὐ φαδίως δύνανται—διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους—οὗτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας. And for the sense cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 7: Ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ἔκαστος, ταῦτα καὶ σοφός ἔστιν.

What,
then, is
Know-
ledge ?

p. 145. *ναμαι λαβεῖν ἵκανως παρ' ἐμαυτῷ*, 'Επιστήμη ὅ τί ποτε

p. 146. *τυγχάνει ὅν*. ἄρ' οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό; τί φατέ; τίς ἀν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτών, καὶ ὃς ἀν ἀεὶ ἀμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ παιδεῖς οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὅνος. ὃς δ' ἀν περιγένηται 5 ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὅ τι ἀν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τί σιγάτε; οὐ τί που, ὡς Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἄγροικίζομαι, προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλους γίγνεσθαι;

A pause.

10

Β ΘΕΟ. "Ηκιστα μέν, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀν εἴη ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευέ σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀγέθης τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὐδὲ αὖ συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω. τοῖσδε

1. *λαβεῖν ἵκανως*] 'To grasp adequately.' 'To get a clear conception of.'

Phileb. 50 D : *Λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφεῖναί με*, κ.τ.λ.

3. *ὁ δὲ . . ἀμαρτάνῃ*] 'But he who makes a blunder, or whoever is in error from time to time.'

4. *καθεδεῖται . . ὅνος*] Schol. Τῶν οὖν παιζόντων ταῦτα τοὺς μὲν νικῶντας βασιλεῖς ἐκάλουν, καὶ ὁ τι ἀν προσετάττον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπήκοον, τοὺς δὲ ἡττωμένους ὅνους. Cp. Hor. Ep. I. I. 59: 'At pueri ludentes, Rex eris, aiunt, Si recte facies.' 'Mant. Prov. I. 34: βασιλεὺς ἡ ὅνος' ἥγουν νικῶν ἡ ἡττώμενος.' Wohlrab.

9. *ἡμᾶς*] So the Bodleian MS. Others (including Ces.) have *ὑμᾶς* by a common error. The first person is obviously more in keeping with the urbanity of Socrates.

10. *προσηγόρους*] The active

and passive meanings are combined. 'Mutually conversable.' Cp. Republic 8. 546 C: Πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ρητὰ πρὸς ἀλληλα ἀπέφηναν. There is possibly an allusion to the mathematical meaning here: 'to make you friends, and bring you into relations with one another.' Cp. Republic 7. 534 D: 'Αλόγους ὅντας ὥσπερ γραμμάς, and the phrases Σύμφωνα καὶ ποτάγορα,—'Ομοια καὶ ποτάγορα, in later Pythagorean writings.

11. *μέν* is omitted in T.

12. *τῶν μειρακίων τι*] Steph. conj. *τινά*, which is also found as a correction in one MS., but cp. Euthyd. 277 D: Γνοὺς βαπτιζόμενον τὸ μειράκιον, βουλόμενος ἀναπαῦσαι αὐτό.

13. *διαλέκτου*] 'Conversation,' with something of the more technical meaning of 'abstract discussion.' Cp. Republic 5. 454 A: "Εριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.

δὲ πρέποι τε ἀν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλεῖον ἐπιδιδοῖεν· p. 146.
τῷ γὰρ ὅντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ',
ῶσπερ ἥρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀκούεις δή, ὡς Θεαιτητε, ἀ λέγει Θεόδωρος,
5 ὡς ἀπιστεῖν, ως ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε σ
θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώ-
τερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ γενναιώς εἰπέ· τί σοι δο-
κεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ύμεις
10 κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ, ἀν τι καὶ ἀμάρτω, ἐπανορ-
θώσετε.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἀν πέρ γε οἵοι τε ὁμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ ἀ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἀν
τις μάθοι ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἀσ νῦν δὴ
15 σὺ διῆλθες, καὶ αὐτὸν σκυτοτομική τε καὶ αἱ τῶν ἄλλων ^δ
δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πᾶσαι τε καὶ ἐκάστη τούτων, οὐκ
ἄλλο τι ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Γενναιώς γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὡς φίλε, ἐν αἰτη-
θεὶς πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἀπλοῦ.

2. ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει] Rep. 7. 536
D : Σόλωνι γάρ οὐ πειστέον, ὡς
γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς μαν-
θάνειν; ἀλλ' ἥπτον ἡ τρέχειν, νέων
δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ
πόνοι.

3. μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου,
ἀλλ' ἐρώτα] Cr. Lach. 184 C :
Χρὴ δὲ ὅπερ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον,
καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε μὴ ἀφίεναι, δὲλλὰ
δεῖσθαι συμβουλεύειν. Rep. 5.
449 C.

5-7. ἀπιστεῖν, ‘to disobey’;
ἀπειθεῖν, ‘to be disobedient.’

5. οὔτε θέμις . . νεώτερον ἀπει-
θεῖν] Instead of making ἀπιστεῖν
depend on θέμις, a new clause is
introduced expressing the par-
ticular points in this disobededi-

ence which make it unlawful.
The like change occurs often in
Plato, and is part of the fulness
of his style. See above, 144
B: “Ωστε θαυμάσαι, κ.τ.λ., and
note.

10. πάντως γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] Theæ-
tetetus is not yet alive to the dif-
ficulty of the subject. He is
sure that Theodorus and So-
crates have entire command
of it.

14-17. ἐπιστῆμαι . . ἐπιστήμη] Theætetetus does not distinguish
between ‘sciences’ and ‘sci-
ence.’ Grammatically, the va-
riation is caused by the intro-
duction of the singular ἐκάστη.

18. Γενναιώς γε] Referring to

Theætetetus
is at length
encouraged
to attempt
an answer.
‘Geometry
and other
branches of
education,
shoe-mak-
ing and the
other use-
ful arts, all
and each
of these is
know-
ledge.’

But these
are many
and vari-
ous; know-

p. 146. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἰσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω.
ὅταν λέγης σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἐπιστή-
μην ὑποδημάτων ἔργασίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν τεκτουνικήν; μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπι-
στήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἔργασίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὐδὲ ἑκατέρα ἐπιστήμη,
τοῦτο ὄρίζεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐπερωτηθέν, ὡς Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν,

εὖ καὶ γενναίως above, and to
Theodorus's praise, supr. 144 D.

19. *ποικίλα*] Either 'a rich variety of things,' or 'many complex notions for one simple one.' The analysis of terms which follows points rather to the latter meaning; but the former is more natural, and is supported by comparing Philibius 12 C (at the opening of the dialogue): Τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἴδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον. . . . ἔστι γὰρ ἀκούειν μὲν οὗτος ἀπλῶς ἐν τι, μορφᾶς δὲ δήπου παντοίας εἰληφε καὶ τινα τρόπον ἀνομοίας ἀλλήλων. The two objections (*πολλά, ποικίλα*) are discussed in the reverse order. See below: Τίνων . . . ὁπόσαι, Πρῶτόν γέ που . ."Επειτά γέ που, κ.τ.λ.

1. *Πῶς τί*] What (*τί*), and with what meaning (*πῶς*). Cp. Soph. 261 E: Πῶς τί τοῦτ' εἰπεις; διπερ ὥηθην, κ.τ.λ. Some editors interpunctuate in all such cases (*πῶς; τί, κ.τ.λ.*). But the Greek idiom often combines two interrogations in a single clause.

ledge is one and simple. To enumerate is not to define. This is illustrated.

2. *"Ισως μὲν οὐδέν]* Sc. λέγω, 'perhaps I am talking nonsense.'

ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι] Sc. λέγειν.

3. *σκυτικήν]* This is said to have differed from *σκυτοτομική* (above); and the change of word is an instance of Plato's love of variety (cp. supr. C: ἀπιστεῖν . . . ἀπειθεῖν). Perhaps the one was a generic, the other a specific term. At least they do not exclude each other in Plato. See Rep. 2. 374 B: Ἡ οὖν σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πολεμικῆς; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλ' ἀρα τὸν σκυτοτόμον, κ.τ.λ. Ib. 10. 601 C: Ποιήσει δέ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς; . . . οὐδὲ δοπιήσας ὁ τε χαλκεὺς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς;

ὅταν . . . φράζεις] 'You express by the term "shoemaking."

12. *Τὸ δ' ἐπερωτηθέν]* 'But what I went on to ask you.' Cp. supr. p. 16. l. 3, μὴ ἀφίεσο, κ.τ.λ. Τὸ δέ γ' ἐρωτηθέν is a MS. conjecture ('τὸ δέ γε, t. mg. τὸ δέ γε ἐρωτηθέν, Vind. suppl. 7. Schanz).

τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὅπόσαι τινές. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆ- p. 146.
σαι αὐτὰς βούλομενοι ἡρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνῶναι ἐπιστή-
μην αὐτὸ ὅ τι ποτ' ἔστιν. ἡ οὐδὲν λέγω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὁρθῶς.

5 ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων p. 147.
τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροιτο, οἶν περὶ πηλοῦ, ὅ τι ποτ'
ἔστιν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρέων
καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἵπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλιν-
θουργῶν, οὐκ ἀν γελοῖοι εἴμεν;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. "Ισως.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μέν γέ που οἱόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς
ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, ὅταν εἴπωμεν

1. τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὅπό-
σαι τινές] The first answer of
Meno to the question, 'What is
virtue?' is exactly analogous to
this of Theætetus about know-
ledge. Instead of attempting
to generalize, he enumerates
the several kinds of virtue.
Men. 71 E : 'Ανδρὸς ἀρετῆν . . .
γυναικὸς ἀρετῆν . . . παιδὸς ἀρετῆ,
κ.τ.λ. Socrates replies (Men.
72 A): Πολλῆ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ
ἔσικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὡς Μένων, εἰ μίαν
ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνεύρηκα
ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων, κ.τ.λ.
The whole passage should be
compared with this. See also
Lach. 191, 192, where Socrates
finds a similar difficulty in lead-
ing the respondent to the con-
ception of a general notion,—
and Soph. 240, where Theæt-
etus is again entrapped into a
similar mistake in defining the
word εἴδωλον.

2. ἐπιστήμην αὐτό] Rep. 472
C : 'Εξητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην
οὗτον ἔστι.

5. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς—εἰ ἀποκριναί-
μεθα] For the double εἰ comp.

Rep. 331 C : Εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ
φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονοῦντος ὅπλα,
εἰ μανεῖς ἀπαιτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.

τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων]
'Some trivial and obvious mat-
ter.'

8. ἵπνοπλαθῶν] For this, the
reading of all the MSS., κοροπλα-
θῶν has been substituted in the
margin of some MSS., for the
sake of the uniformity which
Plato avoided. See below, note
on κοροπλαθῶν, p. 19. l. 1.

11. οἱόμενοι συνιέναι] Cr.
Rep. 505 C : Εἰ δύεδίζοντές γε
ὅτι οὐκ ἵσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγοντι
πᾶλιν ὡς εἰδότι φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό
φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ συνιέντων
ἡμῶν ὃ τι λέγονται, ἐπειδὴν τὸ τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ φθέγγωνται ὅνομα. Soph.
244 A : Τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαί-
νειν ὅπόταν δν φθέγγησθε; We
find ourselves involved in a
further stage of the same ab-
surdity at the end of the
dialogue, p. 210 A : Καὶ παν-
τάπασι γε εὕηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν
ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὁρθὴν εἶναι
μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος
εἴτε δοτούν.

p. 147. πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες εἴτε ἄλλων
ἢ ώντινωνοῦν δημιουργῶν. ἢ οἵει τίς τι συνίησί τινος
ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν ὁ 5
ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Σκυτικὴν ἄρα οὐ συνίησιν ὃς ἀν ἐπιστήμην
ἀγνοῇ, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Ἐστιν οὕτως.

10

ΣΩ. Γελοία ἄρα η ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπι-
στήμη τί ἐστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα.
τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται, οὐ τοῦτ' ἐρωτηθεῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εοικεν.

ΣΩ. "Ἐπειτά γέ που ἔξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως 15
ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν. οἷον καὶ
ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαῦλόν που καὶ ἀπλοῦν

1. εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσ-
θέντες] It is in Plato's manner
to surprise us with a fresh ex-
ample at each step of the argu-
ment, instead of dwelling upon
one already adduced. Rep. 3.
333 B: "Ωσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικός,
κ.τ.λ. Prot. 312 D: "Ωσπερ ὁ
κιθαριστής, κ.τ.λ., and in this
dialogue, p. 161 D: Βατράχου
γυρίνου. 169 B: Σὺ δὲ κατ'
'Ανταίον, κ.τ.λ. 178 D: Οὐχ ἡ
τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ. 190 C: 'Υγιαί-
νοντα ἡ μαινόμενον.

2. ἢ οἵει τίς τι] τίς is made
oxytone here because of τι following.
οἵει is parenthetical,
and therefore does not affect
the position of the enclitics.
For the sense cp. Men. 80
D: Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὡ
Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἴσθα τὸ
παράπαν ὃ τι ἐστι.

12. ὅταν.. ὄνομα] 'When he
gives as an answer the name
of a particular art.' The ac-
cusative is cognate.

15. "Ἐπειτά γέ που] This
ought strictly to refer to the
illustration: to which the sen-
tence presently returns. But
Socrates had reverted to the
main subject in the preceding
instances.

16. περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν] Ar. Met. 3. 1007 a: 'Αδύνατον
ἀπειρά γ' ὅντα τὰ συμβεβηκότα δι-
ελθεῖν ἢ οὖν ἀπαντα διελθέτω ἢ
μηθέν.

17. ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει] For the form of reference with
ἐν cp. Thucyd. 1. 9: 'Εν τοῦ
σκῆπτρου τῇ παραδόσει. Phileb.
33 B: 'Εν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων.
The frequency of this idiom
perhaps assists the genitive

εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῆ ὑγρῷ φυραθεῖσα πηλὸς ἀν εἴη, τὸ δ' p. 147.
ὅτου ἔân χαίρειν.

Theætetus perceives that the answer required is analogous to a geometrical expression;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ράδιον, ὥστε Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτᾶν οἷον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν
5 ἔναγχος εἰσῆλθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σῷ
ὅμωνύμῳ τούτῳ Σωκράτει. D

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δή, ὥστε Θεαίτητε;

πηλοῦ, which is descriptive rather than objective. ‘In the question of the clay.’

1. πηλὸς ἀν εἴη] Either, (1) ‘earth, if tempered with moisture, will be (*ἀν εἴη*) mud,’ or (2), ‘moistened earth would seem to be (*ἀν εἴη*) the definition of mud.’

2. ὅτου is masculine (supr. A B), although τινός above (p. 19, l. 13) was neuter.

3. νῦν γε οὕτω] ‘Now as you put it.’ So far Theætetus has appeared wholly unfamiliar with the conception of a universal notion. But Socrates’ illustration reminds him of the comprehensive simplicity of geometrical expressions. And thus he finds a clue in what he knows to the new labyrinth of inquiry into which Socrates invites him. Mathematical ideas, being the first pure abstractions obtained by the mind, are peculiarly fitted to guide it to the contemplation of abstractions generally. So at least thought Plato: Rep. 7. 522-531. On the minuteness of such illustrations see Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. (1840) p. 197: ‘A number of Plato’s dialogues are intended merely to produce the consciousness of a general notion, which we possess without the trouble of acquiring it. Hence his dis-

cursiveness has often the effect of tediousness to us.’

In reading what follows, it must be borne in mind that, by the ancients, arithmetic was studied through geometry. If a number was regarded as simple, it was a line. If as composite, it was a rectangular figure, whether plane or solid. To multiply was to construct a rectangle, to divide was to find one of its sides. Traces of this usage still remain in terms like square, cube, common measure, but the method itself is obsolete. Hence it requires an effort to conceive of the square root, not as that which multiplied into itself produces a given number, but as the side of a square, which either is the number, or is equal to the rectangle which is the number. The use of the Arabic notation and of algebra has greatly assisted in expressing and conceiving the properties of numbers without reference to form.

6. Σωκράτει] Young Socrates becomes the respondent in the Politicus. To introduce him here by name is quite in the manner of Plato. Naber’s proposal to cancel this word, and Μεγαροί supr. 142 B, is surely erroneous. To do so would be to blur the outlines which Plato has made distinct.

p. 147. ΘΕΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεων τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὅδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀποφαίνων ὅτι μήκει οὐ ξύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω

1. Περὶ δυνάμεων τι, κ. τ. λ.] See Eucl. B. 10. Deff. 3-11: Εὐθείαι δυνάμει σύμμετροι εἰσιν, ὅταν τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν τετράγωνα τῷ αὐτῷ χωρίῳ μετρήται. Ἀσύμμετροι δέ, ὅταν τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτῶν τετραγώνοις μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται χωρίον κοινὸν μέτρον γενέσθαι. Τούτων ὑποκειμένων δείκνυται ὅτι τῇ προτεθείσῃ εὐθείᾳ ὑπάρχουσιν εὐθείαι πλήθει ἀπειροὶ ἀσύμμετροι αἱ μὲν μήκει μόνον, αἱ δὲ καὶ δυνάμει, (v. l. σύμμετροι καὶ ἀσύμμετροι, αἱ μὲν μήκει καὶ δυνάμει, αἱ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον.) Καλείσθω οὖν ἡ μὲν προτεθείσα εὐθεία ρήτη. Καὶ αἱ ταύτη σύμμετροι, εἴτε μήκει καὶ δυνάμει, εἴτε δυνάμει μόνον, ρήται. Αἱ δὲ ταύτη ἀσύμμετροι, ἄλογοι καλείσθωσαν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς προτεθείσης εὐθείας τετράγωνον, ρήτόν. Καὶ τὰ τούτῳ σύμμετρα, ρήτα. Τὰ δὲ τούτῳ ἀσύμμετρα, ἄλογα καλείσθω. Καὶ αἱ δυνάμειναι αὐτά, ἄλογοι· εἰ μὲν τετράγωνα εἴη, αὐταὶ αἱ πλευραί, εἰ δὲ ἔτερά τινα εὐθύγραμμα, αἱ ἵσα αὐτοῖς τετράγωνα ἀναγράφουσαι. B. 7. 17. 19: Τετράγωνος ἀριθμός ἔστιν ὁ ἴσακις ἵσος, ἢ ὁ ὑπὸ δυὸς ἵσων ἀριθμῶν περιεχόμενος. "Οταν δὲ δυὸς ἀριθμοὶ πολλαπλασιάσαντες ἀλλήλους ποιῶσι τινα, ὁ γενόμενος ἐπίπεδος καλεῖται· πλευραὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλαπλασιάσαντες ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοί. Prop. 21: Τὸ ὑπὸ ρήτων δυνάμει μόνον συμμέτρων εὐθειῶν περιεχόμενον ὄρθογώνοις ἀλογόν ἔστι. καὶ ἡ δυναμένη αὐτὸς ἀλογός ἔστι. Καλείσθω δὲ μέση.

δυνάμεων] In mathematical language *δυνάμεις*, or ‘powers,’ are commonly understood to be the squares, cubes, etc., of simple quantities. And the word has been so interpreted here.

But it is not clear that in Plato’s time this point of terminology was fixed. And on comparing 148A it would rather seem that *δύναμις* is here an abbreviation for ἡ δυναμένη γραμμὴ εὐθεία, i.e. to speak arithmetically, not (1) the ‘power’ but (2) the ‘root,’ and the same term is presently limited by Theaetetus and young Socrates to irrational roots. Cp. Eucl. B. 7. Deff.: ‘Ἐκ δύο ὀνομάτων πρώτη, δευτέρα, etc. ἀποτομὴ πρώτη, δευτέρα, etc.’ This explanation suits the context best. But the question is not one of much consequence. For just as the sides of the squares which are equal to 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 are δυνάμει σύμμετροι, the squares themselves may be described as μήκει ἀσύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, i. e. having irrational sides.

2. H. Schmidt, who is followed in this by Schanz, has deleted the comma which was placed after *πεντέποδος* in previous editions.

3. τῇ ποδιαίᾳ] Sc. (1) δυνάμει, or (2) εὐθείᾳ:—the unit of measurement for integer quantities. The meaning is that the line = $\sqrt{1}$ or 1 is incommensurable with the line = $\sqrt{3}$.

H. Schmidt takes τῇ ποδιαίᾳ (*δυνάμει*) for an instrumental dative, ‘commensurable by the “unit.”’ This is less natural than ‘commensurable with unity,’ and particularly awkward if *δύναμις* is the square. For how can a square be the measure of a line? If the words τῇ ποδιαίᾳ were cancelled as a gloss, they

i.e. simple and comprehensive. He relates the discovery of the integral and potential root.

κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἐπτακαι- p. 147.
δεκάποδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο. ήμιν οὖν εἰσ-
ῆλθε τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνά-
μεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειραθῆναι ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἐν, ὅτῳ
5 πάσας ταύτας προσαγορεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις. E

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ εὕρετέ τι τοιοῦτον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ.


ΣΩ. Λέγε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν. τὸν
10 μὲν δυνάμενον ἵσον ἴσακις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ

could be more easily spared than many phrases which have been excised by recent editors.

The square root of 2 was also incommensurable with the unit-line. But this had been already proved in the familiar theorem about the side and the diameter of a square, and was therefore passed over as already known.

The sides of the square could easily be found through the familiar relation between the hypotenuse and the other sides of a right-angled triangle. Thus, the diameter of $1 = \sqrt{2}$. The hypotenuse of $\sqrt{2}$ and $\sqrt{1} = \sqrt{3}$. And so on.



4. ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἐν, ὅτῳ] ἐν is not the antecedent of ὅτῳ;

the construction is *κατὰ σύνεσιν*, as if it were *ἐύρεῖν*, ὅτῳ, κ.τ.λ. ‘To generalize and find an expression whereby we should embrace them all.’ Cp. Soph. Philoct. 341: *Τοιγαροῦν τὸ σὸν φράσοι | αὐθιςπάλινμοι πρᾶγμ’, ὅτῳ σ’ ἐνύβρισαν.* Charm. 166B: *Ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἡκεις ἐρευνῶν, ὅτῳ διαφέρει πα- σῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ σωφροσύνη.*

9. Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα] For this collective use of *ἀριθμός* cp. Phaed. 104 A: ‘*Η τρὶς καὶ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἄπας.*’ Soph. 238 A: ‘*Ἀριθμὸν δὴ τὸν ξύμπαντα.*’

10. δυνάμενον] Used here in its ordinary sense, without any reference to δυνάμεων above.

ἵσον ἴσακις γίγνεσθαι] I. e. to be made as a square number, which, as Euclid says, is *ὁ ἴσακις ἵσος*, *ἢ ὁ ὑπὸ δυοῖν ἵσων ἀριθμῶν πειριεχόμενος.* ‘To arise by the multiplication of equal numbers.’ Such technical abbreviations hardly admit of strict grammatical analysis. But this formula may be accounted for by the apposition of parts to the whole. Cp. infr. 148 A: ‘*Ἄδύνατος ἵσος ἴσακις γίγνεσθαι,* κ.τ.λ. 193 C: *Δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερά,* and note.

p. 147. τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἴσόπλευρον προσείπομεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γέ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν τοίνυν μεταξὺ τούτου, ὃν καὶ τὰ p. 148. τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ πᾶς ὁς ἀδύνατος ἵσος ἴσακις 5 γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡ πλείων ἐλαττονάκις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμήκει αὐτὸν σχήματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμήκη ἀριθμὸν ἔκαλέσαμεν.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Οσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἴσόπλευρον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μῆκος ὠρισάμεθα, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μῆκει μὲν οὐ

1. τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἴσόπλευρον]
The expression is amplified and varied for the sake of non-mathematical readers.

9-13. προμήκη . . ἑτερομήκη]
These terms were distinguished by the later Pythagoreans. Nicomachus says that ἑτερομήκης ἀριθμός has one factor greater than the other by 1, προμήκης by more than 1.

12. τετραγωνίζουσι]
'Form as their squares.' This use of τετραγωνίζειν is enough to show that geometrical terminology was not yet fixed. See the notes on δυνάμεων . . προμήκη . . ἑτερομήκη.

13. ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη]
Sc. τετραγωνίζουσι. See Eucl. 2. 14.

ώς μῆκει μὲν οὐ ξυμέτρους ἔκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἢ δύνανται]
Translate either, (1) 'not commensurable with the former in linear measurement, but in the superficial content of their squares,' or (2) 'not commensurable with them in linear measurement, while they are mu-

tually commensurable in the surfaces of which they are severally roots.' I.e. the lines which are (or stand for) the irrational roots are not commensurable with the integral roots or with unity ($\tauῇ ποδιαίᾳ$), but their squares, being integers, have a common measure. They are commensurable not in themselves, but in their squares, that is, they are potentially commensurable (δυνάμει μόνον σύμμετροι). For the construction ἢ δύνανται comp. αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτά in the Deff. of Euclid quoted above; also, Eucl. 10. 22: 'Ἡ δυναμένη αὐτό. It remains doubtful whether the one set of roots (δυνάμεις) or both are the nominative to δύνανται, and consequently, whether τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις refers (1) only to oblong number, or (2) to both oblong and square number. The former alternative may be adopted as the simpler; although the latter would be the more accurate expression. Instead of enumerating all the

ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἀ δύνανται· καὶ p. 148.
περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

B

ΣΩ. "Αριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὡς παῖδες· ὥστε μοι
δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις
5 ἔσεσθαι.

irrational roots, which seemed infinite, they conceived the idea of finding an expression which should embrace them all. They first went for assistance from arithmetic to the less abstract forms of geometry (Ar. Met. 1. 2: *Aἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας*). Here they at once found a generalization. All numbers which can be produced by equal integers they called square numbers. The rest, formed of un-

equal factors, they called oblong. The roots of the former can be measured by unity, the roots of the latter cannot, though the numbers themselves can. Hence a general distinction, and a simple nomenclature. The roots of square numbers they called *μήκη*, i. e. *μήκει σύμμετροι*, commensurable in whole numbers, the roots of oblong numbers, *δυνάμεις*, i. e. *δυνάμει μόνον συμμέτρους*. And similarly, in regard to solid quantity, i. e. the cube roots of numbers.

$$\begin{array}{c} 4 \\ \boxed{} \end{array}$$

In other words, $\sqrt{16} = 4$ or $16 = 4^2$;

and $4 = \underline{\underline{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4}}$ = the line forming one of its sides.

On the other hand

$$\sqrt{12} = 3.464 \text{ or } 12 = 2\boxed{}^2 \text{ and } 2\boxed{}^3 = 3.\boxed{464}^{3.464};$$

and $3.464 = \underline{\underline{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4}}$, which is not commensurable with the side of the former square, although the squares are commensurable. The boys ended with the term with which they started; and yet they had gained much: they saw now as one, what they had seen as many; as a whole, what they had seen as infinite; and this by limiting the application of the term and distinguishing the thing from that with which they had confused it. In like

manner an advance is made towards a true conception of knowledge, when we have distinguished it from sense and from true opinion, although we fail to define it as it is in itself.

4. *οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις ἔσεσθαι*] 'Will not be found guilty of perjury.' Cp. supr. 145 C, *οὐδεὶς ἐπισκῆψει*, and note. The article refers to what has been already mentioned. The feminine form *ψευδομαρτυριῶν* is used in Legg. 11. 937 B.

p. 148. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μήν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὃ γε ἐρωτᾶς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἀν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι σύ γέ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν· ὥστε πάλιν αὖ φαίνεται ψευδὴς ὁ Θεόδωρος.

But he
fears that
the ques-
tion about
knowledge
is not so
easy.

5

ΣΩ. Τί δαί; εἰ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ οὗτῳ δρομικῷ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντευχηκέναι, εἴτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἡττήθης, ἡττόν τι ἀν οἵει ἀληθῆ τόνδ' ἐπαινέσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

10

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἵει εἶναι ἔξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντη ἄκρων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Νὴ τὸν Δῖον ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων.

15

Socrates
still urges
him.

ΣΩ. Θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαυτῷ καὶ τι οἴου Θεόδωρον λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὅν.

3. καὶ] τε καὶ T.

7. διαθέων] Running a course.

Comp. Prot. 335 E: Νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ὁσπερ ἀν εἰ δέοισθαι μον Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἰμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι ἐπεσθαι, ή τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ ή τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐπεσθαι.

9. ἀληθῆ is cognate or adverbial accusative, as in Menex. 242 D: "Οτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ ἀμφισβητοῦεν.

11. ὁσπερ νῦν δῆ] Viz. above, 145 D: Σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ.

12. τῶν πάντη ἄκρων] The Bodl. MS. has ἄκριβῶν, with an accent over the *a*, and a dot over each of the letters *i*, *b*. *ἄκρων* is required by the words which follow. Cp. Lach. 192 C: Τῶν πάντων καλῶν πραγμάτων ἥγει σὺ ἀνδρίαν εἶναι; Εὖ μὲν οὖν ἵσθι ὅτι

τῶν καλλίστων. The mistake perhaps originated in not perceiving that *ἄκρων* is masculine. 'Knowledge is no trifling matter to find out, but it belongs to men every way complete;' i. e. not, like the runner, accomplished in one thing only.

14. καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων] 'Most certainly, to men complete in the highest degree.' The superlative of *ἄκρος*, *summus*, is a kind of double superlative. Cp. Legg. 10. 906 B: Τῶν παντάπασιν ἀκροτάτων δεσποτῶν.

17. προθυμήθητι] Supr. 145 D.

18. ἐπιστήμης is governed partly by *πέρι*, but chiefly by *λόγον*.

He answers that he has tried ineffectually before; but is still anxious. 'This is a sign, dear lad, that there is something in you, and that you ought to be made to feel the power of my art. You have heard that I am a strange fellow, but you were not aware that I practised my

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμίας μὲν ἔνεκεν, ὡς Σώκρατες, φα- p. 147
νεῖται.

ΣΩ. "Ιθι δή· καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω· πειρῶ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ 5 ταύτας πολλὰς οὖσας ἐνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες, οὗτῳ καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' εὐ ἵσθι, ὡς Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ ε αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σου ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὗτ' αὐτὸς δύ- 10 ναμι πεῖσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ίκανῶς τι λέγω, οὗτ' ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὗτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει· οὐ μὲν δὴ αὐδὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλειν.

ΣΩ. 'Ωδίνεις γάρ, ὡς φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

1. Προθυμίας . . ἔνεκεν] Cp. Phædr. 272 C: Πειρῶ λέγειν .. "Ενεκα μὲν .. πείρας ἔχομ' ἄν. Polit. 304 A: Πείρας μὲν τοίνυν ἔνεκα.

3. καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ιφηγήσω] Comp. Gorg. 455 D: Αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. ὑφηγεῖσθαι is sometimes 'to set a pattern,' as in writing or drawing. Rep. 3. 403 E, Legg. 10. 890 C.

5. ἐνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες . . ἐνὶ λό- γῳ προσειπεῖν] The processes of generalizing and of defining or naming, although more clearly distinguished here than supr. 147 D (συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἐν . . ὅτῳ προσαγορεύσομεν), are still considered as different aspects of the same thing.

8. ἀκούων . . ἐρωτήσεις] Thus it is indicated that, although this is the first meeting between Theaetetus and Socrates, the curiosity of the youth had been previously awakened. Those whom Socrates had puzzled, had puzzled their com-

panion in turn. See Apol. 23 C, Symp. 215 D.

12. μέλειν] The reading is doubtful. μέλειν has on the whole the best authority; but the reading of the Scholiast, εὑρεῖν, which is found on the margin of several MSS., supposing it to have been originally a gloss, agrees better with μέλλειν. There is an idea of uneasiness in μέλειν which suits well with the context. And although οὐδὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλλειν (sc. ίκανῶς τι λέγειν) is sufficiently Greek, yet 'to get rid of a care' is a simpler notion than 'to get rid of an ineptient act.' For μέλειν used personally eomp. Aesch. Ag. 370: Θεοὺς βροτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι μέλειν. Soph. Electr. 342: Κείνου λαθέσθαι τῆς δὲ τικτούσης μέλειν (where it may be impersonal, as perhaps here). Eur. H. F. 772: Θεοὶ θεοὶ τῶν ἀδίκων μέλουσι.

13. 'Ωδίνεις γάρ] Rep. 6. 490 B: Καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὁδῖνος, πρὶν δ' οὐ.

p. 148. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὡς Σώκρατες· ὁ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω. mother's trade.

p. 149. ΣΩ. Εἰτα, ὡς καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ως ἐγώ είμι νιὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης; 5

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡδη τοῦτό γε ἥκουσα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα καί, ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην, ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εὖ ἵσθ' ὅτι μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπης 10 πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους· λέληθα γάρ, ὡς ἔταιρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δέ, ἃτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἴμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῦν· ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας;

B ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. 15

ΣΩ. Εἴπω οὖν σοι τὸ αἴτιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἄπαν ως ἔχει, καὶ ράον μαθήσει ὁ βούλομαι. οἷσθα γάρ που ως οὐδεμίᾳ αὐτῶν ἔτι αὐτὴν κυϊσκομένη τε καὶ τίκ- 20

'Consider the midwives; they have once had children, but

4. μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς] 'Truly noble and valiant,' or 'commanding,' 'of no common or feeble mould.'

γενναίας] 'Of the right sort.' βλοσυρᾶς, 'burly.' Comp. Rep. 7. 535 B: Γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἥθη.

13. ἀτοπώτατος, κ.τ.λ.] 'That I am the strangest of mortals, and bring men to their wit's end.' *ἀτοπώτατος* is the very word to express Socrates' idea of himself,—*αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς λόγους*. Symp. 215 A: Οὐ γάρ τι ράδιογ τὴν σῆν ἀτοπίαν ὅδ' ἔχοντι εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριθμῆσαι.

ἀτοπώτατός εἴμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς

ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῦν] Comp. Men. 79, 80: "Ηκουον μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ πρὸς συγγενέσθαι σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῦν. . . καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἴ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὅμοιότατος εἴναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τὰλλα ταύτη τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ. This whole passage is at least as much in favour of the MS. reading *ἀτοπώτατος*, as of Stallbaum's conjecture, *ἀπορώτατος*, which was suggested by the former part of it. Men thought Socrates a strange being, because he made them discontented with themselves.

are now past the age. They have thus experience of child-birth and are also such as the virgin Goddess approves. They perceive the state of those they meet with. They can arouse or allay the travail of a patient: and cause abortion when they think it meet. They are also naturally the best match-makers.

τονσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἄλλ' αἱ ήδη ἀδύνατοι τίκ- p. 149.
τειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἀρτεμίν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε. στερίφαις μὲν οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὡν ἀν ἥ ἄπειρος· ταῖς δὲ δι' ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε, τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Οὔκον καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς κυνύσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαιῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνν γε.

15 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαι γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια καὶ ἐπάδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὡδῖνας καὶ μαλθακωτέρας, ἀν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὃν δόξῃ ἀμβλίσκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσιν;

4. *Αἰτίαν*] An adjective agreeing as predicate with 'Αρτεμίν. 'Artemis is said to be responsible for this.' Cp. infr. 150 E: Τῆς μέντοι μαιείας δὲ θεός καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος.

5. *ἄλοχος*] Used etymologically, as if from ἀ priv., and λέχος or λοχεύω.

6. *ἄρα*] According to this tale. Cp. *φασὶν* supra.

7. *ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις, κ.τ.λ.*] 'It is not in human nature to become skilful where it is not experienced.' This point is dropped in the comparison: unless Plato means to hint that the art of Socrates was super-human.

8. *ἀτόκοις*] Bodl. p.m. *ἀτόποις*.

The correction is by a recent hand.

τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα] 'In honour of their resemblance to herself.' *τιμῶσα*, 'prizing.' Cp. Symp. 179 D: Οὗτως καὶ θεοὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα σπουδὴν . . . τιμῶσιν.

15. *φαρμάκια*] The Diminutive is noticeable. 'Gentle remedies.'

17. *τίκτειν τε δή*] Sc. ποιεῖν. Cp. Symp. 206 D: Σκυθρωπόν τε (sc. γίγνεται) καὶ λυπούμενον συσπειράται, κ.τ.λ.

18. *νέον ὃν*] Sc. τὸ βρέφος, said here of the embryo, 'At an early stage,' i. e. before abortion is dangerous. Cp. Hipp. de Morb. Mul. § 3, 97: Ἡν-

p. 149. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἥσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ προμηήστριαι εἰσι δεινόταται, ως πάσσοφοι οὖσαι περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι ποίαν χρὴ ποιώ ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαν ως ἀρίστους παιδας τίκτειν; 5

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἵσθ' ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ μεῖζον φρονοῦσιν ἡ εἰς τῇ ὁμφαλητομίᾳ. ἐννόει γάρ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡ ἄλλης οἵει τέχνης εἴναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ ξυγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὖ τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποῖον 10 φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. Εἰς γυναῖκα δέ, ως φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἵει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἄλλην δὲ ξυγκομιδῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕκουν εἰκός γε. 15

p. 150. ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον ξυναγωγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἡ δὴ προαγωγεία ὄνομα, φεύγοντι καὶ τὴν προμηηστικὴν ἄτε σεμναὶ οὖσαι αἱ μαῖαι, φοβούμεναι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν. ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις 20 μόναις που προσήκει καὶ προμηήσασθαι ὄρθως.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

μηνιαῖον φθείρῃ τὸ παιδίον, where the same thing is spoken of. (This explanation is adopted by Schaeorschmidt, 1874, and by H. Schmidt, 1877.) For the ellipse, which is a little difficult, cp. infr. p. 161 A, τό γε σόν, sc. κύμα. δύνανται is lost sight of as the sentence proceeds. The subject of ἀμβλίσκουσιν (used causatively) is still αἱ μαῖαι.

4. ποίαν χρῆ] ‘What woman should be married to what man, to produce the noblest off-

spring.’

13. Εἰς γυναῖκα simply repeats the construction of εἰς ποίαν γῆν. In such cases the construction is often elliptical, as here.

τοῦ τοιούτου] Sc. τοῦ ποιὸν σπέρμα εἰς ποίαν καταβλητέον.

16. ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον] ‘Unlawful and skill-less’; contrary to morality and nature. Socrates, according to his wont, assumes that vice is simply ignorance, so that ‘vicious’ and ‘unscientific’ are convertible terms.

‘They are slow, indeed, to acknowledge the pride they take in this, though they bring people together lawfully, and not unlawfully.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον p. 150.
δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναιξὶν
ἐνίοτε μὲν εἴδωλα τίκτειν, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀληθινά, τοῦτο
δὲ μὴ ράδιον εἶναι διαγνῶναι. εἰ γὰρ προσῆν, μέγι-
στόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἀν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ
κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ μή. ἡ οὐκ οἴει;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν

1. [ἔλαττον δέ] There is a slight irregularity in the antithesis, occasioned by the stress on *τοσοῦτον*. The balance of clauses is, however, completed with *τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ*, κ.τ.λ.

2. τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος] It is doubted whether δρᾶμα here and infr. 169 B, Rep. 5. 451 C, is literal = 'function' or figurative = 'rôle.' In either case the unusual word ('performance' for 'work') has here a humorously imposing effect.

8. Τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως] For the well-known metaphor, which is nowhere else so completely elaborated, compare Symp. p. 206, sqq. (where Diotima proceeds to explain the mystical expression *τόκος ἐν καλῷ*) κυνοῦτι γάρ, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἀνθρώποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἐν τινι ἡλικίᾳ γένουνται, τίκτειν ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ μὲν ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις. τίκτειν δὲ ἐν μὲν αἰσχρῷ οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θεῖον τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τοῦτο ἐν θυητῷ ὅντι τῷ ζῷῳ ἀθάνατόν ἔστιν, ἡ κύησις καὶ ἡ γένησις. . . οὐθεν δὴ τῷ κυνοῦτι τε καὶ ηδη σπαργῶντι πολλὴ ἡ πτοιόησις γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ὡδίνος ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα. Ib. 209: τούτων αὖ ὅταν τις ἐκ νέου ἐγκύμων ἡ τὴν ψυχὴν θεῖος ὡν, κ.τ.λ. to the end of the speech. Repub. 6.

490 B: Οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδὲ ἀπολύγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ δὲ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἄψασθαι φροσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ φρολησίας καὶ μιγεῖς τῷ ὅντι ὅντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀληθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῷη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὗτο λόγοι ὡδίνος, πρὶν δὲ οὐ. So far of the relation of the mind to knowledge. For the relation of the teacher and the taught see Phædr. 276 E, 278 A: Πολὺ δέ, οἷμαι, καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἱ ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἰκανοί, καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα . . δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἶον νιεῖς γηγένειος εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἐὰν εὑρεθεὶς ἐνῇ, ἔπειτα εἴ τινες τούτου ἔκγονοί τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἄμα ἐν ἀλλασσιν ἀλλων ψυχαῖς κατ' ἀξίαν ἐνέφυσαν. For the theory of teaching and learning thus illustrated see Rep. 7. 518 B: Δεῖ δή, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν, οὐχ οἴαν τινες ἐπαγγελλόμενοι φασιν εἶναι, τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ δέ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθένειν, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὅψιν ἐντιθέντες, κ.τ.λ.—where it occurs

p. 150. ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἄνδρας
ἄλλὰ μὴ γυναικας μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἄλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἔνι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν
εἰς δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ, πότερον εἴδωλον καὶ 5
ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ
ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ταῖς
μαίαις· ἀγονός είμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἥδη πολλοί μοι
ώνειδισταν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν
ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, 10
ἀληθὲς ὄνειδίζουσι. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε· μαιεύεσθαι
με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν.

under a different metaphor, that of the cave.

It is always difficult to separate the Platonic from the real Socrates. In the present passage they are indissolubly blended. That men thought Socrates the strangest being, and that he brought them to their wit's end, is matter of fact. The quaint humour, perhaps even the name 'Son of a Midwife,' is Socrates' own. But it is impossible to determine how far the theory based upon his practice, that to teach is not to put something into the mind but to evolve something out of it, or to turn the mind from darkness to light, was consciously held by Socrates himself, and how far it is Plato's theory of the method Socrates pursued. It receives its full development in the seventh book of the Republic, but is not there, as here, combined with the Socratic confession of ignorance.

3. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἔνι] ‘But

as its greatest triumph my art comprises this.’ δέ answers to μέν above, the former δέ being parenthetical. μέγιστον recalls μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον supra.

5. δυνατόν] Sc. τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτήν.

εἴδωλον] Comp. Symp. 212 A, Rep. 7. 520 C. (From whence Bacon probably took his Idola.) Soph. 240 A, 264 B, 266 C.

6. ἀποτίκτει] ‘Is delivered of.’ ἀπο- denotes completion or result, as in ἀποσαφεῖν, ἀποτελευτᾶν.

7. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε] ‘For I have the same previous condition which the midwives have, in being barren of wisdom.’ ἐπεὶ implies ‘This is our highest function, for like the midwives I cannot pretend to what is higher still, viz. original production.’

12. ὁ θεός] Who presides over my art as Artemis does over that of the midwives. ὁ θεός must not be identified with τὸ δαιμόνιον, though they are probably connected (see below,

than theirs, for it is exercised upon the minds of men, and I can also discern the false birth from the true. I am childless of discoveries, by the will of the Deity whom I serve in this. But those we take in hand, however stupid

at first, make wondrous progress and do great things. If they leave me too soon, their minds miscarry: unless they return to me, when, if I am permitted to receive them, they again improve.

εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τις σοφός, οὐδέ τί μοι p. 150.
 ἔστιν εὕρημα τοιοῦτο γεγονός, τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκ-^D
 γονον· οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαί-
 νονται ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊού-
 σης τῆς ξυνουσίας, οἵσπερ ἀν οὐδές παρείκη, θαυ-
 μαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώ-
 ποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ
 καλὰ εὑρόντες τε καὶ κατέχοντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιείας

and cp. Apol. 40 B : τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον), but belongs rather to the belief expressed in Apol. 21, 23, where Socrates speaks of his cross-questioning as a Divine service, because occasioned by the oracle at Delphi; and Phæd. 85 B : 'Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλος εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, i. e. sacred to Apollo the god of the true μουσική (ib. 61 A : 'Ως φιλοσοφίας οὖσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς'): but here, as in one or two places of the *Apology*, the feeling is generalized. The impression remains, however, that Apollo's part herein corresponds to that of his sister Artemis.

1. τις] This is preferred as the Bodleian reading. τι, the reading of T, etc., may possibly be right. C. F. Herm. compares Phædr. 228 B : Εἰ μὴ πάνυ τις ἦν μακρός.

οὐδέ τι μοι] 'Nor have I had such a prize of my invention born to me, the offspring of my own mind.' Perhaps there is a slight play upon the word *εὕρημα*. Compare Soph. ΟΕδ. Τυρ. 1107 : Εἴθ' ὁ Βακχεῖος θέος | εὕρημα δέξατ' ἔκ του | Νυμφάν 'Ελικωνιδᾶν, αἷς πλεῖστα συμπαίζει; but the primary meaning is

'invention.' Cp. Phædr. 278 A : γίεις γηγονός .. ἑαυτοῦ, ἐὰν εὑρεθεὶς ἐνῇ, and εὑρόντες below.

2. ἔστιν .. γεγονός] This differs from γέγονεν as ἔχω with aor. or perf. partic. differs from the perf. act. This punctuation is upheld by Burger, De Theæt. 47, who, however, suggests that γεγονός may be interpolated. Most editors place the comma after τοιοῦτο. Cp. Lach. 186 E : Οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετής οὔτε μαθητής οὐδενὸς . . . γεγονένοι. The diorthoses of the Bodl. MS. has placed a comma after γεγονός, as in the text.

6. ἐπιδιδόντες] Sc. φαίνονται.

7. καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι] 'And that manifestly.' τοῦτο, sc. ποιοῦσιν : viz. ἐπιδιδόσιν.

ἐναργὲς ὅτι] A strengthened form of δῆλον ὅτι. 'As clear as day.' Plato frequently thus extends an idiom. C. F. Hermann, Wohlrab, and Schanz agree in deleting the comma after ἐναργές. It must be admitted, however, that καὶ ταῦτα is more usual than καὶ τοῦτο in such a connexion. The Bodl. MS. favours the punctuation of the earlier editors.

9. εὑρόντες τε καὶ κατέχοντες] 'Holding as their own dis-

p. 150. ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. ὥδε δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἥδη
εποῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ
καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτὸὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες,
ἀπῆλθον πρωϊαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τά
τε λοιπὰ ἔξημβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν καὶ τὰ 5
ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν,
ψευδῆ καὶ εἰδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ
ἀληθοῦς, τελευτῶντες δ' αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
p. 151. ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὡν εἰς γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ
Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί. οἷς, ὅταν πάλιν 10

coveries.' Schanz reads *καὶ τεκόντες*, which is found in some inferior MS. authorities, and may possibly be right, but may also be due to corruption, through the accidental omission of *καὶ*, or to MS. conjecture. The v.r. *καὶ ἔκόντες* rather points to this; and *κατέχοντες* gives a perfectly good sense, expressing the satisfaction a man feels in the secure possession of that which he owes to the exercise of his own powers. Those who left Socrates too early had no such security. Wohlrbab quotes Symp. 175 D: Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εὗρες αὐτὸ καὶ ἔχεις.

3. ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ'] 'They left me, whether it was that they despised *me*, or were *themselves* won over by some one else.' The needless emphasis has given rise to suspicion. Heindorf read ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ('of their own accord, or through the influence of others'), for which there is slight MS. authority. Schanz proposes ἢ αὐ, where αὐ is still more superfluous than the minute antithesis. If ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ is read, the clause may be either joined to *καταφρονή-*

σαντες or (with L. Dissen quoted by Wohlrbab) to *ἀπῆλθον*. The latter is more probable.

πεισθέντες] 'Attracted,' 'captivated'; cp. Thucyd. 6. 54.

4. τὰ . . . λοιπά] 'What more they had in them.' Cp. infr. 210 B.

5. ἔξημβλωσαν] Cp. Aristoph. Nub. 137: Φροντίδ' ἔξημβλωκας ἔξευρημένην (where, however, the verb is used causatively as above 149 D, ἀμβλίσκοντιν).

διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν] Symp. 206 C: Τίκτειν δ' ἐν μὲν αἰσχρῷ οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. Cp. infr. 151 A B. The image of *μαιευτική* is merged in that of *προμηνοτική*. The word *ξυνεῖναι* expresses more than one kind of intercourse.

9. Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου] We read of the introduction of this youth to Socrates in the Laches, 179 A: Λυσιμ. 'Ημῖν εἰσιν νίεῖς οὐτοῖ, ὅδε μὲν τοῦδε . . . ἐμὸς δὲ αὐδε· παππᾶν δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὄνομα ἔχει τούμον πατρός, Ἀριστείδην γὰρ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν. Lysimachus and Melesias are consulting Nicias and Laches, in the presence of Socrates, about their sons, Aristides and Thucydides.

ἐλθωσιν δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς ξυνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ p. 151.
 δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἔἃ, καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι ἐπιδιδόασι. πάσχοντι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι καὶ
 5 τοῦτο ταῦτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις ὡδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίπλανται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖναι. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὡδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπάνειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὗτως. ^β
 10 ἐνίοτε δέ, ὡς Θεαίτητε, οἷς ἂν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ εὔμενῶς προμνῶμαι, καὶ ξὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ίκανῶς τοπάζω οἷς ἀν ξυγγενόμενοι ὄνται. ὅν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. Ταῦτα δή σοι, ὡς ἄριστε,

1. θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες] ‘Showing extraordinary solicitude.’ ‘Going on their knees to me.’ Cp. Apol. 35 A : ‘Εώρακά τινας... θαυμάσια ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ αποθανοῦνται.

2. τὸ..δαιμόνιον] Here, as always, not commanding, but forbidding; and, as generally, neuter and impersonal. This is not the place to discuss the subject. It suits well with the intensely self-reflective nature of Socrates (lost sometimes for whole days in thought) that he should pause suddenly on the eve of doing something, without being able (at the time) to explain to himself and others the motives of reason or feeling which checked his impulse.

3. οὗτοι] This is the reading of T and most MSS. The Bodleian has αὐτοί, which is certainly admissible, and is perhaps also preferable as the more

difficult reading. ‘In some cases I am permitted to do so, and the men themselves improve.’ But οὗτοι is on the whole more probable.

7. ἢ ἐκεῖναι] T has ἢ κεῖναι. Schanz reads ἢ κείναι.

9. πως] Qualifying μὴ δόξωσι. ‘Whom, somehow, I perceive not to be,’ etc.

13. ἐξέδωκα] For the word cp. Soph. 242 D : Δυὸς δὲ ἔτερος εἰπών (τὰ ὄντα), ύγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι. For the thing cp. Lachl. 200 D: Κανέγώτὸν Νικήρατον τούτῳ ἥδιστα ἐπιτρέποιμι, εἰ θέλοι οὗτος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλοις μοι ἐκάστοτε συνίστησιν. For the ironical hyperbole in θεσπεσίοις cp. Euthyd. 289 E: Καὶ γάρ μοι οἵ τε ἀνδρες αὐτοὶ οἱ λογοποιοί, σταν συγγένωμαι αὐτοῖς, ὑπέρσοφοι, ὡς Κλεινία, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ τέχνη αὐτῶν θεσπεσία τις καὶ οὐψηλή.

p. 151. ἔνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα, ὑποπτεύων σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἴει, ὡδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου οὖν πρός με ὡς πρὸς μαίας νἰὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἀ ἀνέρωτῷ, προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἶστ' εἰ, οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι. καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὁν ἀν λέγης, ἡγήσωμαι 5 εἴδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἴτα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίανε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ηδη, ὡς θαυμάσιε, πρός με οὗτω διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἔτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπειδάν τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴονται 10 εὔνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὅντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς θεὸς δύσνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲ ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλά μοι ψεῦδός τε ξυγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. Πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν. 15 ὡς δὲ οὐχ οἶστ' εἰ, μηδέποτ' εἴπησ. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἶστ' εἴσει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὡς Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὗτω παρακελευομένου αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι ὃ τί τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὃ ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὡς γε νῦν φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἰσθησις.

1. ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἴει] Cp. supr. 148 D E: 'Αλλ' εὐ ισθι ... πέπονθα λέγω.

2. προσφέρου] Charm. 165 B: Σὺ μὲν ὡς φάσκοντος ἐμοῦ εἰδέναι περὶ ὁν ἐρωτῶ προσφέρει πρός με.

6. εἴτα] Cp. Apol. 23 C: Πολλάκις ἐμὲ μυμοῦνται, εἴτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν.

ὑπεξαιρῶμαι] The MSS. have ὑπεξαιρῶμαι, Bekk. corr. See below, ἀφαιρῶμαι, where T and B pr. have ἀφαιρῶμαι.

too I seldom fail.
Take courage then,
and be not angry if I
put aside your first-born as not
worth rearing. I am
guided in this also by
the Deity,
who desires your good.'

Theætetus
now ven-
tures to
answer,
I. Know-
ledge is
Sensation.
I. 'Why,
Protagoras
meant this
when he

ἀποβάλλω] ὑποβάλω B.

10. τινα λῆρον] Some 'barren stuff.'

οἴονται] Plutarch in quoting this passage reads οἴονται με.

11. οὐδεὶς θεός] And therefore not the presiding genius of my Art.

18. σοῦ γε] I. e. ' You, whom I respect so highly.'

22. ἐπιστήμη . . . αἰσθησις] The term *αἰσθησις* is more simple and more extensive than any one by which it could be ren-

said, "The Man the Measure of what is." I.e. What appears to me, is real to me.

ΣΩ. Εὖ γε καὶ γενναῖως, ὡς παῖ· χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως p. 151. ἀποφανόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸς κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἡ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὅν. αἰσθησις, φήσ, ἐπιστήμη;

5 **ΘΕΑΙ.** Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρη-

dered in English or any modern language, in which the notion of the five senses has become fixed. 'Sense-perception' is too definite for it here. See below, 156 B : Αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἔχοντιν ὄντα, ὅψεις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ δοκήσεις καὶ φύξεις καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδονή γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι, κ. τ. λ. Perhaps 'to see and feel is to know,' is the nearest equivalent to what Theætetetus means. But 'feeling' has ethical associations which must be excluded here. The German word 'Sinn' presents a nearer parallel.

Before reflection begins, our individual impressions are those of which we are most conscious and most certain. And subjective certainty is the primitive meaning of *τὸ ἐπίστασθαι*. Hence *αἰσθησις* seems at first sight identical with *ἐπιστήμη*. Cp. Phæd. 83 C: "Οτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἄμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἡ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπί τῷ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ ἀν μάλιστα τούτῳ πάσχῃ, τούτῳ ἐναργέστατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ὅν. Aristotle, Metaph. 3. 1009 b: 'Η περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐνίσις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐλήλυθεν. . . . ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἰσθησιν, ταύτην δὲ εἴναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἴναι φασιν. The saying of Theæte-

tus is shown to be the meeting point of two lines of speculation; the one of which may be termed in modern language, subjective, the other objective: the one regarding all knowledge as relative and apparent to man: the other regarding things without reference to man as in a state of transience or relation: thus sense cannot be knowledge, unless knowledge is relative, and being is change. This leads to an analysis of Sensation. We are made aware of its real nature, and so taught to distinguish Knowledge from it. See Aristot. de An. 3. 3: Δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὁσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαι τι εἴναι ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ κρίνει τι καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων καὶ οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταῦτὸν εἴναι φασιν, ὁσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε, Πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώπουσιν, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις. Ὅθεν σφίσιν αἱεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται. Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν βούλεται τούτοις καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, Τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, οἷον ἐπ' ἥμαρ ἄγησι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

1. Εὖ γε καὶ γενναῖως] Supr. 146 C.

2. αὐτό here—sc. τὸ ἀποφανθέν—and supr. 148 E, has no distinctly expressed antecedent.

6. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι] 'Well, after all, I should not wonder if...'

p. 152. κέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;

5

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν οὗτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἵα μὲν ἔκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μέν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἵα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κάγώ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

10

β ΣΩ. Εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν. ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἀρ' οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἥμων ρίγοι, ὁ δ' οὐ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἥρεμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

15

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτὸς τὸ πνεῦμα

'E.g. When it is asked, Is the wind cold? Protagoras would say it is cold to him who feels cold. Appearance in this

3. *ἄνθρωπον*] Not 'Man,' i. e. collective human nature; nor yet exactly 'Each man.' As we have seen, p. 147, Thætetus is little conscious of the universal. Hence *ἄνθρωπος* signifies to him not humanity, nor yet the individual, as opposed to it, but this or that man, 'any man you choose.' And whether or not it was so intended by Protagoras, it would certainly appear to have been so understood by his 'disciples,' to whom Socrates presently refers.

7. ὡς οἵα μὲν, κ. τ. λ.] Cp. Cratyl. 385 E, 386 A: "Ωσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, λέγων πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς ἄρα οἵα μὲν ἀν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἵα δ' ἀν σοί, τοιαῦτα δ' αὖ σοί. This repetition of

the same language affords a presumption that the explanation, as well as the original saying, is Protagoras' own.

11. μέντοι] 'Well, at all events.' εἰκὸς μέντοι .. μὴ ληρεῖν] Cp. Phaedr. 260 A: Οὐκ ἀπόβλητον ἔπος εἶναι δεῖ .. δὸν εἰπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μὴ τι λέγωσι' καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον.

16. ἐφ' ἑαυτό] 'ἑαυτοῦ Vindob. suppl. 7. ἑαυτό B T.' Schanz. The accusative may be defended from Thucyd. I. 141: "Οταν.. τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἔκαστος σπεύδῃ. 4. 28: Τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι. The prep. is used in a slightly pregnant sense, = *ipsotenus*, 'As far as to itself, and no further.' Cp. infr. 160 A: Οὐδὲ .. ἐκεῖνο .. ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενῆσεται. (Perhaps the accus. is also partly due to the idea of motion in *πνεῦμα*.) ἐφ' ἑαυτό is sup-

case is sensation. The wind is to me as I sensibly perceive it.
i.e. Sensation discovers Being.

ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ p. 15².
Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ρίγοῦντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ
μὴ οὔ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὗτος ἐκατέρῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι γάρ.

10 ΣΩ. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἰσθησις ταῦτὸν ἐν τε σθερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἐκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἐκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.

ported by H. Schmidt. For ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, which is preferred by Wohlrab, Schanz and others, cp. Tim. 51 B: Ἄρ' ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. For the use of the reflexive pronoun cp. Rep. 4. 419 A: Καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἑαυτούς. This notion is carried farther by Locke, Hum. Underst. 2. 8. § 21: ‘The same water may produce the sensation of cold in the one hand and heat in the other.’

7. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔστιν] ‘When you say “appears,” it is that he has a sensation.’ The example is kept in view throughout. There is MS. authority for αἰσθάνεται, (Cp. inf. 164 B: Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὅρᾳ οὐκ ἐπίσταται ἔστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὅρᾳ ἐπίσταται.) But the change of subject makes αἰσθάνεσθαι preferable. Cp. inf. 186 D: Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδωσινομα κ. τ. λ.; Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε. Crat. 410 C: Τὸ γὰρ γεγάσι γεγενῆσθαι λέγει. And the repetition of the termination is a more probable form of corruption than the recurrence of σθ in the same word. φαίνεσθαι ap-

pears as a correction for φαίνεται in some MSS.

9. Φαντασία ἄρα] I. e. ‘In regard to heat and cold and the like your theory and that of Protagoras agree.’ φαντασία occurs here simply as the noun of φαίνεσθαι, = ‘appearing,’ rather than ‘appearance,’ and must be kept clear from the notion of *faculty*, and the associations due to Aristotle, (see de An. 3. 3, where he defines it, κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένης.) Appearance (or relative being) becomes a middle term between sensation and being, so that all is merged in sensation. Thus, while the answer of Theætetus is shown to coincide with the saying of Protagoras, the reader is gently led to acquiesce for the moment in their common point of view.

ἐν τε σθερμοῖς] Cp. infr. 204 D: “Ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστιν. These are instances of Plato’s tentative method.

10. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται] (1) Sc. αὐτά, which however is purposely omitted; viz. τὰ σθερμά, κ. τ. λ.

p. 152. ΘΕΑΙ. "Εοικεν.

ΣΩ. Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ ἔστι καὶ ἀψευδές,
ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ³Αρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἡν ὁ 5
Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἡνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ
συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν
ἔλεγεν;

Or, (2) while τὰ θερμά, κ. τ. λ. are subj. of κινδυνεύει, οὖτα may be cogn. acc. ‘For they would seem to be to each according to his sensation.’ As we dwell upon the above example in support of the identification of appearance and sense, δτι τῷ μὲν ρίγοῦντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὐ, (where, however, ἔστι was carefully excluded,) we are led insensibly to substitute ‘relative being’ for ‘appearing,’ by a play of words, which may be preserved in English, ‘What appears to me, is to me.’ And from relative being (ἐκάστῳ εἶναι) we argue at once to ‘being’ (αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος). For a similar recapitulation, in which the argument is really carried a step further (with γάρ), cp. 190 E: Οὔτε γάρ ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδής ἐν ἡμῖν οὖσα δόξα.

For γάρ, introducing as a reason what is properly an inference, cp. also Gorg. 454 D.

2. Αἴσθησις ἄρα] ‘Sensation then is of Being, and is infallible, in accordance with your theory.’ Certainty is here implicitly assumed as the mark of ἐπιστήμη. The genuineness of the last words has been needlessly questioned by Wolff and others. They are required in order to bring ‘the wheel

full circle’ and to complete the identification of Protagoras’ theory with that of Theætetus. Compare with ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα, infr. 160 C: Κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν.

5. ³Αρ' οὖν, κ. τ. λ.] If sensation is of Being, then Being is not Being but Change. ἄρα in such questions (cp. infr. 200 C) is more emphatic than ³αρ' οὐ. Here it expresses delighted surprise. ‘In the name of all that is charming, was Protagoras even wiser than we knew?’ For the Graces in this connexion cp. Prot. 320 C: Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι . . . χαριέστερον εἶναι μῆθον ἡμῖν λέγειν.

‘What? says Socrates, did Protagoras then teach an obscure exoteric doctrine to the multitude, and tell the truth in esoteric confidence to his disciples? Did he teach the one to believe in ὄντα, the others in nothing but γιγνόμενα?’ Prof. Kennedy.

7. τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ] He told the *real truth*, not in his book which is so entitled (*Ἀλήθεια*), but privately to his disciples. Cp. Crat. 413 A: ‘Ἐγὼ δέ, ὃ Ερμόγενες, ἀτε λιπαρὴς ὡν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέπυσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις. (Socrates has just given a derivation of the word δικαιοσύνη,

'This theory of Knowledge, then, depends upon a theory of Being, which Protagoras reserved for his disciples, to whom he

told the
real truth
in a mys-
tery.
2. 'If Sen-
sation is
Knowl-
edge,
Being is
Change.
Things are
not, but
become.
Heraclitus,
Empedo-
cles, Ho-
mer, Epi-
charmus,
all agree
in this.'

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις; p. 152.
 ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ’ οὐ φαῦλον λόγον· ὡς ἄρα^D
 ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ’ ἂν τι προσ-
 είποις ὥρθως οὐδ’ ὅποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ’, ἐὰν ὡς μέγα⁵
 προσαγορεύης, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ,
 κοῦφον, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὅντος ἐνὸς
 μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὅποιονοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ
 κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα,
 ἀ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὥρθως προσαγορεύοντες· ἐστι
 μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ’ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ^E
 τούτου πάντες ἔξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδον ξυμ-

which he thus ironically attributes to the disciples of Heraclitus as an esoteric doctrine.) By a similar irony, he says here that the 'friends of Protagoras' have learnt their doctrine from their master 'in a mystery.' Clearly then the doctrine which Socrates proceeds to develop was not to be found in the written teaching of Protagoras, but in the interpretations of his reputed followers. The question, how far the Cyrenaics are indicated by the phrase, 'disciples of Protagoras,' has been discussed in the introduction.

τὴν ἀλήθειαν] There is a slight allusion here to the work of Protagoras of this name, which is more distinctly referred to afterwards.

2. καὶ μάλ’ οὐ φαῦλον λόγον] 'I will tell you, and it is indeed a high argument.' He had spoken of a *λόγος* οὐ φαῦλος above (151 E). Cp. infr. 179 D.

3. οὐδ’ ἂν τι προσείποις] (1) 'Nor can you call anything rightly by any name.' Or (2) with H. Schmidt, making οὐδέν

the object and *τι* predicative, 'Nor can you rightly call it anything or any kind of thing.' But this is less probable, and is certainly not required by what follows.—Whoever the contemporaries were to whom Plato refers as the disciples of Protagoras, he aims beyond them at the whole relative side of Greek thought, of which Heraclitus was the most prominent exponent.

8. καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα] These words are introduced in order to include Empedocles, whose elements, however, were not subject to growth and decay, and who was probably not independent of an Eleatic influence. His Muse is called in the Sophist (242 E) *μαλακωτέρα* (in contradistinction to the *συντονώτεραι μοῦσαι* of Heraclitus), because his two principles of friendship and strife do not possess the world together, but alternately.

11. ξυμφέρεσθων] MS. authority prepondrates (numerically) in favour of *ξυμφέρεσθον*, which Stallbaum and Wohlraab have

p. 152. φερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας· κωμῳδίας μέν, Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δέ, Ὀμηρος, [*[ὸς] εἰπὼν

‘Ωκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν,

5

vainly attempted to defend. Even if it were clear that Empedocles was set over against Protagoras and Heraclitus, or that these (coupled with *τε καὶ*) only counted for one, the use of the dual here would still be unnatural. Stobæus, who quotes this passage, has *ξυμφέρονται*, which is possibly right. In the Bodleian MS. there is an erasure to the right of the omieron, which seems originally to have been *ω*. An accent on the penultimate has also been erased. Thus *ξυμφερέσθων* (or *συμφερέσθων*) is supported by the Bodleian first hand, besides three other MSS. ‘Be it assumed (since we cannot ask them) that the philosophers of all ages speak with one voice concerning this.’ For the imperative, denoting a provisional assumption, cp. *infr.* 187 B: *Καί μοι τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω*. 197 E: *Πεποίησθω*. Soph. 248 A: *Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους τοῦτο ἡμῖν μενέτω* *ξυνομολογηθέν*. Rep. 6. 485 A: *Τοῦτο . . . ώμολογήσθω* *ἡμῖν, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.* Legg. 2. 672 E: *Διαπεπεράνθω*. Possibly the word *ξυμφερέσθων* retains here something of its literal meaning, ‘are gathered together,’ ‘move all one way.’ Thuc. 7. 36. The boldness of the language, especially the word *στρατόπεδον*, is in favour of this.

3. Ἐπίχαρμος] Epicharmus, ed. Krüsemann, fr. 95: *Συνεκρίθη, καὶ διεκρίθη, καὶ ἀπῆνθεν*

ὅθεν ἦνθε πάλιν γὰ μὲν εἰς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω. Ib. fr. 90: *Φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἀσκοὶ πεφυσημένοι*. The passage quoted by Diog. Laert. 3. 10 (who says that Plato borrowed from Epicharmus), though interesting, if authentic, is too long for quotation here, except the line *ἐν μεταλλαγῇ δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον*. (Cp. Mullach, Fragment. Phil. Gr. Epicharm. vv. 177–194.) Epicharmus (circ. 490 B.C.) is called a Pythagorean. One or two of his *γνῶμαι* remind us of Heraclitus, although, as only fragments from his Comedies are preserved, we cannot tell in any case how far the notions expressed are his own.

τραγῳδίας δέ, Ὀμηρος] Where the form is in question, *ἔπη* are distinguished from *τραγῳδία*: as in Rep. 3. 394 C. Where this is not the case, they are combined as tragedy, this being another name for *σπουδαία μητική*: e. g. Rep. 10. 605 C: *Ἀκροῷμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν*.

4. *[ὸς] εἰπών] The best MSS. read *Ὀμηρος εἰπών*. A few add *γάρ*, as in a similar passage, 175 D (*ὶλιγγιῶν τε κ.τ.λ.*) *γάρ* is added in one MS. (Ven. 2.) *ὸς εἰπών* is Heindorf’s very probable emendation. The MS. reading is to be defended, if at all, by supposing a ‘return to the indicative.’

5. Ὡκ. θ. γ.κ. μ.Τ.] Il. 14. 201, 302.

πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ρόῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἡ οὐ p. 152.
δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἀν ἔτι πρός γε τοσοῦτον στρατό- p. 152.
5 πεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὁμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας
μὴ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ ράδιον, ὡ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, ὡ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ

<sup>‘Motion is
the principle of
growth,</sup>

6. μὴ . . . γενέσθαι] A few MSS. have μὴ οὐ. But the omission of οὐ may be defended by the remoteness of the supposition. Cp. Sophist 241 E: Τούτων γὰρ μήτε ἐλεγχθέντων μήτε ὄμολογηθέντων σχολῆ ποτέ τις οὗντος τε ἔσται . . . μὴ καταγέλαστος εὖναι: Soph. O. T. 76, 77. μή belongs to the adj. ‘Who could prove other than ridiculous?’ Compare with the whole passage Cratyl. 401 E, 402 A, where, after proposing first Ἑστία (fire) and then ὡσία (displacement), as derivations for οὐσία, Socrates says: Ὡς γαθέ, ἐννεονήκα τι σμῆνος σοφίας. Ερμ. Ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο; Σω. Γελοῖον μὲν πάνυ εἰπεῖν, οἷμαι μέντοι τιὰ πιθανότητα ἔχειν. Ερμ. Τίνα ταύτην; Σω. Τὸν Ἡράκλειτόν μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν παλαί ἄττα σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ἄρεας, ἀ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔλεγεν. Ερμ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; Σω. λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ροῆ ἀπεικάζων τὰ δύντα λέγει ως δίς ἐσ τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἀν ἐμβαίης, κ. τ. λ. Two Orphic lines are then quoted besides this of Homer and Hesiod: Ὦκεανὸς πρῶτος καλλίρροος ἥρξε γάμοιο, δος ρά καστιγνήτην ὄμομήτορα Τηθὺν ὅψιεν. Socrates adds, ταῦτ’ οὖν σκόπει ὅτι καὶ ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ καὶ πρὸς

τὰ τοῦ Ἡράκλειτου πάντα τείνει. The last words are a good commentary on ξυμφερέσθων.

The theory of Knowledge, ‘All impressions are true,’ is shown to require the theory of Being, ‘All things come and go.’ And thus of the Protagorean and Heraclitean traditions there is woven a doctrine of sense, similar to that which was held by the Cyrenaics and perhaps others at this time. As a doctrine of sense it is received, as a doctrine of knowledge and being it is negated. Compare the way in which δόξα is treated in the Republic, 5. 479 A: Τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν, ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὁσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον; κ. τ. λ. τί δέ; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ἥττόν τι ἡμίσεα ἡ διπλάσια φαίνεται; Οὐδέν. Καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μή τι μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἡ τάνατία;

8. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε, κ. τ. λ.] The clause ὅτι . . . ἡσυχία is added in explanation of τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα. ‘The theory is confirmed by the following indications of the fact that,’ etc. H. Schmidt quotes Menex. 237 E: Μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι, κ. τ. λ. . . πᾶν γάρ, κ. τ. λ. Cp.

p. 153. σημεῖα ἵκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ήσυχία· τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἄλλα γεννᾶ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις· ἡ οὐχ αὗται γενέσεις πυρός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Αὗται μὴν οὖν.

β ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὕ;

Thuc. 1. 2 : Καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔστι, διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὅμοιῶς αὐξῆθηνται· ἐκ γάρ, κ. τ. λ.

1. δοκοῦν] The expression has been thought harsh [δοκοῦν] Schanz; and Badham proposes to read ὁτιοῦν. But cp. supr. 152 D: Ἀ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι. Infr. 153 E: Καὶ ὃ δὴ ἔκειστον εἶναι φαμεν χρῶμα: also 176 C: Δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι. ‘Being, so esteemed.’ ‘What passes for Being.’

3. ὃ δὴ καὶ τἄλλα γεννᾶ] ‘Which our theory assumes to produce all other things.’ The symbol of fire as the primal element is elsewhere associated with the theory of a flux. See Cratyl. 401 (quoted above), ib. 413 B (speaking of the Heracliteans): ‘Ο μὲν γάρ τις φοστοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιοι, τὸν ἥλιον’ τούτον γὰρ μόνον διαιόντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὰν οὖν τῷ λέγω αὐτὸ ἀσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκόως, καταγελᾶ μου οὐτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτᾶ, εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἴμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπειδὰν ὃ τι αὐτὸς λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φοστή τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ράδιον ἔστιν εἰδέναι. ὃ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ

rest of decay.
Fire, the presiding element, is generated by friction, that is, by motion.

‘ Living creatures owe their origin to a similar cause.

πῦρ φοστίν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. ὃ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελᾶν φοστίν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο, κ. τ. λ. Thus the mythology of the doctrine was rationalized by its adherents. In this dialogue every feature of it is presented, from the most sensuous symbolism (ἥλιος, χρυσῆ σειρά) to the most abstract principle (*τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν*, 156), and its most remote application. See also the famous saying of Heraclitus (fr. Bywater): Κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε θέων τις οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἦν τε ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζων ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ σβεννύμενον μέτρα. But the symbol fire was by no means confined to Heraclitus (cp. the Atomists, Pythagoreans, etc.). ✓

5. τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις] This is added parenthetically with reference to τρίψεως. Τούτω δὲ κίνησεις has been adopted by editors on the authority of the Bodleian MS. But τοῦτο is also the reading of the Bodl. first hand. The marginal note δικῶς is due to the corrector (b) who changed τοῦτο into τούτω, instead of restoring κίνησις.

'Exercise is essential to the preservation and improvement both of body and mind.'

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυ- p. 153.
χίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλυνται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ
κινήσεων ἐπὶ πολὺ σώζεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

5 ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις—οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως
μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὅντων, κτᾶται τε μαθήματα
καὶ σώζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ' ἡσυχίας,

3. ἐπὶ πολύ] 'To a great extent;' or 'for a long time.' The MSS. vary between (*ώς*) ἐπὶ πολύ (T etc.), and ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (B etc.), from which *ώς* ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ has been conjectured. But *ώς* in T was at first omitted, and ἐπὶ πολύ gives a better sense. Cp. Thue. 8. 1: 'Ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἡπίστουν. Crat. 415 A: Τοῦ ἀνεινέπῃ πολύ.

5. 'Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις] ἔξις in Plato, like *φαντασία*, is less technical than in Aristotle. It is simply the noun of *ἔχειν*, whether transitive or not. The body is said *ἔχειν πως*, the mind is said *ἔχειν τὰ μαθήματα*; hence ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἔξις, 'the condition of the body'; but ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις, 'the having in the mind.' Cp. Rep. 9. 591 B: 'Ἡ ψυχὴ τιμωτέραν ἔξιν λαμβάνει σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην . . . κτωμένη. Ar. Met. 4. 1022. 6: 'Ἐξις δὲ λέγεται ἔνα μὲν τρόπον οἶον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἔχομένου . . . ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον διάθεσις, κ. τ. λ.'

For a similar transition from one sense of a word to another ep. 158 E: Τὰ δὲ δοκοῦντα τῷ δοκοῦντι εἰναι ἀληθῆ.

'But with regard to the having the mind, is it not through learning and practice, which are motions, that it gains what it learns, and is preserved, and becomes better?' The sentence

proceeds as if *ψυχή* were the subject, at all events of the latter part. Cp. Rep. 7. 532 B: 'Ἡ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν, κ. τ. λ.'

6. κινήσεων ὅντων] Cp. Prot. 329 D: "Οτι ἐνὸς ὅντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόριά ἔστιν ἀ ἐρωτᾶς. ὅντων is neuter; 'things which are of the nature of motion,' like *τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις* above. Others suppose ὅντων to be the masculine form used for the feminine according to a well-known tendency of Attic Greek. But in this case it would be better to read *κινησέοις ὅντοιν* with Buttmann and Sehanz.

7. σώζεται] (1) 'Retains' (middle), or, better, (2) 'is preserved' (passive). *ἔξις*, as above interpreted, the preceding *κτᾶται τε . . . καὶ*, and *ἐπιλανθάνεται* in the corresponding clause, may be urged in favour of the former: for which ep. 163 D: "Επι ἔχοντα μνήμην τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον. Rep. 455 B: Μηδ' ἀ ἔμαθε σώζοιτο. But when *σώζεται* is rendered as passive, there is a more natural progress in the thought, 'gets knowledge, is preserved, improves,' while *ἐπιλανθάνεται* may be as justly opposed to improvement as to retention. And we avoid the difficulty of supposing that the word is used differently here, and a few lines

p. 153. ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὕσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει
οἳ τε ἀν μάθη ἐπιλανθάνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθόν, κίνησις, κατά τε ψυχὴν
καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τούναντίον;

5
Motion,
then, is
good, and
rest is evil.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας

above and below: cp. Symp. 208 A: Μελετὴ . . σώζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. See the whole passage. In the indeterminate state of grammar, may there not be a real, though not unconscious, ambiguity? H. Schmidt thinks that *σώζεται* may be taken reflexively throughout sections B to D, ‘Es lässt sich in allen drei stetter medial fassen, in der ersten und dritter als “servat se” und in der zweiten als “servat sibi.”’ This comes practically to the same thing as (1).

4. τὸ μὲν ἄρα] ‘The one, then, namely, motion, is good.’

There seems no reason to suspect a gloss. There would be a want of Plato’s usual explicitness without *κίνησις*; and the variety of genders presents no difficulty. Cp. Rep. 433 D: Ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα—ἡ—δύναμις; inf. 156 B: Τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις.

7. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω . . δτι] (1) ‘Must I go on to mention still weather and calms, and the like, showing how quietness in every case corrupts and destroys, whilst its opposite preserves: and for my crowning instance, pressing it into the service, shall I insist upon it that by his golden chain Homer means the sun?’ For *προσβιβάζων*, ‘making it

yield to my theory,’ cp. Phædr. 229 E: Άις εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβάζῃ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἔκαστον.—‘If one is to force each of them (the mythes) to harmonize with probability.’ Cratyl. 427 C: Καὶ τἄλλα οὗτα φαίνεται προσβιβάζων—ό νομοθέτης, ‘forcing the sound of words to square with the sense.’ Mythology, poetry, nature, body, mind, the elements, had already been ‘pressed into the service.’ But this final instance requires still greater force. Thus Plato glances, as he does elsewhere, at the absurd allegorical interpretations of Homer which were current (amongst Heracliteans and others) in his day. The position of the accusative *τὴν χρυσῆν σειράν* is possibly due to the attraction of the active *προσβιβάζων*, and to the previous accusative, *τὸν κολοφῶνα*, which is in apposition to the sentence (Riddell, Digest of Idioms, §§ 11, 13). For the transitive clause with *ἀναγκάζω* cp. Symp. 202 A: Μή τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε, δομή καλόν ἔστιν, αἰσχρὸν εἶναι. Parm. 133 C: ‘Ο ἀγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι. Or (2) ‘And finally, shall I clinch the proof (or shall I compel assent) by bringing on my crowning argument (and showing) that by his golden chain Homer means

'Water and air are preserved by motion.
The whole may be clinched with Homer's golden chain.'

καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ p. 153· ἀπολλύσι, τὰ δὲ ἔτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὁμηρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ 5 ὅτι ἔως μὲν ἀν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, [¤]

the sun?' For ἀναγκάζω here cp. Rep. 10. 611 B: "Οτι..ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ καὶ δ ἄρτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειν ἀν. In (2) προσβιβάζων is not used as in Phædr. 229 E, Crat. 427 C, and the Bodleian reading προβιβάζων would do equally well. In either case ἀναγκάζω, like λέγω supra, is deliberative subjunctive. Schanz brackets ἀναγκάζω, and reads προσβιβάζω ('Shall I adduce?'). Dobree conjectures ἀναγαγὼν προσβιβάζω.

1. αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι] There is a slight redundancy of expression in order to bring the instance in question under the general theory. Here, as elsewhere, Hirschig prunes the text.

3. τὴν χρυσῆν σειράν] Il. 8. 18, foll. At this point Socrates has entered fully into the Heraclitean vein; as when he says of himself in the Cratylus, 407 D: "Οφρα ἵδηιοι οἶοι Εὐθύφρονος ἵπποι, or in the Phædrus, 238 D: Οὐκέτι πόρρω Διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι. This is the crowning argument, because it adduces the capital fact of nature witnessed to by the oldest and gravest authority (*στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον*). The lines chiefly adverted to are 23-26: 'Ἄλλ' ὅτε δή κεν ἐγὼ πρόφρων ἐθέλοιμι ἐρύσσαι, | αὐτῇ κεν γαίῃ ἐρύσσαιμ' αὐτῇ τε θαλάσσῃ. | σειρὴν μὲν κεν ἔπειτα περὶ ρίον Οὐλύμποιο | δησαίμην, τὰ δέ κ' αὐτε μετήροι πάντα γένοιτο. Cp. Heracl. fr. 31, By-

water: Εἰ μὴ ἥλιος ἦν, εὐφρόνη ἀν ἦν. Fr. 29: ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβίσσεται μέτρα, εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἔξευρήσουσι. See also Eur. Orest. 982-4. As fire was the symbol of motion, so the sun was the still more concrete symbol of fire. See Rep. 6. 508, where the sun is allowed to be paramount in the region of sense; being essential to vision and to life. For the way in which the authority of Homer and the poets is used, ironically by Plato, but seriously by those whom he imitates, cp. Cratyl. 391, where an argument is based upon the line ὃν Ξάνθον καλέεσσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον, and infr. 194 E: "Οταν τοίνυν λάσιόν τον τὸ κέαρ ἔη, ὃ δὴ ἐπήνεσεν δ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής.

5. ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος] The motion of the whole universe, and the perpetual interchange of the different elements, was symbolized in the Heraclitean theory by the revolution of the sun, who not only rose and descended, traversing the sky, but was also quenched and rekindled daily, Νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ (fr. 32). Lassalle compares Ar. Meteor. 1. 9: 'Η μὲν οὖν ὡς κινοῦσα καὶ κυρία καὶ πρώτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ὁ κύκλος ἐστίν' ἐν ὁ φανερῶς ἡ τοῦ ἥλιον φορὰ διακρίνουσα καὶ συγκρίνουσα τῷ γίγνεσθαι πλησίον ἡ πορρώτερον, αἵτια τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς ἐστι.. 'Ἐστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὑδατος ἀναθυμία-

p. 153. πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις· εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὕσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματ' ἀν διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτ' ἀν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν, ἀπερ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. 'Υπόλαβε τούνυν, ὡς ἄριστε, οὐτωσί. κατὰ τὰ

σις, ἀτμίς· ἡ δὲ ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ, νέφος. . . Γίνεται δὲ κύκλος οὗτος μιμούμενος τὸν τοῦ ἥλιου κύκλουν, ἀμα γάρ ἐκεῖνος εἰς τὰ πλάγια μεταβάλλει, καὶ οὗτος ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Δεῖ δὲ νοῆσαι τοῦτον ὕσπερ ποταμὸν ῥέοντα κύκλῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κοινὸν ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος. . . "Ωστ' εἴπερ ἦνίττοντο τὸν Ὁκεανὸν οἱ πρότερον, τάχ' ἀν τοῦτον τὸν ποταμὸν λέγοιεν τὸν κύκλῳ ῥέοντα περὶ τὴν γῆν. Cp. infr. 181 D: Τὴν δὲ περιφοράν, and note: Phil. 28 E.

2. εἰ δὲ σταίη] Cp. Phædr. 245 C (where the point of view is nearer to Plato's own): Τὸ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς. . . οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸν τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὐθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινηθέντα γενέσθαι. In the text all is made to depend on change; in the above passage all change depends on that which is self-moving; but in both, motion is essential to being. Cp. also Legg. 10. 895 A: Εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὄμοι γενέσθαι, καθάπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τοιούτων τολμῶσι λέγειν, τίν' ἂρα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων; Ar. Met. I. 994 A: Τὸν μὲν ἀνθρωπὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος κινηθῆναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἥλιου, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, καὶ τούτου μηδὲν εἶναι πέρας. Ib. 11.

6-10. Simpl. in Aristot. Cat. p. 1056. Bas. (quoted by Lassalle): Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἔτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιλείπει, οἷχοιτο ἀν πάντα ἀφανισθέντα· διὸ καὶ μέμφεται 'Ομήρῳ 'Ηράκλειτος εἰπόντι, 'Ως ἔρις κ.τ.λ. Οἰχήσεσθαι, γάρ, φησι, πάντα. Schol. Ven. ad Iliad. 18. 107: '(Ως ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο) 'Ηράκλειτος τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν κατ' ἔριν συνεστάναι νομίζων μέμφεται 'Ομήρῳ, σύγχυσιν κόσμου δοκῶν αὐτὸν εὑχεσθαι. In the words ἄνω κάτω there is perhaps an allusion to Heraclitus' ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία. See also Phædo 72 C.

Some of the latest guesses at truth have sometimes had a real or fanciful resemblance to the earlier ones. See Comte in Miss Martineau's abridgment, vol. I. p. 429: 'Amidst the confusion and obscurity which exist on this subject, I think we may conclude that no organism, even the simplest, could live in a state of complete immobility. The double movement of the earth, and especially its rotation, may probably be as necessary to the development of life as to the periodical distribution of heat and light.'

6. 'Υπόλαβε] If being then is motion, how are we to conceive of knowledge, i. e. of sensible perception? This is now evolved, a fresh appeal to experience being made at every

If the revolution of the sun and of the heaven were stopped, the order of the universe would be overthrown.'

3. The theory is now applied.
 (1) Colour is not something without nor in the eye, it arises between, when the eye encounters a particular motion. Hence it is different to man and other animals, to different men, and

δύματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι p. 153.
 αὐτὸ ἔτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὄμμάτων μηδέ ἐν τοῖς
 δύμασι· μηδέ τιν' αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἥδη γὰρ ε
 ἀν εἴη τε *όν που ἐν τάξι καὶ μένοι καὶ οὐκ ἀν ἐν
 5 γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ'
 αὐτὸ ἐν ὃν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὔτω μέλαν τε καὶ
 λευκὸν καὶ ὅτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς
 10 τῶν ὄμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται
 γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ ἔκαστον εἶναι φαμεν χρῶμα,
 οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, p. 154.
 ἄλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἰδιον γεγονός· ἢ σὺ διϊσχυρί-

step. Each sensation is the result of a double movement from within and from without. Hence all sensations are, (1) relative to the individual (*ἐκάστῳ ἰδιον γεγονός*); (2) relative to each other. (1) is proved chiefly of the sensations of colour, warmth, etc.: (2) of the perceptions of size and number.

κατὰ τὰ δύματα] ‘In the sphere of vision.’

2. *ἔτερόν τι*] ‘A separate thing.’

3. *χώραν*] Cp. infr. 156 C.

4. **όν*] MSS. *ἄν*, Heind. corr. *όν που ἐν τάξι = εἴ τις αὐτῷ χώρα ἀποταχθείη*. The change from *ἄν* to *όν* is more probable than the repetition of *ἄν* in this place. For *ἥδη = if that were done*, cp. infr. 201 E: “*Ηδη γὰρ ἄν οὖσιαν . . προστίθεσθαι*.

10. *πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φοράν*] The theory does not consider the origin of this motion. The instinctive belief in the reality of external things is already weakened.

11. *ὅ δὴ ἔκαστον εἶναι φαμεν*] Cp. 152 D: “*Α δὴ φάμεν εἶναι. τὸ προσβάλλον, sc. ἡ φορά. τὸ προσβαλλόμενον, sc. τὰ δύματα.*” Cp. infr. ἀλλῷ τῷ προσπεσόν . . ἄλλου προσελθόντος.

12. *οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον*] ‘Neither that which strikes, nor that which is struck,’ i.e. Neither the motion from within nor that which meets it from without. Here, as elsewhere, ‘sight’ is conceived of as an act, and not as a passive impression. And *τὸ προσβαλλόμενον* is the object, *τοῦτο, ὃ προσβάλλει τὰ δύματα*. This is a curious use of the passive voice. But the comparison of other passages, esp. Tim. 45 C: *ὅπηπερ ἀν ἀντερείδη τὸ πρόσπιπτον ἐνδοθεν πρὸς ὃ τῶν ἔξω ξυνέπεσεν*, excludes the possibility of doubt, although the expression so understood is inconsistent with the theory of active and passive elements, which is afterwards introduced (infr. 156 A).

p. 154. σαιο ἀν ώσ οἶον σοὶ φαίνεται ἔκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὄτωοῦν ζώῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἅρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὄτιον; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἵσχυρῶς, ή πολὺ μᾶλλον, 5 ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταύτὸν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μᾶλλόν μοι δοκεῖ ή ἔκεινο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ὡς παραμετρούμεθα ή οὖν ἐφαπτόμεθα, μέγα ή λευκὸν ή θερμὸν ήν, οὐκ ἀν ποτε 10 ἄλλῳ προσπεσὸν ἄλλο ἀν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ή ἐφαπτόμενον ἔκαστον ήν τούτων, οὐκ ἀν αὖ ἄλλου προσελθόντος η τι παθόντος αὐτὸν μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλο ἀν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὡς φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα 15

to the same man in different states.

(2) Warmth in like manner is relative to the touch, and size and number are wholly relative. For want of observing this,

9. ὡς παραμετρούμεθα] Cornarius, followed by most editors, reads ὡ, taking παραμετρούμεθα actively. Although (as H. Schmidt remarks) in the example given infr. 155 B the case is altered by the supposition that Theætetus has grown, I still adhere to the MS. text and interpret (with Jowett) ‘that with which we compare ourselves in size.’ The instance most in point is that adduced in the Phædo, 102 B, where Simmias is shorter than Socrates, but taller than Phædo. There is in any case some confusion between relativity and subjectivity. This is partially evaded by making self the subject of comparison, but would be increased if τὸ παραμετρούμενον meant ‘that which perceives size,’ as it must if ὡ is read. None of the examples given are such as

to suggest the notion that bigness is in the eye.

We are introduced to a new class of objects, and make a transition in the argument at the same time. All that I can see, hear, feel, etc., is seen, heard, felt, etc. by me alone, and arises solely in relation to me. Again, I view the size of other bodies in relation to my own, or I compare different quantities. I cannot think of any magnitude or number as great or small, except in relation to some other magnitude or number.

12. τὸ παραμετρούμενον ή ἐφαπτόμενον] I. e. ‘I, the subject in the one case of self-measurement, in the other of sensation.’ Cp. 182 A, τὸ . . πάσχον. Ar. Eth. N. 10. 4. § 5: Αὐτὴν δέ (τὴν αἴσθησιν) λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν ή ἐν φέστι μηδὲν διαφερέτω.

we allow
ourselves
to fall into
manifest
contradic-
tions.

E.g. We
say that
six dice are
more and
fewer;
more than
four, fewer
than
twelve.

Can any-
thing be-
come more
unless in-
creased?

εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ώς φαίη ἀν Πρω- p. 154.
ταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν
λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις;

5 ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἴσει ἀσ-
βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ, ἀν μὲν τέτταρας
αὐτοῖς προσενέγκης, πλείους φαμὲν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων
καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις.
καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν. ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀν σε Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἢ τις
ἄλλος, Ὡ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μεῖζον ἢ πλέον
γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν; τί ἀποκρινεῖ;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰν μέν, ὡ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν
τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.
τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἡραν, ὡ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ,
ώς ἔοικεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπίδειόν τι ξυμ-
βήσεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται,
20 ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.

1. εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα]
'We allow ourselves to be
drawn into using strange and
ridiculous expressions.' Pro-
tagoras would not find fault with
us for calling the six dice more
than the four, but for using the
verb εἶναι to express the relation.

6. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ]
The difficulty has been stated
with regard to size, it is now
illustrated with regard to num-
ber.

14. τὸ δοκοῦν] Cp. p. 157 C:
Δοκοῦντά σοι.

16. φυλάττων] Not exactly
'avoiding' (φυλαττόμενος), but

'being careful:' keeping watch
on one point only. Cp. Gorg.
461 D: 'Εάν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάτ-
της. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις; Τὴν μακρο-
λογίαν . . ἥν καθείρξης: infr. p. 180
A: Εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν
βέβαιον ἐᾶν εἶναι. Also infr.
169 C: πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μῆ,
κ.τ.λ.

17. Εὖ γε . . καὶ θείως] Theæte-
tus' answer showed great dia-
letical aptitude. He perceives
the contradiction, and yet will
not answer παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ.
Cp. Rep. 1.346 A: καὶ, ὡ μακάριε,
μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι
καὶ περαίνωμεν.

19. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα] 'Our

p. 154. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἡμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἔξητακότες, ἥδη ἀν τὸ λουπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, ξυνελέθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἄτε ἴδιωται πρῶτον βουλησόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὅπωστιοῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ' ἀν βουλοίμην. 10

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε. ὅτε δ' οὗτος ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ἡ ἡρέμα, ως πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, πάλιν ἐπανα-

p. 155. σκεψόμεθα, οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς

tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.' Eur. Hipp. 612: 'Ἡ γλῶσσ' ὅμωμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.

3. πάντα . . ἔξητακότες] 'Having ransacked every mental problem.'

4. ἐκ περιουσίας] 'Out of our superfluity,' 'for mere pastime.' Dem. de Cor. 226: Οὗτος δ' ἐκ περιουσίας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖ.

5. τοιαύτην] Sc. σοφιστικήν. Cp. Symp. 210 B C: "Ωστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικῆς ὡν τὴν ψυχήν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, ἔξαρκεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι καὶ τίκτειν λόγους τοιούτους, viz. ἐπιεικῆς. Plato is thinking of such encounters as those which he has satirized in the Euthydemus.

τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν] Ar. Nub. 321: Καὶ γνωμιδίῳ γνώμην νύξασ', ἐτέρῳ λόγῳ ἀντιλογήσω.

6. ἐκρούομεν] 'Would have knocked our arguments together,' like swords in a sham fight; 'would have bandied arguments.'

Let us consider this, not in the spirit of controversy, but with calm inquiry.

What are these apparitions that have been raised within us?

7. αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά] 'Compared with one another.' The reading of the old edd., αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, might be defended, but αὐτά is the Bodleian reading.

8. ἡμῖν] Cp. Rep. 1. 343 A.

11. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε] V. r. Καὶ μὴν ἔγώ (B pr. TII.) The abruptness of ἔγώ without γε may be defended from Rep. 6. 500 A: Καὶ ἔγώ, ἀμέλει, ἔφη, συνοίομαι, infr. 164 A, Eur. Med. 1375: Καὶ μὴν ἔγώ σήν. Alcest. 369: Καὶ μὴν ἔγώ σοι πένθος .. συνοίσω. But the correction of the Bodleian MS. is in the ancient hand. In either case καὶ belongs to the pronoun.

12. ως πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες] Plato does not forget, either here or infr. 172 E, that Socrates has been summoned to appear before the King Archon.

13. οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες] 'With no feeling of impatience.' Cp. Men. 75 C D: Εἰ μὲν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμ' ἀν αὐτῷ, ὅτι 'Εμοὶ

One voice says, Nothing can become more or fewer, greater or less, while it is equal to itself.

Another: —That to which nothing is added, and from which nothing is taken, remains equal to itself.

αὐτοὺς ἔξετάζοντες, ἄττα ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα p. 155.
ἐν ήμιν; ὃν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὡς ἐγὼ
οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἀν μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον γενέ-
σθαι μήτε ὅγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἕως ἵσον εἴη αὐτὸ-
5 ἔαυτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, φίλοι, μήτε προστίθοιτο μήτε
ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε φθίνειν,
ἀεὶ δὲ ἵσον εἶναι.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, οὐ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, β

μὲν εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὄρθως λέγω,
σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ
ἔλεγχειν εἰ δὲ ὡσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ
σὺ νῦν φίλοι ὅντες βούλουντο ἀλ-
λῆλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πραότε-
ρον πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀπο-
κρίνεσθαι.

1. *φάσματα*] These mental phenomena (that have started into prominence). The *ἀπορίαι* just stated have made us aware of certain ‘facts of consciousness’ or postulates of our own minds. These are here called *φάσματα*, but presently, when they have been expressed and assented to, *όμολογήματα*. Cp. Polit. 268 E: Τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἀτρέως τε καὶ Θυέστου λεχθεῖσαν ἔριν φάσμα. Meno 85 C: Ωσπερ ὅντας ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηται αἱ δόξαι αὗται, κ.τ.λ. For the thought cp. infr. 203 A: Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαβόντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ήμᾶς αὗτούς. Prot. 331 C: Οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἔλεγχεσθαι ἀλλ’ ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ.

2. ὃν πρῶτον . . φήσομεν] ‘The first of which, as we look steadily at it, we shall thus put into words.’

3. ἀφαιροῖτο] Sc. ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ.

Or, possibly, the pronoun is here the subject: ‘And it suffers no diminution.’ Cp. infr. B: ἀφαιρεθέντος.

11. οὐ μὴ πρότερον ἦν] This may be construed in two ways. (1) ‘What existed not before, but (exists) afterwards, this cannot be, without production and a process of becoming.’ (2) ‘What was not before, neither can that be afterwards, without production,’ etc.

The latter is the more subtle interpretation, but is probably right. Schol.: Οἱ Πρόκλος τὸ ἀλλὰ παρέλκειν λέγει. ‘Prorsusque ita Latine dixeris quod non prius erat at postea id esse.’ Heindorf.—‘Nay but, if it was not before, it cannot be afterwards.’ Cp. Soph. 265 B: Ἡτις ἀν αἰτίᾳ γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι. The position of *ἀλλά* in the MSS., however (*ὕστερον* *ἀλλά* libri omnes, W.), throws some doubt upon the reading, and *ἄρα* may be suggested. *ὕστερον* **ἄρα τοῦτο εἶναι*, κ.τ.λ., ‘that, as our postulate runs, this cannot afterwards be with-

p. 155. *ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἀνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ γε δή.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε ὅντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τούναντίον παθόντα, ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μείζω εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὅγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ σοῦ αὐξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ὕστερον ὃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦ, οὐ γενόμενος· ἀνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι

A third:
Nothing
can be
what it was
not, with-
out be-
coming.
These seem
to jar, when
we say that
the dice
which were
fewer are
now more
without
being in-
creased;
or that I,
who was
taller than
you, am

out becoming and having become.' For the addition of γίγνεσθαι cf. infr. C.

H. Schmidt observes that the contradiction is not between the assumptions themselves, but between the assumption and the fact. But μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς can only mean 'fight amongst themselves,' and if the logic of such a half-humorous passage is to be pressed, No. 3 may be supposed to say 'Socrates is what he was not; he must have changed.' 'No,' says No. 2, 'he cannot have changed, for nothing has been taken from him, therefore he is not diminished.' No. 1 then comes to the aid of No. 2.

6. τηλικόνδε] 'Of the height you see me.'

7. ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ] 'In the space of a year.' 'Within a year.' This very natural expression has somehow given offence, and Madvig conj. παθόντα ἐν ἐμαυτῷ, an emendation which appears to have been anticipated by the copyist of Par.

1814.

9. μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὅγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος] 'My size having been stripped of nothing,' i.e. 'Without anything being taken from my height.' Badham conjectures μηδὲν ἐμοῦ τοῦ ὅγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος. But this is unnecessary.

11. ἀνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι αὐτοῖς] This axiom is supplementary to the three former. In the first, the aorist was used (γενέσθαι), the present in the second (αὐξάνεσθαι, φθίνειν). Both (γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι) are accordingly combined in the third, by means of which the two former are applied. It is now shown that the aorist implies the present. To us such refinements are difficult, because needless. The subtlety is carried still further in the Parmenides, until it is reduced to the formula, 'That which is, is.' Parm. 156 C: 'Εστός τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἔσταναι, ἀνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἴον τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν' . . ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὲν μεταβάλλει ἀνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.

now short-
er, without
becoming
so.

Theætetus
is full of
wonder and
bewilder-
ment at
this contra-
diction :—
a sign of his
philosophic
nature.

ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλὺς τοῦ ὕγκου οὐκ ἄν ποτε p. 155.
ἐγιγνόμην ἐλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις
οὗτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἡπαραδεξόμεθα. *ἔπει
γάρ που, ὡς Θεαίτητε· δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἀπειρος
τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὑπερ-
φυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ’ ἔστι ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίστε ὡς
ἄληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιῷ.

ΣΩ. Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὡς φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς ^ν
τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου
τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ

3. *καὶ*, which implies a subtle connexion between *ταῦτα* and *ἄλλα μυρία*, can only be expressed in English by the emphasis on ‘these.’ Cp. Soph. ΟΕδ. Col. 276: “Ωσπερ με κάνεστήσαθ’, ὁδε σώζετε.

ἡπαραδεξόμεθα] Sc. *παρὰ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου*. ‘If we are to take this at his hands;’ i. e. not only accept, but adopt this as our own difficulty. Cp. infr. 161 B, Charm. 162 E: εἰ οὖν ξυγχωρεῖς τοῦτ’ εἶναι σωφροσύνην ὅπερ οὐτούτῳ λέγει, καὶ παραδέχει τὸν λόγον, ἔγωγε πολὺ ἄν ηδιον μετὰ σοῦ σκοποίμην... Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ξυγχωρῶ, ἔφη, καὶ παραδέχομαι. But it must be admitted that εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτ’ *ἄρ’ *ἀποδεξόμεθα would give a plainer sense.

*ἔπει γάρ που] ‘I assume this (*δῆ*), for I suppose I take you with me.’ Cp. Euthyph. 12 C: “Ἐπει γάρ που νῦν γε: Εὐθ. πάνυ γε. The MSS. have εἰπέ, but there can be little doubt of the truth of Heindorf’s emendation. The six dice are more when compared with four. They were fewer when compared with twelve. They cannot be more

without having become more, and they cannot have become more without increase. Protagoras would say: It is true the same thing cannot be more without addition, but the dice in the two cases are not the same thing, for they are in a different relation.—The distinction between relative and absolute quantity is so familiar to us, that this is apt to appear a mere verbal quibble. But the solution of such difficulties was one of the steps by which the Greeks arrived at that distinction.

9. οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν] ‘Theodorus is evidently right in his surmise about you. For this Wonder is a true symptom of the philosophic nature.’

11. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ή αὕτη] Arist. Metaph. 1. 2: Διὰ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἀνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἥρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, κ. τ. λ.

Aristotle also observes that if wonder is the beginning, cessation of wonder is the end of philosophy;—so reconciling Plato’s saying with that of

p. 155. φιλοσοφίας ἡ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἱριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις ἥδη δὶ’ ὁ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ’ ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν λέγειν, ἡ οὕπω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕπω μοι δοκῶ.

5

ΣΩ. Χάριν οὖν μοι εἴσει, έάν σοι ἄνδρος, μᾶλλον εἰ δὲ ἄνδρῶν ὄνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ γε πολλήν;

ΣΩ. Ἡθρεὶ δὴ περισκοπῶν, μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων 10 ἐπακούῃ. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἡ οὐ ἀν δύνωνται ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις

4. To meet these and other difficulties the 'Protagorean' doctrine is further developed. It must be concealed, however, from the uninitiate,

Democritus, who made ἀθανασία his aim. See K. F. Herm. Gesch. d. Plat. Phil. p. 153.

1. τὴν Ἱριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον] Hes. Theog. 265: Θαύμας δ' Ὁκεανοῖο βαθυρρείταο θυγάτρα | ἥγαγετ' Ἡλέκτρην ἡ δ' ὡκεῖαν τέκεν Ἱριν. Cf. v. 780.

2. πότερον μανθάνεις ἥδη] 'Do you begin to perceive what is the reason of this, according to the theory we attribute to Protagoras?'

Aristotle, Met. 10. 1063 A, points out that the Protagorean doctrine rests very much on the relativity of quantity: Φαινονται γὰρ οὐχ ἥκιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀντιφάσεις ταῦτον κατηγορεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ ποσὸν ὑπειληφέναι μὴ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ καὶ εἶναι τετράπηχυ τὸ αὐτὸν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι. ἡ δ' οὐσία κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ὡρισμένης φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τῆς ἀδρίστου.

6. Χάριν, κ. τ. λ.] 'Shall I then earn your gratitude, if in regard to a man, or rather men, of high renown, I help you to elicit the truth of their

meaning from its hidingplace in their minds?'

μᾶλλον δὲ ἄνδρῶν] Viz. Heraclitus, Homer, and the others mentioned above, 152 E.

7. ἄνδρῶν . . αὐτῶν] The two genitives are not precisely in the same construction: ἄνδρῶν is governed by διανοίας, αὐτῶν by ἐξ in συνεξερ. The pronoun αὐτός, however, is frequently used to recall a noun, which, for the sake of emphasis, has been placed in the forepart of the sentence, e.g. Rep. 5. 477 D: Ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμίν τινα φῆς εἶναι αὐτήν, κ. τ. λ. Cf. Shak. Winter's Tale, 5. 1: 'Whom | Though bearing misery, I desire my life | Once more to look on him.'

ἀποκεκρυμμένην is to be taken closely with συνεξερ., as the order shows. Cf. Phaed. 89 A: πεφευγότας ἀνεκαλέσατο.

12. ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι] What may be 'grasped thus.' The extreme materialists are here discarded; in the Sophist they are made better for the

those ‘im-penetrable’ men, who believe in no unseen operations, but only in what they can clutch with both hands.

δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι p. 155.
ώς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δή, ὡς Σώκρατες, σκληρούς γε λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους. p. 156.

5 ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ γάρ, ὡς παῖ, μάλ’ εὑ ἄμουσοι. ἄλλοι δὲ

argument’s sake, that we may be able to discourse with them. The description there is very similar. Soph. 246 A B: Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἔξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἔλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γάρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων δισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταῦτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὅριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τις φησι μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἔθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. 247 C: τούτων οὐδὲν ἀν ἐπασχυνθεῖεν οὐ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἄλλὰ διατείνουντ’ ἀν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶν ἔμπιεζειν εἰσὶν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἔστιν.

πράξεις] E. g. δικαία καὶ ἀδικος πρᾶξις. Cp. Soph. 247 A B.

1. γενέσεις] E. g. αἴσθησις, κίνησις, ἥδονή.

Sensationalism is here treated as already a kind of idealism, whereas in the corresponding passage of the Sophist, p. 246, the doctrine of an unseen γένεσις is regarded as an inference which the idealist by his dialectic compels the reluctant materialist to accept. See Introduction.

3. σκληρούς . . . καὶ ἀντιτύπους] ‘Hard and repellent,’ i. e. stubborn and impenetrable. Cp. Soph. 246 B: Ἡ δεινοὺς εἴρηκας ἀνδρας· ἥδη γάρ καὶ ἔγὼ τούτων συχνοῖς προσέτυχον. For the verbal climax cp. Tim. 62 B C:

Σκληρὸν δέ, ὅσοις ἀν ἡμῶν ἡ σάρξ ὑπείκη . . τὸ δὲ ἐκ τετραγώνων ὃν βάσεων . . ἀντιτυπώτατον εἶδος. There is perhaps a humorous intention in the application of these material attributes to the men in question, similar to the play of words by which the Heracliteans are called ῥέοντες, infr. 181 A.

5. ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ κομψότεροι] In comparison with these advocates of gross bodily ‘matter,’ Protagoras is almost an idealist. His disciples believe not indeed in a world of νοητὰ εἶδη, but in a hidden process underlying appearances. Cp. Rep. 5. 477 C: δυνάμεως γὰρ ἔγὼ οὕτε τινὰ χρόνα δρῶ οὕτε σχῆμα, κ. τ. λ.

ἄλλοι δέ] Viz. the μαθηταὶ Πρωταγόρου, to whom he communicated his doctrine ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, 152 C. Schleiermacher (who is followed by Schanz) conjectured ἀλλ’ οἵδε: but the men would then be apt to be confused with the ἀνδρες ὄνομαστοι above. The ‘disciples of Protagoras’ are evidently contemporaries of Plato. Aristippus is probably included. (Κομψός and συρφετός are opposed, Hippias Maj. 288 D: Οὐ κομψὸς ἄλλὰ συρφετός.) The word κομψός is used similarly of certain nameless (Pythagorean?) philosophers in Polit. 284 E, 285 A: Πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν λέγουσιν ὡς ἄρα μετρητικὴ περὶ πάντ’ ἔστι τὰ γιγνόμενα. Cp. Phil. 53 C: κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες (Megarians?) αὐ

p. 156. πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὡν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἀρχὴ δέ, ἐξ ἦς καὶ ἡ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἥρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἅπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πά- 5 σχεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς τὸν ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἕκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἅπειρα, δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικόν, ἀεὶ συνεκπί- πτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὄνόματα, ὅψεις 10 τε καὶ ἀκοὰι καὶ ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι,

τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μην-
ύειν ἡμῖν· οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

3. ἦν] ‘Really is,’—according to the well-known idiom, which becomes more frequent in Aristotle. What a thing proves to be when an inquiry is finished, that it *was* before the inquiry began. It is a transference of the reality of history to a general statement. H. Schmidt’s argument for taking *ἦν* literally, ‘In the beginning all was motion,’ is not convincing.—The doctrine asserted above is now more minutely developed.

ἄλλο . . οὐδέν] Sc. *ἦν*.

8. συνεκπίπτουσα] ‘Tumbling forth to light at the same moment.’ Compare the lively expression in Rep. 4. 432 D, when justice is discovered: *πάλαι, ὃ μακάριε, φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι.* For the insertion of *καὶ γεννωμένη* cp. Soph. Ant. 537: *Καὶ ἔνυμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆσαιτίας.* Aesch. Prom. 331: *Πάντων μετασχῶν καὶ τε- τολμηκώς ἐμοί.* The present

tense denotes a process that is always in transition.

10. τὰ τοιάδε . . ἔχουσιν ὄνόματα,
ὅψεις . . κεκλημέναι] The slight redundancy helps to connect the sentence.

11. The senses of taste and touch are added in the version of Ficinus: ‘olfactus, gustus, tactusque frigidorum et calidorum,’ and Cornarius inserted *καὶ γεύσεις καὶ θίξεις* after *ὀσφρήσεις*, perhaps with reference to the false interpretation of infr. C D, βραδὺ . . θάττω.

12. ἡδοναί γε δῆ] The particles mark the transition to a class of things less familiarly known by the name *αἰσθησις*.

13. αἱ ἀνώνυμοι] See Locke, Hum. Und. b. 2. c. 3: ‘I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense, nor indeed is it possible if we would, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for.’ Also Spinoza, Eth. 3

Far more refined are those whose mysteries we now reveal. Their first principle, upon which the whole depends, is that All is motion. Motion is active and passive, and each kind is infinite. These meet and produce innumerable twin births:

sensation
and sens-
ible thing
springing
forth to-
gether.
Sensations
include
pleasures,
pains, de-
sires and
fears, and
there are
many with-
out a name.
Sensible
things are
colours,
sounds, and
the like.
All the
things now
spoken of

παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὡνομασμέναι· τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν π. 156.
γένος τούτων ἐκάσταις ὁμόγονον, ὅψεσι μὲν χρώματα
παντοδαπαῖς παντοδαπά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναί, ο
καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενῆ
5 γιγνόμενα. Τί δὴ οὖν βούλεται οὗτος ὁ μῦθος,
ῳ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα; ἅρα ἐννοεῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ἄθρει ἔάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. βούλεται
γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μέν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν,
10 κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτής ἔνι τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν.
ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιά-
ζοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ γεννᾶ, τὰ δὲ

(quoted by H. Schmidt): ‘uni-
cuique ex jam dictis clare con-
stare credo, affectus tot varia-
tiones oriri, ut nullo numero
definiri queant . . . pleraque
animi fluctuationes nomina non
habent.’

2. The Bodleian, with most
other MSS., has ἐκάστης.

5. οὗτος ὁ μῦθος] Cp. Soph.
242 C: Μὴθόν τινα ἐκαστος φαίνε-
ται μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν
ἡμῖν, κ. τ. λ. For the spirit with
which all this is done compare
Rep. 8. 545 D E: Φῶμεν αὐτὰς
τραγικῶς, ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς
παιξούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ
σπουδῇ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογου-
μένας λέγειν;

6. πρὸς τὰ πρότερα] ‘In relation
to what came before,’ viz.
from 153 D, ‘Υπόλαβε—
to 155 C, παραδεξόμεθα.

8. ‘Αλλ’ ἄθρει ἔάν] ‘Well, look
attentively; perhaps we shall
be able to finish it.’ Cp. infr.
192 E: ‘Ιδε δὴ, ἔάν τι μᾶλλον
νῦν ἐπισπῆ. ἔάν = ‘in the hope
that.’

9. ταῦτα] ποιοῦντα, πάσχοντα,
αἰσθητά, αἰσθήσεις.

πάντα . . . κινεῖται] Cp. Locke:
‘The next thing to be con-
sidered is, how bodies produce
ideas in us, and that is mani-
festly by impulse, the only way
which we can conceive bodies
operate in.’

11. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ] ‘The
slower have their motion in
one spot, and in relation to
what is in contact with them,
and are thus the producing
elements; but those which are
[thus] produced are swifter;
for they are carried about, and
their motion is from place to
place.’

For ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ cp. infr. 181
CD: ‘Οταν δὲ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.

12. τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα τοῦτω δή] Schol.: Εἰς τὸ δὴ ὑποστικτέον.
This only means that οὕτω δή
is to be taken with the pre-
ceding words. The phrase has
been felt to be somewhat harsh;
and perhaps the second οὕτω
may have crept in from the
preceding clause. The (prob-
ably conjectural) interpolation
of Cornarius after οὕτω δή
[βραδύτερά ἐστιν. ὅσον δὲ αὐ

p. 156. γεννώμενα τοῦτω δὴ θάττω ἐστί· φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ὅμιλα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ ξυμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεν-

ταχύ, πρὸς τὰ πόρρωθεν τὴν κίνησιν ἵσχει καὶ οὕτω γεννᾶ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὗτα δῆ] is quite unnecessary, and confuses the real sense. It was occasioned by the condensation of the language and the inversion or 'chiasm' in what follows, which, to correspond exactly, should have been τὰ δ' αὖ θάττω φέρεται καὶ γεννᾶται. The slower motions are the ποιῶντα and πάσχοντα, which, when in contact, produce (without changing place) the αἰσθητά and αἰσθήσεις (i. e. qualities and sensations), which are the 'quicker motions,' and pass to and fro between the ποιοῦν and πάσχον. Cp. inf. p. 159 C D: 'Εγένησε γάρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν, ἀμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα. Qualities and sensations are in locomotion, because existing merely in the act of flowing from subject to object, and from object to subject, perhaps also because they are realized now here, now there. Cp. 153 D E. When it is said that they are the swifter motions, the theory is vaguely connected with Heraclitean doctrine. Sensations and qualities are drops in the ever-flowing river of succession. The man or the tree is like the dull weed that clogs it, itself to be carried down in time. Subject and object are more of the nature of Earth, sensation and quality are sparks of the everliving Fire. That the ποιοῦν and πάσχον are both

γεννῶντα appears from 159 C D: 'Εγένησε γάρ δὴ .. τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, quoted above.

Sensational idealism is hampered by the necessity of dissolving 'substance' (whether matter or mind) into a series of transient processes, without too violently contradicting experience. An instance of this logical necessity has appeared since the above note was written, in Mr. J. S. Mill's 'Permanent possibilities' (Mill on Hamilton, ch. XI.), a device which unintentionally throws a vivid light on Plato's meaning here. Perception and attribute are conceived as momentary; things and persons are imagined as a gradual growth and decay. By 'slow' and 'swift' are really meant 'lasting' and 'momentary.' The distinction of kinds of motion (*ἄλλοιώσις, φορά*) is purposely slurred over here, that it may come in as a fresh point at a later stage of the discussion, 181 C. Cp. 157 B. See also Kant, Krit. d. r. Vern. B, 230.

3. τῶν τούτῳ ξυμμέτρων] Men. 76 D: 'Ἐστὶ γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχήματος ὃψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. This definition is said to be 'κατὰ Γοργίαν.' In Tim. 67 C Plato calls colour φλόγα ὥν σωμάτων ἔκαστων ἀπορρέουσαν, ὃψει ξύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσαν πρὸς αἴσθησιν. Cp. ib. 45, 6. Plato's account of sensation in the Timaeus coincides in many points with this part of the Theætetus, showing that, al-

are in motion. But the motion of some is swift and

of others slow. Those which produce are slow, and their motion depends on *juxta-position*. The things produced are swifter, for they are in locomotion, and do not merely

νήση τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἰσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, p. 156.
 ἀ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγένετο ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο
 ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὅψεως
 πρὸς τῶν ὄφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ ε
 5 συναποτίκτοντος τὸ χρῶμα, ὁ μὲν ὄφθαλμὸς ἄρα
 ὅψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὥρᾳ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο
 οὕτι τι ὅψις ἀλλὰ ὄφθαλμὸς ὥρων, τὸ δὲ ξυγγεννῆσαν
 τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ
 λευκότης αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε

though rejected as a theory of knowledge, the hypothesis is retained as a ‘probable’ doctrine of sense. See also Phil. 34.

3. τότε δή, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Then it is that while these are issuing in the midst, sight from the eyes, whiteness from that which helps to create the colour, the eye is filled with seeing, and sees now, and becomes not sight indeed, but seeing eye, and that which helps to give the colour birth is covered with whiteness, and it too becomes not whiteness but white, whether stick or stone, or whatever it is that happens to have been coloured with this hue.’

μεταξὺ φερομένων] It is doubtful whether this means ‘whilst they are moving,’ or ‘as they are moving in the midst.’ The former is idiomatic Greek, but the latter seems preferable if we turn to 154 A: Μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός, and infr. 182 A: Φέρεσθαι ἑκαστον τούτων ἄμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος. And the idiomatic use of *μεταξύ* belongs rather to cases in which one action supervenes upon another, than where both are

simultaneous, as here.

9. εἴτε *ὅτωοῦν, κ.τ.λ.] The MS. reading is δτουοῦν ξ. χρῶμα. [Heind. who receives δτιοῦν . . χρῆμα from Cornarius, adds, ‘ne ipso quidem χρῆμα opus fuerit, h.l.’ But δτιοῦν has scarcely more authority than χρῆμα. One MS. (Par. H.) has σῶμα on the margin, but δτονοῦν . . σῶμα, though it has thus some slight authority, is not satisfactory. The real text is perhaps restored by dropping χρῶμα, and reading δτωοῦν as in the text (δτωοῦν Par. F.) ‘White, whether stick or stone, or whatsoever happens to be coloured with that colour.’ The repetition of similar consonants is a frequent form of corruption; ep. esp. 158 C; δτῷ χρή, κ.τ.λ.; where three MSS. (Bodl. Vat. Ven. II.) read δτῷ χρόνῳ χρή, κ.τ.λ. (Χρόνου, χρόνον, χρόνον, occurring within the next few lines.) Also, 149 C, ἀτόποις for ἀτόκοις Bodl. pr. Vat. pr. Ven. II. with ἀτοπώτατος a few lines above.

Another way is opened by the ingenious conjecture of Schanz, who reads δτονοῦν . . σχῆμα. Cp. esp. Men. 75 B: “Ἐστω γὰρ δὴ ήμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, δ

p. 156. *ὅτῳοῦν ξυνέβη χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι.
καὶ τάλλα δὴ οὗτω, σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ⁵
μηδὲν εἶναι, δὲ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς
ἄλληλα ὄμιλίᾳ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς
κινήσεως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ
πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὡς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι
παγίως· οὕτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἔστι τι, πρὸν ἀν τῷ πά-
σχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὕτε πάσχον, πρὸν ἀν τῷ ποιοῦντι·
τό τέ τινι ξυνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ αὖ προσπεσὸν
πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ

p. 157. μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι
ἀεὶ ἐπόμενον. But the language is clearer and simpler without introducing the notion of 'form.' For εἴτε ξύλος εἴτε λίθος cp. infr. ἀνθρωπόν τε καὶ λίθον καὶ ἔκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος. Hipp. Maj. 292 D: Καὶ λίθῳ καὶ ξύλῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ θεῷ, κ.τ.λ. The sentence is turned like Phaedr. 237 A: Εἴτε δὶς φόδης εἶδος λιγέσι, εἴτε διὰ γένος μουσικὸν τὸ Λιγύων ταύτην ἔσχετε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν. Rep. 10. 612 A: Εἴτε πολυειδῆς εἴτε μονοειδῆς εἴτε ὅπη ἔχει καὶ ὅπως. The aorists, while marking the momentariness of each act of sense, give picturesqueness to the expression, referring, as in the Homeric similes, to an imaginary case.

4. τότε] Supr. 152 D.

6. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν] A further effort is here made to melt away the 'category of substance' into thin air. The 'permanent possibility' (which is only relatively permanent) is incognizable in itself. 'For it is impossible to have a firm notion (they say) even of the

become.
—The eye and its appropriate active motion come in contact. Then sight begins to fit from the eye and colour from the object of sight; the eye becomes a seeing eye, and the object becomes coloured.

active and passive elements as existing separately in any single case.' αὐτῶν, sc. τῶν κινουμένων, 'To distinguish in them the active or passive element as existing.' αὐτῶν refers, as H. Schmidt points out, to σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα, κ.τ.λ., i.e. sense-phenomena generally. It depends rather on τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον than on ἐνός. Cp. Arist. Met. 5. 20: Μηδὲν ἀξῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἐνός. For αὐτῶν Cornarius suggested αὖ τι. If a change were necessary, αὖ τῶν would seem more probable. τῶν ἐπὶ ἐνός, 'of things taken singly,' might then be compared with τῶν ἐν ἔκεινων, Phil. 16 D. (Wohlrab joins ἐπὶ ἐνός αὐτῶν, 'in the case of any one of them.') For ἐπὶ ἐνός cp. infr. 186 A, ἐπὶ πάντων.

7. νοῆσαι... παγίως] Rep. 5. 479 C: Καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ οὕτ' εἶναι οὕτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὕτ' ἀμφότερα οὕτε οὐδέτερον. The word is used by Aristotle.

11. πάσχον ἀνεφάνη] E. g. The same eye, when seen, is active, when seeing, passive.

Neither seeing eye nor coloured object can be thought of as existing independently of this mutual process. We must not speak of anything as existing, but only as becoming this or that, arising, perishing, or changing. This applies not only to single things, but to those

ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ κάθ' αὐτό, ἀλλά p. 157.
 τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἔξαιρετέον, ⁱⁿ
 οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἡναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνη-
 θείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ
 5 δεῖ, ως ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε
 του οὔτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν
 ὅνομα ὃ τι ἀν iστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι
 γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἄλλοι-
 ούμενα· ως ἐάν τι τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος ὁ
 10 τοῦτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ
 περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ὃ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἄνθρω-
 πόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἔκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ c
 εῖδος. Ταῦτα δή, ως Θεαίτητε, ἀρ' ήδεα δοκεῖ σοι
 εἶναι, καὶ γεύοιο ἀν αὐτῶν ως ἀρεσκόντων;

3. οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς] 'Though, as I need not observe.' The irony of this appears very clearly, if we compare 197 A: Εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός, κ.τ.λ.

4. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ] Sc. ποιεῖν. Or rather τό is an accusative in opposition to the active of ξυγχωρεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

5. οὔτε του] The genitive is a point of transition to ἐμοῦ.

7. φθέγγεσθαι . .] 'To use the expression.' ('Man muss Ausdrücke wie γιγνόμενα ff. brauchen.' H. Schmidt.)

9. δ τοῦτο ποιῶν] For the redundancy cp. Rep. 6. 506 A : Δίκαια καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἔστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἀξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα.

11. ως δὴ ἀθροίσματι . . τίθενται] Sc. ὅνομα. The subject of τίθενται is indefinite. From our Protagorean point of view, that which answers to a common name, or which counts for one, is not ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, nor ἐν παρὰ

τὰ πολλά, but an arbitrary or conventional aggregate of phenomena. Cp. Parm. 165 A, where the word ὅγκος answers to ἀθροίσμα here, but implies something even more vague and formless. The same terminology recurs infr. 182 A, οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον, where it denotes genus as opposed to species. A doubt may be raised whether the wholes here intended are general (a class = an aggregate of individuals) or particular (a thing or person = an aggregate of attributes). The former is preferable. Cp. however Tim. 56 C : Ξυνα-θροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τοὺς ὅγκους αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι (of the invisible particles of bodies).

12. καὶ ἔκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εῖδος] These words, which have occasioned needless difficulty, are to be explained by the common ellipse of ἄλλο. 'Men and other animals,' 'animals and other forms.'

↑
towards
(the side of)

p. 157. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ω̄ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἡ ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾶ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ω̄ φίλε, ὅτι ἔγὼ μὲν οὔτ' οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ' 5 εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μακεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα ἐπάδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι, ἔως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα ἔννεξαγάγω. ἔξαχθέντος δέ, τότ' ἥδη σκέψομαι εἴτ' ἀνεμιάνον εἴτε γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν 10 εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἢ ἂν φαίνηται σοι περὶ ὃν ἂν ἐρωτῶ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρώτα δή.

ΣΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν, εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα 15 ἢ ἄρτι διῆμεν.

5. ποιοῦμαι] ‘Tanquam proprium mihi vindico, velut dicitur ποιεῖσθαι τινα νιόν.’ Heind. Is it not rather, ‘give birth to?’ ‘Produce as mine?’ Cp. Rep. 2. 372 C: Ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας. Crit. 45 D: Ἡ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας.

7. παρατίθημι] Supr. 149 C: Διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκα καὶ ἐπάδουσαι. See the description of the education of a Greek youth in the Protagoras, 325 E: Παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιτῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιῆματα. The genitive is perhaps partitive with παρατίθημι, but more probably governed by ἀπογεύσασθαι.

10. καὶ καρτερῶν] ‘And with perseverance.’ Boldness was all he required at first; 148 C, θάρρει: 151 D, ἐὰν . . ἀνδρίζῃ.

14. εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει] ‘Whether

bundles of things, which men call sorts or natures.

Theætetetus is invited to acknowledge the theory so far developed. Socrates disclaims having any share in it, except that he has helped to bring it to the birth. The Good and Noble must be thought of with other things, as not existing, but arising continually.

you are pleased with the idea that nothing is, but is ever becoming, good and noble, as well as what we have just enumerated.’

15. ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν] As in 156 B αἴσθησις is made to include desire, fear, etc., so, by the subtle introduction of these words, the doctrine is pushed to its farthest limits, and thus its chief fallacy is hinted at—that of arguing from sense to higher things. So afterwards Protagoras is made to assume that the doctrine applies to states as well as individuals.

ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν are brought in as it were accidentally, merely as a fresh example, like κοροπλαθῶν supr. 147 B. But this, to the Platonic reader, was already a tacit ‘reductio ad absurdum,’ and for all readers

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω ὡς τὸ δι- p. 157.
εξιόντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑπο-
ληπτέον ἥπερ διελήλυθας.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλείπον αὐτοῦ. E
5 λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων
καὶ μανίας ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο
παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. οἷσθα γάρ που ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι
τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι διῆ-
μεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις
10 ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα p. 158.
ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδὲν
ῶν φαίνεται εἶναι.

5. A formidable class of objections is now disposed of. It is commonly said that in dreams and madness

it prepares the way for the pivot-argument from the δόξα τοῦ ὀφελίμου in what follows, 177 ff. H. Schmidt, however, approves of Heindorf's proposal to cancel these significant words.

2. θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν] The order is φαίνεται θαυμασίως ὡς ἔχειν. θαυμασίως ὡς is stronger than θαυμασίως, and is formed by attraction of the antecedent from θαυμάσιον ἐστιν ὡς.

4. Μὴ τοίνυν] The doctrine is now so far developed that we have only to notice an objection, and it will be complete. As false opinion is our stumbling-block afterwards, so now false impressions have to be accounted for. The solution is a simple one, and confirms our theory—they are not false to him who is the subject of them. The position, Sense is knowledge, was at first made equivalent to the reality of the object of sense (p. 152). But are dreams real? Are the illusions of madness true? Is that

really bitter which tastes so to the diseased palate?—If truth is wholly relative, if nothing is but what becomes, this must be so.

5. καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ] ‘And disease, especially madness and its delusions of sight, hearing, and other senses.’ μανία is the subject of λέγεται, and ὅσα is cogn. accus. Cp. Soph. Trach. 406: Λεύσσων μάταια.

6. ὅσα . . τί ἄλλο] The double cognate accusative is also noticeable. ‘The cases in which it is said—to have any other illusory impression.’

10. πολλοῦ δεῖ] This phrase has become equivalent to an adverb. Hence it is unnecessary to adopt δεῖν from Heindorf's conjecture.

11. ἀλλὰ πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδὲν ὕν φαίνεται εἶναι] E. g. Democritus (who is believed to have written against Protagoras) said of all sensations except hardness and weight: Σημεῖον δὲ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ φύσει τὸ μὴ ταῦτα πᾶσι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ζῷοις, ἀλλ' ὁ ἡμῖν γλυκύν, τοῦτ'

p. 158. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ω̄ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ω̄ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἔκαστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ φαίνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγὼ μέν, ω̄ Σώκρατες, ὅκνω εἰπεῖν ὅτι 5 οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι μοι νῦν δὴ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντι βαύτό. ἐπεὶ ω̄ς ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἀν δυναίμην ἀμφισβήτησαι ω̄ς οἱ μανόμενοι ἢ οἱ ὄνειρώττοντες οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοί τε, καὶ ω̄ς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ διανο- 10 ὧνται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ὑπαρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὁ πολλάκις σε οἷμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων 15 τί ἀν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδεῖξαι, εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα ἡ διανοούμεθα ὄνειρώττομεν, ἢ ἐγρηγόραμέν τε καὶ σ ὑπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μήν, ω̄ Σώκρατες, ἄπορόν γε ὅτῳ χρή 20

ἄλλοις πικρὸν καὶ ἔτεροις δέξῃ καὶ ἄλλοις δριμύ, τοῖς δὲ στρυφνόν· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὠσαύτως.

6. νῦν δή] Supr. 151 D.

9. οἱ μὲν . . αὐτῶν] I. e. the madmen.

10. πτηνοί τε] Sc. οἴωνται εἶναι. Cp. supr. 149 D: τίκτειν τε δή, and note.

15. Ὁ πολλάκις] δ is not exactly governed by ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων, but is cognate accusative in apposition with the whole sentence which follows. 'What question do you allude to? This. I dare say you have often heard it asked, etc.' Ridgell's Digest, § 15, b. Cp. 165

D: Ἀ Ἑλλοχῶν ἀν πελταστικὸς ἀνηρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, κ.τ.λ. Rep. 4. 443 B: Τὸ ἐνύπιον, δ ἔφαμεν ὑποπτεῦσαι, κ.τ.λ.

Arist. Met. 3. 6. 1011 A: Τὰ δὲ τοιάντα ἀπορήματα ὅμοιά ἔστι τῷ ἀπορείν πότερον καθεύδομεν νῦν ἢ ἐγρηγόραμεν. Ib. 7. 5.

20. ἄπορόν γε ὅτῳ χρή ἐπιδεῖξαι] Descartes de la Méthode, p. 164 (Cousin): 'Et que les meilleurs esprits y étudient tant qu'il leur plaira, je ne crois pas qu'ils puissent donner aucune raison, qui soit suffisante pour ôter cette doute, s'ils ne présupposent l'existence de Dieu.' Descartes, however, would not say

nothing of what appears is real. Protagoras says, All that appears to me is real to me. What account does he then give of these phenomena?

There is a doubt which is often raised about them: e.g. when it is asked, Can we prove that we are not dreaming now?

ἐπιδεῖξαι τεκμηρίω. πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα p. 158.
τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ἡ τε γὰρ νυνὶ διειλέγμεθα,
οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέ-
γεσθαι· καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὅναρ ὄνείρατα δοκῶμεν διηγεῖ-
σθαι,—ἄτοπος ἡ ὁμοιότης τούτων ἔκείνοις.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾶς οὖν ὅτι τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλε-
πόν, ὅτε καὶ πότερόν ἐστιν ὅναρ ἀμφισβητεῖ-
ται, καὶ δὴ ἵσου ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ὃν καθεύδομεν ὡς ^δ
έγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαμάχεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ⁵
τὰ ἀεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθῆ,

ὅμοιώς ἐφ' ἑκατέροις διῆσχυριζόμεθα.
Attention was of course early
attracted by the phenomena of
dreams. See esp. II. 22. 199 :
'Ως δὲ ἐν ὄνείρῳ οὐ δύναται φεύ-
γοντα διώκειν.'

B has δτῷ χρόνῳ χρή, whence Schanz formerly conjectured δτῷ
χρώμενον χρή, and now reads δτῷ
χρεών. But T gives χρή, and χρόνον occurs a few lines below.

[ἀπορον] Sc. τὸ ἀμφισβήτημα
γίγνεται. δτῷ, κ.τ.λ., explains the
point of the difficulty.

1. πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα
τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ] 'For
everything corresponds in each
exactly, as if one series was the
counterpart of the other.'

3. ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ] This is the
reading of the best MSS., though
ἐνυπνίῳ is supported by the
greater number. If the latter
reading were adopted, ἐν τῷ
must be changed to ἐν τῷ.

4. καὶ δταν δῆ] 'And when in a
dream we do seem to be relating
dreams,—it is strange, the re-
semblance of this state to that.'

ὄνείρατα . . διηγεῖσθαι] Either
(1) 'to tell dreams,' or (2) 'to
give utterance to thoughts
which are only dreams.' Cp.
supr. πάντα ἡ διανοούμεθα ὄνειρώτ-

τομεν. ὄνείρατα in (2) is a sort
of cognate accusative, or rather,
is in apposition to the suppressed
object of διηγεῖσθαι. ὅναρ is
adverbial to δοκῶμεν. (Meno 85
C : "Ωσπερ ὅναρ ἄρτι ἀνακείνηται
αἱ δόξαι αἴται"). But the former
explanation (1) is simpler and
is really free from objection.
δταν δῆ has a different force in
(1) and (2). Either, (1) 'When
it comes to this,' marking a
climax, or, (2) 'When in fact,'
marking the correspondence to
the previous clause. The second
interpretation (2), although in
some ways plausible, seems to
require Hirschig's emendation
διαλέγεσθαι for διηγεῖσθαι. τού-
των refers to the waking, ἔκεί-
νοις to the sleeping state, like
ἐνθάδε and ἔκει of the visible
and invisible world. There is
a slight break in the sentence
before ἄτοπος, κ.τ.λ. Heindorf's
conjecture ἄττα (for ὄνείρατα),
approved by Cobet, and adopted
by Schanz, ('and when in
dreams we do seem to be re-
lating something'), is rather
flat, but is more plausible if we
adopt Hirschig's emendation :
'when we seem to have a con-
versation in our dream.'

Dreams
have as
much real-
ity to the
dreaming
mind, as
daylight
impressions
have to

p. 158. ὥστε ἵσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμὲν ὅντα εἶναι, ἵσον δὲ ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἑκατέροις διῆσχυριζόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἵσος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι τὸ ἀληθὲς ὄρισθήσεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Γελοῖον μέντ’ ἀν εἴη πολλαχῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, οἵτοια τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἐμοῦ τοίνυν ἄκουε οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἀν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ ἀεὶ δοκοῦντα ὄριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. λέγουσι δέ, ώς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὗτος ἐρωτῶντες, ¹⁵Ω Θεαί- τητε, ὃ ἀν ἔτερον ἡ παντάπασι, μή πή τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξει τῷ ἔτερῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταύτῃν εἶναι ὁ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἔτερον, ἀλλ’ ὅλως ἔτερον.

7. πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι] The supporters of the same doctrine as quoted by Aristotle extended this argument to meet that from general consent. Met. 3. 5. 1009 B: Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι οἴονται προσήκειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι.

10. τι ἄλλο . . σαφές] ‘Any other certain test.’

14. ὄριζόμενοι] ‘Who determine.’ Perhaps there is a touch of irony in the application of this word to the Protagoreans.

17. μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταύτῃν] These words expand παντάπασι, and are required in order to place Theætetus at the right point of view. Megarian subtlety is here ironi-

cally brought to the help of Protagoras, by the introduction of a fallacy in the Euthydemus vein. The language of logic is applied to the sensible world : the language of ideas to things which admit of degrees. And the idea dwelt upon throughout is that of difference. The language is humoured accordingly. Socrates ill can hardly be said to be ὅλως ἔτερον, wholly different, from Socrates well, but they differ when taken each as a whole, ὅλον τοῦτο ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ (159 B). Cp. Democritus ap. Ar. de Gen. et Cor. 1. 2 : Καὶ ὅλως ἔτερον φαίνεσθαι ἐνὸς μετακινηθέντος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία γίγνεται γραμμάτων.

the waking mind.
And half our life is spent in dreaming.
The impressions of madness, too, though more short-lived, are real at the time to him who experiences them.
In both cases it is impossible to demonstrate which is the real world.
Our theory resolves this doubt as follows :

That which
is different
has a dif-
ferent
power,

Whether
this be
active or
passive.

And the
same thing
in combi-
nation with
different

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυ- p. 158.
νάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὀτωσοῦν, ὅταν ἢ κομιδῇ ἔτερον. p. 159.

ΣΩ. Ἐπ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦ-
τον ὁμολογεῖν;

5 **ΘΕΑΙ.** Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἴ ἄρα τι ξυμβαίνει ὅμοιόν τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ
ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταῦ-
τὸν φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἔτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

10 **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ως πολλὰ μὲν εἴη
τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἄπειρα, ώστα δέ γε τὰ πά-
σχοντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλῳ ἄλλῳ συμμιγνύμενον
15 καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταῦτὰ ἄλλ' ἔτερα γεννήσει;

1. *τοίνυν*] 'Then,' i. e. taking the question as you put it in their behalf. The particle is added with reference to the words *καὶ μή*, κ.τ.λ., above.

2. *ὅταν*] Hirschig and Schanz read ὃ ἂν from Badham's conjecture. But the subject of *ἔχειν* is easily supplied from the preceding sentence, leaving *τι* joined to *ταῦτόν* as the object.

6. *Εἴ ἄρα*] 'What is the same is like, therefore what is like is the same.' This is one of many examples of the imperfect state of logic, which puts Socrates' respondent at his mercy. He does not always escape unchecked, however, see Prot. 350 C: "Ἐγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἡρωτήθην· εἰ γάρ με τότε ἦρουν, εἶπον ἀν ὅτι οὐ πάντες. And Socrates is not now speaking in his own name.

8. *ἀνομοιούμενον*] ἀνομοιῶ is used several times by Plato, but is not found in other writers. It seems to be a coinage of some philosopher. See esp. Rep. 8. 547 A.

10. *πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν*] Soph. 259 C: Ὡς καὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται.

14. *ἄλλο ἄλλῳ.. καὶ ἄλλῳ*] Cp. Rep. 2. 369 C: Παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλον, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλον χρείᾳ. 'The combination of one element with this and another with that, and again with another different from all.' Compare with what follows, Ar. Met. 5. 2. 1026 B: Εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός ως εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, πότερον ἔτερον ἢ ταῦτὸν . . μονισκὸς Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος, κ.τ.λ.

15. *γεννήσει*] The future is used because *συμμιγνύμενον*=ἐὰν *συμμίσγηται*.

p. 159. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

^B ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τἀλλ' ἥδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον· Σωκράτη ύγιαινοντα καὶ Σωκράτη ἀνάμοιον φήσομεν;

things has different products.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ύγιαινοντι Σωκράτει;

Socrates ill, is a different man from Socrates well,

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸν τοῦτο λέγω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάμοιον δή που.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἔτερον ἄρα οὗτως ὥσπερ ἀνάμοιον;

10

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

^c ΣΩ. Καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἡ νῦν διῆλθομεν, ώσαύτως φήσεις;

Socrates sleeping from Socrates waking, and so on.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν, ἄλλο 15 τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ύγιαινοντα Σωκράτη, ως ἐτέρῳ μοι χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ως ἐτέρῳ;

Therefore, in combination with the same active motion they will produce different results.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἔτερα δὴ ἐφ' ἔκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν;

20

2. Λέγωμεν δῆ] Phæd. 100 C : Καὶ πάντα δὴ οὗτα λέγω. Σωκράτη is in an imperfect construction, governed partly by λέγωμεν, partly by φήσομεν. The object here is to impress us with the assumption of the absoluteness of difference.

ἥδη] I. e. Having laid down these premises. We now venture to apply our theory universally: not as supr. 153 D : Κατὰ τὰ ὅμματα πρῶτον.

12. καθεύδοντα] Par. F. marg. add. καὶ ἐγρηγοροῦντα. Bodl. καθεύδοντι^a. Is it possible that καθεύδοντα δὴ ἐγρηγορότι may be the true reading? But cp.

supr. 149 E : Εἰς γυναῖκα δέ, and see Riddell's Digest, § 232.—'Platoni satis visum est res quasdam significasse.' Wohl-rab.

13. ώσαύτως φήσεις] Sc. ἀνάμοιον καὶ ἔτερον εἶναι τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος, κ.τ.λ.

15. τι ποιεῖν] 'To act upon something;' to be agents. So τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμέ, below. Soph. 247 D : Εἴτε εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἔτερον δτοῦν.

19. ἐφ' ἔκατέρου] In either case. Cp. Parm. 130 A : Λέγοντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους . . ἐφ' ἔκαστου ἄχθεσθαι τὸν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα.

Accordingly, wine both seems and really is pleasant to me when well.

p. 159.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. "Οταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαινων, ἡδύς μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

5 ΣΩ. Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν, ἀμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶσσαν ἀπειργάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ 10 αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώττῃ ἐποίησε καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὀμολόγητο.

But the same wine both seems and really is distasteful to me when ill. For I am then a different man.

15 ΣΩ. "Οταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα,—ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐτερα δὴ αὐτὸν ἐγέννησάτην ὁ τε τοιοῦτος Σω-^ε κράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν 20 αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἀλλ' αἰσθανόμενον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

9. ἀπειργάσατο] ‘The sensation, arising on the side of the subject, renders the tongue percipient.’

14. ἀσθενοῦντα] The former construction is resumed from ὅταν . . λάβη, *supr. C.*

18. ἐγέννησάτην] The use of the third pers. helps to support the notion of ‘Socrates being a different man.’ Observe, too, the accuracy with which not the wine, but the drinking of the wine, is spoken of as the

‘active motion.’ The dual is expressive. ‘They produce when paired.’

For this whole example *cp. Symp. 186 B*, where the same thing is briefly stated by Eryximachus: Τὸ γὰρ ὑγιές τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν ὄμολογον-μένως ἔτερόν τε καὶ ἀνόμαιόν ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ἀνόμαιον ἀνομοίων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἔρᾷ. ἄλλος μὲν οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ ἔρως, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσώδει.

p. 159. ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν ἐγώ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὗτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἴσθησις,
 p. 160. καὶ ἄλλοιν καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὕτ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτ' ἄλλῳ συνελθὸν ταῦτὸν γεννῆσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο 5 γεννῆσαν ἄλλοιν γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἐγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνό τε ἔαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνωμαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνό τε τινὶ γί-

I should never receive the same impression from anything else. And it would never produce the same impression upon another person. Nor could either subject or object become separately what they become together.

1. οὐδὲν ἄλλο . . . γενήσομαι οὗτως αἰσθανόμενος] ‘There is nothing else from which I can receive the same sensation.’ That ἄλλο is the object of *αἰσθανόμενος* is evident from what follows. For the accusative see 185 A: ‘Α δι’ ἐτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι’ ἄλλης ταῦτ’ αἰσθέσθαι, and elsewhere. There is a stress on *οὗτως*. For *γενήσομαι* . . . *αἰσθανόμενος* see a few lines below, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνομαι. The words *γίγνεσθαι*, *αἰσθανόμενος*, have become in a manner technical; cp. infr. 182. *γενήσομαι* *αἰσθανόμενος* answers to *ἐγεννησάτην* . . . *αἰσθανόμενον* above. The point insisted on is not the identity of the subject while in the same combination, but the difference which arises with every new combination. For ἄλλον *ποιεῖ* (the Bodleian reading) cp. supr. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν. ‘For a different object implies a different sensation, and makes him who per-

ceives it a different man’: i. e. I and my sensation become different with every change in the object of sense.

The intention of these words is to mark the incommunicable individuality of every act of sense: i. e. not *wine* or *bitterness*, but the peculiar bitterness of a particular wine to a particular palate at a particular moment. (This view of the passage is disputed by H. Schmidt, but accepted by Wohlraab and Prof. Jowett.)

4. τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμέ] ‘Which (in this case) affects me.’ It is unnecessary to supply *αἰσθανόμενον*. Supr. 159 C. As the sensation changes with the object, so the quality changes with the subject.

8. τοιοῦτος] Viz. οὗτως αἰσθανόμενος.

11. τινός] The genitive is caused by *αἰσθανόμενος*, but cp. Rep. 4. 438 A: Τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι τοῦ. Cp. also ib. 5. 478 B: Δοξάζειν μέν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν.

I become percipient of something. It becomes sweet or bitter or the like to some one. Subject and object in perception are thus mutually dependent and inseparable.

γνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὺ ἡ πικρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται. p. 160.
γλυκὺ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκύ, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. B

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται δή, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις, εἴτ' ἐσμέν,
 5 εἰναι, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπείπερ ἡμῶν ἡ
 ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μέν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν
 ἀλλων, οὐδὲ αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται
 συνδεδέσθαι. ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναι τι ὄνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι
 10 ἡ τινὸς ἡ πρός τι ρήτερον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ^{ιο} δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἡ ὃν ἡ γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον ε^ι
 οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ως ὁ λόγος ὃν διελη-
 λύθαμεν σημαίνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὥς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοὶ ἐστι καὶ
 15 οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δὲ οὐ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἰσθησις· τῆς γὰρ

2. ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι] ‘It is impossible a thing should ever become, etc.’ Heindorf and others would change γενέσθαι here to γίγνεσθαι, to avoid the change of tense. But, as H. Schmidt points out, such variations are too common to allow room for objection here. And it may fairly be maintained that the aorist has the effect of making the negation more absolute in the second statement.

8. εἶναι τι ὄνομάζει] ‘Uses the term Being in reference to anything.’ Infr. 201 D: Οὐτωσὶ καὶ ὄνομάζων. Parm. 133 D: Ὡν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες, εἶναι ἔκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα. Cp. Phaed. 92 D: Ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα ἐπωνυμίαν τοῦ δὲ ἐστιν. The alternative is repeated below,

D: τὰ ὅντα ἡ γιγνόμενα. Schanz, from Frei’s conjecture, unnecessarily repeats γίγνεσθαι. The ellipse is easily supplied. The doctrine at first rejected the verb ‘to be’ (157 B). Now, grown bolder, it professes indifference as to the language employed, seeing that the fact has been made so clear, and the consideration of the most formidable objection has ended in triumph.

14. ὅτε δὴ] ‘Since it is so.’ Cp. supr. 154 E, Symp. 206 A: ὅτε δὴ τούτου ὁ ἔρως ἐστιν.

17. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεί ἐστι] (1) ‘Since it is inseparable from my being at the particular time.’ Cp. supr. B: ‘Ημῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μέν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ‘Denn sie ist immer ein Stück

p. 160. ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεὶ ἔστι. καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοί, ως ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ως οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εοικεν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς ἀν οὖν ἀψευδὴς ὡν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ 5 διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἡ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἀν εἶην ὅνπερ αἰσθητής;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὔ.

ΣΩ. Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἔστιν ἡ αἰσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταύτον συμπέ- 10 πτωκε, κατὰ μὲν "Ομηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον οἵον ρένματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον επούτων οὗτως ἔχόντων αἰσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. 15 ἡ γάρ, ω̄ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἵον νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίευμα; ἡ πῶς λέγεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὗτως ἀνάγκη, ω̄ Σώκρατες.

meines Seins.' Deutchle. Otherwise (2), making οὐσίας a genitive of the object:—'For it is conversant with the Being of that which is to me.' Supr. 152 C: Αἰσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι καὶ ἀψευδές. For a somewhat similar use of οὐσία (with a play upon the word) cp. Gorg. 472 B: Ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

7. αἰσθητής] The newly-coined word helps to celebrate the establishment of the theory. Cp. infr. 208 E: Αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς ἔσται, οὐ πρότερον ἦν δοξαστής.

13. Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον] Prot. 309 D: Σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ

being: and I am the judge, as Protagoras says, of what is and is not to me. Surely what I thus perceive I may be said to know.

Theætetus then was right. Sensation is knowledge. And in this formula the doctrines of Heraclitus and Protagoras meet.

σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας. Perhaps Plato is ironically preparing the way for what follows, p. 161 D, 162 C.

15. αἰσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι] The proposition which Theætetus ventured 'out of his own consciousness' now appears as the resultant of pre-existent tendencies of thought. The doctrine 'Sense is knowledge' is the meeting-point of the two theories 'Man is the measure,' and 'All is motion.' The several topics are recapitulated in the reverse order. So Ar. Eth. N. 1. 3. 8: Περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα.

γίγνεσθαι here nearly = συμβαίνειν. Cp. Soph. 260 C: Δόξα ψευδὴς γίγνεται καὶ λόγος.

I. a. First
criticism
the doctrine
of sense.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔουκε, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεννήσα- p. 160.
μεν, ὃ τι δή ποτε καὶ τυγχάνει ὄν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον
τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρε-
κτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπουμένους μὴ λάθη ἡμᾶς οὐκ
5 ἄξιον ὄν τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ ἀνεμιαιόν τε p. 161.

1. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ . . . ἐγεν-
νῆσαμεν] Our theory is now
complete. (1) First the hy-
pothesis was ventured, Sensa-
tion is knowledge. (2) This
was at once identified with the
axiom of Protagoras, ‘The man
the measure of what is:’ and
their common meaning was
brought home to us by the
analysis of a familiar example.
(3) The mystery was revealed
which lay beneath this saying,
but had been reserved for
certain ‘disciples of Protago-
ras,’ the Heraclitean theory of
the universe that ‘All is mo-
tion;’ in which all philosophers
save Parmenides concur: which
is witnessed to by poetry; and
confirmed by the observation of
nature. (4) This theory of be-
ing was then applied to the
phenomena of sense; by which
means the contradictions of
common language were re-
moved; and (5) in meeting
the formidable objection drawn
from what are commonly called
false impressions, the doctrine
was still further developed,
and shown to be universally
applicable.

At each step it has grown in
distinctness, and boldness, and
apparent certainty. At first
only warmth, colour, and the
like were spoken of; gradually
our eyes were opened to the
relativeness of size and number.
By and by it was assumed that
the term *aīσθησις* includes plea-

sure, pain, hope, fear, etc. Then
we are quietly asked to concede
that things good and beautiful
have only a relative existence.
And, being now fairly at the
mercy of the argument, we can-
not resist the admission that
the illusions of dreams and
madness are as real as our
waking and sane impressions.
They are real to us at the time
when we experience them;
which is all the reality any
thing is permitted to claim.

3. τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ] Accu-
sative in apposition to the action
of *περιθρεκτέον*, κ.τ.λ., like *τὸν*
κολοφῶνα, supr. 153 C. ‘And
now to celebrate its birth in
due form, we must really in our
argument “run round about”,
with it, and consider, etc.’
Schol.: ‘Ημέρα πέμπτη τοῖς βρέ-
φεσιν ἐκ γενέσεως οὗτω κληθεῖσα
παρ’ ὅσον ἐν ταύτῃ καθαίρουσι τὰς
χεῖρας αἱ συνεφαψάμενοι τῆς μαι-
ένσεως, καὶ τὸ βρέφος περὶ τὴν
ἔστιαν φέρουσι τρέχουσαι κύκλῳ,
καὶ τοῦνομα τίθενται τούτῳ, δῶρά
τε πέμπουσι τῷ παιδίῳ, ὡς ἐπὶ¹
πλεῖστον πολύποδας καὶ σηπίας, οἵ
τε φίλοι καὶ οἰκεῖοι καὶ ἀπλῶς οἱ
προσήκοντες.

ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον] ‘All
round;’ i.e. leaving out no
point of view.

4. τῷ λόγῳ] ‘In our argu-
ment.’

5. τὸ γιγνόμενον] ‘That which
is now born to us.’ In this
and in some other cases where
the reading has been ques-

p. 161. καὶ ψεῦδος. ἡ σὺ οἵει πάντως δεῖν τό γε σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι; ἡ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὄρων, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς, ἐάν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸν ὑφαιρῇ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνέξεται, ὁ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος· οὐδαμῶς 5 γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἡ αὖ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

ΣΩ. Φιλολόγος γ' εἰ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἵει λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ ῥαδίως ἔξελόντα ἐρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα· τὸ 10 δὲ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἔξερχεται παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀλλ' ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγου παρ' ἐτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειρά- 15 σομαι, οὗ τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν.

tioned, the present or imperfect tense really gives additional vividness.

3. τις σοῦ] The Bodl. first hand gave *τίστου*?

ώς πρωτοτόκου] Although these words are added to the second clause, they belong in sense rather to the first, i.e. χαλεπανεῖς ὡς πρωτοτόκος. Cp. supr. 151 C.

5. οὐδαμῶς δύσκολος] 144 B: Μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος. 155 A: Οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες, κ.τ.λ.

6. αὖ] 'You have proved that it is so.—Is this position now to be reversed?'

8. Φιλολόγος γ' εἰ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὁ Θεόδωρε] Phædr. 235 E: Φιλτατος εἰ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς, ὁ Φαιδρε. Ib. 264 B: Χρηστὸς εἰ, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. χρηστός is said in a tone of good-humoured pleasantry.

'You are truly a patient

inquirer and an ingenuous person, Theodorus, if you take me for a sack full of different theories; and expect me without any difficulty to pull out the refutation of what has been now stated. But you do not perceive what is really taking place all the while (*τὸ γιγνόμενον*).'

10. οὐκ αὖ] The transposition of αὖ (to vary the expression and emphasize the negative) has caused needless embarrassment. Cp. Rep. 3. 393 D, 4. 442 A, 6. 499 E, Crat. 391 C, infr. 195 E, μόνον αὖ.

13. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδέν] 'But I have no advantage in wisdom beyond this simple skill, to receive a theory from some wise person, and accept it on fair conditions.' Cp. Rep. 7. 531 E.

15. μετρίως] 'In a spirit of

ΘΕΟ. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὡς Σώκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ ποίει p. 161.
οὗτως.

ΣΩ. Οἰσθ' οὖν, ὡς Θεόδωρε, ὁ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἑταίρου
σου Πρωταγόρου;

5 ΘΕΟ. Τὸ ποῖον;

c

1. Why did not Protagoras say that a pig or a tadpole was the measure of

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἥδεως εἴρηκεν, ὡς τὸ
δοκοῦν ἔκαστω τοῦτο καὶ ἔστι· τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν τοῦ
λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς ἀλη-
θείας ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἔστιν ὃς ἡ κυνο-

fairness.' 179 A: Μετρίως ἄρα
ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου εἴρη-
σται.

παρὰ τοῦτο] From Theætetetus.
Or is Protagoras meant?

3. ὡς Θεόδωρε] Theodorus is now gradually drawn into the discussion, but proves a shy respondent. He shrinks from being made the instrument of his friend's defeat (162 A), is not moved by Socrates' humorous challenge (*ib. C*), will not accept the responsibility of 'guarding the orphan' (165 A),—he is a mere geometrician and unused to dialectic (*ibid.*), and only when Socrates declares that with no one else can he conduct the argument with becoming gravity (168 D E) is he induced to come forward and discuss the question so far as his own subject is involved in it, but no further (169 C). He listens quietly to the long digression (172–177), but convinces some impatience when the discussion is resumed (177 C), and although at one point (181 B) he shows unexpected eagerness, he refuses to be drawn into further argument (183 D).

ὁ θαυμάζω] A courteous way

of expressing strong dissent.
Prot. 329 B: Εἴπερ ἄλλω τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ πειθούμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ
πείθομαι· δὲ δὲ θαύμαστα σοῦ λέγον-
τος . . . Gorg. 458 E: "Ακούε
δή, ὡς Γοργία, ἡ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς
λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ. No fault is found with the arguments of Protagoras, only if we follow his doctrine to its results, all creatures that have sense must be equally infallible. Hence there can be no teaching and no discussion.

6. Τὰ . . . ἄλλα . . . εἴρηκεν, ὡς] 'For the most part I am charmed with his statement of the theory that, etc.' ὡς, κ.τ.λ. explains *εἴρηκεν* and not the whole clause.

8. τῆς ἀληθείας] 'Αλήθεια seems to have been the title, or at least one title, of Protagoras' work. It is often covertly alluded to in this and other dialogues. See esp. *supr. 152 C*, and *cp. Cratyl. 391 C*: Εἴ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν Πρωταγόρου δλῶς οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ρήθεντα ἀγαπώντης ὡς τον ἄξια.

9. ὃς] The type of stupidity. *Lach. 196 C*: Κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν οὐκ ἀν πᾶσα ὃς γνοίη.

κυνοκέφαλος] Something more

p. 161. κεφαλος ἡ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἔχόντων αἰσθησιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς ἥρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ θεὸν ἔθανμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὁ δὲ ἄρα ἐτύγχανεν ὧν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου γυρίνου, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλου του ἀνθρώπων. ἦ πῶς λέγωμεν, ὡς Θεόδωρε; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι’ αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἔτερος τὴν ἑτέρου, ὥρθη ἡ ψευδής, ἀλλ’ ὁ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἔκαστος μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὥρθα καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δή ποτε, ὡς ἔταιρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ’ ἕκεīνον, μέτρῳ ὅντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας; ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωτα-

things? His principle clearly includes all creatures that have sense; and destroys his own pretension to superior wisdom:—

remote even than the *Musῶν ἔσχατος*, infr. 209 B. As we might say, Why not the lemur or the chimpanzee?

2. πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς] ‘Showing a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him.’

3. ἥρξατο] This use of the aorist indicative with *īna*, δπως, etc., is not infrequent. Euthyd. 304 D: Καὶ μήν, ἔφη, ἀξιόν γ’ ἦν ἀκοῦσαι. Τί δέ; ἦν δὲ ἐγώ. “Ινα ἥκουσας ἀνδρῶν διαλεγομένων, οἵ νῦν σοφώτατοί εἰσιν. Άesch. Prom. 749: “Οπως πέδω σκήψασα τῶν πάντων πόνων | ἀπηλλάγην.

5. βατράχον has been rejected by several editors as a gloss on *γυρίνου*. It is sufficiently defended by Stallbaum, who quotes Bernhardy, Syntax, p. 193. The introduction of *γυρίνου* alone would be too abrupt, and the

referenee in infr. 167 B would not be elear.

7. ἀληθὲς ἔσται, κ.τ.λ.] The future indicative with *ei* is often used in dwelling on a supposition which is unendurable. Cp. Sophoel. Philoet. 988: Εἴ μοι οὗτος ἐκ τῶν σῶν μ’ ἀπάξεται βίᾳ;

10. ὥρθη ἡ ψευδής] For εἴτε omitted ep. infr. 169 D, 203 A.

13. σοφός] Se. ἦν, antieipated from below.

ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος] The negative form of the same saying, viz. Οὐκ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, is in like manner turned against itself, Euthyd. 287 A: Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμαρτάνομεν μήτε πράττοντες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε διανοούμενοι, ήμεῖς, ὡς πρὸς Διός, εἰ οὔτως ἔχει, τίνος διδάσκαλοι ἥκετε;

15. ἦν] Viz. in his life-time.

17. ταῦτα] The old edd. with

Not to say
that it cuts
at the root
of dialectic
and of all
discussion.

γόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς p. 161.
μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν· οἷμαι
δὲ καὶ ἔντασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ
γὰρ ἐπισκοπὲν καὶ ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας
5 τε καὶ δόξας, ὥρθας ἑκάστου οὕσας, οὐ μακρὰ μὲν καὶ p. 162.

some inferior MSS. read καὶ ταῦτα.

1. *τῆς μαιευτικῆς*] Here Naber would again prune the text.

2. *οἷμαι δὲ καὶ ἔντασα*] Locke, Hum. Und. 13. § 88: ‘But if it should so happen that two thinking men have different ideas, I do not see how they could argue or discourse with one another.’

3. *ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία*] Ar. Met. 3.4. 100b: Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τι σημαίνειν οὐδὲν σημαίνειν ἔστιν, μὴ σημανόντων δὲ τῶν δυομάτων ἀνήρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἐν. Euthyd. 286 C: Τοῦτον γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκὼς ἀεὶ θαυμάζω. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἔχρωντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀεὶ θαυμαστός τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τούς τε ἄλλους ἀνταρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν. οἷμαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ κάλλιστα πεύσεσθαι. ἄλλο τι ἡ φευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι; τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται δὲ λόγος. Gorg. 481 C: Εἰ μὴ τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἄλλα τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἢν ἦν ῥάδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἐτέρῳ τὸ ἔαυτοῦ πάθημα.

4. *ἐπισκοπὲν*] ‘To contemplate,’ or ‘consider.’ Supr. 155 A, infr. 207 C.

5. *μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος*]

‘Great, nay enormous.’ μέν points forwards to the alternative implied in ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα, κ.τ.λ. ‘But then perhaps he was in jest.’ Others, with Buttmann on Men. 82 A, “Ελλην μέν ἔστι, take μέν to mean, ‘I presume.’ But in that and similar passages the question is the first of a series, or at least preliminary to something which is to follow. διωλύγιος, Schol.: Μεγάλη, ἡ ἐπὶ πολὺ διήκουσα. ἀντὶ τοῦ περιβόητος . . σημαίνει δὲ ἔσθ’ ὅτε καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν καὶ τὸ νυκτερινόν. The meaning, ‘loud’ (if it really existed, but it is perhaps due to a fanciful derivation from δλολύζω), must have been derived from the meaning ‘long.’ Cp. Μακρὸν ἀυτέν, φωνὴ οὐρανομήκης. The idea of vast size, or length, may again have arisen from the association of infinity with gloom. If so, the word is possibly related to ἡλυγή, λυγή. Compare ράξ, ρώξ, πτήσσω, πτώσσω, etc. ‘Vast in extent’ is the only meaning admissible here and in de Legg. 10. 890 D: Τί δὲ οὐ χαλεπά τε ἔστι ἔννακολούθειν λόγοις οὕτως εἰς πλήθη λεγόμενα, μήκη τε αὖ κέκτηται διωλύγια; This, too, is the meaning in which it is used by Neoplatonist writers. For the climax with καὶ compare 155 E: Σκληρούς τε . . καὶ ἀντιτύπους. 173 E: Σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν. Rep. 5. 449 D: Μέγα καὶ ὅλον.

p. 162. διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθὴς ή ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ παιζούσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο;

ΘΕΟ. ὩΣ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἀνήρ, ὕσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἶπες. οὐκ ἀν οὖν δεξαίμην δι' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος 5 ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸι παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβέ· πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλ' ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρα κἀν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθών, ὥσθε Θεόδωρε,

2. ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου] 'If the Truth of Protagoras is sincere, and was not laughing when she uttered this from behind her impenetrable screen of written words.' There is an allusion to the etymology of ἀδύτον.

Cp. the celebrated passage in the Phædrus, about written teaching, 275 D: Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὁ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον ζωγραφίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἐστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δὲ ἀνέρη τι, σεμνῶς πάντι σιγᾶ, κ.τ.λ. For the imagery which is here resumed see above, 152 C: Τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἡνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγε. 155 E: Τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην... μή τις τῶν ἀμύντων ἐπακούῃ... ὃν μελλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν... οὗτος ὁ μῦθος. At first Protagoras himself spoke in riddles—now his 'Truth' is personified, and speaks obscurely from her hidden shrine. Plato often thus follows up a metaphor. Compare the well-known image of the wave Rep. 4. 441 C: Ταῦτα μὲν μόγις διανευάκαμεν. 5. 453 D: "Αν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἢν τε εἰς μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως

γε νεῖ οὐδὲν ἥττον. 457 B: Ἐν ὕσπερ κῦμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν ὥστε μὴ κατακλυσθῆναι. 472 A: Τὸ μέγιστον τῆς τρικυμίας. 473 C: "Ωσπερ κῦμα ἐκγελῶν κατακλύσειν.

4. ὕσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἶπες] 161 B: Τοῦ ἑταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου.

6. παρὰ δόξαι] 'Against conviction.' Rep. 1. 346 A: Καὶ, ὁ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν.

7. πάντως καὶ] See above, 143 A, and note.

8. ἐμμελῶς . . . ὑπακούειν] Cp. Soph. 217 D: Πάντες γάρ ὑπακούονται σοι πράως. Rep. 5. 474 A: Glaucon says, 'Αλλά τοι σε οὐ προδώσω, ἀλλ' ἀμυνώ οἰς δύναμαι. δύναμαι δὲ εὔνοίᾳ τε καὶ τῷ παρακελεύεσθαι, καὶ ἵσως ἀν ἄλλου του ἐμμελέστερόν σοι ἀποκρινούμην. The notion is not that of a respondent who assents to everything, but of one who apprehends the drift of each question in turn. See 145 D E, 155 D E, 159 B.

9. Ἀρα κἀν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα] It appears from this, and 169 B, that the Lacedæmonians used to compel bystanders to join in their gymnastic exercises. ("Ἐλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον... ἀπιέναι ή ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύονται.) This is probably

πρὸς τὰς παλαιότρας ἀξιοῦς ἀν ἄλλους θεώμενος p. 162.
γυμνούς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ^B ἔιδος παραποδυόμενος;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐάλλα τί μὴ δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι
 5 ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὥσπερ νῦν οἵμαι ύμᾶς
 πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐᾶν θεάσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔλκειν πρὸς τὸ
 γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἥδη ὅντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε
 καὶ ύγροτέρῳ ὅντι προσπαλαίειν.

ΣΩ. Ἐάλλ' εἰ οὕτως, ὡς Θεόδωρε, σοὶ φίλον, οὐδὲ
 10 ἐμοὶ ἔχθρόν, φασὶν οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν εἰ
 ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἵτεον. Λέγε δή, ὡς Θεαί-
 τητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἣ νῦν διήλθομεν, ἅρα οὐ συνθαν-
 μάξεις εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσει μηδὲν χείρων
 εἰς σοφίαν ὅτουοῦν ἀνθρώπων ἡ καὶ θεῶν; ἡ ἥπτον
 15 τι οἷει τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἡ εἰς ἀνθρώ-
 πους λέγεσθαι;

the point of the allusion here. There is no reason to suppose that the human form was less visible in an Athenian than in a Lacedæmonian palæstra. The law observed in severer times at Athens, which forbade adults to enter a gymnasium where boys were exercising, perhaps throws some light on this Spartan custom. (Æsch. c. Tim. p. 2. § 12.)

2. *ἐνίους φαύλους*] Socrates courteously implies his own inferiority. H. Schmidt objects that Socrates, although pretending ignorance, professes to have a special gift in dialectic. But the words have the same ironical tone as supr. 154 E, *ἄτε ιδιώται*, Rep. 2. 368 D, *ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί*, and are used with reference to the failure of Socrates and Theætetus to come to any conclusion hitherto.

3. *παραποδυόμενος*] ‘Stripping beside them,’ i. e. to compare with them.

7. *σκληρόν*] ‘Stiff,’ opposed to *ύγροτέρῳ*, ‘more supple.’ Symp. 196 A: ‘Υγρὸς τὸ ἔιδος (δὲ ἔρως) οὐ γὰρ ἀν οἶστ τ’ ἦν πάντῃ περιπτύσσεσθαι . . εἰ σκληρὸς ἦν. Cp. Rep. 3.410 D, where *σκληρόν* is metaphorically applied to character: ‘Αγριότητός τε καὶ σκληρότητος καὶ αὖ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἡμερότητος. See too Hor. Od. 4. 1: ‘Desine . . flectere molibus Jam durum imperii.’

8. *προσπαλαίειν*] Sc. *σε*. ‘Let more supple youth try a fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasium.’ (Jowett.)

11. *σοφόν*] ‘Qui scientiam aī-σθησιν esse ponendo repente sapiens evasit.’ Heind.

12. *συνθανμάξεις*] Cp. supr. δομαράξω.

15. *εἰς θεούς*] Contrast with

According to this theory, Theætetus is as wise as any God.

p. 162. ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δὲ οὐκ ἔγωγε. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾶς, πάννυ θαυμάζω. ιηνίκα γὰρ διῆμεν δὲν τρόπον λέγοιεν δὲ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ μοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τούναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν.

ΣΩ. Νέος γὰρ εἰ, ὃ φίλε παῖ· τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἡ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Ὡ γενναῖοι παιδές τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ἔνγκαθεζόμενοι, θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, οὓς ἔγὼ ἐκ τε τοῦ ιο

this Legg. 4. 716 C: 'Ο δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πού τις ὡς φασιν ἀνθρωπος,—a truth of which Plato here throws out a distant hint.

4. τούναντίον] Viz. οὐκ εὖ φαι νόμενον λέγεσθαι. This word is not the subject of μεταπέπτωκε, but in apposition with the subject, forming part of the predicate. 'Nunc autem res subito in contrarium vertit. Ut Menon, 70 C: 'Ενθάδε δὲ . . . τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν.' Heind.—Riddell (Dig. of Idioms, § 13) would treat all such examples as accusatives. But with verbs of *becoming*, etc., the above explanation appears more probable.

τάχα] So the Bodleian MS. with Vat. Ven. II. Other MSS. have ταχύ.

6. Νέος γὰρ εἰ] Parm. 130 E: Νέος γὰρ εἰ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται.

τῆς . . . δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει] 'Your ear is quickly caught, and your mind influenced, by popular arguments.'

The confidence of the youth is shaken by these objections, but they are dismissed by Socrates, who points out that argument should be met with argument and not with ridicule.

9. δημηγορεῖτε] 'You talk clap-trap.'

10. ἄγοντες] Hip. Maj. 298 D: Μηδὲν τὸ τῶν νόμων εἰς μέσον παράγοντες. Phaedr. 267 A: Τὸν δ' . . . Εὔηνον εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν.

The Bodl. MS. with its two followers, Vat. and Ven. II., gives λέγοντες. But the tendency to the repetition of consonants, already noticed, weakens its testimony in this instance with λέγειν and λέγετε following. Compare, besides the instances adduced in the note on 156, 169 C: 'Αντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἄγε, Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλὰ λέγε. As regards the sense there would be a slight awkwardness in the repetition of the same common word, which it is in Plato's manner to avoid, though, on the other hand, the expression ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν is made more pointed at first sight. But the general sense with δημηγορεῖτε is enough to occasion this, without the introduction of λέγοντες. And if we look closely at the expression εἰς τὸ μέσον λέγειν θεούς, it is hardly supported by comparing Herod. 6. 129: "Ἐριν εἶχον

λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσὶν ἡ ὡς p. 162.
οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἔξαιρω, καὶ ἂ oī πολλοὶ ἀν ἀποδέχοιντο^E
ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν διοίσει
εἰς σοφίαν ἔκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὅτου-
5 οῦν· ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ. ἡντινοῦν λέγετε,
ἄλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε. φὶ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἡ
ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος
οὐδὲν ἐνὸς μόνου ἀν εἴτ. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεό-

ἀμφὶ μουσικῇ καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἐς
τὸ μέσον; Legg. 7. 817 C
(the poets are addressed): Μὴ
δὴ δόξῃτε ἡμᾶς . . . ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμᾶς
δημηγορεῖν . . . πρὸν κρίναι τὰς ἀρ-
χὰς εἴτε ῥητὰ καὶ ἐπιτίθεια πε-
ποιήκατε λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον εἴτε
μῆ. Here λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον is
not equivalent to δημηγορεῖν,
but means rather to ‘recite in
public.’ Cp. ib. 2. 664 C: Εἰς τὸ
μέσον ἀσύμμενος. The passages
already quoted show that ἀγειν
εἰς τὸ μέσον, meaning ‘to ad-
duce in illustration or argu-
ment,’ is quite Platonic. See
also Phil. 57 A: Οὐ δ’ ἔνεκα
ταῦτα προηγκάμεθα εἰς τὸ μέσον.
There is a slight expression of
violence in θεοὺς . . . ἄγοντες,
'dragging in the gods,' which
suits the context well.

1. ὡς εἰσὶν ἡ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν] Here, as 152 A, Protagoras' opinion is quoted in his own words. Diog. Laert. 9: Περὶ θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι, οὐθὲ ὡς εἰσὶν οἱθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν. πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, η τε ἀδηλότης, καὶ βραχὺς ἀν δέ βίος δ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

2. ἔξαιρω] Rep. 6.492 E: Θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἔξαιρω-
μεν λόγου.

— 5. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην] In dealing with a metaphysical theory it is not enough to have

shown its inconsistency with common sense. It must be met upon its own ground, and the truth which it contains, as well as the sources of falsehood, clearly distinguished. This, and not merely, as the Scholast says, that he may draw out Theætetus further, is Socrates' motive in relinquishing the ground he had taken in 151 C. This point of method has two aspects, the Socratic defiance of opinion and the Sophistic contempt for obvious facts. Gorg. 472 B: 'Αλλ' ἔγώ σοι εἶς ἀν οὐκ δύολογῶν οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις. Soph. 293 E: Ξεν. φανερός, ὁ Θεαίτητε, εἰ σοφιστὴν οὐχ ἔωρακώς. Θε. τί δή; Ξεν. δόξει σοι μύειν η παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν δύματα . . . τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον.

8. οὐδὲν ἐνὸς μόνου] Schol.: 'Εκ τῆς τῶν κυβευόντων συνηθείας ἔλαβε τὸ οὐδενὸς μόνου, ὅταν ἐκεῖ πέσῃ ἐν τῷ παίζειν ἐν τῷ ἐλάχιστον.

(1) 'Not worth an ace.' Or, if, as Wyttensbach thought, the phrase originated in the line of Homer, Il. 8. 234: Νῦν δ' οὐδὲν ἐνὸς ἄξιοί εἰμεν "Εκτορος, (2) 'No better than a single man,' whereas he is now ἐτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιος. Cp. Polit. 297 E: Τὸν ἐτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον

p. 163. δωρος εῑ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογίαις τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τούτων λεγομένους λόγους.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐλλ' οὐ δίκαιον, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἀνήμενος φαῖμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἐλλη δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς ὅ τε σὸς 5 καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλη.

ΣΩ. Τῆδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ̄ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἴσθησις ταῦτὸν ἢ ἔτερον· εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ 10 καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. ^b Ή οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἃ τῷ ὄρâνῳ αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἀμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; οἷον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον 15 οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν, ὅταν φθέγγωνται, ἢ ἀκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἃ λέγουσι; καὶ αὖ γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὄρâνῳ, ἢ ἐπίστασθαι, εἴπερ ὄρωμεν, διῆσχυριούμεθα;

ἰατρόν. See above, 143 D: "Ἄξιος γὰρ . . . γεωμετρίας ἔνεκα, and below, 167 C: 'Ο σοφιστῆς . . . ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθεῖσιν. Bonitz questions such a use of ἄξιος = (ἀντάξιος), and would read οὐδενὸς λόγου.

1. πιθανολογίαις τε καὶ εἰκόσι] The Bodleian reading in the ancient hand. (Schanz doubts of this, but the erasure of στ is quite discernible.) Most MSS. have πιθανολογίᾳ. Cp. Ar. Eth. N. 1. 2: Παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικοῦ ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.

2. τούτων] Several MSS. have τηλικούτων.

5. ὅ τε σὸς καὶ] Theætetus

2. The doctrine is therefore examined in the shape in which it first appeared; viz. 'Sense is knowledge.' If to see and hear is to know, when a person hears a strange language, or sees characters which he

has answered for both. See above, σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος.

9. ἢ ἔτερον] πότερον B.

10. τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα] The novel doctrine of active and passive motions, the reality of dreams and phantasies, etc.

11. ἐκινήσαμεν] Rep. 5. 450 A: "Οσον λόγον πάλιν, ὕσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, κινέῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας!"

13. ^b Ή οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] The argument is in brief as follows: 'If sensation is knowledge, we can know and not know the same thing; since (1) we have perfect sensible perception of things we do not know thoroughly; and (2) we remember (i. e. know) things which we do not sensibly perceive.'

has never learned,
does he
know or
not know
what is
said and
written?

Allowing
this to pass,

Can I be
ignorant of
what I re-
member?

ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐτό γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ p. 163.
όρωμέν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν· τῶν
μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὥρᾶν τε καὶ ἐπί-
στασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὁξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν ε
τεῖ ἄμα καὶ εἰδέναι· ἀ δὲ οἵ τε γραμματισταὶ περὶ⁵
αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἐρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι
τῷ ὥρᾶν ἡ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γ', ὁ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι
πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. ἀλλ' ὅρα
δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκόπει πῆ αὐτὸ διω-
σόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιόνδε· ἐλ τις ἔροιτο, ἀρα δυνατόν, ὅτου
τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτο ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα μνήμην αὐτοῦ

9. ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ] ‘That I may let you grow,’ i. e. ‘That I may not be always stunting and stopping you.’ Cp. Lys. 206 A: Οἱ καλοί, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐπανῇ καὶ αὔξῃ. Also Phaedr. 246 E: Τούτοις δὴ τρέφεται τε καὶ αὔξεται μάλιστά γε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα. Rep. 497 A: ’Ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται. Symp. 210 D: ’Αλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τετραμένος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους τίκτη.. ἔως ἀν ἐνταῦθα ῥωσθεῖς καὶ αὔξηθεις, κ.τ.λ. The expression in Aristoph. Vesp. 638, Ηὔξανόμην ἀκούων, though more humorous, also affords an illustration.

We may naturally ask what objection Socrates would have raised, had he not feared to check Thætetetus’ growing intelligence. This may perhaps be gathered from below, where he ventures to puzzle him a little further, 165 D: Ἰσως δέ γ', ὁ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἀν τοιαῦτ'

ἐπαθεις, κ.τ.λ. Socrates might have asked, Does every one who sees the forms of the letters, or who hears the sounds, possess the sciences of them (γραμματική, μουσική, 145 A)? Could he give an account, e. g. of the ὁξύτης and βαρύτης of what he hears? Cp. Rep. 7. 524 C: Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἔώρα, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. Not even the objects of sense are known by sense, but by a higher faculty.

10. τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, κ.τ.λ.] The implied metaphor is probably that of the wave. It is continued below, 172 B: Δόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς . . . ἐκ λόγου, μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττους, καταλαμβάνει: and is slightly varied, 177 C: Πλείω δὲ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῖν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον.

14. ἔτι ἔχοντα] The Bodl. MS. has ἐπέχοντα, for which error cp. Rep. 7. 532 B. H. Schmidt (as Schanz formerly) defends ἐπέχοντα, in the sense of ‘main-

P. 163. τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο δὲ μέμνηται. μακρολογῶ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, εἰ μαθών τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἶδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς, ὥ Σώκρατες; τέρας γὰρ ἀν εἴη⁵ Surely not. δὲ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δέ. ἄρα τὸ ὄρανον⁶ And yet, οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθησιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγέ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἴδων τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν¹⁰ το δὲ εἶδε κατὰ τὸν ἄρπι λόγον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Ε ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὐδενὸς ή τινός;

¹⁵

ΘΕΑΙ. Τινὸς δή που.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃν ἔμαθε καὶ ὃν γῆσθετο, τοιουτωνί⁷ τινων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὴ εἶδε τις, μέμνηται που ἐνίοτε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνηται.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ μύσας; ή τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθετο;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὥ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο γε φάναι.

taining,' 'keeping up,' i. e. not allowing to fade. But ἔτι ἔχοντα is simpler, and is sufficiently supported by MS. authority.

5. τέρας γὰρ ἀν εἴη δὲ λέγεις]
 'The supposition is monstrous.' Parm. 129 B: Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ή τὰ ἀνόμοια ὄμοια, τέρας ἀν, οἷμαι, ἦν. Phæd. 101 B: alib. The word *τερατεία* in Ar. Nub. 418 (with the verb *τερατεύομαι*) is connected with this use of *τέρας*.

13. Τί δέ;] So Bodl. first hand, Vat. Ven. II. It seems more appropriate in serious argument than *τί δαί*, the common reading.

μέντοι]
 The particle brings forward something hitherto lost sight of, which may tend to modify the foregoing statement. We have hitherto dwelt on *αἰσθησις* to the exclusion of *μνήμη*, etc.

²⁰ when I
shut my
eyes and
remember
what I
have seen,

ΣΩ. Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσοιμεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον· p. 164.
εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγώ, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν
ἰκανῶς γε συννοῶ· ἀλλ’ εἰπὲ πῆ.

5 ΣΩ. Τῇδε· οἱ μὲν ὄρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου
γέγονεν οὖπερ ὄρων· ὅψις γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις καὶ ἐπι-
στήμη ταῦτὸν ὡμολόγηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

I remember it and do not see it.
10 ΣΩ. Ό δέ γε ὄρων καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὖ
έώρα, ἐὰν μύσῃ, μέμνηται μέν, οὐχ ὄρᾳ δὲ αὐτῷ·
ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὄρᾳ οὐκ ἐπίσταται ἐστιν, εἴπερ ^ν
καὶ τὸ ὄρᾳ ἐπίσταται.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

I.e. If to see is to know,
I remember it and do not know it.
ΣΩ. Συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὗ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἔτι
μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὄρᾳ. ὁ
τέρας ἔφαμεν ἀν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

20 ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀδυνάτων δή τι συμβαίνειν φαίνεται,
ἐάν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν ταῦτὸν φῇ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλο ἄρα ἐκάτερον φατέον.

But this seemed to us a monstrous supposition;
Therefore, Sense is not Knowledge.

1. εἰ σώσοιμεν] The use of the optative is questioned, and σώσομεν has been conjectured. But see Riddell's Digest, § 77. He observes that the time of the infinitive after δεῖ (sc. τοῦτο φάναι) is undefined. A similarly doubtful optative occurs in Polit. 268 D: Τοῦτο τοίνυν .. ἥμīν ποιητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλοιμεν .. κατασχῆναι τὸν λόγον. For the sense cp. especially Phædo, 89 B: Ἐάνπερ γε ἥμīν ὁ λόγος τελευτῆσῃ, κ.τ.λ.

3. οὐ μὴν ικανῶς γε συννοῶ] ‘But I do not quite comprehend why it is so.’

6. οὖπερ ὄρων] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. ὄρων, sc. ἐστίν οἱ γέγονεν. Compare the technical use of αἰσθανόμενος, noticed above, 159 D, 160 A. Also 156 D: Ἐγένετο οὖ τι ὅψις ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὄρων. See also 160 D: Ἐπιστήμων .. ὕπερ αἰσθητής.

13. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὄρᾳ] Soph. 264 A: Φαίνεται δ' ὁ λέγομεν.

p. 164. ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ε ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δῆτ' ἀν εἴη ἐπιστήμη, πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ως ἔοικε, λεκτέον. Καίτοι τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ὡς Θεαίτητε, δρᾶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος πέρι;

ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθά μοι ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην, πρὶν νενικηκέναι, ἀποπηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἄδειν.

—We are
in too great
a hurry.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή;

ΣΩ. Ἀντιλογικῶς ἔοίκαμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὄνο- 10 μάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ περιγενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἀγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταῦτα ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι ποιοῦντες.

Perhaps
the contra-
diction is
only verbal.

2. πάλιν] μὴ πάλιν Bodl. (μή), Vat. Ven. II. The Bodleian margin however says, ἐν ἑτέρῳ λείπει τὸ μή. If μή were right, the subjunctive ἢ would be required to complete the sense.

7. ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου] Viz. the theory of Protagoras, which we have been trampling upon. Cp. infr. E : Προπηλακίζομεν.

10. Ἀντιλογικῶς ἔοίκαμεν] Rep. 5. 453 E, 454 : Ἡ γενναία, ἢν δ' ἔγώ, δὲ Γλαύκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης. Τί δή; "Οτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἰσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἴδῃ διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπέων, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. Lys. 216 A : Καὶ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἄσμενοι ἐπιπηδήσονται οὗτοι οἱ πάνσοφοι ἀνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, καὶ ἐρήσονται εἰ οὐκ ἐναντιώτατον ἔχθρα φιλία; The tendencies of Ἀντι-

λογική are, first, to argue from contradictions of language, leading in the last resort to scepticism. Phæd. 90 B : Καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἵσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι τε καὶ κατανευηκέναι ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιές οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων. Secondly, to confuse ideas or principles with facts or results. Ib. 101 E: "Αμα δὲ οὐκ ἀν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὥρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοισ τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν.

πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὄνομάτων ὁμολογίας] 'With a view to mere verbal consistency.' The whole fallacy of such formal reasoning is elaborately exposed in the Sophist.

12. οὐ φάσκοντες] Viz. supr. 154 D : Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοί, κ.τ.λ., echoed in ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι, below.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕπω μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις.

p. 164.

ΣΩ. Ἐλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὃ γε δὴ νοῶ. ἡρόμεθα γὰρ δὴ εἰ μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα με-
5 μνημένον, ὄρωντα δὲ οὖ, ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἄμα μεμνημένον· τοῦτο δὲ ἔναι αἰδύ-
νατον. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος,
καὶ ὁ σὸς ἄμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ταῦτόν ἔστιν.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

E

Protagoras
might still
have much
to say.

ΣΩ. Οὕτι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὡς φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἔζη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἄν ἥμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὄρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ οἱ ἐπίτροποι οὓς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέ-
15 λουσιν, ὅν Θεόδωρος εἶς ὄδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυ-
νεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἐνεκ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὡς Σάκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος· ἡμεῖς p. 165.

7. μῦθος ἀπώλετο] Schol.: Παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν τὴν διήγησιν μὴ ἐπὶ πέρας ἀγόντων. Hence probably the absence of the article. Cp. Rep. 10. 621 B: Καὶ οὗτως, ὡς Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐπώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο. Cp. also Phil. 14 A: 'Ο λόγος, ὡσπερ μῦθος, ἀπολόμενος οἴχοιτο.'

μῦθος . . ὁ Πρωταγόρειος] Cp. supr. 157 C: Οὗτος ὁ μῦθος. Soph. 242 C: Μῆθόν τινα ἔκαστος φαίνεται μοι δημιεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν. Arist. Met. 1. 993 a: Ψελλιζομένη γὰρ ἔσικεν ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία. Gorg. 485 B.

11. εἴπερ ὁ πατὴρ] See the passage of the Phaedrus already quoted, 275 E: Πλημμελούμενος δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ λοιδορηθεῖς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ,

κ.τ.λ. Cp. Soph. 241 D: Μή με οἶν πατραλοίαν ὑπολάβης γίγνεσθαι τινα. Τί δή; Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκάσων ἥμιν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν. It is in another sense that Phaedrus in the Symposium (177 D) is πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου.

15. κινδυνεύσομεν] Not, 'I will undertake the risk,' but = κινδυνεύω βοηθήσειν, 'It seems I shall have to take his part myself.' Cp. Cratyl. 399 A: Καὶ κινδυνεύσω ἐάν μη εὐλαβῶμαι, ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέοντος γενέσθαι. Symp. 174 C: "Ισως μέντοι κινδυνεύσω καὶ ἐγὼ οὐχ ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὡς Σάκρατες, ἀλλὰ καθ' Ομηρον φαῦλος ὁν ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέναι θουνὴν ἄκλητος.

18. Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου] With whom Protagoras stayed

p. 165. δέ πως θάττον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι [σοὶ] ἔξομεν, ἐὰν αὐτῷ βοηθῆς.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὁ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν τὴν γ' ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα ἢν τις ὁμολογήσειε μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ρήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ λέγω ὅπῃ, ἡ Θεαιτήτω;

The 'crucial' question is this,

when he came to Athens. Apol. 20 C: 'Αινδρί, ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ἔνυπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἰππονίκου. Prot. 311 A, 315 D: Xen. Symp. 1. 5. It hardly needs to be observed that *ἐπίτροποι*, like *δρφανόν*, is used figuratively, with reference to doctrines.

1. ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων] 'From the abstractions of dialectic.' We are accustomed to speak of Geometry as a purely abstract science, but see Arist. Met. 1. 2: *Αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας.* The expression *ψιλοῖς λόγοις* is used differently in Symp. 215 C: *Ψιλοῖς λόγοις ἄνευ ὄργάνων*, but cp. Phædr. 262 C: *Νῦν γὰρ ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν οὐκ ἔχοντες ἵκανὰ παραδείγματα.* Antisthenes is said to have called the Ideas of Plato *ψιλαὶ ἔννοιαι*. For *λόγοι = διαλεκτική* cp. Phæd. 99 E: "Ἐδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῦν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. See also Arist. de An. 1. 1, where a distinction is drawn between *φιλόσοφος*, *μαθηματικός*, and *φυσικός*.

2. μέντοι] *σοὶ* is omitted in Bod. Vat. Ven. II. Although retained in the text by Schanz, it is not necessary to the sense.

If retained, it should be accentuated, as H. Schmidt observes.

[ἔξομεν] Theodorus speaks on behalf of the *ἐπίτροποι Πρωταγόρου*.

4. τὴν γ' ἐμῆν] Cp. infr. 168 B: *Κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν*, and, for the 'modest' use of *γε*, Crat. 44 E, Rep. 1. 329 A: *Οἶόν γέμοι φαίνεται*.

6. μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ρήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα] By freeing ourselves from the habitual oppositions of words, we are sometimes reconciled to what at first appears a pure contradiction. Spinoza(Cog. Met. I.) shows a still loftier indifference to common language: 'At vero si rem accuratius examinare vellemus, possemus forte ostendere Deum non nisi impropprie unum et unicum vocari; sed res non est tanti imo nullius momenti iis qui de rebus non vero de nominibus sunt solliciti.' Many of the difficulties in Greek philosophy arose, as Plato himself points out in the Sophist, from the too great stress laid upon logical alternatives; while the complexity and variety of things as they exist was lost sight of.

ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα] 'According to our common mode of affirming and denying:' viz. with a view to words.

ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ p. 165.
νεώτερος· σφαλεὶς γὰρ ἥττον ἀσχημονήσει.

B

Is it possible for the same person to know and not to know the same thing?

You are bound to say it is, if sight be knowledge. Nay, you may be driven to it without reference to memory, within the sphere of sense itself. A relentless adversary will pin you down, covering one eye with his mantle,

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. ἔστι δὲ
οἶμαι τοιόνδε τι· ἀρα οἴόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι
5 τοῦτο ὁ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκριωύμεθα, ὡς Θεαίτητε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατόν που, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὄραν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τι
γὰρ χρήσει ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν
10 φρέατι συνεχόμενος, ὅταν ἐρωτᾶ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνήρ,
καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἔτερον ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ
όρᾶς τὸ ἴμάτιον τῷ κατειλημένῳ;

C

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φήσω, οἶμαι, τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι
ἐτέρῳ.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὄρᾶς τε καὶ οὐχ ὄρᾶς ἄμα ταῦτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὗτῳ γέ πως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἔγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὔτ'
ἡρόμην, τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλ' εἰ, ὁ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ

3. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα] Cp. Rep. 5.473 C: 'Ἐπ' αὐτὸ^ν
δή, ἦν δ' ἔγώ, εἴμι ὁ τῷ μεγίστῳ
προσεικάζομεν κύματι. Where Socrates assumes the same 'tragic'
tone as here.

4. ἀρα οἴόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι
.. μὴ εἰδέναι] This (Megarian)
question lies at the root of
most of the ἀπορίαι which follow.

9. ἀφύκτῳ] Euthyd. 276 E:
Τουαῦτα ἡμεῖς ἐρωτῶμεν ἀφύκτα.

ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος] 'Caught
in a pit,' i.e. unable to stir hand
or foot.

11. καταλαβὼν .. τὸν .. ὀφθαλ-
μόν .. εἰ ὄρᾶς τὸ ἴμάτιον] The fal-
lacy called ἔγκεκαλυμμένος ('ob-
velatus'), which has been called
the invention of Eubulides,
seems to be here anticipated.

17. οὐδὲν .. τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ.] Τάττω,
se. ἀποκρινέσθαι. Cp. Rep. 5.473
A: 'Εξευρηκέναι ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γε-
νέσθαι ἢ σὺν ἐπιτάπτεις (sc. ἔξευρεῖν).
For the sense cp. supr. 158 E:
Μὴ ἵπολάζωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦτὸν εἶναι,
κ.τ.λ. Cp. Euthyd. 295 E: Πότε-
ροι ἐπίστασαι τῷ ἢ ἐπίστασαι, ή
οὐ; Ἔγωγε, ἔφην, τῇ γε ψυχῇ.
Οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσαποκρίνεται τοῖς
ἐρωτωμένοις. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ
ὅτῳ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασαι τῷ, κ.τ.λ.
For the intentional abruptness
of the expression ('None of
that! I never asked you for
it') cp. Phil. 28 E: Οὐδὲν τῶν
αὐτῶν.

τοῦτο .. τὸ ὅπως] τοῦτο, al-
though presently explained by
τὸ ὅπως, is in the first instance
pronominal for οὗτῳ γέ πως.

p. 165. ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁρᾶς, ὁρῶν φαίνει. ώμολογηκὼς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὄρᾶν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄρᾶν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου τί σου συμβαίνει.

^d ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τάναντία οἷς ὑπερέμην.

ΣΩ. "Ισως δέ γ', ὡς θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἀν τοιαῦτ' ἐπαθεῖς, εἴ τις σε προσηρώτα εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν ὁξύ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόρρωθεν δὲ μή, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἥρεμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ το ἄλλα μυρία, ἢ ἐλλοχῶν ἀν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἡνίκ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν ταῦτὸν ἔθον, ἐμβαλὼν ἀν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἥλεγχεν ἀν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς, πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν ¹⁵

to confess
that you
see and do
not see, and
therefore
know and
do not
know. And
thus you
will be
proved to
know both
vividly and
dimly, near
but not far
off, softly
and vio-
lently.

7. ὡς θαυμάσιε] Such addresses interposed give a tone of increased earnestness, expressing the interest of Socrates in what he is about to say.

9. ὁξὺ.. ἀμβλύ] These terms are properly applicable to vision.

ἐγγύθεν μὲν .. πόρρωθεν δὲ μή] This probably refers to the sense of smell, cp. τὸ ὀσφραίνεσθαι below, perhaps also to taste and touch (so H. Schmidt). Or ἐγγύθεν .. τὸ αὐτό may refer to all the senses except sight.

10. σφόδρα καὶ ἥρεμα τὸ αὐτό] 'To know the same thing strongly and feebly:' e. g. Τὸ ψυχρόν,—152 B: 'Ριγοί.. δὲ μὲν ἥρεμα, δὲ σφόδρα; but the reference here is probably to sound, cp. τὸ ἀκούειν below. (H. Schmidt takes τὸ αὐτό adverbially, 'stark und leise ebenso:' but cp. infr. 166 B.) Aristotle does not feel the difficulty.

Met. 6. 1029 b: Τὰ δὲ ἔκαστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἥρεμα ἔστι γνώριμα.

καὶ ἄλλα μυρία] Cp. Phil. 14 D: Βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία.

11. ᾧ] An accusative depending chiefly on ἐρόμενος, but vaguely also on all that follows.

μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις] 'A logical mercenary.' μισθοφόρος is aimed at the Sophist's fee.

13. ἐμβαλὼν] 'Making his assault.'

14. ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς] Rep. 3. 411 B: 'Οταν δὲ ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνή ἀλλὰ κηλῆ. 'Keeping up the attack.' Cp. Odyss. 19. 71: Τί μοι ὁδὸς ἐπέχεις κεκοτηότι θυμῷ;

15. πολυάρατον] Buttmann conjectures πολύκροτον, 'cunning,' which occurs as a v. l. for πολύτροπον in the first line of the Odyssey. Heind. conjectures πολυήρατον, but adds, 'ne hoc

ξυνεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενός τε p. 165.
καὶ ξυνδήσας ἥδη ἀν τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων ὅσων
σοί τε κάκείνῳ ἐδόκει. Τίν' οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας,
φαίης ἀν ἵσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἔρει;
5 ἄλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνοντες
αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὄμόσε, οἷμαι, χωρήσεται, κατα- p. 166.
φρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων, Οὗτος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ
10 χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθὲν ἔδεισεν, εἰ

How would
Protagoras
defend his
own
against the
attacks of
such a
light-
armed mer-
cenary?

3. He
would say

quidem satisfacit.' In Ven. II. both ἄ's are written over era-
sures. *πολυάρητος* occurs twice
in the *Odyssey*, 6. 280; 19.
404: 'Ονομ' ὅττι κε θείης | παιδὸς
παιδὶ φιλῷ· πολυάρητος δέ τοι
ἐστιν. Protagoras seems to
have affected certain rhetorical
expressions, and he or some
other Sophist perhaps may have
used this word. See *Phaedr.* 267
D: 'Ορθοέπεια, etc. Stallbaum
quotes Themist. *Orat.* 22.
325. 19. cd. Dindorf.: Τὸν πο-
λυάρατον πλούτον τί ἀν καὶ λέγοιμεν
δροῖων ἀγωνοθέτης πολέμων ἔστιν.
For the sense cp. *Euthyd.* 272 B:
Τῆς συφίας ἡς ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς
ἐριστικῆς. Ib. 273 E: Εἰ δὲ νῦν
ἀλληλῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχε-
τον, ἔλεφ εἴητον. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ ἔγωγε
σφὼ ὥσπερ θεώ προσαγορεύω. Ib.
296 D: 'Αλλὰ βούληθείης, ἦν δ'
ἔγώ, ὃ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημε. Ib.
301 B: 'Ηδη δὲ τοῦν ἀνδροῖν τὴν
σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μιμεῖσθαι, ἀτε
ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτῆς.

2. χρημάτων . . ἐδόκει] *Protag.*
328 B: Καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς
πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πε-
ποίημαι. ἐπειδὰν γάρ τις παρ'
ἔμοι μάθῃ, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀπο-
δέωκεν δὲ γάρ πράττομαι ἀργύριον

ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὀμόσας,
ὅσου ἀν φῇ ὅξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα,
τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.

3. τε] Bodl. γε, which Wohl-
rab defends.

7. Ταῦτά τε πάντα] From
162 D onwards.

8. ὄμόσε . . χωρήσεται] 'He
will grapple with us.' There
is a change of construction
similar to that in supr. 149 D :
Καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας,
καὶ . . ἀμβλίσκουσι. Protagoras
is first imagined as pushing his
adversary 'over a precipice,'
by stating the Eristic objection
to his doctrine in an extrava-
gant form, and then as turning
from arguments to facts, and
showing the bearing of his
theory not on truth and falsehood,
but on (relative) good
and evil.

10. χρηστός] Here almost =
εὐχερής, 'Good easy man!'

ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ.] 'When
he had found a child who was
terrified by the question,' etc.
For the dative cp. *Rep.* I. 343
A: ὃς γε αὐτῇ . . γιγνώσκεις.

παιδίον] Cp. *infr.* 168 D,
where the same exaggeration
is used.

p. 166. οἵον τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸν μεμιῆσθαι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησε διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε. τὸ δέ, ὃ ῥᾳθυμότατε Σώκρατες, τῇδε ἔχει. ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν δι’ ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῆς, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς 5 οἴαπερ ἀν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοια, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθείσ. αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρεῖναι τῷ ὧν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὖσαν πάθος, οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἡ αὖτοῦ ἀποκυήσειν ὁμολογεῖν οἵον τ’ εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἡ ἔάνπερ τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὅντι; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναι τινα, ἀλλ’

3. τὸν ἐμέ] The use of the article has a humorously pathetic rather than a pompous effect. Cp. Soph. 239 B: Τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε ἔτι τί τις ἀν λέγοι; Phaedr. 258 A: Τὸν αὐτόν. Ib. 20 B: Τὸν ἐμέ. Ib. 59 B: Τοὺς μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληβον.

4. ὃ ῥᾳθυμότατε Σώκρατες] ‘Slovenly Socrates!’

7. εἰ δὲ ἄλλοια] Sc. ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλλεται. The former case, ἐὰν σφάλληται, was contingent. This is present fact. For the sense cp. Charm. 162 C D.

8. αὐτίκα] ‘To begin with.’

τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσεσθαι] I. e. ἐμέ. ‘Do you think a man would admit?’

μνήμην] ‘That the memory a man has of an impression when it is past, is anything like what he experienced at the time.’

9. τοιοῦτόν τι οὖσαν πάθος] Hume, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding: ‘Everyone

will readily allow that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination.’—

‘We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind.’

—‘When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed.’

14. τὸν εἶναι τινὰ] τινὰ is subject, τὸν predicate. Cp. Phil. 14 C: Ἀρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐρε φῆ Πρώταρχον ἔνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος, καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία.

that he is not refuted, because not fairly represented by you. He would urge that memory is far less vivid than sensation. And, while not fearing to admit that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, he would assert that the man knowing is different from the

✓ man ignorant, and that every man becomes as many as the changes he undergoes. More seriously, he would challenge us to prove either that each man's sensations are not peculiar to him, or that it does not follow from this, that what appears to each man, is to him.

οὐχὶ τούς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, ἐάνπερ p. 166. ἀνομοίωσις γίγνηται, εἰ δὴ ὄνομάτων γε δεήσει θη- σ ρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλήλων; ἀλλ' ὡς μακάριε, φήσει, γενναιοτέρως ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἐλθὼν ὁ λέγω, εἰ δύνα- σαι, ἔξελεγξον ὡς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίγνονται, ἢ ὡς ἴδιων γιγνομένων οὐδέν τι ἀν μᾶλλον τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἢ εἰ εἶναι δεῖ ὄνομάζειν, εἴη, φπερ φαίνεται. ὃς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκε- φάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑηνεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά μου ἀνα- πείθεις, οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ φημὶ μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἔκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή· μυρίον μέντοι δια- φέρειν ἔτερον ἔτερον αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὃς ἀν τινα ἡμῶν φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ρή-

Compare a strange fancy of Comte's, Catéchisme Posit. p. 2: 'For each man differs from himself successively as much as he differs simultaneously from other men.'

1. καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπεί-
ρους] 'Which become multi-
plied to infinity, if only alter-
ation take place.'

2. ἀνομοίως γίγνηται, the reading
of Bodl. Vat., admits of a possi-
ble rendering, 'If only the man
become in a different way:' i.e.
when he is the subject of a dif-
ferent process. But the reading
in the text (that of T and
other MSS.) is probably right.

3. ὡς μακάριε] 'By all that is
sincere.' Protagoras is sup-
posed here to appeal to Socrates
as an ingenuous, single-minded
person. In other cases ὡς μα-
κάριε conveys a hint of εὐήθεια
('Bless your simple heart!'),
Phaedr. 236 D.

genitive is not objective but de-
scriptive. Cp. Euthyd. 295 D:
Βουλόμενός με θηρεύσαι τὰ ὄνόματα
περιστήσας. 'If we must really
be on our guard against being
entangled by each other with
words.'

3. ὡς μακάριε] 'By all that is
sincere.' Protagoras is sup-
posed here to appeal to Socrates
as an ingenuous, single-minded
person. In other cases ὡς μα-
κάριε conveys a hint of εὐήθεια
('Bless your simple heart!'),
Phaedr. 236 D.

4. γενναιοτέρως] 'In a nobler
spirit,' viz. than that of mere
verbal dispute.

8. ὄνομάζειν] Supr. 160 B.

19. τῷ ρήματι] 'In a verbal

p. 166. ματί μου δίωκε, ἀλλ' ὥδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί^E λέγω. οἶν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἡ ἐσθίει, καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τάνατία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται· σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι. 5

p. 167. οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν. οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ως ὁ μὲν κάμνων ἀμαθής, ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφός, ὅτι ἀλλοῖα· μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμείνων γὰρ ἡ ἐτέρα ἔξι. οὗτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἐτέρας ἔξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνων μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ιατρὸς 10 φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὕτι γε ψευδῆ δοξάζοντά τίς τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἡ ἀν πάσχῃ· ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ 15 β ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' οἴμαι, πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας

He would tell us that he is far from disparaging the wisdom of the wise: but he would define wisdom as the power of bringing men over, not from false ideas to true ones, but from a

way.' Cp. Rep. I. 340 D: Λέγομεν τῷ ρήματι οὗτως, κ.τ.λ.

I. μου] To be taken with λόγον.

3. φαίνεται . . . καὶ ἔστι . . . ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται] What is to the healthy man, also appears to him. Protagoras asserts that what appears to the sick man also is to him.

6. κατηγορητέον] Sc. τοῦ κάμνοντος. The word has here its proper vernacular meaning 'to accuse,' although this is inapplicable to the succeeding clauses, where a more general notion has to be supplied.

8. μεταβλητέον . . . ἔξι] This 'practical' view of education is in close accordance with that which Plato attributes to Protagoras in the dialogue which bears his name. See esp. 328 A: 'Ἄλλὰ κἀν εἰ δλίγον ἔστι τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβάσαι εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητόν.

15. πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας συγγενῆ ἔαυτῆς] πονηρᾶς is the reading of all the MSS., δοξάζοντας of Bodl. (with marks over σ by b) Vat. Ven. Π. ἔαυτῆς is found in all the MSS. but one (Flor. b. αὐτῆς). πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει, 'through having a bad or vicious soul.' ἔξι, like φαντασία, is not with Plato, as with Aristotle, a term of art, it is simply (as observed above on 153 B) the noun of the verb ἔχειν, and accordingly has two meanings, 'econdition,' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχειν πως, and 'having;' and, like πρᾶξις, it sometimes wavers between both. For instances of the active sense cp. Rep. 4. 433 E: 'Η τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἔαυτοῦ ἔξι καὶ πρᾶξις. Soph. 247 A: Δικαιοσύνης ἔξει καὶ παρουσίᾳ, and infr. 197 B: 'Ἐπιστήμης που ἔξι φασὶν εἶναι. Also Crat. 414 B, de Legg. I. 625 C, Tim. 73 A, 74 B, 87 E. For an instance where it seems

worse to
a better
state. Un-

συγγενῆ ἔαυτῆς χρηστὴ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἔτερα τοι- p. 167.
αῦτα, ἢ δή τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ

to waver cp. Rep. 509 A: "Ετι μειόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξιν. Ib. 591 B: 'Η ψυχὴ .. τιμιωτέραν ἔξιν λαμβάνει, σωφρο- σύνην κτωμένη. Gorg. 524 B: "Ἐχει τὴν ἔξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ. And above, 153 B: 'Η τοῦ σώ- ματος ἔξις . . ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις, we seem to pass from one meaning to the other within a few lines, as here. Comp. also Gorg. 523 C: Ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες. ἔαυτῆς presents more difficulty, but it may still be genuine. The transition is easy and not unfrequent from the person thinking to the mind thinking. Cp. Phædo. 82, where the change from the masculine to the feminine, i. e. from the persons to the souls, occurs several times together. Gorg. 526 B: Τοιοῦτον τινα . . ἐνίστε δὲ ἄλλην. Infr. 173 A: Σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐδὲ δρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ . . ἡ ἔκ νέων δουλείᾳ ἀφῆρται . . κινδύνους . . ἔτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλ- λουσα, οὐδὲ οὐ δυνάμενοι, κ.τ.λ. See also, for an instance of a like change of subject, Rep. 4. 441 E: Μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κράσις . . προστήσετον. That such a change of subject does occur here, is evident from the nominative χρηστή. The reflexive pronoun is also facilitated by συγγενῆ, being a correlative word. Cp. Phædr. 238 C: Τῶν ἔαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν. Compare also for the use of the reflexive pronoun, where it cannot be strictly referred to the subject of the sentence, Rep. 419 A: 'Εάν τις σε φῆ μὴ πάνι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἔαυτούς.

Supr. 152 B: Πότερον . . ἐφ' ἔαυτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἡ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν.

δοξάζοντα is preferable as the reading of the best MS., as the harder reading, and because the change to δοξάζοντα was so easy with the same word occurring a few lines above. For the change from the singular τινὰ to the indefinite plural cp. Rep. 1.344 B: 'Επειδὴν δέ τις . . αὐτοὺς . . δουλώσηται . . ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὁνο- μάτων . . μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἀν πύθωνται αὐτὸν τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν ἥδικηκότα: et passim.

'For it is not to be supposed that anybody ever makes one who thinks falsely afterwards think truly. For it is impossible either to think what is not, or to think anything beyond the present impression, which is always real. But, I suppose, whereas men through having an inferior mind entertain thoughts of a kindred nature, a good mind causes them to have good thoughts, those, namely, which men in ignorance call true.'

If any change of reading were required, the most probable would be the transposition of ἔυγγενῆ ἔαυτῆς and ἔτερα τοιαῦτα, —πονῆρας ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας ἔτερα τοιαῦτα χρηστὴ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι συγγενῆ ἔαυτῆς.

1. χρηστή] Sc. ψυχή.

ἔτερα τοιαῦτα] Sc. χρηστά.

'Wheras inferior minds have opinions kindred to themselves, a superior mind creates in them opinions which resemble it.'

2. φαντάσματα] This word here

p. 167. καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἔτερα τῶν ἔτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς. φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, 5
c ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῆ, χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις

til this is disproved,
Socrates must be content to be a 'measure of things.'

contains no association of falsehood, seeing that φαίνεσθαι and εἶναι are identified; but neither does it imply truth.

2. ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν] I. e. 'all are equally real.'

4. κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς] The theory is exposed by being gravely carried to the farthest point. Man is reduced to a level not only with brutes but with vegetables. Cp. Ar. Met. 1008b: Εἰ δὴ μηθὲν ὑπόλαμβάνει ἀλλ' ὅμοίως οἴεται τε καὶ οὐκ οἴεται, τι ἀν διαφερόντως ἔχοι τῶν φυτῶν; This however is only remotely hinted at. At present we are to receive this as an additional proof of Protagoras' boldness. For a more serious use of the analogy between human nature and the vegetable world see Rep. 6. 491 D: Σπέρματος πέρι ἡ φύτου εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων, κ.τ.λ. and, for a still closer parallel, Tim. 77 A: Τῆς γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνης ἔντοντος φύσεως φύσιν ἀλλαῖς ιδέαις καὶ αἰσθήσεσι κεραννύντες, ὡσθ' ἔτερον ζῶον εἶναι, φυτεύουσιν ἀδὴ νῦν ἡμερα δένδρα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ σπέρματα παιδευθέντα ὑπὸ γεωργίας τιθασῶς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσχε· πρὶν δὲ ἦν μόνον τὰ τῶν ἀγρίων γένη, πρεσβύτερα τῶν ἡμέρων ὅντα. Heind. quotes Aristot. de Plant. 1. 1, where, after mentioning the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles on the question, 'Do plants feel?' he adds, 'Ωσαύτως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐπιθυμεῖν

μόνον αὐτὰ διὰ τὴν σφοδρὰν τῆς θρεπτικῆς δύναμεως ἀνάγκην ἔφησεν, δὲ ἐὰν συσταίη, ἥδεσθαι ὅντας αὐτὰ καὶ λυπεῖσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τε σύμφωνον ἔσται. Cp. Άesch. Eumen. 911: ΑΘ. στέργω γάρ, ἀνδρὸς φιτυποιμένος δίκην, | τὸ τῶν δικαίων τῶνδ' ἀπένθητον γένος.

6. χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ τὰληθεῖς] 'Impart to them good and healthy sensations and real ones too ;' i. e. not only real (which they all are), but also good and healthy. The difference of idiom by which in Greek what is most emphatic is put first, though well known, is often a source of difficulty.

Cp. supr. 150 E: Αὗτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι.

Schlciermacher's conjecture, ἀληθείας, has been generally received, but ἀληθεῖς (in which Wohlrap agrees) is very possibly right. For the difficult position of τε cp. Rep. 4. 465 E: Καὶ γέρα δέχονται παρὰ τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεως ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν. Ib. 5. 472 A: Εἰκότως ἄρα ὄκνουν τε καὶ ἐδεδοίκη οὕτω παράδοξον λέγειν λόγον τε καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν. The objection drawn from supr. ἀδή τινες . . ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν is cancelled by the preceding ταῦτα δὲ δεὶ ἀληθῆ. The state of plants has as much reality as that of the wise man:

τε καὶ τάληθεῖς ἐμποιεῦν, τοὺς δέ γε σοφούς τε καὶ p. 167.
 ἀγαθοὺς ρήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν
 πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἵα γ' ἀν
 ἑκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι
 5 αὐτῆς, ἔως ἀν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ· ἀλλ' ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν
 ὅντων αὐτοῖς ἑκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ
 δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς
 τοὺς παιδευομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν
 σοφός τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευ-
 10 θεῖσι· καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ εἰσιν ἔτεροι ἐτέρων καὶ
 οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ δοξάζει, καὶ σοὶ, έάν τε βούλῃ ἔάν τε μή,
 ἀνεκτέον ὅντι μέτρῳ· σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος
 οὗτος· φὶ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν,
 ἀμφισβήτει, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών, εἰ δὲ δι' ἐρωτήσεων
 15 βούλει, δι' ἐρωτήσεων. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέον ἀλλὰ
 πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι. ποίει
 μέντοι οὔτωσί· μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶν. καὶ γὰρ ε
 πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν
 ἀλλ' ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐστὶν

Protagoras would be willing to proceed by question and answer, only he would demand fair treatment.

and the latter has no advantage in point of truth.

2. *ταῖς πόλεσι*] A further step is thus made in advance. Having already (supr. 157 D) included the good and noble amongst the things of which each man is judge for himself, it is natural to apply the same theory to the State, and to law and justice. It is on this point that the dialectic of Socrates afterwards lays hold:—infr. 172 A, 177 C.

3. *εἴναι* has been needlessly suspected.

9. *ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων*] Prot. 328 B.

12. *ἐν τούτοις*] ‘Through the instances herein adduced.’

14. *λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών, κ.τ.λ.*] Protagoras himself is represented as master of both styles (Prot. 329 B: ‘Ικανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους .. εἰπεῖν .. ίκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτήθεις ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχύ’), and in the Phaedrus Socrates himself adopts both, of course to the implied disadvantage of the rhetorical. See also Gorg. 449 B C, Soph. 217 C: Πότερον εἴωθας μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι .. ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων;

εἰ δὲ δι' ἐρωτήσεων βούλει] Sc. διεξελθεῖν. Protagoras is supposed to add this out of compliance with Socrates’ humour. *μέν* in the preceding clause really looks forward to *ποίει μέντοι, κ.τ.λ.*

p. 167. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίζῃ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ' ὅσον ἀν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ 5 ἐνδεικνύμενος τὰ σφάλματα, ἢ αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ

p. 168. τῶν προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο. ἀν μὲν γὰρ οὗτῳ ποιῆσ, ἑαυτὸς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντές σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ' οὐ σέ, καὶ σὲ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτὸς δὲ μισή- 10 σουσι, καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἵν' ἄλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν οἱ πρότερον ἥσαν. ἐὰν δὲ τάνατία τούτων δρᾶς ὕσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τάνατία ξυμβήσεται σοι καὶ τοὺς ξυνόντας ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπει- 15 δὰν πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται. ἐὰν οὖν ἔμοὶ πείθῃ, ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρέθη, οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς, ἀλλ'

I. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] Sc. ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐν λόγοις, supr. ‘To play false in this particular game.’ Cp. infr. 187 D: ‘Ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦσδε. 207 E: ‘Ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ. Ast and others take *τοιούτῳ* of what follows: ‘There is false play in such a case as this, viz. when,’ etc. This is also possible, but the context points the other way. The whole passage contains a covert censure of the eristic method which has pervaded the argument hitherto. Cp. Rep. 6. 487 B, where perhaps Socrates himself is gently criticized: ‘Ηγοῦνται . . . ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἔκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, . . . ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι.

5. ἐκεῖνα . . . τὰ σφάλματα] ‘Those slips and deviations which are due to himself and to the company he has previously kept.’ *παρακρούειν* (to deflect) is said to have been a wrestler’s term. The language recalls supr. 150 E: Διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν.

II. ἵν' ἄλλοι . . . ἥσαν] Protagoras here applies his theory. Supr. 166 B.

15. μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα] Viz. τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, i. e. μισολόγους γεγονότας. See the remarkable passage in the Phædo on this subject, 89, 90; where a parallel is drawn between the growth of misanthropy and scepticism.

16. ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρέθη] Viz. supr. 166 C: Γενναιοτέρως ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἐλθὼν ὃ λέγω.

For Dialectic, if fairly used, leads to sincere inquiry: if controversially, to the hatred of inquiry.

We would invite us to examine the meaning of his own saying, and of the principle of motion, and thus to meet the doctrine of sense on its own ground, avoiding the captiousness of verbal criticism.

Ἴλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεὶς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει τί ποτε p. 168.
λέγομεν, κινεῖσθαι τε ἀποφανόμενοι τὰ πάντα τό τε
δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι ἴδιώτη τε καὶ πόλει.
καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει εἴτε ταῦτὸν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο
5 ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἰσθησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ
συνηθείας ρήμάτων τε καὶ ὄνομάτων, ἀ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅπῃς
ἄν τύχωσιν ἐλκούτες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς
παρέχουσι. Ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἑταίρῳ σου εἰς
βοήθειαν τὸ προσηρξάμην κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὰ
10 ἀπὸ σμικρῶν· εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς ἔξη, μεγαλειότερον ἄν τοῖς
αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν.

ΘΕΟ. Παίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς
τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε. καί μοι εἰπέ· ἐνενόησάς
15 που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὄνειδίζοντος
ἡμῖν ὅτι πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζούμεθα εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαρι-

1. Ἄλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθείσ] Sc. σεαυτόν. Cp. infr. 174 A: Αὐτὴν συγκαθεῖσα. ‘Meeting us without reserve, in a candid and good-humoured spirit.’

6. ὅπῃ ἄν τύχωσιν ἐλκούτες] Soph. 259 C: Τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τότε δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἐλκων. Phil. 57 D: Τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὀλκήν. Infr. 195 C, 199 A.

9. τὸ προσηρξάμην] ‘I have contributed as a beginning.’ Notwithstanding Buttmann’s ingenious defence of this word, Lexil. 1. 103, it is difficult not to incline to the conjecture of Coraius suggested by Schneider, προσῆρκεσα μέν. Cp. Legg. 6. 757 B: Σμικρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ, πᾶν δὲ σον ἄν ἐπαρκέσῃ: Soph. (Ed. Col. 72: ‘Ως ἄν προσαρκῶν σμικρά, κερδάνη μέγα. See however infr. 171

E: ‘Υπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες,— and esp. the use of ἐπάρχεσθαι in the Homeric hymn to Apollo, l. 125: Οὐδὲ ἄρ—’Απόλλωνα χρυσδόρα θῆσατο μήτηρ, | ἀλλὰ Θέμις νέκταρ τε καὶ ἀμβροσίην ἐρατεινὴν | ἀθανάτησιν χέρσιν ἐπήρξατο, and the use of ὑπαρξάμενος in Tim. 41 C.

10. μεγαλειότερον] A rhetorical word, used probably in ironical imitation of Protagoras’ style. See note on πολυάρατον, 165 E. Cp. Xen. Mem. 2. 1. § 34: Οὗτοι πῶς διώκει Πρόδικος τὴν ὑπὸ Ἀρετῆς Ἡρακλέους παιδεύσιν, ἐκσόμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειότεροις ρήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν.

12. πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας] ‘Your defence of our friend has been most vigorous.’ For τῷ ἀνδρὶ cp. supr. 162 A: Φίλος ἀνήρ.

17. χαριεντισμόν τινα . . λόγον]

p. 168. εντισμόν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ;

ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ὁρᾶς οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἔστιν; εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρί, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεῖ εἴρωτῶντάς τε καὶ ἀποκριωμένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἵνα μή τοι τοῦτο γ' ἔχῃ 10 ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παιζόντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὐτοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δ'; οὐ πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πώγωνας ἔχόντων ἄμεινον ἀν ἐπακολουθήσει λόγῳ διερευνωμένῳ;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὕτι σοῦ γε, ὡς Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον. μὴ οὖν οἷον ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἐταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν

p. 169. παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί, ἀλλ' ἵθι, ὡς ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἔως ἀν εἰδῶμεν, εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον 20

'Giving a bad name of "quibbling" to our argument and exalting the respect due to his maxim, he bade us be in earnest when we are dealing with his theory.' For τὸ πάντων μέτρον cp. Phil. 20 B: Τὸ . . εἰ βούλει. The sentence continues as if ἐνενόησας ὅτι had preceded. For χαριεντισμόν cp. supr. 167 E, and for ἀποσεμνύνων 166 C. τοι (which Schanz omits with pr. T.) adds a touch of humorous earnestness to the request of Socrates.

7. τάδε πάντα] Viz. Theætetus, the younger Socrates, and their companions. Supr. 144 C, 146 B.

That Protagoras may be treated with due gravity, Theodorus is at last compelled to join in the discussion.

11. αὐτοῦτον τὸν λόγον] Coisl. p. m. Αὐτοῦ τὸ λόγον. The Bodl. p. m. had αὐτοῦ τὸν τὸν λόγον. Cp. 166 D: Τὸν δὲ λόγον αῦ μη τῷ ρήματί μου δίωκε. τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, if correct, refers to the fresh arguments which Protagoras had assumed in his defence, and the discussion founded on them.

18. σὲ δὲ μηδενί] The pronoun is simply used to strengthen the negative. Cp. Soph. ΟΕδ. Τυρ. 1019: Καὶ πῶς ὁ φύσας ἐξ οὗτον τῷ μηδενί;

20. διαγραμμάτων . . ἀστρονομίαν] Note the variety, and cp. supr. 147 Λ B.

εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ίκανοὶ ἔαυτοῖς εἴς τε p. 169.
ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τἄλλα ὡν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις
διαφέρειν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ ράδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον
5 μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων
σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν
καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν
Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ ^β
ἀπιέναι ἡ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταῖον
10 τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δράμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσ-
ελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἀναγκάσης ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι.

ΣΩ. Ἄριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπεί-
κασας· ἵσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. μυρίοι
15 γὰρ ἥδη μοι Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυγχά-

2. *aἰτίαν ἔχεις*] ‘You are reputed.’ Rep. 4. 435 E: Οἱ δὴ καὶ
ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν *aἰτίαν* (*τοῦ θυ-
μοειδεῖς εἶναι*), Gorg. 503 B. Cp.
the use of *aἰτιῶμαι* in Rep. 10.
599 E, 4. 435 E.

8. *τείνειν*] Cp. Phæd. 65 A:
Ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι.
‘You come nearer to the analogy of Sciron.’

9. *κατ’ Ἀνταῖον*] The allusion
to the Lacedæmonian custom
(supr. 162 B) is repeated, but,
as usual, with fresh imagery,
and additional point. The
Lacedæmonians tell one to
strip or go away. But you,
like Sciron, strip all you meet
with, and, like Antæus, force
them to wrestle with you. H.
Schmidt needlessly suspects
κατ’ Ἀνταῖον. There is a slight
inversion for the sake of em-
phasis. The natural order
would be *μᾶλλόν τι κατ’ Ἀνταῖον*.

10. *τὸ δράμα δρᾶν*] (1) ‘To go

about your work.’ Or (2) ‘To
perform your part.’ Cp. supr.
150 A: “Ελαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ
δράματος, and note.

11. *πρὶν ἀναγκάσης*] Schanz,
following Heindorf, thinks it
necessary to read *πρὶν ἀν.* *ἀν*
might of course easily fall out
before *ἀναγκάσης*. But its omis-
sion may be defended on the
ground that *ἀνίης* contains a
general statement.

ἀποδύσας] ‘Having stripped
him of every pretext.’

13. For *νόσον* Heindorf aptly
compares Phædr. 228 B: Τῷ
νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν.

14. *ἵσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ
ἐκείνων*] ‘But I have more of
the athlete in me than they
had;’ (*ἵσχυρικός*=‘given to
trials of strength.’)

15. *Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες*] Winkelmann (Fr. Antisthenis)
suspects an allusion to Antisthenes here. But the Scholiast

p. 169. νοντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ’ εὐ̄ ξυγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ’ ἔγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι· οὗτω τις ἔρως ο δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν τε ἄμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὀιησαι.

5

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ’ ἄγε ὅπῃ ἐθέλεις· πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα είμαρμένην, ἷν [ἄν] σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς, δεῖ ἀνατλῆναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὡν προτίθεσαι οἵος τ’ ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καί μοι πάνυ το τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μή που παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καί τις πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ὀνειδίσῃ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαι γε καθ’ ὅσον ἀν δύνωμαι.

15

ΣΩ. Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβώμεθα

is probably nearer the mark: Οἱ Θρασύμαχοι, Καλλικλεῖς, Διωνυσόδωροι, Εὐθύδημοι καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. Cp. Euthyd. 297.

1. καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν] ‘Men of valour in the art of controversy.’

μᾶλ’ εὐ̄ ξυγκεκόφασιν] ‘Have bruised me well.’

2. οὗτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε] Sc. με implied in ἔγὼ supr. It is left doubtful whether οὗτω is to be joined with δεινός or ἐνδέδυκε. ‘So strong a passion for this kind of exercise has taken possession of me.’ It is not forgotten that Socrates says this at the close of his career. For ἐνδέδυκε cp. Phæd. 89 D: “Η τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται.

3. δεινός] For the inversion (=οὗτω δεινός τις ἔρως) cp. Rep. 3. 391 D, 6. 500 A.

4. προσανατριψάμενος] ‘Giving

me a grip,’ ‘trying one fall with me.’

6. ἀλλ’ ἄγε] The Bodl. has ἀλλὰ λέγε. See above 162 D: Εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, and note. ἄγε is more vivid and in better agreement with the image which follows. Hermann’s objection is well answered by H. Schmidt.

7. [ἄν]] ἄν has weak MS. authority. Cp. supr. B: Πρίν, κ. τ. λ. and note.

9. ὡν προτίθεσαι] Viz. διαγραμμάτων πέρι, supr. A.

11. λάθωμεν] Cp. supr. 164 C: Δανθάνομεν ταῦτα.. ποιοῦντες. There is exquisite humour in Socrates’ warning Theodorus against being sportive in argument.

12. τις] Somebody; i.e. Protagoras.

16. ἀντιλαβώμεθα] ‘Let us at-

οὐπέρ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἵδωμεν, ὁρθῶς ἡ οὐκ ὁρθῶς p. 169.
ἔδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι αὐτάρκη
ἔκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ἔννεχώρησεν ὁ
Πρωταγόρας περὶ τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος δια-
φέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφούς. οὐχί;

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

I. B. Protagoras' own maxim is criticized.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὠμολόγει, ἀλλὰ
μὴ ἡμεῖς βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἔννεχωρήσαμεν, οὐ-
δὲν ἀν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι· νῦν
ιο δὲ τάχ' ἀν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἔκείνου
ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τού-
του αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παρ-
αλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἡ ἄλλως.

ΘΕΟ. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν δι' ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἔκείνου
λόγου ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. p. 170.

tack the question from the same point as before.' Cp. Rep. 8.544

B: Πάλιν.. ὥσπερ παλαιστῆς τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε.

3. καὶ ἡμῖν ἔννεχώρησεν] The sentence breaks and reverts to the direct form. Cp. Rep. 6.489

D: Οὓς δὴ σὺ φύς, κ.τ.λ. κἀγὼ ἔννεχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. (Others, with Heindorf, 'and whether Protagoras was right in admitting?') In conceding for Protagoras that some men are wise, we went beyond his own words. We must try to prove it out of his own mouth. He says, What appears to each man, is to him. Now it certainly appears to every man that some are wiser than himself, and some less wise; that some think truly, others falsely. Therefore, whether Protagoras be right or wrong, it is the case

that some think truly, and some falsely.

11. καλλιόνως ἔχει] 'It would seem the less exceptionable course.' The rare form of the adverb in -ως avoids the ambiguity of καλλιον ἔχει.

12. διομολογήσασθαι implies greater thoroughness than ἀν-ομολογησάμενοι, supr. 164 C.

οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει] 'It is of no small importance to the question at issue.' Socrates appeals again to the geometrical consciousness of Theodorus, to whom possibly παραλλάττει, a half-technical word, may express more than the simple διαφέρει.

15. δι' ἄλλων.. ἐκ τοῦ.. λόγου] 'Not through any third person, but from the data supplied by himself.'

p. 170. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Οὐτωσί. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι φησί που φῖ δοκεῖ;

ΘΕΟ. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, 5 μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμὲν οὐδένα ὃν τινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἔαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἡ νόσοις ἡ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν 10 τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτῆρας σφῶν προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαφέροντας ἡ τῷ εἰδέναι. καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τὰνθρώπινα ζητούντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἔαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὖτις ίκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, 15 ίκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἄπασι τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἡ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν 20 ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

c ΘΕΟ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;

6. καὶ φαμέν is paratactic for λέγοντες.

10. χειμάζωνται] There is a zeugma only in so far as the verb is used literally with ἐν θαλάσσῃ and figuratively with ἐν στρατείαις ἡ νόσοις. Cp. Lach. 194 B: Ἀνδράσι φίλοις χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ . . βοήθησον.

ώσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν] Cp. Rep. 6. 489 C: Τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν, ἔαν τε πλούπιος ἔαν τε πένης κάμνῃ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ

ἰατρῶν θύρας λέναι, καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεύμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν δυναμένου. On the omission of πρὸς with the second word see Cobet, Var. Lect. pp. 163 sqq.

23. ὡς Πρωταγόρα] Bodl. Vat. pr. Ven. II. have τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ. But the Bodleian has ὡ in the margin by an ancient hand. The reading τῷ may have been suggested by τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ infr. E.

'What appears to each man, is to him.' And does it not, then, appear to every man that some know more than he does and some less: so that in the greatest dangers, they look up to the wise man as to a God, submitting to be taught and ruled by him? And they account wisdom to be true thought; and folly to be false opinion.

It follows
that, if all
men think
truly, some
men think
falsely.

πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν ἀεὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπου δοξάζειν, ἢ π. 170.
ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ που ξυμβαίνει μὴ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ ἀλλ' ἀμφότερα αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὡς Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἄν τις τῶν 5 ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἡ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ως οὐδεὶς ἡγεῖται ἔτερος ἔτερον ἀληθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλ' ἄπιστον, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτο γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἦκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρωπον λέγων.

10 ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δή;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρός με ἀποφάνηγ περὶ τιως δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν ἔκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ήμιν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστι κριτᾶς γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀεί σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν; ἢ μυρίοι ἑκάστοτε σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡγούμενοι ψευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὡς Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι εδῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, οἵ γέ μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων 20 πράγματα παρέχουσιν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν ως σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἔοικεν ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

8. εἰς τοῦτο . . ἀνάγκης . . ἦκει] ‘Is driven to this.’ ‘Is reduced to a point where this is inevitable.’ Cp. Soph. OEd. Tyr. 687 : ‘Ορᾶς ἵν’ ἦκεις ;

18. Νὴ τὸν Δία . . παρέχουσιν ‘Yes, truly, Socrates, I have opponents more than I can tell, as Homer says, and they give me worlds of trouble.’

19. φησὶν Ὅμηρος] Od. 16. 121: Τῷ νῦν δυσμενέες μάλα μυρίοι εἰσ’ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ.

τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα]

‘The trouble of the world,’ i.e. troubles, the greatest that can come from all men. Cp. *Æschin.* c. Timarch. 9 : Τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον δήσαντες πρὸς τὸν κίονα αὐτὸν τὸν Πιττάλακον ἐμαστίγουν τὰς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πληγὰς οὕτω πολὺν χρόνον ὥστε, κ.τ.λ. A somewhat similar use of ἀνθρώπων occurs in Soph. Phil. 305 : Πολλὰ γὰρ τάδε | ἐν τῷ μακρῷ γένοιτ’ ἄν ἀνθρώπων χρόνῳ. ‘Respondet vulgare illud nostratium, alle menschenmögliche.’ Heindorf.

As a matter of fact
men do become
judges of
one another's im-
pressions.

p. 170. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ; ἀρ' οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ὡςτο μέτρον εἶναι ἀνθρωπον μηδὲ οι πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτην

p. 171. τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἦν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ὡςτο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἷσθ' ὅτι πρῶτον 5 μὲν ὅσῳ πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ' ἑκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Ἔπειτά γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον. ἐκεῖνος 10 μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴησιν, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, συγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀπαντας.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

β ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀν ψευδῆ συγχωροῦ, εἰ τὴν 15 τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δέ γ' ἄλλοι οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς ψεύδεσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δέ γ' αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἔξ ὧν γέγραφεν.

ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται.

For instance, they condemn Protagoras. His opinion therefore may be true for him, but, on his own showing, it is false for all men besides. Its truth is to its falsehood, as one man is to all mankind. But further, in saying that they think truly, he confirms them in saying that he thinks falsely: and upholds them in denying that they are wrong. Thus the unanimity of dissent is not broken even by Protagoras himself.

1. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ;] Sc. ἀνάγκη ἔστιν; Or rather, as H. Schmidt points out, a more general notion: ‘What follows for Protagoras? Is he not compelled?’

2. μηδὲ.. μηδέ] ‘If Protagoras himself also did not think so, nor yet the majority, as indeed they do not.’

5. συνοίεται] This is present,

because it has been asserted just above in ὥσπερ .. οἴονται.

10. Ἔπειτα.. κομψότατον] ‘Now follows the most exquisite touch of all.’ Cf. Rep. 5. 558 A: Τί δέ; ἡ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή;—ἔχει, sc. τὸ πρᾶγμα, s. ὁ λόγος. μέν points forward to the antithesis, which is expressed in οἱ δέ γ' ἄλλοι, κ.τ.λ.

ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμέ- p. 171.
 νων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπό γε ἐκείνου ὁμο-
 λογήσεται,—ὅταν τῷ τάναντίᾳ λέγοντι συγχωρῇ ἀλη-
 θῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγ- c
 χωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἀνθρωπον
 μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς οὐδὲν μὴ μάθῃ. οὐχ
 οὕτως;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

The saying
of Protago-
ras is true
for nobody.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων,
 10 οὐδενὶ ἀν εἴη ἡ Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, οὐ τέ
 τινι ἀλλῳ οὕτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀγαν, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὸν ἔταιρόν μου κατα-
 θέομεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τοι, ὡς φίλε, ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν

1. [Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα] ‘So then, the result obtained from them all is this.’ Cf. Soph. 245 E: Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὐτὸν θεατέον, ἵν’ ἐκ πάντων εἰδῶμεν ὅτι τὸ δὲν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἰπεῖν δὲ τί ποτε ἔστιν. Ar. Met. 988 a: Τοσοῦτόν γ’ ἔχομεν ἔξ αὐτῶν, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. The preposition is probably suggested by ἐξ ὧν immediately preceding. ‘On all hands, then, including Protagoras, we find it disputed, or rather on his part it is admitted.’ This use of ἐξ has been needlessly disputed by Heindorf and others, and Schanz reads ὑφ’ ἀπάντων. Badham suggests ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ τῶν Πρωταγόρου.

3. [ὅταν .. συγχωρήσεται] These words are explanatory of ὑπὸ ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, and what follows, from μήτε onwards, depends immediately on συγχωρήσεται, but really also on all that precedes. The construction of a sentence is frequently thus

disturbed by the introduction of an explanatory or appositional clause. Cp. Rep. 7. 529 B: Οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιεῖν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἀν περὶ τὸ δὲν τε ἥ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον, ἔαν τέ τις ἄνω κεχηνῶς ἢ κάτω συμμεμικῶς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τι ἐπιχειρῆ μανθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ποτέ φημι αὐτὸν, οὔτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ βλέπειν τὴν ψυχήν, κανὸν ἔξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μανθάνῃ. The futures middle are used with passive meaning.

5. [μήτε κύνα] Supr. 154 A.

12. [Ἀγαν] ‘We are urging my friend too vehemently,’ ‘running him very hard.’

[καταθέομεν] Cp. Legg. 7. 806 C: Τί δράσομεν, δὲ Κλεινία; τὸν ξένον ἐάσομεν τὴν Σπάρτην ήμῶν οὕτω καταδραμέν;

14. [Αλλά . . ἄδηλον] ‘But it does not appear that we are outrunning what is right,’ i.e. I do not see that we are transgressing any rule of truth or fairness. τὸ δὲρθόν means simply

p. 171. τὸ ὄρθον. εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύτερον ὅντα σօδ φώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψειε μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἀν ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδὺς ἀν οἴχοιτο . ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἷμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν 5 αὐτοῖς, ὅποιοι τινές ἔσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἀν τοῦτο γε ὄντινον, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἔτερον ἔτερον, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ταύτη ἀν μάλιστα ἴστασθαι τὸν λόγον,

Could he put his head above the ground, no doubt he might convince us of much folly. But we have done our best.

No one will deny that one man is wiser, and another less wise, than his neighbour.

10

(as in Rep. 7. 540 D : Τὸ ὄρθὸν περὶ πλεύστου ποιησάμενοι. Meno, 99 A : 'Ηγεμῶν . . ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρθον), 'What is just and true.' There is no necessity therefore for making παραθεῖν (with the accusative) mean 'to swerve from.'

i. εἰκός γε ἄρα] Socrates admits that there is some ground for Theodorus' remonstrance. 'It is reasonable, I grant, to presume that as he is older so he is wiser than we are.' *ἄρα* refers to an implied argument; 'as your words imply.' For εἰκός γε cp. infr. 202 D.

4. καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα] Sc. ληρώδη. Steinhart suggests that the notion of Protagoras putting up his head and disappearing again is perhaps taken from the use of 'Charon's steps' in the theatre. H. Schmidt well observes that καταδὺς . . . ἀποτρέχων implies that the Sophist would not have waited for a rejoinder. Cp. Rep. 1. 344 C D, esp. the words ὃ δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε, οἷον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, πρὶν διδάξαι ικανῶς ἡ μαθεῖν εἴτε οὔτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει.

5. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν] Socrates returns to the charge with the second ἀλλά.

6. τὰ δοκοῦντα] 154 C: 'Ἐὰν μὲν τὸ δοκοῦν, κ.τ.λ. Men. 83 D: "Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὗτως. Σ. Καλῶς" τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνουν. Cp. esp. Crat. 386 B C.

ii. ταύτη ἀν . . Πρωταγόρᾳ] 'Will be most likely to take up this position, which we sketched out for it in our defence of Protagoras.' Cp. Il. 11. 570, 1: Αὐτὸς δὲ Τρώων καὶ 'Αχαιῶν θῦνε μεσηγῆς | ιστάμενος. Ib. 590, 1: 'Αλλὰ μάλ' ἄντην | ιστασθ' ἀμφ' Αἴαντα μέγαν. Parm. 130 D: "Οταν ταύτη στῶ. 'The argument' is personified, as so often in Plato (cp. Rep. 6. 484 A : Διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντος λόγου. Ib. 503 A : Τοιαῦτ' ἄπτα ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου), and is the subject of συγχωρήσεται, ἔθελησαι, δμολογήσει and τολμήσειε, in what follows. (If Protagoras were the subject, as H. Schmidt suggests, the dative Πρωταγόρᾳ should have been αὐτῷ). ιστασθαι depends

It is clear, too, that the strength of the position lies in the region of sensible things, which we made the basis of our defence of Protagoras.

(*Transition to the conception of the Beneficial.*)
If the theory would concede any thing,

ἡ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρᾳ, ὡς τὰ p. 171.
μὲν πολλὰ ἡ δοκεῖ ταύτη καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστῳ, θερμά,^E
ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου· εἰ δέ
που ἐν τισι συγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλον,
5 περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐθελῆσαι ἀν φάναι μὴ πᾶν
γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δὲ ίκανὸν εἶναι ίστθαι
αὐτὸ γιγνώσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, ἄλλα ἐνταῦθα δὴ
ἄλλον ἄλλον διαφέρειν, εἴπερ ποὺ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ p. 172.
αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἀν
ἐκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ
εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐκάστη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν
σοφώτερον οὔτε ἴδιώτην ἴδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως

immediately on φῶμεν.—May there also be a slight play upon the word ἰστασθαι? ‘This unstable theory will make a stand hereabouts if anywhere.’ See also Thuc. 6. 34: Πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γνῶμαι ἰστανται.

1. ἡ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρᾳ] This ‘new wave’ of discussion rises upon the last, 167 B, 168: Κατὰ μὲν σώματα ιατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς . . ταῖς πολέσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οὖά γ' ἀν ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἔως ἀν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ. The argument is beginning to relax a little under the influence of the ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν thrown carelessly in, 157 D.

4. συγχωρήσεται] Sc. ὁ λόγος. Others go back for a subject to δόντιον, supr. D. But if the imaginary opponent were wholly indefinite, why should a doubt be expressed whether he would make a reasonable admission?

So in what follows, 172 A, the words εἴπερ ποὺ, οὐκ ἀν πάντα τολμήσειε, imply certain pre-conceptions and tendencies.

6. καὶ θηρίον δέ] ‘Nay, even every inferior animal.’ Vegetables might have been included. Supr. 167 B C.

10. Οὐκοῦν . . περὶ πολιτικῶν] The distinction in the case of sensible things between the impressions of sense, and the knowledge of what is good, is evident enough. The analogous distinction in the case of things moral and social is less obvious. See, amongst other passages, Rep. 6. 505 D: Τί δέ; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἀν ἔλουντο τὰ δοκοῦντα καν μὴ ἦ ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἄλλα τὰ ὅντα ζητοῦντι, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἥδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει;

12. οἰηθεῖσα] Sc. καλά, δίκαια, κ.τ.λ.

p. 172. εἰναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ η̄ μὴ συμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ', εἴπερ που, αὐτὸς ὁμολογήσει σύμβουλόν τε συμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἐτέραν ἐτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀν πάνυ τολμήσειε φῆσαι, ἀ ἀν θῆται πόλις συμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὐτῇ, 5 παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ συννοίσειν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὐ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὄστοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἵσχυρίζεσθαι ως οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὔσιαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἀν 10 δοκῇ χρόνον. καὶ ὅσοι γε δὴ μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν, ὥδε πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι. Λόγος δὲ ήμας, ὡς Θεόδωρε, ἐκ λόγου, μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττου, καταλαμβάνει.

it would be this, that all are not equally judges of what is wholesome; and in the case of states, that although honour and justice are matters of convention merely, yet in deciding what is expedient, mistake is possible both to individuals and states.

8. ἐθέλουσιν ἵσχυρίζεσθαι] He drops the figure, and passes from what the ‘argument’ would be apt to say, to what certain persons, who are presently defined, actually do say. For a somewhat similar transition from ‘arguments’ to ‘certain persons’ cp. Gorg. 457 C: Οὖμαι, ὡς Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἐμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωράκεναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ράδιως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἀν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισμένοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας . . . καὶ ἔνιοι γε τελευτῶντες (cp. καὶ ὅσοι γε in the present passage), κ.τ.λ.

11. μὴ παντάπασι] ‘In part only.’ For the negative form cp. Soph. 247 B: Τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταῦτα ἀποκρίνονται πᾶν (‘here they make a certain distinction’). Aristotle (Met. 1008 a) uses the expression τοῖς τὸν Πρωταγόρου λέγουσι λόγον.

12. ὥδε πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι]

‘Conduct their philosophic procedure thus.’ ‘Proceed somewhat on this wise in their philosophy.’ Cp. Men. 80 E: Όρᾶς τοῦτον ως ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις;

ὥδε refers either to the preceding sentence, or to the exposition which is broken off by the digression:—certainly not (with H. Schmidt) to the digression itself.

The digression which follows is not merely an ornament. As in the Sophistes the philosopher and the sophist are the counterpart of being and not-being respectively, so here the man of the world and the philosopher represent the contrast between the life of sense and the life of knowledge.

13. μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττου] The question of Justice and Injustice, etc. is greater than the question of the relativity of Sense. The greater question is not fully resumed in the pre-

This is the attitude of some who have partially relinquished the Protagorean doctrine. They offer us a new and important handle for discussion.
(*Digression.*)
Before entering upon this, however,

ΘΕΟ. Ούκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὥς Σώκρατες;

p. 172.

ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μέν γε δή, ὥς δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς 5 τὰ δικαστήρια ιόντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ρήτορες.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δή οὖν λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιᾶδε διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται 10 πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.

sent dialogue, but is treated at large in the Gorgias and Republic.

1. Ούκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν] Compare the opening of the digression in the Phædrus, 258 E: *Σχολὴ μὲν δὴ ὡς ἔσοκε . . .*, and Cic. de Amic. 5: ‘Etsimus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi.’ We must suppose that the impending trial of Socrates, although not alluded to until the end of the dialogue, is in Plato’s mind throughout this passage. Cp. Gorg. 522 B.

2. ὥς δαιμόνιε] ‘In sober truth.’ The words add a touch (not here of expostulation but) of solemnity.

4. ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις] ‘In scientific pursuits.’ Supr. 143 D: *Γεωμετρίαν ή τινα ἀλλην φιλοσοφίαν.* Tim. 88 C: *Μοντικῆ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ.* Socrates takes common ground with Theodorus. Cp. infr. 173 E: *Τά τε γὰς ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦστα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομοῦστα.* Compare with the whole passage the opening words of the Apology (esp. ὅμοιογοίν ἀν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἴναι ρήτωρ), and the dispute of Socrates with Callicles in

the Gorgias.

8. ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι]^{*} ‘Who have knocked about from their early days.’ Compare Aristophanes’ *περίτριμμα δικῶν* (Nub. 447), and Dem. de Cor. 269.

κυλινδούμενοι] The word expresses contempt for the ‘casual,’ ‘hand to mouth,’ intellectual existence of the lawyer. Cp. Rep. 5. 479 D: *Μεταξύ πον κυλινδεῖται,* Phædr. 257 A, Polit. 309 A.

10. πρὸς ἐλευθέρους] Soph. 253 C (referring to this): **Η πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνευρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον;* Rep. 6. 499 A: Οὐδέ γε αὖ λόγων, ὃ μακάριε, καλῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἵκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γεγόνασιν, οἵτινες μὲν τὸ ἀληθές, κ.τ.λ. 7. 536 D: Οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλευθέρον χρὴ μανθάνειν—and the whole image of the cave with its captives and their liberation. See also Aristot. Met. 1. 2: *Δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι’ οὐδεμίαν αὐτὸν ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἔτέραν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀνθρωπος φάμεν ἐλευθέρος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μη ἄλλου ὕν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴ μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν.*

p. 172. ΘΕΟ. Πή δή;

ΣΩ. Ἡ τοῖς μέν, τοῦτο ὁ σὺ εἶπες, ἀεὶ πάρεστι σχολὴ καὶ τὸν λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἥδη λόγου ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὗτοι κάκεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ· καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἡ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἀν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος· οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι ^E (κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ρέον) καὶ οὐκ ἔγχωρει περὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τὸν λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην

2. τοῦτο ὁ σὺ εἶπες] H. Schmidt would delete the commas, because Theodorus had only spoken of himself and Socrates. But such 'apposition of general and particular' is common in Plato.

4. τρίτον ἥδη λόγους ἐκ λόγου] 'We are for the third time beginning a fresh argument.' The first fresh λόγος was the criticism of Protagoras and his defence; the second begins where Theodorus is induced to accept Socrates' challenge (see the doubtful words, 168 E: Αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον); the third and greatest (*μείζων*, supr. B) arises with the mention of the wholesome and expedient, and the partial supporters of Protagoras. Cp. Rep. 1. 354, where Socrates owns to a similar discursiveness, and is by no means exact in recapitulating.

5. οὗτοι κάκεῖνοι] Sc. μεταλαμβάνονται. This part of the sentence (from ὥσπερ . .) stands in apposition to what precedes. Cp. supr. 171 C: Τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας . ., and note; also Rep. 8. 557 C: Κινδυνεύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι· ὥσπερ ἴμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν

ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον, οὗτοι καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἥθεσι πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη ἀν φαίνοιτο. Also ib. 7. 532 A: Οὗτοι καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ, ἀνεν πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸν ὁ ἔστιν ὄρμᾶ, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ πρὸν ἀν αὐτὸν ὁ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὄρατοῦ. But as the verb is omitted in the second clause, the comma is preferable to a colon after ποιοῦνται.

6. καθάπερ ἡμᾶς] Such slight redundancies are natural in conversation.

ἀρέσκειν governs the accusative where it means *to satisfy*. It has the dative supr. 157 D. The whole sentence is in construction with Ἡ.

7. διὰ μακρῶν ἡ βραχέων] See Polit. 286.

10. ἀνάγκην] Hesych.: Ἀνάγκη· ἡ δικαιοτικὴ κλεψύδρα. Pollux, 8. 17: Ἔνοι δ' οἴονται καὶ ἀνάγκην σκέδος εἶναι δικαιοτικόν. The latter quotation expresses doubt. May not the notion mentioned by the grammarian have arisen from the present passage? The structure of the sentence (*τε—καὶ*) forbids our identifying

we pause
to reflect
upon the
happiness
and free-
dom of the
philosophic
life, which
has leisure
to take up
fresh topics
or to lay
them down
at will.
Not so the
mind which
is exercised
in the
courts of
law. The

forensi
civili
(as
before)

one is the
training of
a freeman,
the other of
a slave—

ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκε καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγι- p. 172.
γνωσκομένην, ὃν ἐκτὸς οὐ ρήτεον· (ἢν ἀντωμοσίαν
καλοῦσιν·) οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀεὶ περὶ ὄμοδούλου πρὸς δε-
σπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ
5 ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ·
πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος· ὥστ’ ἐξ ἀπάν- p. 173.

ἀνάγκη here with the clepsydra, which has been already alluded to. It is rather ‘the strong arm of the law,’ which the adversary could bring to bear, if the speaker wandered from the indictment. (So also Ast and H. Schmidt.) ‘But the other sort are always pressed for time: for the ebbing water hurries on the speaker: and he has no liberty to follow whither fancy leads him, but the adversary is at hand to wield over him the irresistible logic of coercion, holding a written outline of the points to which he must confine himself, which forms a running commentary to his oration.’

2. ὃν ἐκτὸς οὐ ρήτεον] ὑπογραφὴν retains its verbal force nearly as if it were ὑπογεγραμμένα, but is not the antecedent to ὃν. See 147 E, note on δτῷ.

ἢν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν] ‘What they call their affidavits.’ The affected unfamiliarity with legal terms is in good keeping. Compare Rep. 3. 400 B: Καὶ, ὡς ἐγώ-
μαι, ἵμβον καὶ τιν' ἄλλον τροχαῖον
ωνόμαζε.

3. πρὸς δεσπότην] Not simply the δικαστής, but rather δῆμος or νόμος, whom he represents. Compare the passages in the Republic in which Δῆμος is spoken of as the master of the ship (488), as the great Sophist (492), and as a mighty beast (493); and cp. Eu-

thyphr. 2 C: “Ἐρχεται κατηγορή-
σων μου, ὥσπερ πρὸς μητέρα, πρὸς
τὴν πόλιν. Also Herodotus, 7.
104 (of the Spartans): “Ἐπεστι
γάρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑπο-
δειμαίνοντι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ἢ οἱ
σοὶ σέ. Pindar, 3. 38: Νόμος
πάντων βασιλεύς.

4. τινα δίκην] So the Bodleian MS. ‘Some cause or other.’ This reading suits the distant, unfamiliar tone, in which judicial proceedings are here described. The other reading, ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκην
ἔχοντα (T, etc.), gives a different force to ἐν χειρὶ . . . ᔁχοντα,—not merely ‘engaged with’ but ‘having in his power.’

καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες] ‘And the trial is never for an indifferent stake, but always immediately concerns the speaker.’ αὐτοῦ is surely masculine not neuter (as Stallb. and Wohlrb.).

6. περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος] Il. 22. 161 (of Achilles and Hector): ‘Ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἱερῆσον, οὐδὲ
βοέην ἀρνύσθην, ἀ τε ποσσὸν δέθλια
γίγνεται ἀνδρῶν’ ἀλλὰ περὶ ψυχῆς
θέον “Εκτορος ἴπποδάμοιο. In Herodotus, 7. 57: Περὶ ἑαυτοῦ
τρέχων (said of Xerxes), the metaphor is already softened down. Cp. Aristoph. Vesp. 375:
Ποιήσω δακεῖν | τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὸν
περὶ ψυχῆς δρόμον | δραμεῖν. The expression τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ is suggested by τὴν ἄλλως.

p. 173. των τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι καὶ ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὄρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἡ ἐκ νέων δουλείᾳ ἀφήρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους 5 κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται, ὥσθ' ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς το ἄνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὡς

Whose
mind be-
comes in-
evitably
dwarfed
and crook-
ed and
servile.
}

1. [ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς] ‘Keen and shrewd.’ As H. Schmidt observes, the former epithet points to concentration of will, the latter to mental penetration.

3. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην . . . ἐλεύθερον] ‘Of all mental growth, and all honest and liberal culture;’ ‘of self-respect and the spirit of upright independence.’ Both meanings are expressed in the Greek.

7. οὖς οὐ δυνάμενοι] ‘So that, not being able to undergo these consistently with righteousness and truth, they betake themselves forthwith to falsehood, and to avenging themselves on one another by wrong, and so are repeatedly bent and stunted; whence they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness in their mind, but supposing themselves to have become capable and accomplished men.’ Cp. Rep. 7. 519 A: *Η οὕπω ἐννεύρηκας τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μὲν σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμὺ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διορᾶ ταῦτα ἐφ’ ἄ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην

ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακίᾳ δ’ ἡναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν’ ὥστε ὅσῳ ἀν ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσούτῳ πλείω κακὰ ἔργαζομενον. . . Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως, εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη τοὺς τῆς γενέσεως συγγενεῖς ὕσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἱ δὴ ἐδωδαῖς τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονᾶς τε καὶ λιχνείας προσφυές γιγνόμεναι, περὶ τὰ κάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν, κ.τ.λ.

9. πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται] ‘Are continually thwarted and cramped in their growth.’ Rep. 6. 495 D: Ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ βαναυσιῶν ὕσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἔνγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν. 10. 611 C: Τεθεάμεθα μέντοι διακειμένον αὐτό, ὕσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαυκὸν δρῶντες οὐκ ἀν ἔτι ῥαδίως αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν τὴν ἀρχαῖαν φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τά τε παλαιὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συντετρίφθαι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυρμάτων. Gorg. 525 C-E

Θεόδωρε· τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει p. 173.
διελθόντες ἡ ἔασαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώ-
μεθα, ἵνα μὴ καί, ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ τῇ
ἔλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα;

Turn we
now from
them; and
let us still
use our
liberty to
describe
the leaders
of our own
band.

5 ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.
πάνυ γὰρ εὖ τοῦτο εἴρηκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ σ
τοιῷδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται, ἀλλ’ οἱ λόγοι
τοιούτοις ἡμέτεροι ὥσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἔκαστος αὐτῶν περι-
μένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ· οὕτε γὰρ δικα-
ιοστῆς οὕτε θεατῆς, ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ
ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ’ ἡμῖν.

1. τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ]
Phædr. 247 A : Φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω
θείου χοροῦ ἴσταται. Polit. 291
B : Ἡμφεγυόησα κατιδῶν τὸν περὶ
τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράγματα χορόν.
The metaphor is continued in
the words οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύ-
οντες, . . οὕτε θεατῆς ὥσπερ ποιη-
ταῖς . . περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων . . .

2. διελθόντες] The expression
is a little confused: for the
words πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώ-
μεθα, as understood with διελ-
θόντες, are unemphatic, while in
the second part of the clause
they are emphatic. Probably
but for the attraction of the
other participle, διελθόντες would
have been διελθωμεν. (Coisl.
τραπώμεθα.)

ἔασαντες] Since here, as in
the 'Sophist' (253 D), we have
stumbled prematurely on the
philosophic life.

3. ὁ νῦν δὴ . . . μεταλήψει]
'Our freedom, which consists,
as we have said, in the power
of ranging from one topic to
another.' The words ὁ νῦν δὴ
ἐλέγομεν belong to ἔλευθερίᾳ καὶ
μεταλήψει and not to λίαν πολὺ¹
καταχρώμεθα. But in deleting

the comma H. Schmidt is again
led by too strict a requirement
of minute logical coherence.
Cp. Tim. 26 E: Καὶ τίν’ ἄν,
ὦ Κριτία, μᾶλλον ἀντὶ τούτου με-
ταλάβοιμεν; Polit. 257 C: Διανα-
παύσωμεν αὐτὸν μεταλαβόντες αὐ-
τοῦ τὸν συγγυμναστὴν τόνδε Σώ-
κράτη; . . Καθάπερ εἶπες, μετα-
λάμβανε.

8. τοιούτοις] The article
is rather doubtful. If genuine,
it still belongs to the predicate,
—'our servants,' i. e. those
which, as philosophers, we have.

περιμένει] 'Waits our plea-
sure for its completion.'

9. The word δικαστής re-
calls the previous description.
With οὕτε θεατῆς ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς
a new illustration is brought
in. Cp. supr. 147 B. The
θεατῆς is the same δεσπότης (viz.
Δῆμος) in another aspect. The
image of dramatic poetry was
suggested by Socrates using the
expression τοὺς τοῦ ἡμετέρου
χοροῦ.

10. ἐπιτιμήσων . . . ἐπιστατεῖ]
'Stands over us to criticise and
to compel.'

p. 173. ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δή, ώς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ σοί γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἄν τις τούς γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; Οὗτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἵσασι τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον· νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὄρθωσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι. σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὅναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἡ κακῶς τι γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τῷ πόλεμῳ

1. ὡς ἔοικεν] The sentence continues as if λέγωμεν had been λεκτέον.

2. τοὺς φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι] ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ is emphatic, i. e. ‘who are frivolous in such a pursuit.’ For an account of these gentry see Rep. 6. 489 D-496, where they are called *παμπόνηροι* . . . ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν είργμῶν εἰς τὰ ιερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, κ.τ.λ.

3. Οὗτοι δέ που] Compare the less ironical description in the Republic, 6. 488 A: Νόησον γὰρ τοιούτον γενόμενον, κ.τ.λ. The contradiction between philosophy and common life is here stated in its most paradoxical aspect. No existing commonwealth is great enough to interest the philosophic mind. Cp. Rep. 6. 496 B: Ἡ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν μεγάλῃ ψυχῇ φυῆ καὶ ἀτιμάσσα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ.

7. σπουδαὶ δέ, κ.τ.λ.] ‘But the ambitious striving of political clubs for power, and public meetings and banquets and revellings with minstrelsy, are actions which do not occur to them even in dreams.’ For προσίσταται cp. Hyperides (?) Pro Euxenippo sub init.: *Ei μὴ*

προσίσταται ὑμῖν αἱ τοιαῦται εἰσαγγελίαι, κ.τ.λ.

For a similar ‘nominativus pendens’ cp. Rep. 7. 532 B: ‘Ἡ δέ γε λύσις . . . ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν . . . ταῦτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν. The irregularity is softened in the present instance by the fact that the earlier part of the sentence forms a sort of collective nominative to προσίσταται. With this list of ‘worldly goods’ compare Rep. 6. 491 C: Πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἴσχὺς σώματος καὶ ἔντελος ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεῖα.

8. ἑταιρειῶν] ‘Clubs’ or ‘leagues.’ See Rep. 2. 365 D: Ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν ἔννωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρείας συνάξομεν . . . Thueyd. 8. 54: Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πεισανδρός τὰς τε ἔννωμοσίας, αἴπερ ἐπύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαιος καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἀπάσας ἐπελθών, κ.τ.λ.

10. τι γέγονεν] So the Bodleian and several other MSS., including the first hand of T. But Clement in quoting the passage reads *tis* with the majority of manuscripts. This, however, may easily have arisen out of what follows. Stallbaum

They know nothing of politics or of public life, still less of revels and intrigues for power.

The philosopher's ignorance of these things and of his neighbour's pedigree, is not ironical but real. His body is at home in the city, but his mind is

κακόν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ p. 173.
γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης
λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ' οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, ε
οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὑδοκιμεῦν χάριν,
5 ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐ-
τοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησα-
μένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ φέρεται
κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τά τε γὰς ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα

says, ‘Si quis alias, certe philosophus scit, quid recte, quid secus in republica fiat.’ But if he is ignorant of what is passing, how can he judge of it? See above, *nόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα*, κ.τ.λ., and infr. 174 C : Οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι. And cp. Rep. 6. 496. This reading is consistent with the spirit of paradox which is unmistakably present throughout. No part of the description except the absence of rhetoric would apply to the real Socrates. Even in this dialogue we have seen that he knows some of the antecedents of Theætetus and is interested in knowing more.

2. οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες] Aristid. Or. 3. T. I. p. 30. ed. Dind.: Τὸ λέγειν περὶ τούτων καὶ ἔγχειριν ὥσπερ ἀν εἴ τις ἔξαρθμεῖσθαι βούλοιτο τὸν χόας τῆς θαλάττης. (Stallb.)

4. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὑδοκιμεῦν χάριν] Cp. Ar. Eth. N. 4. 3. §§ 27, 28 (of the high-minded man)—πρὸς τὰ ἔντυμα μὴ λέναι . . εἴρωνα πρὸς τὸν πολλούς.

7. ἀτιμάσασα] Cp. Rep. 6. 496 B, quoted above.

8. κατὰ Πίνδαρον] The fragment is thus quoted by Clem. Alex. Str. 20. 707: Πέταται κατὰ

Πίνδαρον τὰς τε γὰς ὑπένερθεν οὐ-
ρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομῶν, καὶ πᾶ-
σαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνάμενος (v. l. ἐρευνώμενος). He seems to have had the poet's words, as well as this passage, in his mind. Plato therefore seems to have changed πέταται into the more prosaic φέρεται (πέτεται occurs as a marginal reading), and to have introduced the words καὶ τὰ ἐπί-
πεδα γεωμετροῦσα (perhaps also ἀστρονομοῦσα), in compliment to Theodorus, adding τῶν ὄντων ἐκά-
στου, κ.τ.λ. Plato almost always thus inweaves quotation with his own language, and accommodates the poet's measures to the rhythm of prose; e. g. Rep. 2. 365 B : Πότερον δίκα τεῖχος ὕψιν
ἢ σκολίαις ἀπάταις ἀναβὰς καὶ ἐμαν-
τὸν οὐτα περιφράξας διαβιώ ; Ib.
364 D : Τῆς δ ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν καὶ τινα δόδυν μακράν τε καὶ ἀνάτη. Protag. 340 D : Ὅταν δέ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἀκρὸν ἵκηται, ρήδίην δ ἥπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπήν περ ἐοῦσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.

τά τε γὰς] Bodl. τὰτε (but with an erasure over ἄ). Is it possible that Plato wrote τὰς τε, as in the quotation of Clement? This seems probable, when it is considered that τὰ ἐπίπεδα, κ.τ.λ. is an afterthought, to which the transition as the words stand in the text is

p. 173. γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπέρ ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ
 p. 174. πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου
 ὅλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθεῖσα.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὡς Θεό-
 δωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θρᾷττά
 τις ἐμμελής καὶ χαρίσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέ-
 γεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῦτο εἰδέναι, τὰ
 δ' ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν.
 ταῦτὸν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅστις ἐν φιλο- 10

somewhat abrupt; and also that the term *γεωμετροῦσα* is more naturally applicable to the surface than to the lower parts of the Earth.

2. τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὅλου]
 'Ο γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, δὲ μή, οὕ. (Rep. 7. 537 C.) See the humorous illustration of this in the Republic, 5. 474 C: "Οτι δν ἀν φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεῖ φαῆναι αὐτόν, ἐὰν ὁρθῶς λεγῆται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέργοντα, κ.τ.λ. And ib. 6. 486 A: Ἐναντιώτατον σμικρολογίᾳ ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς δεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου. . . ἢ οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἵον τε οἵει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον; Ibid. 500 B.

3. ὅλου] 'In its universal aspect.'

εἰς τῶν ἐγγύς] 'Not lowering herself to contemplate any of the things surrounding her.'

4. Theodorus does not at once understand the contrast between 'things universal and things near.'

6. Θρᾷττα τις] 'Θρᾷτταν a patria ancillam hanc dicit. ἐμμελής

autem h. l. ad leporem et venustatem in jocando trahendam docuit Ruhnken. ad Longin. p. 261. Fabellam hinc forte duxit Laërt. I. 34.' Heind.

Does not ἐμμελής rather refer to the slave's neatness in her own department? Cp. τορῶς καὶ δέξεως 175 E. 'A trim and dainty Thracian handmaid.' The opposite is implied in ἀσχημοσύνῃ .. ἀβελτερίας, infr. C. The same jest occurs in Chaucer, The Miller's Tale, 3458–60: 'He walked in the feldes for to prie Upon the starres, what ther should befallie, Til he was in a marlepit yfalle.'

10. ταῦτὸν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα]
 'The same piece of raillery does not fail to apply,'—'will serve.' For the metaphorical use of ἀρκεῖν ἐπὶ cp. Soph. Ant. 611: Τό τ' ἐπειτα καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ πρὸν ἐπαρκέσει νόμος ὅδε.

For the application of the σκῶμμα in the mouth of an enemy see the speech of Cælicles in the Gorgias, 484 sqq., which presents many points of similarity to the present passage.

traversing the earth and heaven, compassing the whole of everything. He is laughed at by ordinary people, as Thales was by the Thracian maid-servant. For knowing nothing of

his neighbour, while he searches into the nature of man, he appears helpless in public and private life, having no topics for scandal, and despising the common subjects of praise and boasting : thinking of a king merely as the shepherd of a troublesome flock, who for want of leisure must be a clown : looking upon broad acres as a narrow strip of earth : and on high pedigree as but a single reach in the descent of an endless river.

σοφίᾳ διάγουσι. τῷ γὰρ ὅντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν p. 174.
 πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὁ τι πράττει,^B
 ἀλλ’ ὀλίγους καὶ εἰ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἡ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα·
 τί δέ ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπός καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει
 προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἡ πάσχειν,
 ἥπτει τε καὶ πράγματ’ ἔχει διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις
 γάρ που, ὡς Θεόδωρε. ἡ οὖ;

ΘΕΟ. "Εγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις·

ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὡς φίλε, ίδιᾳ τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ
 τοιοῦτος ἑκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον, c
 ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἡ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῆ περὶ
 τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὄφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι,
 γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θράτταις ἄλλὰ καὶ τῷ
 ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατα τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπί-
 πτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινή, δόξαν
 ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη. ἐν τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίαις
 ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοιδορεῖν, ἀτ’ οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν
 οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι. ἀπορῶν οὖν
 γελοῖος φαίνεται. ἐν τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν D
 ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις, οὐ προσποιήτως, ἄλλὰ τῷ ὅντι
 γελῶν ἔνδηλος γιγνόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύ-
 ραννόν τε γὰρ ἡ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἔνα τῶν

4. τῇ τοιαύτῃ] Sc. ἀνθρωπίνῃ.

10. ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον]

These words refer only to δημοσίᾳ, and recall 172 C.

14. εἰς φρέατα] 'Into pitfalls and all manner of perplexity.' Cp. supr. 165 B: Τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος. But the words immediately refer to supr. A: Πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ.

15. ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη] 'And the awkwardness of the position is terrible, making him seem no better than a fool.'

17. ἴδιον] I. e. he cannot use

personality in invective.

20. οὐ προσποιήτως, ἄλλὰ τῷ
 ὅντι] Cp. 173 E: Οὐ γὰρ αὐ-
 τῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν,
 κ.τ.λ.

21. τύραννον.. ἐγκωμιαζόμενον] Governed (1) by ἀκούων, im-
 plied in ἀκούειν below : or (2)
 more truly, an accusativus pendens. τε is answered by δέ in
 γῆς δέ, κ.τ.λ. infr.

22. ἔνα τῶν νομέων] Comp.
 the Politicus, 266 D, where
 this is regarded as the most
 universal conception of the

τρ. 174. νομέων, οῖον συβώτην, ἡ ποιμένα, ἡ τινα βουκόλον ἥγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα· δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἔκείνων ζῷον καὶ ἐπιβούλότερον ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς· ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἥττον τῶν 5 εὐνομέων τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν ὅρῃ τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία πλέθρα ἡ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὡς τις ἄρα κεκτημένος θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς ἄπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη 10 ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναιός τις ἐπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους

kingly office; contemplating νομευτική as a whole, the philosopher thinks of βασιλική only as a part of it: "Οτι τῇ τοιᾶδε μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὔτε σεμνοτέρου μᾶλλον ἐμέλησεν ἡ μῆ, τόν τε σμικρότερον οὐδὲν ἥτιμακε πρὸ τοῦ μείζονος, ἀλλ' δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν περάνει τάληθέστατον. Soph. 227 A : Τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἡ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἥττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον, εἴ το μὲν σμικρὰ τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς καθαῖρον. τοῦ γὰρ κτήσασθαι ἔνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ἔνγγενες καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔνγγενες κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμᾶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἐπέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἥγεῖται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δέ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἡ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον.— The latter passage has also a slight tinge of the irony of the text. The figure may have originated in some saying of Socrates. Compare Xen. Mem. I. 2. § 32 : "Οτι θαυμαστὸν οἱ δοκοί εἶναι, εἴ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεὺς καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν μὴ δύμολο-

γοίη κακὸς βουκόλος εἶναι. Ib. § 37 : 'Ο δὲ Κριτίας· Ἀλλὰ τῶνδε τοῖς σε ἀπέχεσθαι δεήσει, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων... Ναὶ μὰ Δλ', ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς, καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε· εἰ δὲ μῆ, φυλάττου, δπως μὴ καὶ σὺ ἐλάττους τὰς βοῦς ποιήσῃς.

2. πολὺ βδάλλοντα] 'As being rich in milk,' i.e. 'squeezing out much wealth.' Compare the speeches of Thrasymachus in Rep. I.

3. ἔκείνων] Masculine.

4. ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν] 'Only he thinks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze their wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature.' There is here an anticipation of the bitter satire or actual human nature which appears in the Politicus.

ἄγροικον δέ..ἀσχολίας] 'Rough and uncivilized from stress of work.'

6. σηκὸν ἐν ὅρῃ, κ.τ.λ.] And so cut off from the great world, over which the philosopher freely ranges, supr. 173 E.

10. γένη ύμνούντων ..] 'And when they cant of pedigree . .'

ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν p. 174
όρώντων ἥγεῖται τὸν ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ p. 175
δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι
ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἕκαστῳ γεγό-
5 νασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ
βασιλεῖς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἑλληνες πολ-
λάκις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν ὅτῳοῦν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ
εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφε-
ρόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ

1. παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ.. ὁρών-
των] ‘Betraying a dull and con-
tracted vision.’ In what fol-
lows, the apodosis ἥγεῖται is twice
resumed (καταφαίνεται, γελᾶ) with

‘Απολεῖ με τὸ γένος· μὴ λέγ’, εἰ φιλεῖς ἐμέ,
Μῆτερ, ἐφ’ ἕκαστῳ τὸ γένος· οἵς ἂν τῇ φύσει
’Αγαθὸν ὑπάρχῃ μηθὲν οἰκείον προσόν,
’Εκεῖσε καταφεύγουσιν εἰς τὰ μνήματα,
Καὶ τὸ γένος, ἀριθμοῦσίν τε τοὺς πάππους ὅσοι.
Οὐδὲ ἔνα δ’ ἔχοις ἰδεῖν ἀν, οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν, ὅτῳ
Οὐκ εἰσὶ πάπποι· πῶς γὰρ ἐγένοντ’ ἀν ποτε; κ. τ. λ.

μυριάδες .. ἀναρίθμητοι] This expression recurs frequently in later Greek authors.

6. βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἑλληνες] These words belong to all the preceding nouns.

7. ἐπὶ πέντε .. προγόνων] The order is ἐπὶ καταλόγῳ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι προγόνων.

8. ἀναφερόντων] Sc. τὸ γένος, or τὴν εὐγένειαν. The genitives depend upon σμικρολογίας, or rather, more vaguely, upon the sense of the words ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, as δυναμένων upon γελᾶ below, κατα- in καταφαίνεται being perhaps used in its condemnatory sense, as in καταγιγνώσκειν.

9. ἄτοπα.. τῆς σμικρολογίας] The genitive is not quite analogous to ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας, Apol. 41 C, which is rather quantitative:

variations of the protasis.

4. ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων] Compare the comic fragment ascribed to Menander: Men. Fragm. Inc. 4 (Meineke):—

nor is it exactly equivalent to ἄτοπος ἡ σμικρολογία (like ἀσημα .. βοῆς, .. φώτων ἀθλίων ἱκτήρια, in Sophocles), though, as in these last cases, the adjective is isolated for the sake of emphasis; but the genitive has the additional meaning, ‘in respect of,’ as after interjections and epithets. Cf. Protagoras 317 B: Πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος. Rep. 1.328 E: Χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου (for its way of life?) 7. 531 D: Πάμπολυ ἔργον λέγεις. τοῦ προοιμίου, ἦν δὲ γάρ; Phaed. 99 B: Πολλὴ ἀν καὶ μακρὰ ράθυμία ἀν εἴη τοῦ λόγου.

The whole sense lies somewhere between σεμνυνόμενοι καὶ ἀναφέροντες .. ἄτοποι φαίνονται τῆς σμικρολογίας and σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων .. ἄτοπος φαίνεται ἡ σμικρολογία.

p. 175. καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἀπ' Ἀμφι-
βρύωνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαιεικοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἦν, οἵα
συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ,
γελᾶς οὐδὲν δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χαυνότητα
ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἅπασι δὴ τούτοις ὁ 5
τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾶται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερ-
ηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τε καὶ
ἐν ἔκαστοις ἀπορῶν.

ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέγεις, ὥς Σώ-
κρατεῖς.

But when
he takes
the other
up into his
own region,
from ques-
tions of pri-
vate wrong,
to inquire

ΣΩ. "Οταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὥς φίλε, ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω,
εὶς καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ Τί ἐγὼ σὲ
ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ
ἀδικίας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτοῦν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ
ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον; ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων 15

2. οἴα συνέβαινεν] The Bodl. reads οἴα συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχη. Perhaps rightly. The meaning in both cases is the same. 'He was,—what Fortune made him.'

3. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ] Se. (1) τοῦ πεν-
τεκαιεικοστοῦ: or (2) τοῦ Ἀμφι-
βρύωνος. But the latter (2) has less point.

11. "Οταν δέ γε, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Rep. 7. 515 E, 516: Εἰ δ', ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἐντεύθεν ἔλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους, καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρὸν ἐξελκύσεις πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἀρά οὐχὶ δύνασθαι τε ἄν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἔλκομενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἄν ἔχοντα τὰ ὅμματα μεστὰ δράν οὐδὲ ἄν ἐν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν.

τινα . . τις] The indefinites are used with an indirect reference to τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικαιοκύν below (D).

12. καὶ . . αὐτῷ] 'And he finds

some one willing.' Supr. 154 E, Rep. 1. 343 A, etc.

15. Εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων] See the passage of the Gorgias (471), in which Polus contends that Archelaus is happy. (Diog. L. mentions a diatribe of Antisthenes, called Ἀρχέλαος, ἢ περὶ βασιλείας, in which Gorgias was assailed.)

Buttmann thus defends *εἰ*, which a few MSS. omit: 'Quamvis certum exploratumque haberent vulgares illi oratores, regem propter divitias suas unice beatum putandum esse, tamen rem ita in eneomiis tractabant, ut, quasi dubia ea videri posset, multis eam exemplis argumentisque probarent. Quidni igitur v. c. encomii alieujus in Crœsum argumentum his verbis indicari potuerit; εἰ Κροῖσος εὐδαίμων;' If *εἰ* is retained, a certain point may be given to *αὐ* (with Cou-

what justice is, from diatribes on the theme 'Is a king happy?' to contemplate the idea of the royal office and of humanness, Then that dwarfed shrewd legal mind is

κεκτημένος τ' αὐτὸν χρυσίον, βασιλείας πέρι καὶ p. 175. ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποίῳ τέ τινες ἔστον καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν,—περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ὅταν αὐτὸν δέη λόγον διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικαιιόν, πάλιν αὐτὸν τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν. Ἰλιγγιῶν τε ἀπὸ ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας, ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν

sin, Wagner, H. Schmidt) by supposing βασιλεύς and κεκτημένος to be distinct subjects: 'Is a king, or, again, one possessed of much gold, to be accounted happy?' It may be questioned, however, whether ἡ βασιλεύς might not give a better meaning.

In any way of taking the words as they stand, τε seems to impede the sense, and αὐτὸν is superfluous. If Plato is really quoting from a rhetorician, this is possibly not a fatal objection, though the conjectures πάννυ πολύν, πάμπολυν, (Heusd. Hirschig. Badh.) would seem probable. (Schanz reads from Madvig's conj. βασιλεὺς εὐδαιμῶν κεκτημένος ταῦ χρυσίον.) Possibly, however, the words βασιλεὺς . . . χρυσίον are adapted from some poet. (Cp. Theogn. : Εὐδαιμῶν εἶην, καὶ θεοῖς φίλος ἀθανάτουσι, Κύρν, ἀρετῆς δὲ ἀλλησούδεμιᾶς ἔραμι.) In which case γάν πολύχρυσον is perhaps the true reading. For κεκτημένος in such an adaptation, cp. (besides Protag. 340 D quoted above), the quotation of Tyrtæus in the Laws, 629 A: Οὗτος ἀν μηδαίμην οὕτος ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην, οὕτος εἰ πλουσιώτατος ἀνθρώπων εἴη, φησίν, οὗτος εἰ πολλὰ

ἀγαθὰ κεκτημένος, εἰπὼν σχεδὸν ἄπαντα, κ.τ.λ. (E.g. the lines might run Εἰ βασιλεὺς εἴην, ἵσχοιμ δὲ γάν πολύχρυσον.)

There is a close parallel between the present passage and 174 B: Τοιγάρτοι, κ.τ.λ. Cp. τί ἐγώ σὲ ἀδικῶ with ἐν δικαιστηρίῳ . . . ἀναγκασθῇ λέγεων: η σὺ ἔμε with ἐν ταῖς λοιδορίαις: εἰ (or η) βασιλεύς . . . with τύραννον τε γάρ . . .

2. ἐπὶ σκέψιν] MSS. ἐπίσκεψιν. Bekker corr.

3. ἀνθρώπου φύσει] Cp. supr. 174 B: Τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει.

8. Ἰλιγγιῶν τε] 'He gives the philosopher his revenge; (for) dizzied by the strange experience of hanging at such a height and looking downwards from mid-air, and being dismayed and lost, and broken in his utterance, he is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaids, nor by any other of the uneducated, for they do not perceive his plight; but by all whose nurture has been the reverse of servile.'

The sentence probably divides after ἀηθείας, and ἀδημονῶν τε . . . answers to Ἰλιγγιῶν τε. γάρ addl. Ven. Σ. This is quite unnecessary.)

p. 175. καὶ βαρβαρίζων, γέλωτα Θράτταις μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδ' ἄλλῳ ἀπαιδεύτῳ οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίως ἡ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖσιν ἅπασιν. Οὗτος δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὃν δὴ φιλόσο- 5 φου καλεῖς, ὃ ἀνεμέσητον εὑρίθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκενάσασθαι μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδῦναι ἡ θῶπας λόγους· ὁ δ' αὖ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τορῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως δια- 10 κονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια

1. *βαρβαρίζων*] Lit. ‘Speaking a strange dialect:’—strange i. e. to the inhabitants of the higher region. Schanz admits into the text Pierson’s conjecture *βατταρίζων* (‘stammering’), founded on a passage in Themistius which seems an echo of this; Themist. 22. 278 b: “Οψει γὰρ ἵλιγγιώσαν εὐθέως καὶ λογιζομένην καὶ βατταρίζουσαν. But there is no sufficient reason for rejecting *βαρβαρίζων*.

6. *ὃ ἀνεμέσητον*] ‘Who may, without our surprise or censure, appear simple and a mere cipher, when some menial service is required of him, if he has no skill, for instance, in tying up bedclothes with the proper knot, nor in flavouring a sauce, or a fawning speech:—the other character is that of the man who is able to do all such service with smartness and despatch, but has not the skill to throw his cloak over his right shoulder with a gentlemanly grace; no, nor to celebrate aright with the music of discourse, in his turn, that life which is lived in truth by the

immortals and by heaven-favoured men.’

Cobet requires οὐδέν for οὐδενί. But the dative, whether masculine or neuter, is analogous to Soph. ΟΕδ. Tyr. 1019: Ἐξ ἵσου τῷ μηδενὶ, and agrees better with εὑρίθει.

8. *ἐπισταμένου*] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. *ἐπιστάμενος* cett.

10. *τορῶς*] ‘Smartly.’ ἀτε δὴ δριμὺς ὥν.

11. *ἀναβάλλεσθαι . . . ἐπιδέξια*] Probably, (1) ‘to wear his garment over his right shoulder in a gentlemanly fashion.’ Aristoph. Αν. 1567: Οὗτος, τί δρᾶς; ἐπ’ ἀριστέρ’ οὐτως ἀμπέχει; | οὐ μεταβαλεῖς θοιμάτιον ὥδ’ ἐπὶ δεξιά; Or, possibly, *ἐπιδέξια* may mean ‘cleverly,’ ‘deftly.’ Cp. Hor. Ep. 1.1.96: ‘Si togad dissidet impar, Rids. Quid, mea cum pugnat sententia secum?’ (2) A possible rendering at first sight is, ‘to strike up the song in his turn.’ Cp. οὐδέ γ’ ἀρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντα, and cp. Rep. 4. 420 Ε: Κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντας. Symp. 177 D: Εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἔρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιά. But one person could hardly be

puzzled in its turn, and becomes a laughing-stock not to the uneducated, but to the wise and free. The philosopher may be well content to seem unskilled in servile arts, in comparison with those who are dumb in the highest music of the soul.

ἐλευθέρως οὐδέ γ' ἀρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὄρθως p. 176.
ἥμησαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ.

ΘΕΟ. Εἰ πάντας, ὡς Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἢ λέγεις
ῶσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἀν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ'
5 ἀνθρώπους εἴη.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὡς
Θεόδωρε· ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι
ἀνάγκη· οὔτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ iδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν
φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

said to sing ἐπὶ δεξιά, and the antithesis requires the other rendering. The slave can tuck in and pack up bedclothes, the freeman wear his garment with a grace. The slaves' contribution to the banquet is literally ὅψον ἥδυναι, figuratively θῶπας λόγους ἥδυναι. Supr. 173 A. (Cp. Gorg.

465 D : Τὴν ρήτορικὴν .. ἀντίστροφον ὁ φωτοπούλας ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἐκείνῳ ἐν σώματι.) The 'freeman's' part is literally the lyre and song; in a higher sense, discourse of philosophy and virtue. This is his proper ἔρανος. Cp. Symp. 177 D, where the minstrel is dismissed, and Eryximachus proposes that they should discourse of the praises of love: Δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι ἔκαστον ἡμῶν λόγουν εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἐρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ὡς ἀν δύνηται καλλιστον, Prot. 347 E. There is a further 'harmony' between the discourse and life of the philosopher; Lach. 188 D : Καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς δ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἀρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμοσμένος οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὅργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅντι ζῆν ἡρμοσμένος αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον ἔνυμφων τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἴαστι, οὕτωμα δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγιοτὶ οὐδὲ λυδιστί, ἀλλ' ἥπερ

μόνη Ἑλληνική ἐστιν ἀρμονία.

There is an allusion to the well-known custom of taking the lyre in turn. θῶπας λόγοις is perhaps rightly supposed by Ruhnk. ad Tim. p. 146 to be a poetical expression, quoted perhaps from Euripides or Epicharmus.

2. θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ] There is a rhythmical cadence in the words, cp. Phædr. 261 A : Πάριτε δῆ, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλίπαια τε Φαῖδρον πείθετε. Rep. 617 D : Ἀνάγκης θυγατρὸς κάρης Δαχέσεως λόγος, κ. τ. λ. Symp. 197 E, the end of Agathon's speech. This is not improved by deleting ἀληθῆ with Cobet, and so leaving an iambic ending ---○---.

7. ὑπεναντίον γάρ] Compare the saying of Heraclitus, Fr. 56: Παλίντονος ἀρμονίκοσμον ὅκωσπερ λύρας καὶ τόξου. The preposition conveys the idea of 'bearing up against.'

9. τόνδε τὸν τόπον] Viz. τὸν σωματοειδῆ τε καὶ ὄρατὸν τόπον, Rep. 7. 532 D. The imagery of place in which Plato's philosophy is enfolded appears most prominently in the Phædo, the Phædrus, and Rep. 6 and 7.

The notion that evil must

Γ. 176. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὃ τι
τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.
ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιου καὶ ὅσιου μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέ-

Men will
not hear

exist in everything but the Divine Nature reappears in a curious mythical form in the Politicus, 270 ; and is implied Tim. 48 A: Ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως. 86 B : Τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν (sc. νοσήματα) διὰ σώματος ἔξιν, κ.τ.λ. Ib. 69 D : Ξυγκερασάμενοί τ' αὐτὰ ἀναγκαῖος τὸ θητὸν γένος ξυνέθεσαν. In the Phædo evil is almost identified with the bodily principle. Our ignorance on the subject is, however, confessed in the Lysis, 220 E, 221 : Πότερον, ήν δ' ἐγώ, ἐὰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόληται, οὐδὲ πεινῆν ἔτι ἔσται οὐδὲ διψῆν οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων ; . . ή γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα, δ' τί ποτ' ἔσται τότε ή μὴ ἔσται ; τίς γάρ οἶδεν ;

2. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ]
Phædr. 252 E, 253 : Ἰχνεύοντες
δὲ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκειν τὴν τοῦ
σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν, εὐποροῦσι
διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἡμαγκάσθαι πρὸς
τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι
αὐτοῦ τῇ μημη, ἐνθουσιῶντες, ἐξ
ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ
ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν
θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν.

Rep. 10. 613 A : Οὐ γὸρ δὴ
ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, ὃς ἂν
προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνε-
σθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς
ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι
θεῷ. Ib. 6. 500 B : Οὐδὲ γάρ
πον, ὃ 'Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε
ώς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν
διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέπειν εἰς
ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας καὶ μαχό-
μενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσ-
μενείας ἐμπίπλασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς
τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα
ἀεὶ ἔχοντα δρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους

οὔτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὔτ' ἀδικούμενα
ἢ π' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ
κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μημεῖ-
σθαι τε καὶ δὲ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοι-
οῦσθαι. Phæd. 107 C : Νῦν δὲ
ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα,
οὐδεμίᾳ ἀν εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγῆ
κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς
βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονμωτάτην
γενέσθαι. Tim. 90 B : Τῷ δὲ περὶ¹
φιλομάθειαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς
φρονήσεις ἐσπονδακότι καὶ ταῦτα
μάλιστα τῶν αὐτοῦ γεγυμνασμένῳ
φρονεῖν μὲν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα,
ἄνπερ ἀληθείας ἐφάπτηται, πάσα
ἀνάγκη που, καθ' ὅσον δ' αὐτὸν με-
τασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀθανα-
σίας ἐνδέχεται, τούτον μηδὲν μέρος
ἀπολείπειν.. διὰ τὸ καταμανθάνειν
τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἀρμονίας τε καὶ
περιφοράς, τῷ κατανοούμενῷ τὸ
κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιώσαι κατὰ τὴν
ἀρχαίαν φύσιν.

3. ὁμοίωσις δέ]
'And to be
made like to Him is to be-
come righteous and holy, not
without wisdom.'

μετὰ φρονήσεως]
Is virtue
possible apart from know-
ledge ? This question is dis-
cussed in the Protagoras and
the Meno. The answer given
is, that practically it would
appear so, but that perfect vir-
ture must be inseparable from
knowledge. And in the Meno
the paradox is solved by saying
that practical virtue is a Divine
gift, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ προσγιγνομένη
ἂνεν νοῦ, but that if ever there
should be a virtuous man who
could teach virtue, he would
be like Teiresias amongst the
shades ; ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς
ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν. In

this: for there must be some evil to resist the good, and this cannot dwell in heaven, but must wander about this lower world. Our wisdom therefore is to escape heavenwards, by becoming

σθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον πεῖσαι ώς p. 176.
 ἄρα οὐχ ὅν ἔνεκα οἱ πολλοί φασι δεῦ πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δ' οὐ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῆ εἴναι. ταῦτα γάρ ἔστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ώς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὥδε λέγωμεν. θεὸς οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ώς οἶόν τε δικαιότατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὅμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἀνήμων αὖ γένηται ὃ τι δικαιότατος. περὶ τούτου καὶ ἡ the more dialectical dialogues one side of the contradiction disappears, and it is assumed that philosophy is essential to real virtue. Phæd. 69 A B: ⁷Ω μακάριε Σιμία, μὴ γάρ οὐχ αὗτῇ ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγῆ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι . . . ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, . . . φρόνησις, . . . καὶ ἔνδιλη βδῆν ἀληθῆς ἀρετὴ ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως, . . . χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλατόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ, κ. τ. λ. In the Republic it is again acknowledged that it is possible to partake of virtue without philosophy, but in an imperfect way; e. g. in the case of the soul which laments its choice of another life; 10. 619 C: Εἴναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. And the education of the φίλακες generally (not of the rulers) is independent of reason, though in harmony with it. Rep. 3. 401, 402. (In the Philebus also the perfect life contains the knowledge of practical things. The philosopher must know his way home.) Thus the contradiction felt at first is reconciled by acknowledging the existence of different parts of our nature, which, though connected, and indispensable to each other's perfection, are not identical. There is a slight emphasis on μετὰ φρονήσεως in opposition to what follows.

4. ἵνα . . . δοκῆ εἴναι . . . ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας] The whole of this passage is parallel to the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the second book of the Republic, and the same thought is differently worked out in the Gorgias.

5. ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος] 'This is what men commonly repeat, an old wives' fable, as appears to me.' The meaning of λεγόμενος here (not = 'as the saying is') seems determined by λέγομεν following.

9. περὶ τούτου] 'Moreover a man's real ability, or else his nothingness and want of manhood, is concerned with this.' περὶ τοῦτο is read in the quotations of Iamblichus and Theodore. It is approved by Cobet, and has been adopted by Schanz. The genitive is accounted for by the indeter-

p. 176. ὡς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενίᾳ τε καὶ ἀνα-
δρίᾳ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ
ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής· αἱ
δ' ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφίαι ἐν μὲν
πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις γιγνόμεναι φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ 5
τέχναις βάναυσοι. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέ-
ποντι ἡ πράττοντι μακρῷ ἄριστ' ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχω-
ρεῖν δεινῷ ύπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι. ἀγάλλονται γὰρ
τῷ ὄνείδει, καὶ οἴονται ἀκούειν ὅτι οὐ λῆροί εἰσι, γῆς
ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἄλλ' ἀνδρες οἵους δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς 10
σωθησομένους. λεκτέον οὖν τάληθές, ὅτι τοσούτῳ
μᾶλλον εἰσιν οἵοι οὐκ οἴονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἴονται· ἄγνο-
οῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὁ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἄγνοεῖν. οὐ
γάρ ἔστιν ἦν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὃν
ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἦν ἀδύνατον 15
εἶκφυγεῖν.

minateness of the point in question. ‘On this, one way or other, depends,’ etc. ἀναδρίᾳ is suggested by ἀνδρός.

5. φορτικαὶ . . βάναυσοι] ‘Vulgar’—‘mechanical,’ or ‘mean.’ The contrast here is not between truth and falsehood, but, as in the Politicus, between the actual and the ideal.

6. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι, κ. τ. λ.] This very favourite thought is developed in the Gorgias. See esp. 524-7.

7. τὸ μὴ . . ύπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι] ‘Not to admit that villainy constitutes him a clever man.’

9. οὐ λῆροι] ‘That they are not mere absurdities, cumbering the ground:—‘not solecisms,’ as Carlyle might say.

γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη] ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης (Il. 18. 104, quoted in Apol. 28), Od. 20. 379,

wise and
just and
pure, so
becoming
like to God.

necessarily
τρόποις

This is a
man's true
'cleverness'
and proof
of virtue.
And the
real penalty
of vice is
one which
cannot be
escaped by
clever
shifts. For
to act
wrongly is
to be re-
moved from
the Divine
pattern,
and to be
brought

Aristoph. Nub. 1203: Πρόβατα
ἄλλως. Milton, Areopagitica :
‘Many a man lives a burden
to the Earth; but a good book
is the precious life-blood of a
master spirit.’

λῆροι] Charm. 176 A: ‘Ἐμὲ
μὲν λῆρον ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι καὶ ἀδύ-
νατον λόγῳ ὅτιοῦν ζητεῖν. Phaed.
72 C: Τελευτῶντα πάντα ἀν λῆρον
τὸν Ἐνδυμιλωνα ἀποδείξειε καὶ οὐ-
δαμοῦ ἀν φαίνοιτο.

10. οἵους . . τοὺς σωθησομένους]
‘Such as all must be in the
city who are to live securely
there.’ ‘Such as those must
be in the state whose lives
are not to be forfeit,’ i. e. en-
dangered by every accusation
(Wohlrab). Cp. Soph. Ant.
189: “Ἡδὲ ἔστιν ἡ σώζονσα.

14. ὃν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν
ἀδικοῦντες] ‘Which men often
escape entirely in doing wrong.’
‘ὃν pendet ab οὐδέν.’ Heindorf.

nearer to
the likeness
of the Evil.
The soul
that does so
will not be
received at
death into
the region
pure from
evils.—They
will laugh
at this,
and call us
simplemen.

ΘΕΟ. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις;

p. 176.

ΣΩ. Παραδειγμάτων, ὡς φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὅντι ἑστώτων,
τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιω-
τάτου, οὐχ ὁρῶντες ὅτι οὔτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἡλιθιότητός
5 τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὄμοι-
ούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι. p. 177.
οὖ δὴ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον φόβοι-
οῦνται. εἰὰν δὲ εἴπωμεν ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς
δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ
10 τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν
αὐτοῖς ὄμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἔξουσι, κακοὶ κα-
κοῖς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ
πανούργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται.

2. Παραδειγμάτων] Cp. Rep. 9. 592 B: 'Αλλ', ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἵστως παραδείγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βούλομένῳ δρᾶν καὶ δρῶντι ἕατὸν κατοικίζειν.

3. ἀθέον] 'From which all that is Divine has fled.'

8. τῆς δεινότητος] 'From this cleverness which is their boast.'

10. τῶν κακῶν καθαρός] Viz. πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγορίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, Phæd. 81 A.

καθαρός] Phæd. 83 D: 'Ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ δμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χάιρειν ἀναγκάζεται, οἷμα, δμότροπος καὶ δμότροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε καθαρῶς εἰς' "Ἄιδους ἀφικέσθαι ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἔξειναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν ἐς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνονοσίας.

Ibid. 69 C: Καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, κ. τ. λ. καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἡ. καὶ κυνδυνεύοντι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς . . καταστήσαντες . . πᾶλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι διὰ ἀμύνητος

καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς "Ἄιδους ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετέλεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.

τὴν αὐτοῖς ὄμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς] I. e. (as H. Schmidt remarks) τὴν αὐτοῖς ὄμοίαν διαγωγὴν τοῦ βίου. 'They will always retain their way of life like to themselves—evil as they are, associating with evil things.' Compare the well-known passage of the Phædo, 81 C–82 A: 'Αλλὰ διειλημμένη γε, οἷμα, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς . . κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν δμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης (imitated by Milton, Comus, 467–9):

'The soul grows clotted by contagion,
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till
she quite lose
The divine property of her
first being.)

11. κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες] κακοῖς is probably neuter. See H. Schmidt, Exegetischer Commentar, p. 139.

12. καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοί]

p. 177. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα δή, ὡς Σώκρατες.

Β ΣΩ. Οἶδά τοι, ὡς ἔταιρε. ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν, ὅτι ἀν iδίᾳ λόγον δέη δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φεύγειν, 5 τότε ἀτόπως, ὡς δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ή ρήτορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν.—εἰ δὲ μή, πλείω ἀεὶ 10 επιρρέοντα καταχώσει ήμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον.—ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἴωμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν· ράω γὰρ τηλικῷδε ὅντι ἐπακολουθεῖν· εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν.

15

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθα που ἥμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ὧ

I. e. the feeling of superiority will only be confirmed in them. The force of ὡς extends to ἀνοήτων τινῶν.

2. Οἶδά τοι, ὡς ἔταιρε] ‘I am quite aware of it, my friend!’ I. e. I know the full extent of the ridicule that they will pour on us.’ He refers to the emphatic answer of Theodorus. (This explanation is accepted by H. Schmidt.)

3. *iδίᾳ*] ‘Singly.’ I. e. in conversation with one person, instead of haranguing *εἰς τὸ μέσον*.

5. καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φεύγειν] Cp. Rep. 7. 518 A : Οὐκ ἀν ἀλογίστως γελῶ.

7. ή ρήτορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται] ‘That brilliant rhetoric of theirs fades utterly, leaving them to appear no better than children.’ Mcletus,

in Apol. 24-27, is a case in point. For πως cp. supr. 144 B.

8. παιδῶν μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν] Cp. Crit. 49 A : Ἐλάθομεν ήμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες.

10. πλείω ἀεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ήμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον] ‘They will come in like a flood and bury our main argument.’ The image is that of a torrent covering with its ‘drift’ the works of man. Cp. Crat. 414 C : Τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τεθέντα κατακέχωσται ηδη ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τραγῳδεῖν αὐτά. Polit. 302 C : Τοῦ νῦν ἐπικεχυμένου λόγου κατ’ ἀρχάς. Legg. 7. 793 B. A still more lively image is employed below, 184 A.

13. τὰ τοιαῦτα] ‘Quam spinosiora ista.’ Cic. Tuseul. 1.

But if they would consent to reason with us, they would ere long become confused and silent, and their fluent rhetoric would fade away, leaving each of them as helpless as a child. But we must return, and take up the broken thread of our discussion.

I. γ. Third
criticism of
the doc-
trine,

What ap-
pears to me,
is to me.

We found
that even
those who
make jus-
tice con-
ventional,
hesitate to
apply their

ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ p. 177.
τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ὡς δοκεῖ,
ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔθέλειν διῆσχυρίζεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ
ἡκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀνθῆται
πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θε-
μένῃ, ἔωσπερ ἀν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τάγαθοῦ οὐδένα ἀν-
δρεῖον ἔθ' οὔτως εἶναι, ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι
καὶ ἡ ἀν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖστα πόλις ἑαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ

3. ἐν μὲν . . . περὶ δὲ τάγα-
θοῦ] ‘In other cases they
would insist strongly on the
truth of their principle;—
with respect to justice in par-
ticular they would insist that
the enactments of any state
are just for her, so long as
they remain in force;—but
when *good* is in question—’

4. περὶ τὰ δίκαια . . . περὶ
τάγαθοῦ] ‘In regard to what
is just—concerning what is
good.’

5. τῇ θεμένῃ] So Bodl. with
Vat. Ven. II., τιθεμένῃ T cett.

6. ἔωσπερ ἀν κέηται] Supr.
172 B: “Οσον ἀν δοκῇ χρόνον.

περὶ δὲ τάγαθοῦ] Rep. 6. 505
D: “Ο δὴ διώκει μὲν ἀπαστα ψυχῇ
καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα πάντα πράττει,
ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα
δέ, κ.τ.λ. What is good can-
not be apparent merely. (Com-
pare the saying of Des Cartes
and Spinoza: ‘The idea of God
implies His existence.’) This
was not, however, universally
admitted. Ar. Eth. N. I. 3.
§ 3: Τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει
καὶ τάγαθά, κ. τ. λ.

τάγαθοῦ..ὠφέλιμα] Rep. 5. 457
B, 458 E: Κάλλιστα γὰρ τοῦτο
καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ
μὲν ὠφέλιμον καλὸν, τὸ δὲ βλα-
βεοῦν αἰσχρόν. . . γάμους . . ποι-

ήσομεν ιεροὺς εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μά-
λιστα· εἴεν δ' ἀν ιεροὶ οἱ ὠφελι-
μώτατοι.

We have not yet risen to the conception of the ideal good ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας: good is still a relative term, though knowledge begins to find a resting-place there. In the concrete the good and expedient are identical. See Spinoza, Cog. Met. I. §§ 6, 11: ‘Res sola considerata neque bona diciatur, neque mala, sed tantum respective ad aliam, cui conduceit ad id quod amat acquirendum, vel contra; ideoque unaquaque res diverso respectu eodemque tempore bona et mala potest dici—Deus vero dicitur summe bonus, quia omnibus conducit, nempe unicuiusque esse, quo nihil magis amabile, suo concursu conservando. Malum autem absolutum nullum datur, ut per se est manifestum.

‘Porro uti bonum et malum non dicitur nisi respective, sic etiam perfectio, nisi quando perfectionem sumimus pro ipsa rei essentia, quo sensu antea diximus, Deum infinitam perfectionem habere, hoc est infinitam essentiam, seu infinitum esse.’

p. 177. ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἀν κέρται ὡφέλιμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι· τοῦτο δέ που σκῶμμ' ἀν εἴη πρὸς ὁ λέγομεν. οὐχί;

principle to
what is Be-
neficial and
good.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα 5
ὁ ὄνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται.

ΘΕΟ. Μὴ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὁ ἀν τοῦτο ὄνομάζῃ, τούτου δή που στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οἴεται τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὡφελιμωτάτους ιο
έαυτῇ τίθεται. ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθε-
τεῖται;

A state
makes laws
for the be-
nefit of its
members,
but they
are not al-
ways bene-
ficial.

p. 178. **ΘΕΟ.** Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἀεί, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ δια-
μαρτάνει ἐκάστη;

15

1. πλὴν εἴ τις . . λέγομεν] Rep. 7. 533 D: "Ἐστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται. The scoffer is supposed to say that the legislature may give the name ὡφέλιμον to what it will. Cp. Charm. 163 D.

3. πρὸς ὁ λέγομεν] In respect of that which we mean.

5. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα] 'Let him not intend the name but the thing whieh is contemplated under it.' γάρ refers to Theodorus' πάνυ γε. Badham's conjecture, τὸ πρᾶγμα ὁ ὄνομαζόμενον θεωρείτω, has received a curious apparent confirmation from the variant which appears on the margin of two MSS. (Ven. II and Ces.), ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὄνομαζόμενον θεωρείτω. But it may still be doubted whether this is not a coincidence of conjectures.

For λέγειν in Plato is rather 'to mean' than 'to say.' For the sense ep. Ar. Met. I. 1006: Τὸ δ' ἀπορούμενον οὐ τοῦτο ἔστιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἔναι καὶ μὴ ἔναι ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα.

7. Μὴ γάρ] These words were put into Socrates' mouth in the edd. before Heindorf. Cp. Soph. 255 B: Μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν, κ.τ.λ. Θε, μὴ γάρ.

8. ὁ ἀν τοῦτο ὄνομάζῃ] 'Whatever name the State gives to this' (τὸ πρᾶγμα, supr.).

10. καθ' ὅσον οἴεται τε καὶ δύ-
ναται] 'To the extent of her opinion and her power.' I. e. She prescribes what she thinks beneficial, so far as she is able to enforce it. (She may be blind to her true interests, or a stronger power may prevent her from legislating according to her own views.) Cp. Rep. I. 338 foll.

Or, 'to put it more generally, (for the laws regard the future benefit of the citizens,')

p. 178.

ΘΕΟ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ διαμαρτάνειν.

ΣΩ. "Ετι τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἀν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσει ταῦτα ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἴδους ἐρωτώη, ἐν ὧ καὶ τὸ ὡφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὅν. ἔστι δέ που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετώμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὡφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. τοῦτο δὲ μέλλον ὄρθως ἀν λέγομεν.

ΘΕΟ. Πάννυ γε.

B

The man, you say, is the measure of all things white, heavy, and the like, for he has

10 ΣΩ. "Ιθι δή, οὐτωσὶ ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνῳ τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων, Πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπός ἔστιν, ὡς φατέ, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοιούτων. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα

2. ἐνθένδε] 'From the following point of view.'

4. ἐν ὧ καὶ] For the method cp. Rep. 6. 491 C: Λαβοῦ τοίνυν ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὄρθως . . . πάντος περὶ σπέρματος ἡ φυτοῦ. By analysing the term 'beneficial' into 'future good' Socrates is able to extend his proof to sensible things, and thus directly to refute Protagoras. For not only 'future good,' but 'future hot,' 'sweet,' 'tuneful,' 'persuasive,' is known by the ἐπιστήμων, and by him alone. Plato also brings out the significant principle that 'prediction is the test of science.'

ἔστι δέ] Cp. τὸ ὡφέλιμον. Whatever is expedient is also referrible to future time. As elsewhere, the connotation of the term is limited by the example given, so that τὸ ὡφέλιμον here really = τὸ ἐν νομοθετήσει ὡφέλιμον, 'Expediency as a principle of legislation.'

Cp. infr. 179 A. And, for the use of καὶ, supr. 152 B: Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὖτως ἐκατέρῳ;

7. τοῦτο δέ] Cp. τὸ ἐσόμενον εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.

μέλλον] The MSS. vary between μᾶλλον (Bodl. Vat. Ven. II.), μελλει μᾶλλον (Coisl.), and μέλλον μᾶλλον (T pr. cett.). But μέλλον is given by the corrector of T.

13. λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ] Cp. supr. 171 E: Τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἡ δοκεῖ ταῦτη καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου. And, for the omission of μελάνων, supr. 159 C, καθεύδοντα, and note.

14. τὸ κριτήριον] The word is formed from κριτής, on the analogy of δικαστήριον. Cp. Legg. 6. 767 B: Δύο δὴ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔστω κριτήρια. The present is probably one of the earliest instances of its use.

οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος]

p. 178. πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἴεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὅντα. οὐχ οὔτως;

ΘΕΟ. Οὔτως.

ΣΩ. ³Η καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὡς ⁵ c Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ· καὶ οἵᾳ ἀν οἰηθῆ ἔσεσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι; οἷον θερμά, ἀρ' ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἴδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἔτερος, ἰατρὸς δέ, ἀντοιηθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι; ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφο- ¹⁰ τέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὐ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἔαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα;

ΘΕΟ. Γελοῖον μέν τ' ἀν εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', οἵμαι, περὶ οἴνου γλυκύτητος καὶ αὐ-

Sc. αὐτά. Or rather the accusatives are cognate. Cp. supr. 152 C: Οἴᾳ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται, and note.

2. ὅντα] There is a slight stress on the present tense in opposition to μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι.

4. ³Η καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν] As here knowledge seems to emerge with the mention of future time, so in the Protagoras, 357, virtue is shown to be knowledge, because it implies the power of comparing the future with the present. (Cp. the line of Homer, Il. I. 343: Οὐδέ τι οἰδε νοῆσαι ἄμα πρόσσω καὶ ὅπισσω.)

7. οἷον θερμά] The word is placed absolutely, or in a loose construction with φῶμεν infr. Heindorf comp. Crat. 393 E: Οἷον τὸ βῆτα· δρᾶς ὅτι τοῦ ἥ καὶ τοῦ τὸ καὶ τοῦ ἣ προστεθέντων οὐδὲν ἐλύπησεν, κ.τ.λ.

ἀρα . . κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν]

'Surely we must suppose (must we not?) that the result will be according to the opinion of one of them, or shall we say that it will be in accordance with both?' It is implied in what follows, which opinion is probably right. For the indefinite ποτέρου see above, 145 B, εἰ ποτέρου, and esp. Lach. 181 D.

αὐτόν] The accusative (not αὐτός) is used because the man is supposed to consider his own case objectively.

12. ἔαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα] Viz. καὶ θερμὸς καὶ πυρέττων. The same word is repeated in a different relation. Cp. supr. 147 E, δυνάμενον, and note.

Cp. Aristotle, Met. I. 5. 1010 b: "Ἐτι δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὡσπερ καὶ Πλάτων λέγει, οὐ δήποτι ὁμοίως κυρία ἡ τοῦ ἰατροῦ δόξα καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντος, οἷον περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ὑγιοῦς ἡ μὴ μέλλοντος.

the standard of them in himself. Has he also the standard in himself of Future things? If he thinks he is going to have a fever, and the physician tells him No, which opinion will prove true for him in the sequel?

στηρότητος μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἡ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα, p. 178.
ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ, κυρία.

D

The musician is a better judge of future harmony than the gymnast, as the latter will himself confess when he hears the sounds.

Surely Protagoras himself professed to be a better prophet than those whom he taught, of the probable effect of a rhetorical argument.

ΘΕΟ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ ἀν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστον τε καὶ εὐαρμόστον ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἀν βέλτιον δοξάσειε μουσικοῦ, ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξει εὐάρμοστον εἶναι.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔστιάσεσθαι μὴ 10 μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἡ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἥδη ὄντος ἐκάστῳ ἥδεος ἡ γεγονό- E τος μηδέν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον 15 αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἄριστος κριτής, ἢ σύ, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἀν προδοξάσαις ἡ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν ὄστισοῦν;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα, ὡς Σώκρατες, τοῦτο γε σφόδρα 20 ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός.

ΣΩ. Νὴ Δία, ὡς μέλε· ἡ οὐδείς γ' ἀν αὐτῷ διε-

4. ἀναρμόστον . . ἐσομένου]

The neuter is used without the article here, because the question refers to a particular case.

9. Here, as in the Gorgias, (463, 4) cookery prepares the way for rhetoric. Cp. supr. 175 D. Even ὀψοποική, however, is not an ἀτεχνος τριβή if it can foretell consequences.

13. μηδέν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα] The certainty of present impressions is afterwards swept away together with the doctrine of motion, infr. 182. And the relation of present to past impressions

is further discussed under the guise of a new inquiry, 191 foll. (See especially the word μημεῖον.)

15. τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν] A further homethrust at Protagoras, of a different order from his own ὑηνεῖς supr. 166 C.

16. ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον] 'That which each of us will find persuasive to be spoken in court.' 'Each of us' includes not only those who are to hear, but the man who is to speak the speech in court.

21. ὡς μέλε] This comic ad-

p. 179. λέγετο διδοὺς πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἰ *δὴ τοὺς συνόντας ἔπειθεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι τε καὶ δόξειν οὐτε

dress, nowhere else used by Plato, marks Socrates' exquisite enjoyment of the humour of the situation.

I. εἰ *δὴ] The MSS. have all εἰ μή. Heindorf corrects this to εἴ πῃ, and gives the following note:—‘Profecto in futurarum quoque rerum cognitione omnibus præcellere se Protagoras profitebatur, aut nemo ipsi magnam doctrinæ mercedem solvisset, si quo modo persuasisset discipulis, etiam de futuris rebus neque vatem neque alium quemquam melius posse judicare, quam ipsum sibi unumquemque. V. ad Gorg. § 75. 47. Platonis autem sententiam restituimus unius litterulæ mutatione. Quippe vulgo scriptum εἰ μή τοὺς συν., unde contrarius prorsus et absurdus sensus efficitur. Quam scripturam nequis tuendam arbitretur verbo αὐτός ad Protagoram trahendo et αὐτῷ mutando in αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ συνόντι), manifesta h. l. est superiorum verborum πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἄριστος κριτής repetitio, neque tum ferri posset hoc αὐτῷ: adeo id moleste redundaret. Idem vitium insedit Phileb. 34 C: “Ινα μὴ τὴν ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν. Corr. ἵνα πῃ, et Protag. 331 D: Καὶ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ὀτφοῦν ἀμηγέπη προσέοικε. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὁ μὴ (l. ὅπῃ) προσέοικε καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τὸ μαλακῷ.”

This reasoning is in the main correct. But δή, which is the received correction of Phil. 1. c., seems more forcible here than πῃ, which has no

particular aptness in this passage. ‘If it had *really* been his wont to persuade them of that which has been now suggested.’ Cp. 166 C: Εἰ δὴ ὄνομάτων γε . . . : alib. The corruption probably originated in the slightly obscure reference of αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, or perhaps simply from the neighbourhood of Νή (written μή). [Schanz also, it would seem independently, suggests εἰ δή.]

Schleiermacher solved the difficulty by omitting αὐτῷ (which, as H. Schmidt observes, might be suggested to an emendator by πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, supr. 178 E), and referring αὐτὸς to Protagoras. But this destroys the force of καί, and the question is not between one oracle and another, but between the opinion of the master and of the common individual. For αὐτῷ referring to an indefinite subject cp. Apol. 39 D: Οὐ γάρ ἔσθ' αὐτὴ ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὗτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὕτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ βάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἔαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. For the change from plural to singular, which has been elsewhere illustrated, cp. esp. Rep. I. 344 B C.

The μάντις is introduced as being ἐπιστήμων of the future generally, just as the physician is of future health or sickness, the musician of future harmony, etc. τις ἄλλος points distantly at Protagoras himself, and his position as the prophet of the school is hinted at. Cp. supr. 162 A: ’Εκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βύβλου ἐφθέγξατο.

μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἀμεινον κρίνειεν ἀν ἡ αὐτὸς p. 179.
αὐτῷ.

And it is acknowledged that a state must often fail in its legislation, which regards the future. (need of expert). Therefore one man is wiser than another, and not every man, but the wise man, is the measure of things.

On this ground, then, the theory cannot stand. And there are other

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ούκον καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον 5 περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔστι, καὶ πᾶς ἀν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετουμένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὠφελιμωτάτου ἀποτυγχάνειν;

ΘΕΟ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μετρίως ἄρα ήμīν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου 10 εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε ἢ ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὀπωστιοῦν ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρῳ γίγνεσθαι, ως ἄρτι με ἡνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ ἔκείνου λόγος, εἴτ' ἐβουλόμην εἴτε μή, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

15 ΘΕΟ. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, μάλιστα ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτῃ, ἡ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὗται δὲ ἐφάνησαν τοὺς ἔκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ήγούμεναι.

ΣΩ. Πολλαχῆ, ὡς Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἀν τό γε 20 τοιοῦτον ἀλοίη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι.

H. Schmidt remarks that the descriptive imperfects are continued from ὑπισχνεῖτο supr.

4. αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον] 'Legislation and expediency' (which is the principle of legislation).

5. πᾶς ἀν ὁμολογοῖ] An appeal to common sense like supr. 171 D: 'Ομολογεῖν ἀν τοῦτο γε ὄντινον. Thus we return to the chief statement, which has been reinforced with the additional argument beginning with "Ἐπι τοίνυν, supr. 178 A.

Arist. Met. 11. 1063 a: Τούτου δὲ ὄντος τοιούτου, τοὺς ἔτέρους μὲν ὑποληπτέον μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς

δ' ἔτέρους οὐχ ὑποληπτέον.

12. τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι] Supr. 150 C.

13. ὡς ἄρτι] Supr. 167 D.

15. Ἐκείνη . . . ταύτῃ] The position which Theodorus has previously accepted is nearer and more familiar to him than that to which he points as still in the hands of Socrates. Hence the use of the demonstratives.

16. καὶ ταύτῃ] 171 foll.

20. μή] Cp. supr. 166 C. τὸ τοιοῦτον is either (1) the theory, or (2) (as cognate subject of ἀλοίη) the refutation of the theory.

P. 179. περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὅν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἔλειν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἵσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω ἀνάλωτοι γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσί, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἀν ὄντα λέγοιεν, καὶ 5 Θεαίτητος ὅδε οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν αἰσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταύτον θέμενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, 10 ὡς ὁ ὑπέρ Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον

i. περὶ δὲ τὸ παρόν, κ.τ.λ.]
This was the point reserved above, 178 D E: Περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἥδη ὄντος, κ.τ.λ. For the change from singular to plural cp. Rep. 2. 373 E: πολέμου . . . ἐξ ὅν.

ἐξ ὅν] ‘The momentary effect produced on each man, from which arise the sensations, and the beliefs which are in accordance with them.’ Vid. 156 D E; and note the incipient distinction between αἰσθησις and δόξα. καὶ . . . δόξαι is added because we are now directly engaged with Protagoras, who said τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι, or rather with those disciples of his who support his theory on the Heraclitean principle. πάθος in this sense appears to have been a technical term of the Cyrenaic school. Cp. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 191: Φάσιν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖκοὶ κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, κ.τ.λ. But we may observe that Plato here, as elsewhere, distinguishes the physical impression from the sensation itself.

5. ὄντα] Ast conjectured τὰ ὄντα, but see above, 178 B: Ἀληθῆ τε οὖται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα.

6. οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν] Hom. Odyss. 11. 344: ³Ω φίλοι, οὐ μὰν ἥμιν ἀπὸ σκοποῦ οὐδὲ ἀπὸ δόξης | μυθεῖται βασιλεια περίφρων.

8. ὡς . . . ἐπέταττε] Supr. 166 C, 168 B. In the previous section Socrates was dealing directly with Protagoras. He now goes still more closely to work by grappling with the principle on which the theory of Protagoras is grounded by his disciples, especially by those who are also followers of Heraclitus. We have already answered him (supr. A) in his own person, but we have not quite done with him (infr. 183 B) until the Heraclitean ‘flux’ has been finally disposed of.

σκεπτέον . . . διακρούοντα] Soph. 246 B: Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἀττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἰδὴ βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ’ οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύοντιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἀπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ἀεὶ ξυνέστηκεν. This combat is somewhat differently de-

points where it is easily as-sailable. But it is more diffi-cult to at-tack the main posi-tion, viz. that the present sensi-ble impre-sion is always true.

Perhaps
this is im-
pregnable,
but let us
approach,
and try
whether its
foundation
in the doc-
trine of
motion
is
secure.

I. δ. Criti-
cism of the
principle,
All is mo-
tion.

Final re-
jection of
the doctrine
of sense.

τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα, εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται. μάχη δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φαύλη οὐδ' ὀλίγοις γέγονεν.

ΘΕΟ. Πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ 5 μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἔταιροι χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρωμένως.

ΣΩ. Τῷ τοι, ὡς φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον· καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται. E

10 ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γάρ, ὡς Σώκρατες, περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτέων, ἡ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις

scribcd in the present pas-
sage.

1. τὴν φερομένην . . . οὐσίαν] ταύτην refers to the conclusion in 160 C and the preceding argument from 156 A onwards.

διακρούοντα] (ἀκούοντα Bodl.) Schol.: 'Ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν δια- κωδωνούντων τὰ κεράμια, εἰ ἀκέ- ραια εἰσιν.' Cp. Phileb. 55 C: Γενναῖος δέ, εἴ πῃ σαθρὸν ἔχει, πᾶν περικρούωμεν. Compare the English expression, 'As sound as a bell.'

5. ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ] 'Gains in importance,' 'is waged with increasing energy.'

6. χορηγοῦσι] Cp. Demetr. Byz. ap. Athen. 295. ed. Schiw.: 'Ἐκάλουν δὲ καὶ χορη- γούσις, ὡς φησιν δὲ Βυζάντιος Δη- μήτριος, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς μισθουμένους τοὺς χορούς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς καθηγουμένους τοῦ χοροῦ, καθάπερ τοῦνομα σημαίνει.'

It would appear from this that the Heracliteans of Ephesus upheld a doctrine akin to that of the Cyrenaics.

τούτου τοῦ λόγου] λόγος is here almost equivalent to

'school of thought.' Cp. supr. τοὺς τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ, κ. τ. λ., infr. τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων.

8. Τῷ τοι] 'We are the more bound to consider the question, and that in the light of its first principle, even as they present it to us in the discussion.' Gorg. 448 E: 'Ωσπερ σοι τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπετεί- νατο Χαιρεψῶν. (καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς is the Bodleian reading, ἐξ ἀρχῆς T. The words ἡ τοιάδε σκέψις . . μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴη ἀν occur in Lach. 189 E.

9. ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται] Viz. in referring everything to a first principle, whether of fire or motion.

11. τῶν Ἡρακλειτέων] Sc. δογ- μάτων. περὶ τούτων, κ. τ. λ. depends verbally partly on διαλεχθῆναι, partly on ἔμπειροι, but really upon the notion 'there is no discussion possible.' Cp. infr. 180 C: 'Οπερ ἦταν ἐρῶν. If the genitives were masculine, and out of construction, the use of ἔμπειροι without an object would be too abrupt. Compare, however, παρὰ μὲν τούτων, below.'

p. 179. 'Ομηρείων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἔφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται ἔμπειροι [εἰναι], οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἶόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δ'

ἀσπερ σὺ λέγεις] 152 C. Cp. Cratyl. 439 C: Φαίνονται γάρ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι.

1. 'Ομηρείων] Cp. 152 C.
ἔτι παλαιοτέρων] 'Orpheum intelligit: conf. Cratyl. § 41. (402 B.)' Heind.

αὐτοῖς μέν] μέν points to the opposition which comes out distinctly afterwards (180 C) between the men and their doctrine. There is no conversing with the men; we must examine their doctrine on our own account.

2. [εἰναι]] Omitted in most MSS. including B T.

3. τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν] 'With men in frenzy.'

4. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ] 'For, in true accordance with their master's writings, they are ever in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they are absolutely without the power of doing so; or rather they possess in a surpassing degree the most perfect absence of all quietness, even in the minutest respect.'

More literally, (1) 'It is beyond everything, how utterly incapable they are of rest even in the most trifling respect.' Cp. Ar. Eth. N. 4. I. § 39: 'Υπερβολῆς . . . τοῦ μηδενὶ ἀν διδόναι. Infr. 192 C.

The doubtful point in this rendering of the last words is πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρόν = 'in respect of what is less than

little.' For πρὸς compare Soph. 248 C: "Οταν τῷ παρῇ ἡ τοῦ πάσχει ἢ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις. And for μηδὲ σμικρόν cp. Phileb. 60 C: Φρόνησιν . . . ἡδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσαν. See also Phædo, 93 B: "Ωστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον . . . ἐπὶ πλέον . . . ἢ ἐπὶ ἔλαττον . . . αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι.

Here it is assumed that by a stretch of hyperbole, made possible by the negative sentence, μηδὲ σμικρόν is substituted for σμικρότατον. Cp. ἡττον . . . ἢ τὸ μηδέν, supr. There is a similar emphasis, though with less complexity, in Symp. 192 C: Οὐκ ἔθέλοντες, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, χωρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ σμικρὸν χρόνον . . . (where οὐδὲ σμικρὸν χρόνον might be rendered 'any time at all'). ὑπερβάλλει is here taken as impersonal, and τό, κ.τ.λ. as epexegetic. The use of μή (not οὐκ) is occasioned by the hypothetical turn = οὐδ' εἰ μηδὲ σμικρὸν εἴη. The genitive ήσυχίας is postponed.

(2) Mr. Riddell, in his Digest of Idioms, § 246, observes that 'to τὸ οὐδ' οὐδέν must be supplied ἐνεῖναι:' i. e. he would render 'the utter absence of it is extraordinary, in regard of the entire absence of rest in the men even in the least particular.' But this is surely too harsh.

(3) H. Schmidt (Fleckens. Jahrb. 103. 806) suspects the whole sentence (μᾶλλον . . . ήσυχίας) as interpolated.

Great has been the conflict and many the combatants on either side. The

friends of
Heraclitus
in Ionia
defend the
doctrine of
motion
with all
their might.

But we
must take
their theory
into our
own hands
to test it.
For the
men are in
a flux, and
offer us no
hold for ar-
gument.

ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἡσυχίως ἐν p. 179
μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἥττον αὐτοῖς ἔνι ἢ τὸ p. 180.
μηδέν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ
μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἡσυχίας· ἀλλ' ἂν
5 τινά τι ἔρῃ, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ρήματίσκια αἰνιγμα-
τώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, καν τούτους ζητῆς
λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴρηκεν, ἐτέρῳ πεπλήξει καινῶς
μετωνομασμένῳ, περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς
οὐδένα αὐτῶν· οὐδέ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
10 ἀλλ' εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον ἔαν εἶναι
μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, ^β
ώς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ
πολεμοῦσι, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκ-
βάλλουσιν.

15 ΣΩ. "Ισως, ὡς Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἀνδρας μαχομένους
έώρακας, είρημεύουσι δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας. οὐ γάρ σοι

The point in ὑπερβάλλει is, not that οὐδ' οὐδέν is a stronger expression than μηδέν (it should be compared with ἥττον . . . ἢ τὸ μηδέν), but (a) the negation is put more strongly by being affirmed; (b) ὑπερβάλλει assists the climax, as being a stronger word than any in the former clause; and, (c) if the first rendering is correct, what was at first spoken of only with reference to argument, is now asserted generally (*πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρόν*). Cp. infr. Μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς.

5. ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Protag. 342 D (of the Spartans): Τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὑρήσει αὐτὸν φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἀν τύχῃ τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλε ρήμα βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον, ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής.

ρήματίσκια . . . ἀποτοξεύουσι] 'Plucking up as from a quiver sayings brief and dark, they let them fly at you.'

6. ἀνασπῶντες] Cp. Soph. Aj. 302: Δόγους ἀνέσπα.

τούτου] Sc. τοῦ ρήματισκίου.

7. τί εἴρηκεν] Sc. τὸ ρήματίσκιον.

καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ] 'Of words new-fangled ill,' 'of terms strangely twisted to an unheard-of sense.' Compare the humorous simile in Protag. 329 A: Ὡσπερ τὰ χαλκεῖα, κ.τ.λ.

10. βέβαιον . . . στάσιμον] 'Fixed or settled—stationary.'

εἶναι] γενέσθαι is purposely avoided.

12. αὐτό] Sc. τὸ βέβαιον.

16. οὐ γάρ σοι ἐταῖροι εἰσιν] The dislike of a geometrician to the Heraclitean 'method' is not unnatural. And it is unmistakably evident here

p. 180. ἔταιροι εἰσιν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὓς ἀν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὡδαὶ μαθηταῖς; οὐδὲ γίγνεται εἰ τῶν τοιούτων ἔτερος ἔτερον μαθητής, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι 5 ἀναφύονται, ὅπόθεν ἀν τύχῃ ἔκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἔτερον ὁ ἔτερος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται εἰδέναι. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ἥτις ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἀν ποτε λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἐκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων. αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. 10

that Plato has used a ‘tour de force’ in bringing together the Heracliteans and the ‘disciples of Protagoras.’

1. τὰ τοιαῦτα] Sc. εἰρηνικά (Heindorf) or, rather, τὰ βέβαια ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

4. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς] ‘Disciples forsooth !’ Rep. i. 330 B: Ποῖ επεκτησάμην, ὡδαὶ Σώκρατες; alib.

5. αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται] ‘They spring up unbidden, wherever each happens to have caught the *afflatus*.’

6. ὅπόθεν ἀν τύχῃ . . . ἐνθουσιάσας] Contrast with this Hegel, G. d. Ph. ed. 1840, p. 55: ‘It is the very spirit of this whole recital, that the more developed Philosophy of a later age, is really the product of the previous labours of the thinking mind: that it is required and determined by these earlier views, and has not sprung of itself independently from the ground.’ (‘Nicht isolirt für sich aus dem Boden gewachsen ist.’) For the expression αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται cf. Rep. 7. 520 B: Αὐτόματοι γάρ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἐκάστη πολιτείᾳ. As in supr. 172 foll. we had a description of the

man corresponding to Protagoras’ theory, so here we have the men of Heraclitus. The wildness and the enthusiasm, at once speculative and irrational, are Oriental rather than Greek, and are probably due rather to the soil than to the germ. Comparatively little of this is to be found in Heraclitus himself, although his sayings might be called ἥματισκα αἰνιγματώδη.

8. οὐκ ἀν ποτε λάβοις λόγον] Ar. Met. 3. 4. 1006 a: Γελοῖον τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον πρὸς τὸν μηθενὸς ἔχοντα λόγον, ἢ μὴ ἔχει· ὅμοιος γάρ φυτῷ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἢ τοιούτος ἥδη. 10. 1063 a: Μηθὲν γάρ τιθέντες ἀναιροῦσι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ δλῶς λόγον, ὥστε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.

9. αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας] ‘But we must take the doctrine out of their hands, and con it over by ourselves like a geometrical theorem.’ Theodorus speaks as a mathematician. The object of παραλαβόντας is vague; neither λόγον in the sense just used, nor ἀρχήν; but τὰ Ἡρακλείτεια ταῦτα, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

The question now before us has come down from ancient times. But wise men formerly veiled their meaning from the multitude in poetry, not as these now, who make no secret of their views, and seek to win universal suffrage for them, and to convert men from the foolishness of common sense.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα p. 180.
 ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς, ώς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὁκεανός τε καὶ Τηθύς ρέύματα 5 τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἔστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, ἃτε σοφωτέρων, ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἡλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἔσταναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δ’ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὡς Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τάναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο, Οἶον ἀκίνητον τελέθει, τῷ πάντι τὸ ὄνομ’ εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα ε Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διῆσχυρίζονται, ώς ἐν τε πάντα ἔστι καὶ ἔστηκεν

1. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα] ‘Well, the theorem, as you call it.’ Compare with the repetition of *γε* the double use of *γάρ*, *ἄλλα*, *κ.τ.λ.*

2. παρειλήφαμεν . . ἀποδεικνυμένων] ‘The doctrine comes to us from ancient and from modern sources. The ancients indeed veiled their meaning from the multitude and said, etc.; but the moderns openly declare their meaning.’ See H. Schmidt, *Krit. Comment.*, p. 509.

4. ρέύματα τυγχάνει] Se. δῆτα, which is purposely (or instinctively) omitted. Ὁκεανός τε καὶ Τηθύς are in apposition with ἡ γένεσις, and ρέύματα is predicate. ὡς, etc. expresses not what the poets said, but what they meant, depending partly on παρειλήφαμεν.

7. σκυτοτόμοι] I. e. The meanest artificers. Cp. Prot. 324 C: ‘Ως μὲν . . εἰκότως

ἀποδέχονται . . καὶ χαλκέως καὶ σκυτοτόμου συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικά: alib.

10. τιμῶσιν αὐτούς] These words merely satirize the φιλοτιμία of the Sophist. H. Schmidt’s remark that the multitude are predisposed to extol a doctrine which reflects the arbitrariness of their life, introduces a subtlety which is not present in the text.

11. Οἶον] MSS. *οἶον*. But the words of Simplieius in Aristot. Phys. f. 7. a. are decisive: ‘Ακίνητον αὐτὸν ἀνυμνεῖ καὶ μόνον ὡς πάντων ἔξηρήμενον.

12. τελέθει, τῷ παντὶ] So all the MSS. Buttm. conjectured τ’ ἔμεναι τῷ πάντῃ. This is gathered from the quotations of Simplieius, and is probably right. Cobet, relying on the same source, changes *οἶον* to *οὐδὲν*.

14. ἔστηκεν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ] ‘All Being is One, and standeth self-contained, not having any space in which it moves.’

p. 180. αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν τῇ κινεῖται. Τούτοις οὖν, ὡς ἔταιρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἀν μή πη ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν,

p. 181. δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιόστραις διὰ 5 γραμμῆς παιζούτες, ὅταν ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἐλκωνται εἰς τάνατία. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τὸν ἔτερον

The nearest approach to this latter assertion in the fragments of Parmenides is in the lines—

(78–85 Mullach) Οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὅμοιον, | οὐδὲ τι τῇ μᾶλλον τό κεν εἴργοι μιν ἔννεχεσθαι, | οὐδὲ τι χειρότερον πᾶν δὲ πλέον ἐστὶν ἔοντος. | τῷ ἔννεχὲς πᾶν ἐστίν, ἐὸν γὰρ ἔοντι πελάζει. | Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείραστι δεσμῶν | ἐστιν, ἄναρχον, ἄπαντον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὀλεθρὸς | τῆλε μᾶλ’ ἐπλάγχθησαν, ἄπωσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής. | ταῦτὸν δὲ ἐν τωντῷ τε μένον καθ’ ἔαυτό τε κεῖται.

He asserts, however, that Being is not without boundaries, else it would be imperfect.

Zeno appears to have said, that being was neither with nor without boundaries. Cp. Arist. de Xenoph. Gorg. et Melisso, c. 3: 'Αἴδιον δὲ ὅντα καὶ ἔνα καὶ σφαιροειδῆ, οὔτ’ ἄπειρον, οὔτε πεπερᾶσθαι.' 'Απειρον γάρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι . . . τὸ δὲ ἐν οὔτε τῷ οὐκ ὅντι οὔτε τοῖς πόλλοις ὅμοιονται. 'Εν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει πρὸς ὅ τι περανεῖ.'

'Dasz hier Melissus als Vertreter der Eleatischen Schule genannt wird, hat seine Grund darin, dasz der Beweis . . . ἐστηκεν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν τῇ κινεῖται nach der von Heindorf angezogenen Stelle Aristot. Phys. 4. 6, dem Me-

lissus angehört.' H. Schmidt.

The Eleatics did not abstract the idea of Being from that of extension, although its fulness destroyed the idea of space. It was here that the Atomists joined issue with them. To Leucippus and Democritus the relations of body were not symbolical but real. They felt that they must account for motion. Hence their assertion of the existence of empty space, τὸ κενόν, or, in other words, τὸ μὴ ὂν in the material sense.

3. εἰς τὸ μέσον] Viz. by having partly discarded and partly retained the principle, ἐπιστήμη ἀσθησις, . . . τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον μὴ παντάπασι λέγοντες.

5. δίκην δώσομεν] For the humour ep. Rep. 5. 474 A: Τῷ ὅντι τωθαζόμενος δώσεις δίκην.

διὰ γραμμῆς παιζούτες] A game, like our French and English, was called διελκυστίνδα.

7. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι] 'I think therefore we ought first to examine the one faction, to whom we first addressed ourselves, these wavering movers of unrest,' and if we find any truth in them, we will join our efforts with theirs to pull us to them, endeavouring to shake the others off. But if those who stand for the un-

Their vehemence almost makes us forget the oppo-

site faction,
who say
that the
One Being
which fills
all things
doth not
move.

We find
ourselves
on the dan-
gerous mid-
dle ground
between
these ar-
mies. With
which side
shall we go?
Shall we
declare for
the inviol-
able consti-
tution of all
things, or
for the

πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ' οὗσπερ ὡρμήσαμεν, τοὺς p. 181.
ρέοντας. καὶ ἐὰν μέν τι φαίνωνται λέγοντες, συνέλ-
ξομεν μετ' αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἐτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν
πειρώμενοι. ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὄλου στασιῶται ἀληθέ-
5 στερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φενξόμεθα παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐ
τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. ἀμφότεροι δ' ἂν φανῶσι ^ε
μηδὲν μέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα ἡγούμενοι
ἡμᾶς μέν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παρπαλαίους δὲ
καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακότες. ὅρα οὖν,
10 ω̄ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προϊέναι κίν-
δυνον.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ω̄ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐ
διασκέψασθαι τί λέγουσιν ἐκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

broken Whole of Being seem
to speak more reasonably, we
will desert to these again from
the revolutionary violence of
the movement party.'

1. τοὺς ρέοντας] 'The unstable philosophers.' ('The river-gods,' Jowett.) They are humorously identified with their principle. Vid. supr. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται. This way of taking ρέοντα—not as causative—is also confirmed by the parallel passage in the Cratylus, 439 C: Αὐτοί τε ὡσπερ εἰς τινα δύνην ἐμπεσόντες κυκώνται καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐφελκόμενοι προσεμβάλλονται. Soerates adopts the jest of Theodorus, supr. 180 B: Μηδὲν βέβαιον ἔν ... ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς.

For a similar reference to a set of persons by an epithet ep. Phileb. 46 A: Οὓς εἴπομεν δυσχερεῖς. Soph. 248 C: Τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥῆθεν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς. Rep. 6. 488 A: Τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων.

5. ἀπ' αὐτῶν] (ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν παρ' αὐτούς Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐτῶν T eett. Sehleerm. eorr.: αὐτὸν τῶν Bekk. But for the position of αὐτὸν ep. supr. 161 A, and note). We pass from the image of a game to that of a civil war, in which the Heracliteans are the 'movement,' or revolutionary, party. There is probably a slight play on the word στασιῶται, and certainly also on the phrase τὰ ἀκίνητα κινεῖν. For 'to move what may not be moved' was, as the scholiast indicates, a proverbial way of speaking of sacrilegious actions. See esp. Legg. 8. 842 E: Διὸς ὄριον μὲν πρῶτος νόμος ὅδε εἰρήσθω· μὴ κινείτω γῆς ὅρια μηδεὶς ... νομίστας τὸ τάκινητα κινεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτο εἶναι. Thue. 8. 15: Τά τε χίλια τάλαντα . . . κινεῖν.

7. μηδὲν μέτριον] 'Nothing worthy of our reception.'

12. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν] 'Nay, Soerates, we can by no

p. 181. ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον ἀν εἴη σοῦ γε οὗτω προθυμουμένου.
 Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινήσεως πέρι,
 ε ποιὸν τί ποτε ἄρα λέγοντες φασὶ τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι.
 Βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε. πότερον ἐν τι εἶδος
 αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἡ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μέν-
 τοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτω, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ, ἵνα
 κοινῇ πάσχωμεν, ἢν τι καὶ δέῃ. καί μοι λέγε· ἄρα
 κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλῃ
 ἡ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται;

movement party? Let us examine the latter first, as we began with them.

Motion is their principle. Do they admit that motion is of two kinds, locomotion and change?

ΘΕΟ. Ἔγω γέ.

10

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ ἡ
 μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκη δέ, ἡ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἡ
 σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἡ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίω-
 σιν ἀλλοιώται, ἄρα οὐκ ἀξιον ἔτερον εἶδος φάναι κι-
 νήσεως;

15

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὴ λέγω τούτω εἶδη
 κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ τὸ περιφοράν.

means endure to stop short of thoroughly examining the meaning of both sets of thinkers.' οὐδέν is, of course, adverbial. Madvig's conjecture, ἀνετέον, had occurred to others. But the humour of the place, where Theodorus, who had been so backward, is now become so eager and ἀτεχνῶς φιλολόγος in the hands of Socrates, is more pointedly expressed by ἀνεκτόν, the MS. reading.

1. σοῦ γε] I. e. You, that were so reluctant to enter on the discussion. Cp. supr. 169 C: οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὃν προτίθεσαι οἵος τούτῳ εἴσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι.

2. ἀρχῆ] This is the predicate, the subject being contained in what follows. Hence

no article is required.

5. ἡ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο] Parm. 138 B: Κινούμενόν γε ἡ φέροιτο ἡ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἀνταγόρα μόναι κινήσεις. No argument can be drawn from this about the comparative dates of the two dialogues. ἀλλοίωσις as yet includes αἰξησις.

Aristot. Phys. Ause. 8. 3. § 3: Πρὸς οὓς, καίπερ οὐ διορίζοντας ποίαν κίνησιν λέγουσιν ἡ πάσας, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι.

6. ἵνα κοίη πάσχωμεν] Socrates continues the notion of danger from supr. A B, and with his usual irony professes fear of τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων.

11. ὅταν δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] Cp. supr. 156 C D.

18. ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ τὸ περιφοράν] 'Coisl. τὴν μὲν ἀλλοίωσιν,

ΘΕΟ. Ὁρθῶς γε λέγων.

p. 181.

On their granting this, we ask, Do you mean that all things move in both these ways? And they must say, Yes; or else it will be as true to say that things stand still, as that they move.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν οὗτω διελόμενοι διαλεγώμεθα ἥδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσι κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν· πότερον πᾶν φατὲ ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενόν τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ μέν τι ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ δὲ ἑτέρως;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· οἷμαι δὲ ἀν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μή, ω̄ ἐταῖρε, κινούμενά τε *αὐτοῖς ¹⁰ καὶ ἐστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὡρθῶς ἔξει εἰπεῖν ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἐστηκεν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεῖναι μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ^{p. 182.} ₁₅ ἀεὶ κινεῖται.

τὴν δὲ περιφοράν—quod glossema sapit.’ Stallb. Cp. Soph. 221 E, alib. It may be asked why circular motion should be chosen to represent *φορά*. The answer possibly is, that the revolution of the Heavens is conceived of as embracing all other kinds of motion. Cp. supr. *ἔως μὲν ἡ περιφορὰ ἡ κινούμενη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος*.

Perhaps also the revolution of the Heavens (or of the Sun) is symbolical of the Heraclitean cycle of elements. (Lassalle.) For *περιφορά* interchanged with *φορά* ep. Rep. 7. 528 A: ‘Ἐν περιφορᾷ ἥδη δὲ στερεὸν λαβόντες . . . ἀστρονομίαν ἔλεγον, φορὰν οὖσαν βάθους.

It must be admitted that *φοράν* would be more exact. But the compound is more rhythmical, and, as *περιφέρεσθαι* does not always mean ‘to revolve,’ it may be used

here for locomotion in general. Sec Tim. 70 B, Apol. 19 C, Rep. 3. 402 A-C.

2. διαλεγώμεθα ἥδη] Imagining them, for the sake of our argument, to be less impracticable. ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοῖς ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἀν ἀποκρίνασθαι. (Soph. 246 D.)

5. τὸ μέν τι . . . τὸ δὲ] Rep. 4. 436 C.

6. ἑτέρως] ‘In one or other of these two ways.’ Cp. Soph. 226 A: Οὐ τῷ ἑτέρᾳ ληπτέον.

9. κινούμενά τε *αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐστῶτα φανεῖται] Cp. Rep. 4. 436 D: ‘Ως οἴ γε στρόβιλοι δλοι ἐστᾶσι τε ἄμα καὶ κινοῦνται. Most MSS. ἔαντοις. For αὐτοῖς, ‘They will find,’ cp. supr. 170 E: Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ, κ.τ.λ.

14. ἐνεῖναι] Almost all the MSS. have ἐν εἶναι. But the correction of the Bodl. MS. to ἐνεῖναι appears to be in an ancient hand.

p. 182.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δή μοι τόδε αὐτῶν· τῆς θερμότητος ἡ λευκότητος ἡ ὄτουοῦν γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτούς, φέρεσθαι ἔκαστον τούτων ἀμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντός τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον *αἰσθανόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησιν ἔτι γίγνεσθαι,

2. Σκόπει δή μοι τόδε αὐτῶν] 'I would have you consider this point in them,' i. e. in their theory. Cp. 149 D : **Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἥσθησαι;*

3. οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν] Supr. 156, 157, 159.

5. τὸ μὲν πάσχον *αἰσθανόμενον] The MS. reading *αἰσθητόν* is inconsistent with the context, and with the language used elsewhere in the dialogue. Buttmann conjectured *αἰσθητόν*, to which Schleiermacher objected that *τὸ πάσχον* means the sensorium, and not the sentient subject. But the distinction between them is not clearly marked from the Protagorean point of view. Indeed the conception of a 'sensorium' nowhere appears, at least in this part of the dialogue. It is only in speaking of a particular sense that *τὸ πάσχον* means, for instance, the eye (157).

In 159 A it appears doubtful whether *τὸ πάσχον* means the tongue of Socrates, or more indefinitely the 'peripient.' And even if *τὸ πάσχον* is limited to the organ of sense, there is no reason why *αἰσθητός* should not be used of this. (Cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 4. 5 : *Ἡ γλῶσσα γνώμων τούτων ἐνεργάσθη*.)

The noun *αἰσθητός* appears to be suggested in 160 D

by the use of *ἐπιστήμων* just before. In the present place it might recur naturally, as it is in the manner of Plato to recall a train of thought by repeating some remarkable word. (Rep. 488 A : *οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι*. Supr. 180 C : *Τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα.*) To which it may be added, that there is a consciousness of technicality observable in the present passage. (*ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἀμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα, κ.τ.λ.*) Apart from these considerations, the rareness of the word, which would be a strong argument in its favour if it had MS. authority, must be allowed to weigh against it as a conjectural reading. And it may also be urged, that the masculine gender of *αἰσθητός* would impair the effect of the passage, in which everything seems to be made, as far as possible, neuter and impersonal.

But Heindorf's emendation, *αἰσθανόμενον*, agrees perfectly with the context and with all that precedes (esp. supr. 159 E, 160 A), and it is quite possible that *αἰσθητόν* may have slipped in instead of it by an unconscious logical inversion on the part of the copyist. This conjecture is therefore adopted in the text.

6. εἰ] I. e. when we carry

Let us now recall their theory of sensations and qualities, which were said to fit between the subject and the object.

τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα; ὥστε οὖν ἡ p. 182.
 ποιότης ἄμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα καὶ οὐ
 μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον· κατὰ μέρη οὖν ἄκουε.
 τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμὸν ^ν
⁵ δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τἄλλα οὔτω. μέμνησαι
 γάρ που ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὅτι οὔτως ἐλέγομεν, ἐν
 μηδὲν αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἡ
 πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνο-
 μένων—τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ
¹⁰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

our analysis beyond the act of sensation to that which underlies it. *ἔτι* is omitted in one MS., and Schanz reads *ἄρα* instead.

1. *ποιόν τι*] MSS. *ποιῶντι*. But the Bodleian margin has *ποιόν τι*, with marg. F, corr. E.

ἡ ποιότης] Two difficulties stand in the way of the reception of any new ‘term of art’; the strangeness of the word, and the effort required to follow the generalization which it presupposes.

2. *ἀλλόκοτον*] ‘Strange and uncouth.’ *ἀλλοκοτώτερον* is a v. r.

3. *ἀθρόον λεγόμενον*] ‘The collective (i. c. general) expression.’ This harmonizes with the language adopted above, 157 B: Δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὔτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, φῶ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἀνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἔκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος.

The conception of quality is of later growth than that of kind or form; since the latter is less abstract, and still retains a tinge of metaphor.

6. *ἐν*] καὶ *ἐν* Bodl. corr.

7. *μηδ'* αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἡ πάσχον]

Supr. 157 A. αὖ distinguishes the active and passive elements from the crude notion of an object, which is analysed into these.

8. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθανόμενα] ‘But out of both as they come together—they become, while producing sensations and sensible things, the one of a certain kind, the other percipient.’

Attribute and perception arise together in the act of sense out of the meeting of agent and patient, neither of which has any independent existence. The text is not grammatical, but neither is it really open to suspicion, and Madvig’s conjecture, ἀποτεχθέντα, makes nonsense. The construction may be explained by substituting ἐκ τοῦ συγγίγνεσθαι ἀμφότερα for ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων συγγιγνομένων,—or the sentence from τὰς αἰσθήσεις to the end may be taken as an expansion of γίγνεσθαι τὸ τοιαῦτα φανῆται. Cp. the construction of infr. 194 C D, where, conversely, τὰ λόγτα should in strict grammar be a genitive governed by τὰ σημεῖα.

p. 182. ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαι· πῶς δ' οὐ;

ε ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἔάσωμεν, εἴτε
ἄλλως εἴτε οὗτος λέγουσιν· οὐδὲ δ' ἔνεκα λέγομεν,
τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτῶντες. Κινεῖται καὶ
ρεῖ, ως φατέ, τὰ πάντα; ή γάρ;

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας ἃς διειλόμεθα κινήσεις,
φερόμενά τε καὶ ἄλλοιούμενα;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δ' οὐ; εἴ πέρ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἡλλοιοῦτο δὲ
μή, εἴχομεν ἄν που εἰπεῖν, οἷα ἄττα ρεῖ τὰ φερόμενα.
ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

δ ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν ρέν
τὸ ρέον, ἄλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου 15
εἶναι ρόήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην
χρόαν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλλῷ ταύτη μένον· ἀρά ποτε οὗτον τέ τι
προσειπεῖν χρῶμα, ὥστε καὶ ὅρθως προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ τίς μηχανή, ὡς Σώκρατες; η ἄλλο γέ
τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπερ ἀεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἄτε 20
δὴ ρέον;

2. εἴτε ἄλλως . . . λέγουσιν]
We need dwell no longer on
the details of the theory, since
our business now is with its
first principle—κίνησις.

7. Ούκοῦν, κ.τ.λ.] Sc. κινεῖται
τὰ πάντα.

12. λέγωμεν] λέγομεν Τ.

17. ἵνα μὴ ἀλλῷ ταύτη μένον]
Cp. supr. 154 D: Φυλάττων μὴ
ἐναντία εἴπω. Infr. 183 A: Ἰνα
δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὅρθη φανῆ.
And, for the argument, Cratyl.
439 D: Ἀρ' οὖν οὗτον τε προσει-
πεῖν αὐτὸν ὅρθως, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρ-
χεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκείνον ἔστιν,
ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, η ἀνάγκη ἄμα

ἡμῖν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸν εὐθὺς
γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι καὶ μηκέτι
οὕτως ἔχειν;

τι προσειπεῖν χρῶμα] To give
the name of any colour (to an
object)—To use the name of
any colour so as to apply it
rightly.

20. τῶν τοιούτων] Viz. τῶν
αἰσθητῶν, i. e. the remark ap-
plies to all sensible attributes
and not to colour only. For
the step which, for the sake
of brevity, Theodorus is here
allowed to make by himself,
H. Schmidt well compares
supr. 158 C E, 189 C, 196 B.

If the qualities moved without changing, we might give them names. But now, while each of them is moving between object and subject, it also changes, so that while you are naming it, it has become another thing.

And the same argument applies to the sensations, and to Sensation, which we said was Knowledge. Therefore when we said Sensation was Knowledge, it would have been equally true to say, Not knowledge. The principle of motion has proved a fallacious support, since according to it every answer, whether Yes or No, is, or rather

ΣΩ. Τί δέ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὅποιασοῦν, p. 182.
οἶν τῆς τοῦ ὄρᾶν ἡ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ
ὄρᾶν ἡ ἀκούειν; E

ΘΕΟ. Οὔκουν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται.

5 ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ὄρᾶν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἡ μὴ
ὄρᾶν, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην αἰσθησιν μᾶλλον ἡ μή, πάντων
γε πάντως κινουμένων.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν αἰσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ως ἔφαμεν
10 ἐγώ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.

ΘΕΟ. Ἡν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἡ μὴ ἐπιστή-
μην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὅ τι ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΟ. Εοίκατε.

15 ΣΩ. Καλὸν ἀν ήμιν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα
τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσιν ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι πάντα
κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὄρθὴ φανῇ. τὸ δ',
ώς ἔοικεν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις,

p. 183.

1. Τί δέ περὶ αἰσθήσεως] So far of αἰσθητά, now of αἰσθήσεις.

2. μένειν] Sc. τὴν αἰσθησιν.

5. Οὔτε ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Then we must not at all predicate seeing in preference to not-seeing, nor any other sensation rather than the absence of it, since all things move in every way.’ Join οὔτε μᾶλλον.

6. Bekker reads οὔτε . . . οὔτε, perhaps rightly.

12. Οὐδέν is adverbial. For ἐπιστήμην . . . ἀπεκρινάμεθα ep. supr. 147 B: “Οταν ἀποκρύπται τέχνης τυὸς ὄνομα. We gave ‘sense’ as an equivalent for Knowledge. But ‘sense’=‘not-sense,’ therefore if ‘sense’=‘knowledge,’ ‘sense’=‘not-knowledge.’

15. Καλὸν ἀν ήμιν] ‘Here is a fine result of having corrected (or completed) our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest, and so to make it clear that that first answer was right, whereas it would seem to be made clear that if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right, both “it is so” and “it is not so,” or, if you choose, “becomes so,” that we may say nothing that would bring them to a stand-still.’ For the asyndeton, and for ἄν (‘would seem to’) Heind. well compares Rep. 10. 602 A: Χαρίεις ἀν εἴη, κ.τ.λ. Badh. conjectures Καλὸν ἄρ' ήμιν συμβαίνει.

p. 183. περὶ ὅτου ἀν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὁρθὴ εἶναι, οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ.

ΘΕΟ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πλήν γε, ὡς Θεόδωρε, ὅτι οὕτω τε εἴπον καὶ 5 οὐχ οὕτω. δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο *τὸ οὕτω λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ν ἀν ἔτι κινοῖτο. *τὸ οὕτω· οὐδ' αὖ μὴ οὕτω· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο κίνησις· ἀλλά τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον τοῖς

1. οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι] These words are added in explanation of *πᾶσα*. While you are naming a quality, it is altered and slips away; and while you are naming a sensation, it has given place to another. While you say the words 'Sense is knowledge,' your theory of change compels you to utter in the same breath, Sense is not knowledge. In supporting your answer by the doctrine of motion, you have made this and every other answer alike unstable.

3. ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτούς] 'That we may not arrest them (*τοὺς ρέοντας*) in their flow.' Cp. supr. 181 D E, 182 A. The humour is lost by reading *αὐτούς*.

5. Πλήν γε, ὡς Θεόδωρε] μὴ is changed to *οὐχ*, because the words are taken out of their hypothetic connection.—Compare the conclusion of the Parmenides.

6, 7. *τό] The articles, which seem necessary, were added by Schleiermacher. Their absence is defended by Wohlhab, who quotes Soph. 244 A: 'Οπόταν δὲ φθέγγησθε.'

7. οὐδὲ γάρ] 'For when we think of "so," there is no motion in it: nor yet in "not so."

becomes, equally true, except that both Yes and No are falsified while we are uttering them. A new dialect should be invented to carry out this theory. The only

8. ἀλλά τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον] Cp. supr. 157 B, Soph. 252 C: Τῷ τε εἶναι που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ χωρὶς καὶ τῷ ἀλλων καὶ τῷ καθ' αὐτὸν καὶ μιρίοις ἐπέροις, διν ἀκρατεῖς ὅντες εὑργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἀλλων δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγξόντων, κ.τ.λ. φωνήν] 'Dialeet.'

Arist. Met. 3. 4. 1008 a: Οὔτε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτ' οὐχ οὕτως λέγει, ἀλλ' οὕτως τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως. καὶ πάλιν γε ταῦτα ἀπόφησιν ἀμφώ διτι οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ μή, ηδη ἀν εἴη τι ὀρισμένον.

Aristotle points out (1), that it does not follow, because quantity is wholly relative, that quality need be so also; (2) that it is not the quality, but the subject of it, which changes.

Sensations are wholly shifting and relative. They could not be the objects of the mind, unless we perceived resemblance and difference in them. In every act of sense, therefore, there is a universal element, and the mind gives to it its own stamp of unity.

Arist. Met. 3. 4. 1007 b: Καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου, διοῦ πάντα χρήματα· ὥστε μηθὲν ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχειν. τὸ ἀόριστον οὖν ἐοίκασι λέγειν, καὶ οἱόμενοι τὸ δὲ λέγειν, περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὅντος λέγουσιν· τὸ γὰρ

word for it
in existing
language is,
'No-how.'

Thus we
are rid, not
only of
Protagoras,
but also of
the theory
of sense, so
far as it is
based on
motion.

τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐ- p. 183.
τῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ρήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ οὐδὲ¹
ὅπως. μάλιστα δ' οὗτως ἀν αὐτοῖς ἀρμόττοι, ἅπειρον
λεγόμενον.

5 ΘΕΟ. Οἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὗτη αὐτοῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὥ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἑταίρου
ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὕπω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ'
ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἀν μὴ φρόνι-¹⁰
μός τις ἦ· ἐπιστήμην τε αἴσθησιν οὐ συγχωρησόμεθα
κατά γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον. εἰ μή τι
πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγει.

ΘΕΟ. "Αριστ' εἴρηκας, ὥ Σώκρατες· τούτων γὰρ
περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινό-
μενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρω-¹⁵
ταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ πρίν γ' ἄν, ὥ Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε
καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὖ τὸ πᾶν ἐστάναι διέλθητε, ¹⁰
ῶσπερ ἄρτι προύθεσθε.

δυνάμει ὃν καὶ μὴ ἐντελεχείᾳ τὸ
ἀόριστόν ἐστιν.

2. τὸ οὐδὲ¹ ὅπως . . . ἅπειρον λεγό-
μενον] With most of the Greek
philosophers the Infinite was
a purely negative idea.

At this point sensation appears to be annihilated. And yet if we view the dialogue as a whole, the impression we receive from it is rather this:—Sensations are purely relative to the individual, and infinitely diverse: taken alone, therefore, they cannot be the objects of knowledge and thought: but it is not denied that they are the occasions of thought and the conditions of knowledge. (186 D: 'Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθή-
μασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ.)

3. οὗτως . . . λεγόμενον] Viz.
οὐδὲ¹ ὅπως.

6. τοῦ τε σοῦ ἑταίρου] This
τε is answered by ἐπιστήμην
τε . . . καὶ is epexegetic.

Aristotle, Met. 3. 4. 1009 a,
expresses the same sense of re-
lief: Καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμένοι
ἀν εἴημεν τοῦ ἀκράτου καὶ κωλύον-
τός τι τῇ διανοίᾳ ὄρίσαι.

10. εἰ μή τι πως] Theætetetus
is to follow the argument, but
Socrates has no intention of re-
linquishing Theodorus, now that
he has dragged him in. This
gives occasion for the banter
which follows.

15. σχοίη] The optative depends
on συνθηκάς. 'As it was agreed
I should, when the discussion
of Protagoras' argument should
be completed.' Supr. 169 C.

p. 183. ΘΕΟ. Νέος ὁν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάνπερ γε βούληται. ἥδιστα μέντ' ἀν⁵ ἥκουσα περὶ ὃν λέγω.

ΘΕΟ. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκῶ, ὃ Θεόδωρε, περὶ γε ὃν κε-
ε λεύει Θεαίτητος, οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι;

ΣΩ. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἱ ἐν ἑστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶ-
μεν, ἥττον αἰσχύνομαι ἡ ἔνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρ-
μενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, αἰδοῖος τέ¹⁵
μοι εἶναι ἄμα δεινός τε. συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ

I. τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους] Viz. Soerates, who, in his character of Seiron (supr. 169 A), is not likely to be over-scrupulous.

3. τῶν ἐπιλοίπων] Viz. the discussion of the Eleatic principle according to Soerates' own proposal, supr. 181 A.

7. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον] 'You challenge cavalry to an encounter in the open plain.'

Sehol.: Ἰππέας προκαλεῖσθαι εἰς πεδίον, ἐπὶ τῶν τοὺς ἐν τισι βελτίους καὶ ἐπιστημονικώτερους αὐτῶν εἰς ἔρι προκαλούμενων. Πλάτων ἐν Θεαίτητῳ καὶ Μένανδρος Καταψευδομένῳ. γράφεται δὲ καὶ Ἰππον εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ἄ βούλεται τις προκαλούντων. The latter interpretation is alone suitable here. For the point is, not that Theætetus is provoking defeat, but that Soerates is eager for the fray.

Theætetus
desires now
to hear the
opposite
theory(that
of rest) dis-
cussed. But
Socrates
declines.
‘Parmenides,
whom
I once saw
in his old
age, in-
spires me,
for his
glorious
depth, with
reverence
and awe.
I fear,
therefore,
lest we

II. Τί δὴ οὖν] Either 'in what respect?' or 'for what reason?' The former is preferable. Theodorus is puzzled, as supr. 161 A. 'How do you mean, Soerates, that you will not comply with his request?' Rep. 5. 449 C: Τί μάλιστα, ἔφην, ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε; Σέ, ἡ δ' ὅσ. "Ἐπι ἕγὼ εἰπον, τί μάλιστα; 'Απορραθνυμένης ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη . . .

12. ἑστός] So Bodl. (though rather doubtfully) with Vat. Ven. II, and other MSS.

15. τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου] Il. 3. 172: Αἰδοῖος τέ μοι ἐστι, φίλε ἐκυρέ, δεινός τε.

16. εἶναι ἄμα] This is the reading of the Bodl. MS. and of T.

συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ . . τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάντι νέος πάντι πρεσβύτῃ] In what connection do these words stand with the Parmenides? Do they imply that Plato had already written it, or that he

should
mistake
his words,
and still
more his
thoughts,
and lest the
crowd of
discussions
which
would
enter in
should

ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ, καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος p. 183.
τι. ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὗτε p. 184.
τὰ λεγόμενα ἔννιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ⁵
πλέον λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὐ ἔνεκα ὁ λόγος
ἥρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι, τί ποτ' ἔστιν, ἀσκεπτον
γένηται ύπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις αὐ-
τοῖς πείσεται· ἄλλως τε καί, ὃν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει

had conceived it? or do they refer to a fact or to a supposition which was the germ from which that dialogue sprang, or which was used to ornament it, by Plato or by some one else? Or did Plato add the present passage after both dialogues had been written? Some light is thrown upon this question by comparing Soph. 217 C: Οἶον (δὶ’ ἐρωτήσεων) καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγ- κάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὡν, ἐκείνου μάλιστη δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσ- βύτου. This passage conveys the impression that the written dialogue is referred to. At all events, the repeated reference helps to mark the Parmenides as belonging to this series of dialogues. (See Introduction.) The same conception of the time at which Parmenides lived, and the same reverence for him, is implied in the words of the Eleatic stranger (his professed disciple), Soph. 237 A: Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὁ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὐσιν .. ἀπεμαρτύρατο .. ὥδε ἔκαστοτε λέγων.

1. βάθος .. γενναῖον] ‘A magnificent depth of mind.’ Schol.: Φαίνεται καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης σεμνύνων τὸν Παρμενίδην.

2. οὗτε τὰ λεγόμενα] It is remarkable to find already in

Plato such a distinct perception of the difference between the grammatical sense and the real drift of an author. The expression ὁ διανοούμενος ἥρμηται occurs in Lach. 190 E.

5. ἀσκεπτον .. λόγων] ‘Should fail to be considered through the endless intrusion of alien subjects of inquiry.’

6. τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων] We pass from the image of a flood (supr. 177 B) to that of a disorderly crowd of discussions. Compare Philebus, 62 C: Βούλει δῆτα, ὁσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπὸ ὅχλου τις ὀθούμενος καὶ βια- ζόμενος, ἡττηθεὶς ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσρεῖν καὶ μίγνυσθαι ὅμον καθαρὰ τὴν ἐνδεεστέραν; See also Shakespeare, Lucrece, 1301, 2: ‘Much like a press of people at a door Throng her inventions, which shall go before.’ For the use of the verb see Rep. 6. 500 B: ‘Ἐπεισκεκωμακότας .. said of the bad philosophers.

εἴ τις .. πείσεται] ‘If we once let them in,—‘give them a hearing.’

7. ἄλλως τε καὶ] ‘Especially as.’ For the paratactic structure cp. Aesch. Pers. 689: “Ἄλλως τε πάντως χοὶ κατὰ χθονὸς θεοὶ | λαβεῖν ἀμείνους εἰσὶν ἢ με- θιέναι.

p. 184. ἀμήχανον, εἴ τέ τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξι' ἀν πάθοι, εἴτε ίκανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐφανιεῖ. δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὃν κνεὶ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολῦσαι.

cause the question about Knowledge to be endlessly deferred.

5

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τούνυν, ὥθε Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἰσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω. ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Transition from Sense to Opinion. We therefore return once more upon our old track, and ask, With what do we see and hear what is white or shrill?

Do we see and hear with our

10

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὁδὸν ἐρωτώγητο τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ὄρᾳ ἀνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὁξέα καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει; εἴποις ἄν, οἶμαι, ὅμμασί τε καὶ ὡσίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγω γέ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὄνομάτων τε καὶ ρήμάτων 15 καὶ μὴ δὶ ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ

swear has been disposed of, but his second is to be evolved through a final criticism of the first. He is now prepared to see the limits of sensation and to pass beyond them. The present criticism was already implied in the language of 179 C.

5. ἀπολῦσαι] ‘To deliver.’

15. Τὸ . . εὐχερές] ‘Facility about words and phrases rather than exactness.’ Cp. supr. 177 E, Polit. 261 E: *Αν διαφυλάξης τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄνόμασι, πλονσιώτερος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσει φρονήσεως. Cp. Arist. Met. 1.3.995 a: Τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβές ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνέρειν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦτον, ὃστε καθύπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι τισι δοκεῖ.

✓

1. εἰ τέ τις, κ.τ.λ.] The reasons given here for avoiding a criticism of Parmenides and the Eleatic doctrine are not such as would prevent its being discussed in another dialogue. It would therefore be a mistake to argue from them against the genuineness of the Sophist. Compare with the expression δὸν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον.. Rep. 5. 450 B: Οὐκ ἴστε ὅσον ἐσμὸν λόγων ἐπεγείρετε.

3. ὃν κνεῖ] Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. δν. Perhaps rightly. Schanz gives κνεῖ, the reading of the Bodleian first hand, and of T.

ὅν κνεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης] Supr. 149 E. This reference to μαιευτική prepares us for the ‘appeal to experience’ in what follows.—A different method is required for the ontological problem.—Theætetetus’ first an-

eyes and
ears, or
through
them?

Not with,
but through.

We are not
each of us
a sort of
Trojan-
horse full
of discon-
nected
faculties.
There is
one pre-
siding na-
ture, in
which
they all
meet. This
is *with*
which we
see *through*
our eyes

ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθε- p. 184.
ρον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπι-
λαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἦν ἀποκρίνει, ἢ οὐκ ὁρθή.
σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὁρθοτέρα, φῶν ὁρῶμεν,
5 τοῦτο εἶναι ὄφθαλμούς, ἢ δι’ οὗ ὁρῶμεν, καὶ φῶν ἀκούο-
μεν, ωτα, ἢ δι’ οὗ ἀκούομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δι’ ὃν ἔκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ,
ὡς Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἴσ.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὡς παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν D
10 ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθη-
ται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι
δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ἔνντείνει, ἢ διὰ τούτων οἷον
ὄργανων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἔκείνως.

15 ΣΩ. Τοῦδέ τοι ἔνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἴ
τινι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὄφθαλμῶν ἐφι-
κνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων
ἐτέρων αὖ τινῶν· καὶ ἔξεις ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοι-

2. ἐπιλαβέσθαι . . . ἢ οὐκ ὁρθή]

'To check your answer and
show where it is erroneous.'
Cp. Rep. 5. 450 A: Οἶον . . εἰρ-
γάσασθε ἐπιλαβόμενοί μου.

9. Δεινὸν γάρ που] 'Would it not be strange, if in each of us there were perched, as in a sort of Trojan horse, a number of separate perceptions, and these did not all meet in some one nature, the Mind or what you will, *with* which, *through* the medium of these, we perceive the various objects of sense?'

10. ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις] The plural is caused by ἡμῖν. As if each of us were a sort of wooden machine, like the Trojan horse ('a sort of Noah's ark,' as we might say).—Man cannot be regarded as a bundle

of separate faculties having no higher unity: that would be too mechanical a conception of his nature. The term 'organ of sense' perhaps originates with this passage. The difference between φῶν and δι' οὗ, direct and indirect instrumentality, is obvious, but difficult to render exactly.

11. ἰδέα is used in the concrete vernacular sense; Thuc. 2. 51: Τοιοῦτον ἦν ἐπὶ πᾶν τὴν ἰδέαν.

15. Τοῦδέ τοι ἔνεκα] 'It is with a view to this that I am so precise with you, namely, to the inquiry whether,' etc. τοῦδε (better than τοῦ δέ) has a double reference to εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν . . αἰσθητά and to εἴ τινι, κ.τ.λ.

18. πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα must mean 'all attributes,' preparing

p. 184. αὗτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἵσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονέν. καὶ μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνει, ἅρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἔκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός;

and hear
through our
ears.

5
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

ΣΩ. Ὡς καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἂ δι' ἐτέρας

p. 185. δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἂ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἂ δι' ὄψεως, δι' ἀκοῆς;

10
But we can-
not see
and hear
through
the same
organ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τι ἅρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἀν διά γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὄργανου, οὐδὲν αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

15

ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρόας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἔστον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἔκάτερον ἔκατέρον μὲν ἔτερον, ἔαυτῷ δὲ ταῦτόν;

20
There are
somethings
which we
perceive
about the
objects of
both senses,
e.g. that
they are
both, that

the way for the suprasensual attributes to be adduced below. For τῷ αὐτῷ ep. Rep. 4. 436 A. In καὶ ἔξεις . . . ἀναφέρειν; the question is put more strongly instead of continuing καὶ εἰ δεῖ ἔνιά γε τῶν τοιούτων ἀναφέρειν εἰς μὴ σωματικόν τι. This passage is differently interpreted by H. Schmidt, who takes εἴ τινι, κ.τ.λ. as hypothetic, and supposes the apodosis to be deferred, where Soerates breaks off at ἵσως δέ, κ.τ.λ.

3. πολυπραγμονέν] Soerates will not, if he can help it, act beyond his part as questioner and μαίευτής.

7. ἂ δι' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως] The object of one sense cannot be perceived by another. Therefore if I perceive anything about the objects of two different senses, it cannot be through either of them.

12. οὐκ ἀν.. αἰσθάνοι' ἄν] 'This cannot be a perception of either sense which embraces the objects of both.'

17. ἢ διανοεῖ] 'I wonder if you have this notion,' i.e. 'Surely you have.' Cp. supr. 145 A; and for the position of ἢ, Rep. 2. 396 B, ἵππους, κ.τ.λ. . . ἢ μιμησονται;

they are different from each other, and each the same with itself. That both are two, and each is one. That they are like or unlike. Through what organ do we perceive these things? If I had asked, through what do we perceive that they are salt, you would have said 'the tongue.'

Through what, then, do we perceive being and not-being, sameness and

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκάτερον δὲ ἔν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλουν,
δυνατὸς εἰ-ἐπισκέψασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Ισως.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῦ διανοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ δι’ ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι’ ὄψεως οἶον τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε τεκμήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἴη ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι, ἀρ’ ἐστὸν ἀλμυρῷ ἡ οὖ, οἵσθ’ ὅτι ἔξεις εἰπεῖν φῶ ἐπισκέψει, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοὴ φαίνεται, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὲ οὐ μέλλει; ή γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ή δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό τ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, φῶ τὸ ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἀ νῦν δὴ ἡρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις

8. τὸ κοινόν] 'That which regards them both.' You can refer any particular sensation to its proper organ. Can you do so in the case of these common perceptions?

Cp. Rep. 7. 522 C: οἶον τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, φῶ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται .. ἐπιστῆμαι .. τὸ ἔν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγιγνώσκειν.

10. ἀμφοτέρω] So B: ἀμφοτέρως T.

16. τό τ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις] 'Which is common not only to these sensible objects, but to all things.' H. Schmidt would confine πᾶσι to objects of sense (sc. τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς), referring τούτοις to φωνῇ,

χρόᾳ, χυμάσ only. Although this is more strictly logical, it seems improbable that the notion of ἐπὶ πᾶσι (and of ἐπὶ πάντων, 186 A) should be thus narrowed.

18. ἀ νῦν δὴ ἡρωτῶμεν] Viz. as Theætetetus understands it, ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀγομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἔν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν, referring to what has just preceded.

'Υπέρευ] This warm praise of Theætetus for dialectical apprehension prepares the way for the unwonted outburst of admiration which follows.

19. περὶ αὐτῶν] Concerning the objects of sense.

p. 185.
B

p. 185. ὅργανα, δι' ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἔκαστα;

difference,
unity and
plurality,
odd and
even?

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἐν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον 5 δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἐρωτᾶς, καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἔπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΣΩ. ‘Υπέρευ, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἀερωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

10

ΘΕΑΙ. ’Αλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἀνέχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλήν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν 15 εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὅργανον ἴδιον ὕσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς η̄ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

Theætetetus answers, that these are perceived through no special bodily organ, but by the mind itself, surveying what is common to all.

Socrates receives his

ΣΩ. Καλὸς γὰρ εἴ, ὡς Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλός τε κάγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὑ̄ ἐποίησάς με μάλα

13. ὅργανον ἴδιον] The Bodl. MS. has ὅργανίδιον.

other instance of this religious feeling, Soph. 265 D : Νῦν μὴν βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἶσθαι σε κατά γε θεὸν αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτη καὶ αὐτὸς νενόμικα. Καλῶς γε, ὡς Θεαίτητε. καὶ εἰ μὲν γέ σε ἥγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων εἴναι, νῦν ἀν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαῖς ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σοῦ καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἀνευ τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτὴ πρόσεισιν ἐφ' ἄπερ νῦν ἐλκεσθαι φῆσι, ἔάσω· χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιπτοῦ γίγνοιτ' ἄν.

17. ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων, κ.τ.λ.] Rep. 3. 402 E.

18. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ] (1) ‘Ad καλῷ ex præcedd. mente repetendum εἴναι, quæ notatu dignum est ellipsis, quum post

answer
with de-
light.
There are
somethings
then which
the mind
itself per-
ceives with-
out the
help of the
body.
Being is
the most
universal
of these.

The Good
and Beautiful
are also
thus per-
ceived.

συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξεις, εἰ φαίνεται σοι τὰ μὲν p. 185.
αὐτὴ δὶ αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ
σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὁ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι
ἔδοκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε.

p. 186.

ΣΩ. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ
μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὡν αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὐτὴν
ἐπορέγεται.

ΣΩ. Ὡς καὶ τὸ ὄμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, καὶ τὸ ταύ-
τὸν καὶ ἔτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
κακόν;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα
πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη

haec *πρὸς* δὲ τῷ καλῷ non inferatur nominativus, verbo *εἰ* vel addito vel subaudiendo, velut infertur Sympos. 195 C: Νέος μὲν οὖν ἔστι, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἀπαλός...’ Heind. (2) ‘Præter hoc pulchrum, quod in te laudavi.’ Stallb.

The latter (2) is right. ‘Besides this beauty you have shown, you have done me a kindness...’ Cp. Eurip. Hec. 382: Καλῶς μὲν εἴπας, θύγατερ, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῷ | λύπη πρόσεστιν. Thuc. 4. 98. 2. The phrase in Symp. 195 C ought to be similarly construed.

6. τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάν-
των παρέπεται] I.e. ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοι-
νῶν ἔστι (supr. 185 C). It will
serve therefore as a sort of
crucial instance.

9. ἐπορέγεται expresses Plato's
notion of the intuitive action

of the mind (*νόησις*), not as mere contemplation, but as a passionate outgoing. Rep. 6. 490 A B.

15. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα] In this and similar phrases the article retains its demonstrative force, as is evident where the words are separated; e.g. Euthyd. 303 C: Ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο με-
γαλοπρεπέστερον. Soph. ΟΕδ. Col. 742: Ἐκ δὲ τῶν μάλιστ' ἔγω.

16. πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι] ‘To consider in relation to each other’: viz. as opposites.

Theætetus is probably thinking of the recent argument in which ἀγαθόν, ὡφέλιμον, μέλλον, were identified. The ‘idea of good’ is still regarded by him ‘hypothetically,’ and, as it were, from beneath. But he is no longer capable of the fallacious admission into which he fell unwarily, supr. 157 D. The

p. 186. ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλη λοντα.

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δή· ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὅ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἄλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνει πειράται ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει.

question pressed by H. Schmidt, 'How past and future enter into the notion of honour,' is hardly present in the Greek, but may be answered by the familiar example of an act of ordinary courage, in which the fear of future disgrace overcomes that of instant danger. The sense of honour emphatically belongs to a creature of 'large discourse, looking before and after.'

ἀναλογιζομένη] 'Thinking over the past and present with a view to the future.'

3. Ἐχε δή] 'Hold there!' Socrates sees his opportunity of furthering the argument by applying the last expression of Theætetus, and therefore bids him pause over it.

7. Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν] Sc. τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ. 'The fact that they exist' (Germ. 'Dasein'). In this and similar passages Plato may be said to be appealing to the consciousness of his reader.

All such ideas the mind immediately contemplates, surveying with a view to the future the present and the past:—e.g. The quality of hardness is perceived through the touch. But that it is, that it is opposite to softness, and that

9. ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα] Returning upon (reviewing) the sensations, it perceives the Being of their objects, and comparing these together, perceives their opposition, and the Being of this again.

12. Οὐκοῦν, κ.τ.λ.] For the rarity of Reason cp. Rep. 4. 428, Tim. 51 E: Καὶ τοῦ μὲν πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν φατέοι, νοῦ δὲ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύτι.

14. ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει] 'Extend to the mind.' Cp. Tim. 64 B: Τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν εὐκίνητον.. καὶ βραχὺ πάθος .. διαδίδωσιν .. ἐπὶ τὸ φρόνιμον .. τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον ἔδραιον δὲ .. ἀναίσθητον παρέσχε τὸ παθόν.

Phileb. 33 D: Θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἔκαστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὸν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῇ ἐκείνην ἔσσαντα, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἴόντα, καὶ τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἔκατέρῳ.

this opposition *is*, the mind itself seeks to decide, returning over its sensations, and comparing them.

The one power belongs to all live creatures from their birth : the other is slowly attained, and only by some men. Sensation does not reach being, there-

τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ p. 186.
ώφελειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων
καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἀν καὶ παραγίγνηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

5 ΣΩ. Οἵν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ὡς μηδὲ οὐσίας ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου
ἐπιστήμων ἔσται ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὡς Σώκρατες ;

10 ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπι-
στήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας
γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μέν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατὸν
ἄψασθαι, ἐκεὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

1. ἀναλογίσματα] ‘But what the mind discovers by reflecting upon these.’ The idea of proportion (*τὸ ἀνάλογον*) does not seem to enter into the verb ἀναλογίζομαι and its derivative noun. ἀναλογίζεσθαι is rather *εἰς εἰδός τι ἀναφέρειν τῷ λόγῳ*.

οὐσία] German critics raise the doubt whether οὐσία is to be taken in the same sense throughout this passage. Plato had not present to his mind the distinctions between ‘Sein,’ ‘Dasein,’ ‘Wesen,’ ‘Fürsichsein,’ etc., but if one meaning is to be held throughout, it is rather the ‘fact’ (‘Dasein’) than the ‘mode’ (‘Wesen’). If this is emphasized, μηδέ (l. 6) retains the force of ‘not even.’

5. ὡς μηδὲ οὐσίας] (1) ‘Ad dat. hunc ὡς repetendum est οἶν τε (potestne illud verum assequi quod ne οὐσίαν quidem assequi potest ?), ut declarant illa mox, Ξύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸν καλεῖς αἴσθησιν ; Ανάγκη. Ωἶτε, φάμεν, οὐ μέτεστιν

ἀληθείας ἄψασθαι, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.’ Heindorf. And so H. Schmidt.

But (2) in the present connection ὡς is probably masculine. ‘Is it possible for him to reach truth who misses truth?’ (Wohl-rab assents to this.) There is a transition in the next question from the subject to the object, from *αἰσθανόμενος* to *αἰσθητόν*. ‘But can one have knowledge of that, the truth of which he misses ?’ A third way may be mentioned, but only to be rejected, viz. (3) making ὡς instrumental dative. ‘Can one reach truth with that,’ etc. Schanz reads οὐ from Heindorf’s conj.

11. ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλο-
γισμῷ] Something very different from syllogism is meant, and more nearly analogous to generalization. Cp. Phædr. 249B: Δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἰ-
δος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν Ἰον αἰσθή-
σεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον.
Phil. 41 C.

p. 186. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ταῦτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖσθαι σαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕκουν δὴ δίκαιον γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκεῖνῷ ἀποδίδωσι ὄνομα, τῷ ὥρâν, ἀκούειν, ὁσφραίνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι;

ε ΘΕΑΙ. Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. Ξύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸν καλεῖσθαις αἴσθησιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὡι γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἄψασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀν εἴη ποτέ, ὡς Θεαίτητε, αἴσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταῦτον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται, ὡς Σώκρατες. καὶ μάλιστά γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο δὲν αἴσθησεως ἐπιστήμη.

9. Ὡι is neuter here—referring to the fem. αἴσθησιν.

12. Οὐδέν ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης] The genitive is governed by μέτεστιν alone. ἀληθείας and οὐσίας are governed partly by μέτεστιν, partly by ἄψασθαι.

16. μάλιστά γεννῦν καταφανέστατον] For the double superlative cp. Rep. I. 331 B: 'Αλλά γε ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θείην ἀν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὡς Σώκρατες, πλούτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι.

17. καταφανέστατον γέγονεν] The criticism of Sensation is now complete. We see it clearly, as relative, shifting, momentary, inseparable from physical conditions: we have placed ourselves above it, and proceed to explore the region next beyond,

fore it fails of truth, and is not knowledge. This lies not in our impressions, but in that which the mind collects from them.

Sensation, therefore, has no share in knowledge. They are wholly distinct.

We have found what knowledge is not. Our aim was to find what

that of Opinion.

To recapitulate the criticism of ἐπιστήμη αἴσθησις. 1. Certain presumptions are raised against the saying ἀνθρώπος μέτρον, as that it makes all beings equally wise, and that it implies that we can at once know and not know the same thing. 2. Protagoras is convicted out of his own mouth, for in confirming the opinion of other men he confutes himself. 3. There is at least one sphere of knowledge which is above sense, the foresight of consequences, the perception of what is good. 4. And within the sphere of sense, if sensation depend on motion, and motion include change, no quality can be so much as named. 5. The mind

it is. Yet we have gained something. We shall not seek for it any more in sensation, but in whatever that is called, when the mind is by itself engaged with being. Opinion is the name for this.

We venture accordingly on a second definition:—

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' οὐ τι μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἔνεκα ἡρχόμεθα p. 187.
διαλεγόμενοι, ἵνα εὔρωμεν τί ποτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη,
ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν,
ώστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ'
5 ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὄνόματι, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν
αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε καλεῖται, ὡς Σώκρατες,
ὡς ἐγῶμαι, δοξάζειν.

ΣΩ. 'Ορθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὡς φίλε. καὶ ὄρα δὴ νῦν
10 πάλιν ἔξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἔξαλείψας, εἴ τι
μᾶλλον καθορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθα. καὶ
λέγε αὖθις τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὡς Σώκρατες,
ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδής ἔστι δόξα. κινδυνεύει δὲ
15 ἡ ἀληθῆς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καί μοι τοῦτο ἀποκε-
κρίσθω. ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ φανῆ προϊοῦσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν,
ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν.

receives impressions from without through certain bodily organs; but knowledge implies the comparison of the impressions received through different organs, and this must be the immediate function of the mind. The whole of this last section should be compared with Rep. 7. 522-6.

5. ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὄνόματι] 'But in that other term, whatever it is, which is applied to the mind when engaged alone with being.'

The form of expression is partly influenced by the words (186 D), Τί οὖν ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα; κ.τ.λ. The distinction between ὄνομα and ρῆμα is not observed here.

10. πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἔξαλεί-
ψας] As if in a mathematical demonstration.

13. Δόξαν] δόξα follows naturally upon αἴσθησις. Charm. 158 E, 159 A: Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἴ σοι πάρεστι σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γάρ που πον ἐνοίστων αὐτήν, εἴπερ ἔνεστιν, αἴσθησίν τινα παρέχειν, ἔξ ἦς δόξα ἀν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη ὃ τί ἔστι καὶ δποιόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη.

As in finding the mathematical δύναμις Theætetus used a word which had been employed in the previous inquiry, so here. But hitherto δόξα has been bound up with φαντασία and αἴσθησις, and even where Socrates had preserved the distinction between apprehension and judgment (179 C), this had passed unnoticed.

16. ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν] Se. φαίνεται.

17. ἄλλο τι ('something else') is not adverbial here.

p. 187. ΣΩ. Οὗτω μέντοι χρή, ὃ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὥκνεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐὰν γὰρ οὗτω δρῶμεν, δυοῦν θάτερα, ἢ εὐρήσομεν ἐφ' ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἡττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὁ μηδαμῆ ἵσμεν· καὶ τοι οὐκ ἀν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος. 5 καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φήσ; δυοῦν ὅντοιν *εἰδέοιν δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἔτερου, τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην δρίζει;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ αὖτις μοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτ' ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν 10 πάλιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Θράπτει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολ-
λάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς
ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο 15
τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν

II. Knowledge is true opinion.

But, still
to return
upon a for-
mer track,

Is false
opinion
possible?

3. ἐὰν . . . δρῶμεν] For the first person cp. infr. 210 B.

6. *εἰδέοιν] MSS. ἰδέαν.
'εἰδέοιν ex emend. apogr. H.' Schanz.

10. ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν] 'To take up a thread of the previous argument.'

Though we have dismissed the saying of Protagoras, so far as it is bound up with sense, τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι, (φαντασία being σύμμεξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, Soph. 264 B), yet the same question returns upon us in regard to opinion considered by itself. This forms a link of connection between the present inquiry and the foregoing. Cp. Cratyl. 429 D:

*Ἄρ' ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται δ λόγος; συχνοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὃ φίλε Κρατύλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι.

See also Euthyd. 284 A, 286 C, where the ἀπορία (ὅτι ψεύδεσθαι, ἀντιλέγειν, οὐκ ἔστιν) is ascribed to the followers of Protagoras amongst others. It has generally, however, been associated with the name of Antisthenes.

15. τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν]
'This experience of the human mind.' Cp. supr. 155 A.

18. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι]
Though the past discussion has been 'wiped out,' this still remains 'to trouble the mind's eye.' Badham would read

ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον ἔάσωμεν αὐτὸν ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα p. 187.
ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἴ πέρ γε καὶ ὅπη-
οῦν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ
5 Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ως οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοι-
οῖσδε κατεπείγει.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς ὑπέμνησας. ἵσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ και- E
ροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν. κρείττον γάρ που
σμικρὸν εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἰκανῶς περᾶναι.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδῆ φαμὲν
ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καὶ τινα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῆ,
τὸν δ' αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ, ως φύσει οὔτως ἔχόντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμὲν γὰρ δή.

1. In re-
gard to
everything

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τόδε γ' ἔσθ' ἡμῶν περὶ πάντα καὶ p. 188.
καθ' ἔκαστον, ἦτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν

ἢ θράττει, but the asyndeton is expressive. δή also has been changed to δέ (Buttmann), but without reason.

2. ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον] I. e. not with reference to sensation and motion (supr. 164, 167, 171, 180), but in a more abstract way. The new ‘manner’ has something in it of the Eleatic spirit. For the expression compare Soph. 245 E: Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὐτὸν θεατέον.

3. ὁπηοῦν] The Bodl. has ὁπηγοῦν. But the second γε is awkward, and ὁπηοῦν has good authority in T.

6. κατεπείγει] Supr. 172 D.

8. πάλιν ὥσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν] We seemed to ourselves to be launching into a wholly new inquiry, but we have fallen into the same track by

a different route. Cp. Aristot. Eth. 1. 7. 2: Μεταβαίνων δὴ δόλογος εἰς ταῦτὸν ἀφίκται. Aesch. Prom. 845: Ταῦτὸν μετελθὼν τῶν πάλαι λόγων ἵχνος.

κρείττον . . . περᾶναι] This is said in order to obviate the discouragement which may be felt at having to return again upon our footsteps. Cp. Soph. 261 A B.

13. ἔχόντων is neuter. For the plural cp. Rep. 2. 375 C: Ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικε.

16. ἦτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι] Socrates here takes up the thread of reflection introduced above, 165 B: Ἡρόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο δὲ οἴδε μὴ εἰδέναι; It was one weakness of the sensation doctrine that it led to this contradiction. The same opposition considered in the abstract is now used to

p. 188. γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὅντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι· νῦν γὰρ ήμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἔστιν οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἔκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἦδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὥν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸν ἢ μὴ εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον. 10

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὕ;

ΣΩ. Ἐρ' οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων, ἀ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἔτερα ἄττα ὥν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ ἀμφότερα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, ὡς Σώκρατες. 15

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀρα, ἀ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἔτερα ἄττα ὥν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτο ἔστι τῷ μήτε Θεαί-

prove the impossibility of falsehood in opinion.

The discussion which follows probably bears some relation to the notions of Gorgias, and perhaps of Antisthenes. At all events it would seem to be a fragment of Eleaticism; being exactly analogous to the difficulties raised by Zeno against the possibility of motion. It runs parallel also to the subtleties of the later Megarians.

1. μεταξὺ . . . λέγω] The construction follows the analogy of χαίρειν ἔω. Cp. Soph. 258 E, where the phrase again occurs in a loose construction.

2. νῦν γὰρ ήμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἔστιν οὐδέν] Because we choose to dwell on the absolute alternative, knowledge or igno-

rance. Cp. supr. 158 E: Μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν, κ. τ. λ., where a limited 'Standpoint' is similarly emphasized.

Plato thus hints at the true solution of the difficulty, viz. the conception of a gradual process, which is afterwards presented under the image of the impressions on wax, etc.

The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις which had been developed in the Meno and Phædo, is perhaps also held in reserve.

5. λείπεται] 'Remains' — when learning and forgetting are left out.

6. ἤδη] 'Since that point is settled.'

7. ὥν τι οἶδεν] For τι thus interposed cp. infr. 192 A.

12. ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων] The articles refer to supr. 187 E.

one of two alternatives is true of us. Either we know it, or we do not know it. (The intermediate processes of learning and forgetting may be left out of sight as beside our present argument.)

In thinking, therefore, I must think of something which I know, or which I do not know.

But I cannot know and be ig-

norant of
the same
thing.

Therefore I cannot think falsely, for I cannot think one thing which I know to be another which I know, else I should know it and not know it.

Nor can I think what I do not know to be something else which I do not know, for what I know not cannot be present to my mind. Nor can I think what I do not

τητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν p. 188.
ώς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν;

ΣΩ. Ἐλλα' οὐ μήν, ἡ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἴεται που ἀ μὴ 5. οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδὲ αὖ ἀ μὴ οἶδεν, ἀ οἶδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γάρ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν τις ἔτι ψευδῆ δοξάσειεν; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν που δοξάζειν, ἐπείπερ πάντ' ἡ ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται 10 δυνατὸν ψευδῆ δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα' οὖν οὐ ταύτη σκεπτέον ὁ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ιόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μή;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὄτουοῦν δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάσει, κανὸν ὑπωσοῦν ἀλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ.

4. Ἀλλ' οὐ μήν . . . ἀ οἶδεν]

'But surely when a man knows anything, he cannot take for that thing one which he does not know, nor for what he does not know can he take what he knows.' Cp. infr. 191 A, and note.

5. αὐτά] Cp. Phaed. 99 B: Ὁ δή μοι φαίνονται . . . ως αἴτιον αὐτὸν προσαγορεύειν: and see 155 E.

6. Τέρας] Supr. 163 D, and note: Τέρας γάρ ἄν εἴη ὁ λέγεις. Phaed. 101 B, alib.

9. ἐν δὲ τούτοις] 'And under this alternative,' viz. as developed in the above instances.

12. ὁ ζητοῦμεν] The Bodl. MS., by an obvious error, has ἔζητοῦμεν. Cp. Polit. 276 C:

^c 'Ο λέγομεν, and v. rr.

13. εἶναι] So the Coislinian MS. and the corrector of T. Most MSS. have εἰδέναι.

16. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ] 'May not the case possibly be simply thus?' μὴ expresses suspicion = 'I should not wonder if.' Cp. Phaed. 67 B: Μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἢ. Ibid. 69 A: Μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὗτη ἢ ἡ ὁρθὴ ἀλλαγή, κ. τ. λ., μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή. Crit. 48 C: Μὴ . . . ταῦτα . . . σκέμματα ἢ: and see Ast, Lcx. sub v. For ἀπλοῦν in this sense cp. supr. 147 C: 'Απλοῦν εἰπεῖν. Symp. 183 D. Polit. 306: Πότερον οὔτως ἀπλοῦν ἔστι τοῦτο ἢ . . . ἔχει διαφοράν . . . Aristot. Eth. N. 5. 9. 9: ^dΗ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν.

p. 188. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γ' αὖ, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τις
ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ· Δυνατὸν δὲ ὄτῳοῦν ὁ τλέγεται, καὶ τις
ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὃν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὅντων του
εἴτε αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτό; Καὶ ἡμεῖς δή, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς 5
ταῦτα φήσομεν Ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οἴηται οἰόμενος.
ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ὡς οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ὥρᾳ μέν τι, ὥρᾳ δὲ οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἐν γέ τι ὥρᾳ, τῶν ὅντων τι ὥρᾳ.
ἢ σὺ οἶει ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οἱ ἄρα ἐν γέ τι ὥρῶν ὃν τι ὥρᾳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

p. 189. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἐν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὃν
ἀκούει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

3. ὁ τλέγεται] ‘Which is herein asserted.’ Buttmann and Bekker conjecture λέγετε, which seems probable, but not necessary. Cp. Phæd. 77 D: ‘Αποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγεται καὶ νῦν, where there is a similar doubt.

II. εἰ] Interrogative. ‘I mean to ask whether (for example) a man who sees something, sees no single thing?’

13. εἰ ἐν γέ τι ὥρᾳ] The converse argument is used Rep.

5. 478 B (where it is asked, ‘What is opinion concerned with?’): ‘Η οἵν τε αὖ δοξάζειν

know to be what I know, nor what I know to be what I do not know.

And what other case (under the above alternative) is conceivable?

2. The path of knowledge being thus hemmed in, we try the path of being. To think that which is not, is to think falsely.

10

But can I think of what is not, either absolutely or with reference to anything?

I cannot see, and yet see nothing.

15

μέν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν; ’Αδύνατον. ’Αλλ’ ἐν γε τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζων; Ναί. ’Αλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὃν γε οὐχ ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατ’ ἀν προσαγορεύοιτο. Πάνυ γε. This close relation between the ideas of unity and being, derived from Parmenides, appears frequently.

See especially Soph. 237 D: ‘Ανάγκη τόν τι λέγοντα ἐν γε τι λέγειν. The mind cannot recognise Being except where it finds its own impress of Unity.

Ar. Met. 3. 4. 1006 b: Οὐδὲν γάρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἐν.

20

And that which I see, being one thing, must have existence. For unity and being are inseparable. The same is true of hearing and touch,

And of thought also.

To think what is not is to think nothing, and to think nothing is not to think.

False opinion, if it exists, must be something different from this.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δῆ του, ἐνός γέ του ἄπτεται p. 189.
καὶ ὅντος, εἴπερ ἐνός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἐν τι δοξάζει;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ἐν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὅν τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ξυγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὃν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ώς ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἶν τε τὸ μὴ ὃν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ
τῶν ὅντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλο τι ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ
μὴ ὅντα δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλο ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ *τε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε ώς ὀλίγον πρότερον
20 ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδῆς ἐστι δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δή.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα ὥδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγο-
ρεύομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

13. περὶ τῶν ὅντων] Arist. Met. 3. 2. 1004 a: Ἀπόφασιν δὲ καὶ στέρησιν μᾶς ἔστι θεωρῆσαι διὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρως θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν, οὗ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἡ ἡ στέρησις (ἡ γὰρ ἀπλῶς λέγομεν ὅτι οὐχ ἵπάρχει ἔκεινο ἡ τινι γένει, κ.τ.λ.)

19. Οὐ *τε γάρ] MSS. οὐ γάρ. τε seems required (as Van Heusde observed), but γάρ is right. Cp. 190 E: οὔτε γάρ ταύτη, κ.τ.λ.

οὔτε ώς ὀλίγον πρότερον] Viz. κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, 188 C.

22. Ἀλλ' ἄρα ὥδε γιγνόμενον] 'But may it be supposed, then, that what we express by this name arises in the following way?' 'In what way?' 'That what we call false opinion is really a sort of crossing of opinions.'

p. 189. ΣΩ. Ἐλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῆ φαμὲν εἶναι
εἰδόξαν, ὅταν τίς τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὖτε τῶν ὄντων,
ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ, φῆται εἶναι. οὗτος γὰρ ὁν
μὲν ἀεὶ δοξάζει, ἔτερον δέ ἀνθ' ἔτέρου, καὶ ἀμαρ-
τάνων οὐ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἀν καλοῦτο ψευδῆ δοξά- 5
ζων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν
γάρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν
δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ.

ΣΩ. Δῆλος εἶ, ὡς Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ 10
οὐ δεδιώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μάλιστα;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν, οἴμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους
διάντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος εἰ οἶόν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ
κοῦφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐ- 15
τοῦ φύσιν ἄλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίγνεσθαι
ἐντῷ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρ-
ρήσης, ἀφίημι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ὡς φῆται, τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ
δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε.

3. Can it then be a cross-application or transferrence of thought: i.e. When I think one existing thing to be another? Theætetus believes this must be the true falsehood.

Socrates claims credit for moderation in not pressing this contradiction in terms, and passes on.

20

1. [Ἄλλοδοξίαν] This seems to have been a prevalent conception. Vid. Arist. Met. 3. 5. ΙΟΙΟ Α: Φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ταῦτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἐκτόρα, ὡς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς, κείσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα, ὡς φρονοῦντας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτά. He ascribes this application of Homer to Democritus, de An.

1. 2. Cp. Herod. 1. 85: Ἀλλογνώσας τὸν Κροῖσον.

[φαμέν] In apposition with the preceding verb, introduced by ὡδε.

This third case is linked

on to the second, but is not, as H. Schmidt supposes, a subdivision of it. The three cases are (1) thinking what we do not know, (2) thinking what is not, (3) thinking cross-wise.

13. τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους] Rep. 2. 382 A: Τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἶόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν. Phil. 23 B: Ἄρα ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ήδονήν.

17. ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρρήσης] Supr. 163 C: Ἰνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. He refers to the boldness with which Theætetus now answers, supr. 187 B: Οὗτοι . . . χρὴ . . . λέγειν προθύμως.

When I take one thing for another, I must have either one or both things in my mind,

Either at once or in turn.

Now thought is the mind's self-dialogue, in

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἔτερόν τι ὡς p. 189.
ἔτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκένο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Οταν οὖν τοῦθ' ή διάνοιά του δρᾶ, οὐ καὶ
5 ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἥτοι ἀμφότερα ή τὸ ἔτερον διανο- ε
εῖσθαι;

*ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν. ἥτοι ἄμα γε ή ἐν
μέρει.

*ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἅρ' ὃ περ ἐγὼ
10 καλεῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν;

ΣΩ. Λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ή ψυχὴ διεξέρ-
χεται περὶ ὧν ἀν σκοπῆ. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀπο-
φαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἵνδάλλεται διανοούμενη, οὐκ

2. ὡς ἐκένο] Referring to the first *ἔτερον*.

5. τὸ ἔτερον] 'The one or the other.' *ἔτερος* here = *alteruter*.

7. ἥτοι ἄμα γε ή ἐν μέρει] The bearing of these words is not quite clear. Perhaps they are meant to introduce the analysis of thinking, in which things are present to the mind at first successively, afterwards in one view. Most MSS. arrange the persons thus: Θε. 'Ανάγκη μὲν οὖν. Σω. Ἡτοι . . μέρει; Θε. Κάλλιστα. Σω. Τὸ δὲ . . καλεῖς; (In the Bodl. MS., however, it is not clear that the double colon after *οὖν* is in the first hand, and *ἥτοι κ.τ.λ.* is given to Socrates in continuation as in our text.) Hirzel, followed by Schanz, gives *ἥτοι . . μέρει* to Theætetus, and *κάλλιστα* to Socrates. *Theæt.* 'Certainly, either at once or by turns.' Soc. 'Well said; but I wonder if your conception of the thinking-

process agrees with mine.' There is much to recommend this arrangement, which is adopted also by H. Schmidt. He proposes, however, to delete the words *ἥτοι . . μέρει*.

Compare with the following account of thinking Phileb. 38 C, 39, where the mind not only talks with itself, but has a writer and a painter within it: Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμᾶς . . , κ.τ.λ. Soph. 263 E: Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταῦτόν πλὴν δ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἀνεν φωνῆς γιγνόμενος, κ.τ.λ.

12. Λόγον is here used in the first of the three meanings given below, 206 D.

13. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδώς] 'As one who does not know,' 'who is not to be supposed to know.' The use of *μὴ* assists the ironical tone of Socrates, who avoids categorical statements. 'You must not assume that I speak as if I knew.'

14. τοῦτο γάρ μοι] Plato was

p. 190. ἄλλο τι ἡ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴν ἔαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον, εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπαίξασα, τὸ αὐτὸν ἥδη φῆ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ 5 καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτόν. σὺ δὲ τί;

question
and answer.
When it
has agreed
with itself
upon a final
answer, we
call this its
opinion.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κάγώ.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ φῆσίν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἔαυτόν. 10

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἀναμιμήσκου δὴ εἰ πώποτ’ εἰπεις πρὸς σε-
αυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχρόν ἔστιν

Opinion is
a silent
proposi-
tion.
To think
this to be
that, is to
say, 'This
is that.'
Now who
ever said

probably thinking of Odyssey 19. 224: 'Ἐρέω, ὡς μοι ἵνδαλλεται ἥτορ. Compare the φάσματα in the beginning of the dialogue. 'The semblance which the mind presents to me, when it thinks, is simply that of conversing, and of being engaged in question and answer with itself.'

2. ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα] 'But when it has come to a determination, whether slowly, or by darting swiftly to its conclusion, and so is now at one and not divided in judgment, we call this its opinion.'

13. παντὸς μᾶλλον..παντάπασιν ἄρα .. ἀνάγκῃ] These adverbs give an almost dramatic vividness to the description of the process of thought. Note especially the liveliness of *τοι*, which some critics have rejected. Cp. Phil. 38 C: Αὐτὸν .. ἀνέροιτ' ἀνῶδε .. τί ποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν ..

The Greek language from Homer downwards was peculiarly apt to suggest such re-

flections as these. διαλεκτική was its proper development. The following remarks of Col. Mure (Lit. of Greece, 2. 14. § 1) on the self-dialogue of Homer, apply in some degree to all Greek literature: 'Exclusively proper to Homer is his power of dramatizing, not merely action, but thought; not merely the intercourse between man and man, but between man and himself, between his passions and his judgment. The mechanism of which the poet here chiefly avails himself is to exhibit the person under the influence of excited feelings as communing with, or, as Homer defines it, addressing his own mind; discussing the subject of his solitude under its various aspects as a question at issue between his judgment and himself. The conflicting feelings are thus, as it were, personified; while the current of the language, often the very sound of the words, is

to himself,
'Surely fair
is foul,' or
'wrong is
right,' or
'odd is
even'?

ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον, ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον, p. 190.
σκόπει εἴ ποτ' ἐπέχειρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παν-
τὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον
οὐδὲ ἐν ὑπνῷ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν
ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἄρτιά ἐστιν ἢ τι
ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλον δέ τινα οἴει ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον σ-
τολμῆσαι σπουδῆ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀναπείθοντα
αὐτόν, ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ὑππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἐν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν
ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφότερά γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ
ἔφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῦν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἀν καὶ δοξάσειν
ὡς τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερόν ἐστιν. ἔατέον δ' *ἔσται σοι τὸ

Therefore
when I mis-
take this
for that, I
cannot
have both
in my mind.

so nicely adapted to the turns of the self-dialogue, that the breast of the man seems to be laid open before us, and in the literal sense of the term, we read his thoughts as they flit through his bosom.'

4. ἐν ὑπνῷ . . . ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον] Note the liveliness with which fresh touches are thrown in. It must be remembered here that sensible perception is excluded from consideration for the present, as well as learning and forgetting. Everything is either known or unknown: present to the mind, or not present.

8. ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον] These words have been unreasonably questioned, on the ground that no limit can be set to the illusions of madness. Not to dwell on the general weakness of such minute philosophy,—the critics forget that

τὸν βοῦν is the ox, *thought of as such*. Cp. the words ἀμφότερά γε . . . τῇ ψυχῇ just below. This reference to the extreme case of madness which has been already cited (supr. 157 E) is quite in Plato's manner.

15. ἔατέον δ' *ἔσται] These words are intended to meet the difficulty which may have been felt about the general statement (*τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον*) ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερόν ἐστιν, in supr. B. Several of the MSS., including Bodl. and Coisl., have ἔατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἔτερον τῷ ἔτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταῦτόν ἐστι περὶ τοῦ ἔτέρου, where ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει evidently refers to 189 E: "Ητοι ἂμμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει. This cannot be adopted without rejecting περὶ τοῦ ἔτέρου as confusing the sentence. The drift would then be, 'You must not dwell upon the words as regards

p. 190. ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἔτερου. λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα δοξάζειν ως τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ', ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐώ τε καί μοι δοκεῖ ως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. "Αμφω μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εοικεν.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἔτερόν γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον μηδαμῆ, οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον ιοῖναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις. ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἀν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὐ μὴ δοξάζει.

But if I
think only
of the one,
I cannot
think the
one to be
the other,
for I can-
not have in
my mind
that of

things alternately presented to the mind, seeing that the word ἔτερον, as far as the word goes, is the same as applied to both.' This would be an imperfect way of developing the distinction thrown out above, and unlike Socrates, who, especially in this dialogue, always waits for Theaetetus to follow him. And it is equally necessary to 'let the word alone,' whether the objects are conceived alternately or both at once. The words ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει may therefore confidently be rejected as a mistaken gloss.

If the words ἐπειδὴ . . . ταῦτόν ἔστι are genuine, περὶ τοῦ ἔτερου must either be omitted or transposed. But it is possible that ἐπειδή, κ.τ.λ., has also crept in from the margin, and this suspicion is so far confirmed by the fact that the Bodl. p. m. wrote ἔστιν. We thus revert to the reading of T and several MSS. ἔτετον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἔτερου. περὶ is often used rather

vaguely, e. g. Rep. 7.538 E: Καὶ περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ. If δὲ καὶ σοὶ is retained, καί may be understood with reference to supr. 189 D, where Socrates takes credit for not pressing the words ἀληθεῖς ψεῦδος. 'You, too (as I did in the former case), must let the word alone in regard to the Other.'

But this is rather strained. The version of Ficinus led some critics to conjecture εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ. But this, as Buttmann observes, would not harmonize with Theaetetus' reply. I have ventured to change δὲ καὶ σοὶ to δὲ ἔσται σοι, an emendation which has often occurred to me in reading the passage. For the sense cp. Euthyd. 301 A, where the word is dwelt upon: Τίνα τρόπον, ἔφη, ἔτερον ἔτερῳ παραγενομένον τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον ἀν εἴη; Ἐάρα τοῦτο, ἔφην ἔγω, ἀπορεῖς; . . . ἀλλ' ἔγωγε οὐδὲ ἀν παῖδα φύμην τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι ως οὐ τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερόν ἔστιν.

12. ἀναγκάζοιτο . . . δοξάζει]

which I
am not
thinking.

This trans-
ference,
therefore,
is also in-
conceiv-
able.

We are
in great
straits.
But we
dare not
face the
conse-
quences of
failure un-
til we have
turned
every
stone.

ΣΩ. Οὗτ' ἄρ' ἀμφότερα οὕτε τὸ ἔτερον δοξάζοντι p. 190.
ἐγχωρεῖ ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὡστ' εἴ τις ὥριεῖται δόξαν. ἐνναι ε
ψευδῆ τὸ ἔτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἀν λέγοι· οὕτε γὰρ ταύτη
οὕτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν ήμῶν οὖσα
δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὡς Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φα-
νήσεται ὅν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ
ἄποτα.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα δή;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἐρῶ σοι πρὸν ἀν πανταχῇ πειραθῶ σκο-
πῶν. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἀν ὑπὲρ ήμῶν, ἐν φῷ ἀποροῦ-
μεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οἷα λέγω. ἀλλ' ἐὰν
εὑρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότ' ἦδη περὶ τῶν p. 191.
15 ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων, *αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γε-
λοίου ἐστῶτες· ἐὰν δὲ πάντη ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινω-

These words are clearly given to Theætetus in the Cesena MS., as well as in Heindorf's edition.

3. οὕτε γὰρ ταύτη] 'The truth is, that the existence of false opinion in our minds does not appear on this any more than on the (two) former grounds.' The clauses, though connected outwardly by γάρ, are rather parallel than consequent, as in 152 C. Cp. also supr. 182 B. In all these places some would change γάρ to ἄρα.

8. πολλὰ . . καὶ ἄποτα] E.g. that it is impossible to distinguish the sophist from the true philosopher; and the other difficulties brought out in the Sophistes.

11. πειραθῶ σκοπῶν] For the participial construction (in fa-

miliar use with πειράομαι) cp. supr. 187 A: Ἡρχόμεθα διαλεγό-
μενοι.

12. αἰσχυνοίμην . . λέγω] 'I should feel ashamed on our behalf, if, while we were still in doubt, the strange consequences I refer to were pressed upon us.'

15. *αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου
ἐστῶτες] 'When we are ourselves free from the absurdity,' 'exempt from the ridicule.' This point is not attained in the Theætetus; and this whole passage may be regarded as an anticipation of the Sophistes.—The MSS. have πά-
σχοντες αὐτά (sc. τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι
ὁμολογεῖν τοιαῦτα, Wohlrab). But
Ast's correction, αὐτοί, is extremely probable. Heind. conjectures πάσχοντας αὐτό, αὐτοί,
κ.τ.λ.

p. 191. θέντες, οἷμαι, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἀν βούληται. ἢ οὖν ἔτι πόρον τινὰ εὑρίσκω τοῦ ζητήματος ήμῖν, ἄκουε.

1. παρέξομεν . . πατεῖν] Gorg. 475 D: Γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὕσπερ ιατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνουν, alib. There is an allusion to the proverbial situation described in Soph. Aj. 1142 foll.: "Ηδη ποτ' εἴδον ἀνδρ' ἐγὼ γλώσσῃ θρασὺν | ναυτὰς ἐφορμήσαντα χειμῶνος τὸ πλεῖν· | φένδυμ' ἀν οὐδὲ ἀν εὑρες ἥνικ' ἐν κακῷ | χειμῶνος εἰχετ', ἀλλ' ὑφ' εἴματος κρυβεῖς | πατεῖν παρέχεται θέλοντι ναυτὶλων. The position imagined is something like that reached at the end of the Parmenides. The point is of course the despair of a bad sailor in a storm. Naber's conjecture, *ναυαγοῦντες*, is unnecessary, and his alternative, *ὡς ναυτὶλως ἀξιοῦντες*, is clumsy as well.

The argument from 187 to 191 may be thus condensed:—

We no longer search for knowledge in sensation, which is neither true nor false, but in opinion, where the mind is engaged with its own objects by itself. But here an old difficulty meets us in another form. It seemed that sensation could not be false, because it was relative to the subject. It now seems as though opinion cannot be false, because a thinking subject is necessarily related to knowledge and being. What I do not know cannot be present in thought. Neither can I lay hold in thought on that which is not. But can I take one thing which *is* for another which also *is*? Thought being silent speech, if I lay hold of both, (i.e. if both are present to the mind,) I cannot

mistake them; e.g. No one ever said to himself, Good is evil. And if only one is present to me, I cannot discourse about them, e.g. if I am thinking only of the good, I cannot say, Good is evil. We are in great straits. For the result at which we seem in danger of arriving is contradictory to most important facts.

We must not appeal to these, however, until we have extricated our minds, if possible, from this metaphysical tangle. For logical and metaphysical difficulties are not to be solved 'ambulando,' but by a higher criticism of the forms of thought which have occasioned them.

In what follows, we are brought gradually back from the simple to the complex, from the more abstract to the more concrete. We are compelled to image to ourselves, what was discarded at a former stage of the inquiry (supr. 188 A), a process between the relativity of sense and the absoluteness of knowledge, which, like every process, admits of degrees. Thus, it may be said, the idea of Motion returns upon us in a higher form.

The mind is a storehouse of old impressions, in which we are continually looking for the types of new ones. But the old impressions fade and get confused, and we fail to bring them with precision and clearness into contact with the new. Hence we sometimes think falsely.

We said it was impossible that I should think what I do not know to be what I know, else I should be ignorant of what I know.

But perhaps it is possible in a certain way; e.g. Theætetus knows Socrates, and yet may

p. 191.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὄρθως ὁμολογῆσαι, ἥνικα ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἃ τις οἶδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἢ μὴ οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ ψευσθῆναι· ἀλλά πη δυνατόν. B

5 ΘΕΑΙ. ³Αρα λέγεις ὁ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα ἥνικ' αὐτὸς ἔφαμεν, τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνίοτε ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὄρῶν ἄλλον ὃν οὐ γιγνώσκω, φήθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὃν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οἷον λέγεις.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἢ ἵσμεν, ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὥδε· ἵσως πη ἥμῖν συγχωρήσεται, ἵσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν c

2. *ἥνικα, κ.τ.λ.*] Supr. 188 C: 'Αλλ' οὐ μῆν, κ.τ.λ. This passage proves that the phrase nearest to *εἶναι* in all these expressions is the subject, and the more remote phrase, generally preceding it, contains the predicate.

5. *τότε ὑπώπτευσα*] This surmise was naturally suggested by the impossible case, which had been just stated, of Theætetus being mistaken for Socrates by one who knew neither of them.

6. *τοιοῦτον εἶναι*] Sc. αὐτό, τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι. *τοιοῦτον* supplies the antecedent to *ὅ*. Others (Stephanus, H. Schmidt) omit the comma after *ἔφαμεν*, and take *τοιοῦτον* as = *ἀδύνατον*.

13. *οὗτῳ*] So as to imply knowledge of what we do not know.

ὥδε· *ἵσως*] This is the punctuation of the Bodleian MS. καὶ *ἵσως*, the reading of T and other MSS., is unnecessary. A qualifying clause is sometimes

thus introduced before ἀλλά— without any particle of connection with what precedes. Compare Soph. El. 450: Σμικρὰ μὲν τάδ', ἀλλ' ὅμως | ἄκω, δὸς αὐτῷ. Φεδ. Col. 1615: Σκληρὰ μέν, οἶδα, παῖδες· ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ μόνον | τὰ πάντα λύει ταῦτ' ἔπος μοχθήματα. Eur. Alc. 353: Ψυχρὰν μέν, οἶμαι, τέρψιν· ἀλλ' ὅμως βάρος | ψυχῆς ἀπαντλούν ἄν. Supr. 171 C: Εἰκός γε ἄρα . . . ἀλλ' ἥμῖν ἀναγκή, κ.τ.λ. Compare also the frequent asyndeton with *πάντως*. For *ἵσως . . . ἵσως* δέ cp. Apol. 18 A: "Ισως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἵσως δὲ βελτίων ἀν εἴη . . . 'Perhaps the difficulty will not resist our treatment, or perhaps it will.'

14. *συγχωρήσεται . . . ἀντιτενεῖ*] Cp. Soph. 254 D: 'Εὰν ἄρα ἥμῖν πη παρεικάθῃ τὸ μὴ δὲ λέγουσιν ὡς ἔστιν οὗτως μὴ δὲ ἀθώσις ἀπαλλάττειν. Rep. 1. 348 E: Τοῦτ' ἥδη στερεώτερον, and, for a similar forlorn hope, Rep. 5. 453 D.

ἀλλὰ γάρ] 'But we must

p. 191. τοιούτῳ ἔχόμεθα, ἐνῷ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὖν εἴ τι λέγω. ἀρα ἔστι μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὕστερον μαθεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐθις ἔτερον καὶ ἔτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὕ;

ΣΩ. Θὲς δή μοι λόγου ἔνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κῆρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, δ καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου, ἔστι δὲ οἷς μετρίως ἔχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι.

ΣΩ. Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν

risk the chance of failure, for, etc.

3. *μαθεῖν*] The tense is noticeable. Whatever difficulty may attend the conception of the process of learning and forgetting (*μανθάνειν*, *ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι*), it is certain that things are learnt and forgotten (*μαθεῖν*, *ἐπιλελῆσθαι*). In what follows the process itself is imagined rather than analysed.

7. Θές] Cp. Phileb. 33 D : Θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν . . παθημάτων τὰ μέν, alib. The image (which was repeated in later Greek philosophy) is not unlike Locke's illustration of the different kinds of memory. Hum. Und. 2. 10. §§ 4, 5 : 'The brain in some retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like freestone, and in others little better than sand.' Ib. 29. § 3 : 'If the organs or facultics of perception, like wax overhardened with cold, will not receive the impression of the seal from

the usual impress wont to imprint it, or like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it when well imprinted; or else, supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with sufficient force to make a clear impression—in any of these cases the print left by the seal will be obscure.'

8. *κῆρινον ἐκμαγεῖον*] Plato's image is not the common one of a waxen tablet, but of a 'block of wax,' such as was used for sealing. The word *ἐκμαγεῖον* is used first of the whole mass, afterwards of those parts of it which have received the particular impressions. 'Hanc notionem Plato a Pythagora videtur mutuatus esse. Cp. Hemsterhusius ad Poll. 9. 130.' Wohlrb.

10. *σκληροτέρουν*] Sc. τοῖς μέν. Cp. supr. 159 B, note on *καθεύδοντα δή*.

13. *τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρός*] Hes. Theog. 54, Aesch. Prom. 461 : *Μνήμην θ' ἀπάντων μοι σο-*

mistake
another
whom he
sees but
does not
know, for
Socrates
whom he
knows.

II. a. *Hypothesis of the waxen block.*

We return
therefore
in part to
the concep-
tion of a
process,
which may
be de-
scribed by

means of the following image. Each of us has in his mind a block of wax, on which he receives the stamp of those sensations and perceptions which he wishes to remember. That which he succeeds in stamping there is remembered and known so long as the impression lasts, but that of which the impression

Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ ἐσ τοῦτο, ὁ τι ἀν p. 191.
βουληθῶμεν μνημονεῦσαι ὡν ἀν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν
ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι
καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα
ἐνσημανομένους. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀν ἐκμαγῆ μνημονεύειν
τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἔως ἀν ἐνῆ τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ· ὅταν
δ' ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἶν τε γένηται ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπιλε- ε
λῆσθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστω οὕτως.

10 ΣΩ. Ὁ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δέ
τι ὡν ὄρᾳ ἢ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ ἄρα τοιῷδε τρόπῳ ψευδῆ
ἀν δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίω δή τινι;

ΣΩ. Ἄ οἶδεν, οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ἀ οἶδε, τοτὲ δὲ
15 ἀ μή. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὡμολο-
γήσαμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἀδύνατα.

μήτορ' ἐργάτων. Plat. Euthyd. 275 D: Καθάπερ οἱ πουηταὶ δέομαι
ἀρχόμενος τῆς διηγήσεως Μούσας
τε καὶ Μνημοσύνην ἐπικαλέσθαι.

1. ἐσ τοῦτο . . ἀποτυποῦσθαι]
'To stamp them upon this, as if we were taking on it the
impressions of seal-rings.'

2. ἀκούσωμεν] ἀκούωμεν B T.

3. ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν] This addition is occasioned by the account of δόξα given above in 184–187, and prepares the way for the case which follows, infr. 195 E. But, although stated here, it is not immediately applied.

ὑπέχοντας αὐτό] 'Holding it'
(the wax) 'to receive our perceptions and thoughts.'

4. ἀποτυποῦσθαι] Sc. ήμᾶς.

ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνση-
μανομένους] For the image of the seal cp. Phæd. 75 D, where

it is used of the mind impressing its own idea of Being upon things.

6. ὅταν δ' ἐξαλειφθῇ] 'Ven. II.
corr. ὁ δ' ἄν. Bodl. et Vat. δέ
omittunt.' Schanz. The Bodl.,
however, has δ' in the margin
by a later hand. The common
reading is sufficiently probable:
the regularity of the sentence
is broken by the introduction of
ἔως ἄν, so that instead of ὁ δ' ἄν
we have ὅταν δέ. Cp. supr. 158
E: Ὁ ἀν . . ὅταν, and notes.

10. αὐτά] Viz. ἀ ἀν ἴδῃ καὶ
ἀκούσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἐννοήσῃ (supr.)

Although I know what is present to me in sensation, i.e. though I may have in me a previous impression of the same thing, yet I may mistake it, i.e. fail to identify it, when present, as the original of that previous impression.

is rubbed out, or is imperfectly made, is forgotten and not known.

For what I know in this way I may mistake, sometimes what I know, sometimes what I do not know.

Mistake is impossible between things both of which are thus known but not present to sense; nor indeed is error possible in any case

p. 191. ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις;

p. 192. ΣΩ. Δεῖ ὥδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διορίζομένους, ὅτι ὁ μέν τις οἶδε σχὼν αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή, τοῦτο οἰηθῆναι ἔτερόν τι ὡν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθα- 5 νόμενον δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὅ γε οἶδεν αὖ, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδ' ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ μὴ οἶδεν αὖ· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ οἶδε· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται γε, ἔτερόν τι ὡν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθῆναι εἶναι· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται, ὡν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ 10 αἰσθάνεται, ὡν μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὡν αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἔτι γε αὖ ὡν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἰηθῆναι αὖ ἔτερόν τι ὡν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὖ καὶ ἐκεί- νου τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἔτι 15 ἐκείνων, εἰ οἶόν τε. καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων

2. ἐξ ἀρχῆς διορίζομένους] ‘Laying down the following preliminary aphorisms.’ These are in fact a restatement of the points already agreed upon. There is a change of subject= δεῖ ἡμᾶς λέγειν.

6. ὁ γε οἶδεν] Sc. μὴ αἰσθανό-
μενος. I. e. not supposing him
to have a sensible perception
of either object.

8. καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται γε] Sc. μὴ εἰδώς. I.e. not supposing him to know it. Both the above cases are distinguished from that in which the predicate is something both known and perceived.

13. καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν] He holds the stamp left by the former sensation in a line with the present sensation, so that the two impressions coincide. Cp. inf. 194 B: Καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθύ.

This is added so as to bear upon the case below, C D: Ὡν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, κ.τ.λ.

16. The second ὁ is justly questioned by Bonitz.

ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον ὄρθως] Cp. such expressions as ὄρθοις ὅμ-
μασι, ἐξ ὄρθης φρενός.

The above statement may be put shortly thus: Mistake is impossible—1. Between things not perceived by sense, when we know both or one or neither of them. 2. Between things not known, when we have a sensible impression of one or both or neither of them. 3. Still more impossible, if that may be, between things, (a) both of which are known, both perceived by sense, and the knowledge of each of which is identified with its proper sensation: (b) One of which we know and also perceive sensi-

without sensation.
Still less when two things are known and present to sense, and when the sensation and the old impression coincide : or when neither is present to the mind at all.

But when something, either known or unknown, is present to sense, and the mind brings to meet the

τὸ μνημεῖον ὄρθως, ὃ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ ὁ p. 192.
οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων κατὰ ταῦτα, ὃ αἰσθάνεται·
καὶ ὁ αὖ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ σ
αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε.
5 καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται.
πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς
ψευδῆ τινὰ δοξάσαι. λείπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, εἴ
πέρ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ἐν τίσι δή; ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον
10 μάθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἔπομαι.'

ΣΩ. 'Ἐν οἷς οἶδεν, οἰηθῆναι αὐτὰ ἔτερ' ἄττα εἶναι
ῶν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται· ἡ ὅν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται
δέ· ἡ ὅν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὅν οἶδεν αὖ καὶ αἰσθά-
νεται.'

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν πολὺ πλεῖον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε.

bly, and identify the knowledge of it with the sensation : (c) Both or either of which we neither know nor perceive sensibly.

The only cases left, in which mistake is possible, are (1) when one thing is known and another perceived sensibly ; or (2) when two things are known and also present to sense, but we fail to connect knowledge and sensation rightly.

3. καὶ ὁ αὖ μὴ οἶδε .. ὁ μὴ αἰ-
σθάνεται] In order to exhaust every conceivable case, the converse or negative of each of the foregoing cases, in which knowledge and sense were combined, must be fully stated.

6. ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμίᾳ] Cp. supr. B: 'Αδυνατώτερον ἔτι ἔκείνων
εἰ οἶδν τε. The genitive is governed by ἀδυναμίᾳ. 'All these cases are beyond everything in regard to the impossibility of

any man's thinking wrongly in any of them.' Cp. supr. 180 A.

9. ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω] 'For perhaps if you state them, I may better perceive your meaning.' Cp. supr. 156 C: 'Εάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. The question here = λέγε.

11-14. 'Ἐν οἷς .. αὖ καὶ αἰ-
σθάνεται] Error arises amongst things already known, when we mistake for these either (1) other things already known and now perceived through sense, or (2) something now perceived by sense but not previously known, or (3) when for something known and perceived we mistake something else which is also perceived and known. Cp. supr. 191 A: 'Ηνίκα,
κ.τ.λ., and note.

15. ἀπελείφθην] 'I am lost.' For this use of the aorist of the immediate past, where a person reflects on his own state,

p. 192. ΣΩ. Ὡδε δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οὗτος ἔστι, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταῦτα, ἄλλο τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὅρῳ αὐτούς, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὕτω, καὶ ἀπτομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν, τοτὲ δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἀκούω ἡ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δὲ 5 αἰσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ὑμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἥττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ;

sensation
her old
impression
of a dif-
ferent
thing—
then the
mind mis-
takes.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὡν βούλομαι δηλώσαι, ως ἔστι μὲν ἀ οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ 10 αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔστι μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο. 15

ΣΩ. Ἰδὲ δή, ἔάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίσπη. Σωκράτης p. 193. ἐπιγιγνώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὅρᾳ δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἰσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν· οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν ἐαυτῷ δοξάσειεν ως ὁ Θεαίτητος ἔστι Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἡ οὐδέν; 20

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, ἀληθῆ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἦν ὡν ἔλεγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων 25 ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώσκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέτερον, οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὖ οἰηθείην, ὃν οἶδα, εἴναι ὃν μὴ οἶδα.

cp. Soph. Aj. 693: "Ἐφριξ" ἔρωτι περιχαρής δ' ἀνεπτόμαν, alib. ἀπολειφθῆναι is the opposite of ἐφέ-πεσθαι.

I. Ὡδε δὴ . . ἄκουε] Cp. supr. 182 A B.

16. Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ.] This putting of the case is equivalent to an hypothetical clause: hence the use of μηδέτερον and the apparent asyndeton in οὐκ ἄν ποτε, κ. τ. λ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθῶς.

p. 193.

ΣΩ. Τρίτον δέ, μηδέτερον γιγνώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθανόμενος οὐκ ἀν οἰηθείην, ὃν μὴ οἶδα, ἔτερόν τιν' εἶναι βῶν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τάλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ' ἔξῆς νόμιζε πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω, οὔτε γιγνώσκων οὔτε ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μέν, τὸν δὲ οὐ γιγνώσκων. καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταύτα, εἰ ἄρα ἔπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔπομαι.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται τούννυν τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι ἐν τῷδε, ὅταν γιγνώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ κηρίνῳ ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σφῷν ἀμφοῖν τὰ σημεῖα, σδιὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἴκανῶς ὄρῶν ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκατέρου σημείου ἀποδοὺς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὄψει, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἵχνος, ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἴτα τούτων ἀποτυχών καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἑκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἢ καὶ οἵα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀρι-

False opinion is the wrong putting together of sensation and thought.

13. διὰ μακροῦ, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Seeing both of you imperfectly far off, I endeavour to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and to make the latter stand in its own foot-print, so as to fit, that recognition may take place; and then failing to do so, and bringing the new and old stamps cross-wise like men who put their sandals on the wrong feet, . . .’

14. ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι] Sc. τὴν ὄψιν. These words and the following (*ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις*) suggest an allusion to Aesch. Choeph. 205-211: Καὶ μὴν στίβοι γε, κ.τ.λ.

17. παραλλάξας] Cp. for the

metaphorical use of this word (which here retains something of its literal sense) Tim. 71 E: Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔννους ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς, ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ὑπνον . . . πεδηθείσ· . . . ἡ διὰ νόσου ἡ διά τινα ἐθνουσιασμὸν παραλλάξας.

18. ἡ καὶ οἵα] ‘Or my mind errs being affected in the same way as the sight is affected in looking at a mirror, when it shifts so that right becomes left.’ Vision is conceived of as flowing from the eye to its object. Cp. Tim. 43.

19. δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεούσης] ‘Shifting, right-side to left.’ The words have given some trouble. Buttmann conjectured *μεταφερούσης*, Hein-

p. 193. στερὰ μεταρρεούσης, ταῦτὸν παθὼν διαμάρτω· τότε
δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἐτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εοικε γάρ, ὡς Σώκρατες· θαυμασίως ὡς
λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.

ΣΩ. "Επι τοίνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρους γιγνώσκων 5
τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γιγνώσκειν αἰσθάνωμαι, τὸν δὲ μή,
τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν ἔχω,
ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καί μου τότε οὐκ
ἔμάνθανες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

10

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γιγνώσκων τὸν ἐτέρον
εκαὶ αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν
αὐτοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οἴήσεται εἶναι αὐτὸν ἐτερόν
τινα ὃν γιγνώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνῶ-

dorf says 'medelam a libris expecto.' Stallb. conjectures δεξιᾶς εἰς ἀριστεράν. But (1) may not δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερά be an adverbial expression, originating in apposition? Thus: 'Ἡ ὄψις μεταρρεῖ δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερά (i.e. τὰ δεξιὰ αὐτῆς εἰς τὰ ἀριστερά)' — when the case of ὄψις changes, δεξιά remains unchanged. Compare ἀνω κάτω στρέφων, Phædr. 278 D; and especially Soph. Ant. 340: Ἰλλομένων ἀρότρων ἔτος εἰς ἔτος, where some MSS. have ἔτους εἰς ἔτος metro repugnante, showing that a similar difficulty had been experienced there. (2) Riddell (Digest of Idioms, § 2) explains δεξιά as in agreement with an unexpressed cognate accusative. (3) It is better to adopt Butt-mann's conjecture than to take μεταρρεούσης causatively.

1. The phrase ταῦτὸν παθὼν contains the antecedent to οἰα.

3. ὡς] So Bodl. and other MSS., but some have φ. 'Your description tallies wonderfully with one's experience of what Opinion is.' The other reading (which is possibly right) requires a comma at Σώκρατες, 'One's experience of opinion tallies wonderfully with your description.' (Ces. 2. Schanz is silent about the reading of T.)

7. τοῦ ἐτέρου] Viz. of the former, which is present to sense.

8. ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν] This refers to the expression τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν ἔχειν. Cp. supr. 192 B C.

11. Hcind. would insert ὃ before γιγνώσκων: but for the transition from the 1st to the 3rd person when the nominative is indefinite cp. infr. 195 D E: Οἰηθείημεν . . . οἰηθείη.

14. ὃν γιγνώσκει] This is the Bodleian reading, which seems

σιν αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν. ἦν γὰρ p. 193.
τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Παρελείπετο δέ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν
5 ὥδη φαμὲν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γι-
γνώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὁρῶντα ἡ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν p. 194.
ἔχοντα ἀμφοῖν, τῷ σημείῳ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἰσθη-
σιν ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον οἴεντα
παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ψεῦ-
10 δος ἄρα ὠνόμασται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκότως γέ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῇ αἰσθησις τῶν
σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῇ
παρούσῃ προσαρμόσῃ, πάντη ταύτη ψεύδεται ἡ διά-
15 νοια. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ οἶδε τις μηδὲ ἐπή-
σθετο πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ψεύδεσθαι β
οὔτε ψευδῆς δόξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑγιὲς λέγομεν. περὶ
δὲ ὧν ἴσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις

preferable to *ῶν*, the reading of T. The reference of *ἐκείνου* is thus made more distinct.

I. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο;] ‘We agreed to this?’

6. ἡ τινα . . . ἔχειν] ‘Or having some other sensible perception of them, to fail in holding the previous impressions of both, each over against the sensation which belongs to it.’ This reading of Van Heusde is supported by T and other MSS., which read *τῷ σημείῳ*. The Bodl. has *τὸ σημεῖον*. Stallb. reads *τὸ σημεῖον . . . ἑκατέρου*, Heindorf, *τῶν σημείων . . . ἑκάτερον*.

8. ἀλλ’ οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον]
I. e. we try, sometimes in vain, to make our memory coincide

with present facts. We are beginning to have a livelier conception of the movement of the mind and of the remoteness of sensible things from our notions of them.

I2. Καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν] ‘So likewise when,’ etc. In the former case both objects were known, and both present in sensation: in this, while both are known, one only is present to sense.

I3. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως] Sc. σημεῖον.

I4. προσαρμόσῃ] Sc. ἡ διάνοια.

I5. ἐπήσθετο] Sc. αὐτῶν. Most MSS. read μηδὲ ἐπήσθετο, but the correction of the Bodl. is in the ancient hand.

I8. ἐν αὐτοῖς . . . ἡ δόξα] ‘Here, and here alone, opinion twists

p. 194. στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίπτεται ἡ δόξα ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς γιγνομένη, καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθῆς, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκοῦν καλῶς, ὡς Σώκρατες, λέγεται; 5

ΣΩ. "Επι τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἔρεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τἀληθὲς δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν 10 μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως *ἀργασμένος ἦ, τὰ ιόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημανόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη "Ομηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ δόμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα 15 ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ίκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά

and twirls about, becoming true and false alternately.' Cp. the language of Rep. 5. 479 D: "Οτι τὰ τῶν πολλάν πολλὰ νόμιμα... μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται, κ.τ.λ.

3. ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους] (1) τύπος is here the present impression, which we endeavour to fit into the mark left by the former one (*ἀποτύπωμα*). τύπος can scarcely be (2) 'the form of the object.' This would be inconsistent with the previous use of the word, 192 A.

6. μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἔρεις] Plato is satirizing the fallacy of supposing that physical illustrations can serve to explain the operations of the mind.

10. φασίν] This may or may not imply a reference to some contemporary doctrine. It indicates the half mythical tone which Socrates has assumed. He knows nothing

of himself, but only repeats what he has heard.

12. *ἀργασμένος] 'Tempered.' This word has been restored from Timaeus to Suidas, the latter of whom quotes this passage. MSS. εἰργασμένος.

τὰ ιόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων . . . ἐνσημανόμενα . . . καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα ἐγγιγνόμενα] The thread of the sentence is resumed in an altered form. Cp. Polit. 295 D: Πᾶν τοιωτον . . . ξύμβαινον . . . γέλως ἄν . . . γίγνοιτο τῶν τοιωτῶν . . . Phæd. 69 B C: Χωριζόμενα δέ, κ.τ.λ.

14. κέαρ] The Homeric form is κῆρ. But κέαρ, although still a poetical form, might be felt to harmonize better with Attic Greek. See above, 173 E, and note.

16. ίκανῶς . . . ἔχοντα] 'Being adequate in respect of their depth.'

The cause of this lies in the nature of the waxen block, which may be either too shallow, or too hard, or too soft, or too narrow, or

impure, whence the impressions are either imperfect or faint, or short-lived, or crowded, or coarse and dim, so that it is difficult for the mind to make each sensation correspond to its proper footprint.

τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, p. 194. ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἶτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὅντα ταχὺ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἀ δὴ ὅντα καλεῖται. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. ‘Υπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. “Οταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἦ, ὁ δὴ επήγνεσεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες

2. *τῶν αἰσθήσεων]* ‘Do not fail in identifying the new impressions with the old.’ The genitive depends on *παραλλάττουσι*, like *τοῦ σκοποῦ* above.

3. *σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὅντα . . . καλεῖται]* (1) There is here a similar irregularity to that noticed above. The sentence begins as though it were to be *σαφῆ γὰρ . . . ὅντα* (sc. *τὰ σημεῖα*) *ταχὺ εὐρίσκουσιν*, or something of the kind: but the thought grows as we proceed: and *σαφῆ . . . ὅντα* is left as an accusativus pendens. What follows is to be construed thus: *ταχὺ διανέμουσιν* (*οἱ τοιοῦτοι ταῦτα*) ἀ δὴ ὅντα καλεῖται, *ἔκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκμαγεῖα*. ‘Such persons quickly distribute things (as we term them) each to the place of its own former impress upon the block.’

Or (2) *ἐκμαγεῖα* may possibly here, as in Legg. 7. 800, 801, mean the mould or form of the seal which gives the impression. Cp. supra, note on *ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους*, (2). This gives a simpler construction and a good meaning, but *ἐκμαγεῖα* is used in the other sense infr. E. ‘For they quickly assign

them (*τὰ σημεῖα*) as being distinct, and having room enough, each to its proper (sensible) original, or so-called reality.’

5. ἀ δὴ ὅντα καλεῖται] Supr. 152 D: ⁸Α· δὴ φαμεν εἴναι, 153 E. The latter part of the dialogue does not forget the earlier part.

σοφοῖ] Supr. 161 D, 167 B.

8. *λάσιον . . . κέαρ]* Il. 2. 851: Πυλαιμένεος λάσιον κῆρ. 16. 554: Πατροκλῆος λάσιον κῆρ. In Homer the epithet ‘shaggy’ is transferred from *στῆθος* to *κῆρ*,—but is here understood of a rugged surface that will not take clear impressions. The wisdom of Homer consists in his knowing of the *κηρός*, rather than in his praise, which is, of course, mistaken. But Plato is satirizing the allegorical method of interpretation, which may have been often not less absurdly applied.

9. ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής] To appreciate the irony here, it is well to compare Soph. 233 D E, where the parallel is drawn between the man who ‘creates’ everything and the man who knows everything; as well as Rep. 10. 596, εqq.

p. 194. καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόν, ὥν μὲν ὑγρόν, εὐμαθεῖς μέν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίγνονται, ὥν δὲ σκληρόν, τάναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχύ, λιθῶδες τι ἡ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ἔμπλεων, ἔχοντες, ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἵσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ 5

p. 195. καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ γίγνεται ἀμυδρά. ἐάν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπ' ἄλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ἢ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, ἐάν του σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν 10 οὗτοι γίγνονται οἷοι δοξάζειν ψευδῆ. ὅταν γάρ τι ὁρῶσιν ἢ ἀκούωσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, ἔκαστα ἀπονέμειν

3. τάναντία] I. e. δυσμαθεῖς μέν, μνήμονες δέ. Plato is again thinking of the rare combination of brilliancy with solidity, which is present in Theætetus, *supr.* 144 A.

λάσιον] ‘Shaggy.’ Here, as in the case of βλοστυρός, we experience what is a frequent difficulty in Plato, that of determining the precise ethical meaning with which he adapts an Epic word.

4. λιθῶδες τι] ‘Those in whom it is shaggy and rugged, a gritty substance, or one filled with an admixture of earth or dung.’ The correction λιθῶδες τε (*Ficin. Heusd.*) avoids the inconsistency of putting as a single case what are spoken of above as two (λάσιον . . . ἢ . . . κοπρῶδες): ‘In whom it is shaggy and rugged and stony, or full of the admixture of earth or dung.’

10. ψυχάριον] Cp. Rep. 7. 519 A: ‘Ως δριμὺν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον.

12. ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν] Cp. *supr.* 191 D: *Η αὐτὸι ἐννοήσωμεν.

It may be asked, whether these expressions do not provide for the difficulty that is raised afterwards about 11 and 12? The answer probably is, that the difficulty which is brought into full light afterwards, is here silently anticipated. (Compare the introduction of ἀγαθόν and καλόν in 157 D, and the deliberate slurring over, in 188 C, of the case which is afterwards to be recognized, 191 A. The inconsistency must be admitted, but it is not necessary, with H. Schmidt, to condemn the words.

The case supposed, though not distinctly stated, may be that in which an impression of sense calls up an alien association: i. e. the second of the two cases given above, 194 A.

As we dwell upon the image we have raised, we find that it is too simple to express more than the relations of sense and memory, and instead of multiplying κήρων πλάσματα, a fresh image is in-

ταχὺ ἔκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι καὶ ἀλ- p. 195.
λοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί τε καὶ παρακούουσι καὶ
παρανοοῦσι πλεῖστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὖ ὅντοι ἐψευ-
σμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ω̄ Σώκρατες. ^β

ΣΩ. Φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δῆ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς.

10 ΣΩ. Ἡδη οὖν οἰόμεθα ἰκανῶς ὠμολογήσθαι ὅτι
παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω τὰ δόξα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Υπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Δεινόν τε, ω̄ Θεαίτητε, ω̄ς ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει
καὶ ἀηδὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολέσχης.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δέ; πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἰπες;

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ω̄ς σ

troduced in Plato's usual manner. The touches of humour have led some critics to suppose that Plato is alluding to contemporary opinions (supr. 191 C, note on l. 8). But may he not be laughing at himself?

The description of the act of recollecting in the Philebus, 34 B, should be compared with the present passage: "Οταν ἀ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχε πάθη ἡ ψυχή, ταῦτ' ἀνεν τοῦ σώματος αὐτῇ ἐν ἔαυτῇ δι τι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνῃ, τότε ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι που λέγομεν. ἡ γάρ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτε αἰσθῆσεως εἴτε αὖ μαθήματος αὐθις ταύτην ἀναποδήσῃ ἐν ἔαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ξύμπαντα ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμας που λέγομεν. The former and simpler process corresponds to the search for the impression upon the wax;

the latter to the hunt in the aviary for a missing bird.

ἐκαστα . . ἔκαστοις] (1) τὰ ὄντα τοῖς ἔκμαγειοις, or (2) τὰ σημεῖα τοῖς οὖσιν. See above, note on σαφῆ γάρ, κ.τ.λ. (194 D, l. 3).

1. ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες] 'Misappropriating,' i. e. 'Assigning wrongly.'

3. καλοῦνται αὖ ὅντοι] αὖ refers to supr. 194 D: Καὶ σοφοί δὴ ὅντοι καλοῦνται. ἀμαθεῖς is the opposite of σοφοί, the words ἐψευσμένοι τε δὲ τῶν ὄντων being inserted by way of explanation.

13. Δεινόν τε] The old editions had γε. The abruptness of the reading in the text is better than such a meaningless connection. Socrates breaks out, after a pause, with an expression, the relevancy of which does not at once appear.

p. 195. ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἂν τις ἄλλο θεῖτο ὄνομα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἐλκῇ τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ἡ δυσαπάλλακτος ἀφ' ἔκαστου λόγου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις;

5

ΣΩ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὁ τι ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἂν τις ἔρηται με. ⁷Ω Σώκρατες, εὕρηκας δὴ ψευδῆ δόξαν, ὅτι οὗτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσίν ἐστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὗτ' ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν; Φήσω δὲ ἐγώ, οἶμαι, ¹⁰ καλλωπιζόμενος ὡς τι εὑρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν.

But, when we consider it, the hypothesis is not adequate to the phenomena.

E.g. The numbers eleven and twelve are not objects of sensation, but of thought, i.e. they are impressions on the waxen block, and yet in adding 7 and 5 people sometimes take eleven instead of twelve.

ΘΕΑΙ. ⁷Εμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὖ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν δὲν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὥρῳμεν δὲ οὗ, ἵππον οὐκ ἂν ¹⁵ ποτε οἰηθείημεν εἶναι, ὃν αὖ οὗτε ὥρῳμεν οὗτε ἀπτόμεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ; Ταῦτα, οἶμαι, φήσω λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὄρθως γε.

^E ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ^{*}φήσει, τὰ ἔνδεκα, ἀ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἡ ²⁰ διανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰηθείη δώδεκα εἶναι, ἀ μόνον αὖ διανοεῖται; Ἰθι οὖν δή, σὺ ἀποκρίνου.

ΘΕΑΙ. ⁷Αλλ' ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ὅτι ὥρῶν μὲν ἂν τις ἡ

2. ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἐλκῇ τις] Compare the still livelier image supr. 191 C: 'Ἐν φῷ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν.'

when unaccompanied by sensation. (Cp. supr. 190 C.) The opposition between these two cases is expressed by *αὖ*. Most MSS. have *φῆσει*. But *φῆσει* is in Par. 1812.

14. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι *αὖ*] 'Is it not then part of your hypothesis, he will say, that on the other hand . . .' If mistake arises upon the wrong union of sensation and thought, thought cannot be mistaken

16. ὁν *αὖ*] 'Which again,' i.e. as well as the man.

20. ^{*}φήσει] Bodl. *φῆσις* with Vat. Ven. II. *φῆσι* T. Stephanus corr.

έφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ ἔνδεκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἀ μέντοι p. 195.
ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα
δοξάσειεν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἵει τινὰ πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ
5 πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἑπτὰ καὶ p. 196.
πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μηδ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ'
αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, ἢ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ
έκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι,
ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἥδη πώποτε ἐσκέψατο
10 λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτ' ἐστί, καὶ ὁ
μέν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἔνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἢ
πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ
ἔνδεκα· ἐὰν δέ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπήται,¹⁵
μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἷμαι γάρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλ-
λον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.

7. αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά] The insertion of the article after αὐτά does not seem necessary, though it may possibly be right.

ἐκεῖ . . . ἐν τῷ ἔκμαγείῳ] ‘In that block of which we spoke.’

μνημεῖα] ‘Records.’ At this stage of psychological inquiry, Memory is made to do the work of Abstraction.

9. εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων] The question is resumed with εἴ, depending on λέγω, which has broken the regularity of the sentence. ‘I mean to ask if . . .?’ If the sentence had proceeded regularly, it would be followed by σκεψάμενον . . . εἶπεν. But εἴ τις, κ.τ.λ., follows λέγω = ἐρωτῶ.

10. λέγων πρὸς αὐτόν] Soocrates refers to his own description of the process of thinking, supr. 189, 190.

14. ἐὰν δέ γε] Theætetus is permitted to enlarge a little upon the subject of calculation, with which he is familiar (supr. 145 D). We seek to identify the sum of 7 and 5, of which we have thought (ἐπενοήσαμεν) with the corresponding number in our minds: and by mistake we identify it with 11 instead of 12.

The statement of this case shows the inadequacy of the figure we have adopted. For where are the 7 and 5 and the sum of them of which we think? They are not in sensation: must they not then be in the waxen block? The former difficulty returns — we have taken one thing which we know for another thing which we know.

p. 196. ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ οἴει. καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μή τί *τότε γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἐνδεκα οἰηθῆναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔσοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τὸν πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λό- 5 γους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθών, ὁ οἶδεν, ἔτερον αὐτὸν οἴεται εἶναι ὡν αὐτὸν οἶδεν, ὁ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ σημαγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἄμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἰσθησιν παραλλαγήν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἡτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς δόξα, ἢ ἡ τις οἶδεν, οἶόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων 15 πότερα αἱρεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀπορον αἴρεσιν προτίθησ, ὥς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔασειν. δῆμος δέ, πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον, τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν; 20

1. *τότε] MSS. πότε. Heind. corr. οἰηθῆναι, sc. τὸν σκοποῦντα.

5. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τὸν πρώτους] ‘The discussion has reverted to its first stage.’ Supr. 188 B. Comparing Phil. 43 C, one is tempted to read ἄν ἥκοι.

8. ἡμαγκάζομεν . . ἀναγκάζοτο] ‘It was by this very argument we tried to make the non-existence of false opinion inevitable, because otherwise it would be inevitable that the same person should know and be ignorant at once.’

11. ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν] ‘Anything but this.’ So Bodl. Most MSS. give ἄλλο τι οὖν.

18. ἀμφότερα] Viz. τὸ εἶναι ψευδῆ δοξαν and ἡ τις οἶδεν οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι μὴ εἰδέναι.

19. τί . . ἀναισχυντεῖν] ‘How, if we were for once to venture on a shameless course?’ The distinction between potential and actual now to be made requires a definition of the *act* of knowing. The difference meant is analogous to that observed by Aristotle between ἐπίστασθαι and θεωρεῖν; which is his favourite example of the difference between ἔξις and ἐνέργεια. Cp. Eth. N. I. 8: Διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ ἐν χρήσει τὸ ἀριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν. The ten-

To meet
this diffi-
culty, we
venture to
say what it
is to know,
—(a daring
step, as we
are still to
seek for the
definition
of Know-
ledge.)

p. 196.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποιόν τί ποτ' ἔστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;

ΣΩ. Εοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ως οὐκ εἰδόσι τί ποτ' ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτ' οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἔστιν; ἀλλὰ γάρ, ως Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γιγνώ-

dency to this distinction appears in Sophocles, Ant. 1278: *Ὥ θεσπόθ, ὥσ, ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος, κ.τ.λ.*

9. μὴ εἰδότας, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates' ideal requirement of a perfect definition as the first step in discussion is perpetually mocking us in Plato. Protag. 361, Rep. I. 354.

11. ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι] 'Infected with logical imperfection.' Cp. Charm. 175 B C: *Καίτοι πολλά γε ἔνγκεχωρήκαμεν οὐν ἔνυβαίνονθ' ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμην εἶναι ἔνυχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ ἐώντος τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι· καὶ ταύτη αὖ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γιγνώσκειν ἔνυχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἐώντος τοῦ λόγου . . τούτο μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἔνυχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲ ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἢ τις μὴ οἶδε μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἀμῶς γε πως . . καίτοι, ως ἔγω οἴμαι, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον τοῦτ' ἀν φανεῖ.*

τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι] In other words, we have felt our way hitherto, not by ab-

stract definition and inference, but (as it is expressed in Rep. 7. 533 C) *τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναροῦντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν.* We first ventured the hypothesis *ἀλτησθαις ἐπιστήμη.* This was rejected, but the difficulties we met with pointed to a further hypothesis, *ὅτι ἡ ἀληθῆς δόξα ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν.* Here again we are met by fresh difficulties, but the discussion of them leads to a fresh hypothesis, viz. that we may know, without having knowledge in hand.

12. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν] We are haunted throughout by a difficulty respecting the search for knowledge akin to that respecting its definition. Can we know it, and yet not know it? To inquire about it implies ignorance of its nature, and yet how can we use the name even in inquiry without knowing the meaning of the name? 147 B: **Η οἵει τίς τι συνίησι τίνος ὄνομα, δο μὴ οἶδε τί ἔστι;* 210 A: *Καὶ παντάπασι γε εὑηθες ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης.*

p. 196. σκομεν καὶ οὐ γιγνώσκομεν, καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὡς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθ' αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖν τε καὶ συνιέναι, ὡς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὡς Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος;

p. 197. ΣΩ. Οὐδένα ὡν γε ὃς εἰμί· εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός· οἶος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τ' ἀν ἔφη ¹⁰ ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ήμιν σφόδρ' ἀν ἀ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν οἶον ἔστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὔργου τι ἀν γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τόλμα τούννυν νὴ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπε- ¹⁵ χομένω σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.

7. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὡς Σώκρατες] Compare what was said of being, 157 B: Τὸ δὲ εἴναι πανταχόθεν ἔξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι καὶ ήμεις πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἡναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.

That there is such a thing as absolute knowledge and absolute being is the postulate of Plato's mind. That he himself or any man can wholly grasp either is more than he will dare to say. The sacredness of this belief, which it would be impious to relinquish, appears also in Theætetus' answer: Τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένω ἔσται σοι πολλὴ συγγνώμη. Cp. Parm. 135 C: Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; ποι τρέψει ἀγνοούμενων τούτων;

9. ὡν γε ὃς εἰμι] Cp. Phædr. 243 E: "Εωσπερ ἀν ἥς ὃς εἰ.

εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός] The apodosis (διελεγόμην ἀν ὡς τούτων ἀπεχόμενος) is omitted, and the construction changed, because, from supposing himself ἀντιλογικός, Socrates proceeds to imagine the effect of the presence of such a man upon the discussion.

10. τούτων τ' ἀν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι] Not exactly with Heind., Stallb., 'abstinere nos jubeatur,' but (1) (sub. δεῖν) 'would have dwelt on the necessity of abstaining,' or, possibly, (2) (throwing an emphasis on ήμιν), 'Would have professed to abstain.' The kind of sophistry intended is illustrated supr. 157 B C, 165-7. τούτων ἀπεχόμενος is not, as some interpreters would have it, 'without definition,' but 'without assuming the reality of knowledge.'

ΣΩ. Ἀκήκοας οὖν ὁ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; p. 197.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω.

To know is
not to have,
but to pos-
sess, know-
ledge.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμης που ἔξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι.

β

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἰπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτῆσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν;

ΣΩ. Ἰσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ δὲ οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας
10 συνδοκίμαζε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εάν πέρ γε οὗσος τ' ω.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτὸν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτῆσθαι
τὸ ἔχειν. οἷον *εὶ ἴμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατῆς
ῳ μὴ φοροῖ· ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἀν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαι
15 δέ γε φαῖμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθῶς γε.

ΣΩ. Ὁρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κε-
κτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὅρνιθας ἀγρίας,
περιστερὰς ἢ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασά-
20 μενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἀν πού
τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς ἀεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται.
ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

4. Ἐπιστήμης .. ἔξιν] Euthyd. 277 B: Τὸ δὲ ἐπίστασθαι .. ἄλλο τι ἢ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἦδη ἐστίν;
Phaed. 76 B.

alternative reading. The Bodl. has φορῶν as an early correction.

13. *εὶ ἴμάτιον] Stallb. attempts to defend the optative without *εἰ* (which has only slight authority), from Rep. 549 A, ἄγριος εἴη, which is not quite parallel, (and there is MS. authority for inserting *ἄν*.) The comparison of 193 A: Σωκράτης ἐπιγνώσκει, κ.τ.λ., suggests the conjecture φορεῖ as an

18. μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ'] This opposition between minute parts of a sentence is characteristic of the Greek idiom. Cp. infr. 199 A B.

ώσπερ] The apodosis (sc. οὕτω τὴν ἐπιστήμην κεκτῆσθαι) is suppressed,—the main thread being resumed in πάλιν δή, κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 3. 402 A-C. Join οἴκοι τρέφοι.

II. β. Hypothesis of
the cagefull
of birds.

p. 197. ΣΩ. Τρόπον δέ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν, ἐπειδὰν βούληται, θηρευσαμένων ἦν ἀν αἱ ἐθέλη, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι· καὶ τοῦτο ἔξειναι ποιεῖν, 5 ὅποσάκις ἀν δοκῆ αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρυνόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὁ τι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἐκάστῃ ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα 10 παντοδαπῶν ὄρνιθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὔσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὄλιγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἀν τύχωσι πετομένας.

E ΘΕΑΙ. Πεποιήσθω δή. ἀλλὰ τί τούντεῦθεν;

ΣΩ. Παιδίων μὲν ὅντων, φάναι χρή, εἶναι τοῦτο 15 τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὄρνιθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι· ἦν δὲ ἀν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς

2. δύναμιν μέν] Heind. well compares infr. 201 B: Πεῖσαι μέν.

3. λαβεῖν . . . ἐθέλη] 'To take and to hold, when he desires to do so, any one of them which he chooses to catch.'

8. κήρυνόν τι] 'We sought to establish in the mind a sort of moulding-block of wax.'

10. ποιήσωμεν] 'Let us frame.' Cp. Rep. 9. 588 D.

11. τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας, κ.τ.λ.] The distinction indicated is probably that between, (1) individuals in the aggregate (*πολλὰ ἀθροισθέντα*, 157 B); (2) intermediate abstractions, as the virtues, numbers, etc.; (3) the highest abstractions, as Being, Goodness, resemblance, difference, etc. Little is thought,

however, of any distinction between memory and abstraction, as appears from the interchange of the terms *μνημεῖον* and *διανόημα* in what precedes.

12. κατ' ὄλιγας] E. g. the virtues, arts, etc.

ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν] E. g. τὴν οὐσίαν . . . τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται, 186 A. The supremacy of certain universal forms, or categories, is a conception which belongs to the maturity of Plato's thought. (See Introduction.)

15. φάναι χρή, εἶναι] Although φάναι χρή is parenthetical, the sentence receives an indirect turn from it. νοῆσαι, sc. χρή.

16. ἀγγεῖον] 'Receptacle.'

17. κτησάμενος] Sc. τις. Cp. ἐκάστῃ ψυχῇ supr. D.

The mind is like a cage, empty at birth, which we fill by degrees with what we learn. Whatever knowledge then is caught by us, is known so long as it remains in this cage. And yet before we have it in hand, there is a further chase required.

τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἡ εύρηκέναι p. 197.
τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐδὲν ἡν αὗτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι
τοῦτ' εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εστω.

5 ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἥν ἀν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστη- p. 198.
μῶν θηρεύειν καὶ λαβόντα ἵσχειν καὶ αὐθις ἀφίεναι,
σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὄνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὃν τὸ
πρῶτον, ὅτε ἐκτάτο, εἴτε ἔτερων. μαθήσει δ' ἐνθένδε
σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις
ιο τέχνην;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου
τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Υπολαμβάνω.

15 ΣΩ. Ταύτη δή, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε ὑποχει-
ρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλῳ πα-
ραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδούς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν,
20 παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κε-
κτῆσθαι ἐν τῷ περιστερεῶνι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῷ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἦδη πρόσσχες τὸν νοῦν.
ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὃν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἀριθμοὺς

The arithmetician has known-

8. ἐνθένδε] The Bodl. MS. has ἐντεῦθεν, which might mean, 'If you will come and look from where I stand.'

15. ὑποχειρίους] 'Under (in the power of) his hand.' (Supr. 197 C.) But not necessarily προχειρίους, 'in hand.'

16. ἔχει] The omission of the subject (*τις, δὲ ἔχων*) is supplied in the next clause by the addition of δ παραδιδούς.

23. Τῷ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν] δὲ δή, the reading of the Bodl. and its two companions, has probably slipped in from ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ above. The example is not merely intended to illustrate the distinction between having and holding, but more immediately to show how we are to conceive of the process of realizing knowledge.

p. 198. ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστῆμαι.

ledge of
every num-
ber in his
mind.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

c ΣΩ. Ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοῖ ἃν ποτέ τι ἡ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει 5 ἀριθμόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὥν.

Yet in cal-
culating he
searches
for what he
knows, put-
ting his
hand as it
were into
the cage.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

10

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς, ὃν ὑμολογήκαμεν ἀπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι. ἀκούεις γάρ που τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

d ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστε- 15

4. ἡ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτά] This is the reading of the MSS. with the exception of Vat. Δ, which omits αὐτά: the reading ἐντός is a conjecture of Cornarius. The common reading is defensible. If αὐτά is omitted, the antithesis is imperfect; and if grammatical symmetry were desired, it could be restored by substituting αὐτό for αὐτά. But there is no real flaw, for τι is cognate accusative, and ἀριθμοῖ τι=cast up a sum. The second accusative in the plural, of the things which constitute the sum, is therefore perfectly admissible; and it is also pointed, referring to αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά in supr. 196 A. ‘Might he not cast up a sum, either of abstract numbers in his head, or of things about him that happen to be numerable?’

As in the Parmenides, where

unity is provisionally negated, so here, where it has not been fully reached, the objects of Knowledge (or rather Knowledges themselves) appear in loose bundles which fly as we approach them.

9. πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὥν] ‘What such-and-such a sum amounts to.’ (ἀριθμητική here seems to include λογιστική.)

11. The question here is not of error, but of inquiry. The pursuit of knowledge implies ignorance even where the process is correct.

13. ἀκούεις . . ἀμφισβητήσεις] Cp. supr. 158 B and esp. Meno, 80 D E: Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὁ μὴ οἴσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅ τι ἔστι; . . Σω. μανθάνω οὖν βούλει λέγειν, ὁ Μένων. ὅρᾶς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις; ὡς οὐκ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.

ρῶν κτῆσει τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, p. 198.
 ἡ μὲν πρὸν ἔκτησθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἔνεκα· ἡ δὲ κε-
 κτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἀπάλαι
 ἐκέκτητο. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὡν πάλαι ἐπιστῆμαι ἥσαν αὐτῷ
 5 μαθόντι καὶ ἡπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν
 ταύτὰ ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου
 καὶ ἵσχοντα, ἦν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ
 εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

10 ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἡρώτων, ὅπως χρὴ τοῖς ὄνο- ε
 μασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσων
 ἵη ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικός,
 ως ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μα-
 θησόμενος παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀ ἐπίσταται;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἄποπον, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώ-
 σεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν
 γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄλογον.

p. 199.

20 ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὄνομάτων
 οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπῃ τις χαίρει ἐλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθαι

We shall
say then
that it is

1. ἦν] The past tense implies 'We have found it to be . . .' Supr. A.

drift in asking,' etc. Cp. Rep. 2. 377 A.

2. πρὸν ἔκτησθαι] So the MSS. And it is unsafe to change to κεκτῆσθαι, as such variations may have depended on some law of euphony. Cp. Sophoc. O. C. 5: Σμικρὸν μὲν ἔξαιτοῦντα, τοῦ μικροῦ δὲ ἔτι, κ.τ.λ.

20. ὅπῃ, κ.τ.λ.] The question asked above, 198 A, was τὸ . . . θηρεύειν, κ.τ.λ., τίνων δεῖται ὄνομάτων. But the illustration has thrown so clear a light upon the subject that in giving our answer we may dispense with nominal definitions.

7. πρόχειρον] As we say, 'at his fingers' ends.'

21. ὅπῃ τις χαίρει ἐλκων] 'Whatever confusion may be wilfully made with the verbs to learn and to know,' i. e. in the ἀμφισβητήσεις above referred to, that a man cannot learn

10. Τοῦτο] Accusative in apposition with the action of the verb, as ταῦτα is very frequently used. 'This was my

p. 199. καὶ μανθανειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠρισάμεθα ἔτερον μεν τι τὸ κέκτησθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μέν τις κέκτηται μὴ κέκτησθαι ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι, ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὅ τις οἰδε μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῆ μέντοι δόξαν οἴον τ' εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ 5
B ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἴον τε, ἀλλ' ἔτέραν ἀντ' ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων τινὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην δια-

what he knows nor what he does not know. For the language cp. Soph. 259 C: Χαίρε τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τότε δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἔλκων.

4. ὥστε οὐδέποτε] ‘So that in no case does it come to pass that a man is ignorant of what he knows, but still he may get hold of a wrong notion in regard to it; for he may not have in hand the knowledge of the particular thing in question, but another instead, when in hunting up some particular knowledge from his stock (*τοῦ δέ κέκτηται*) he gets hold of the wrong one by mistake as they flit across him: that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the knowledge of eleven instead of that of twelve,—in other words, the rock-pigeon that was caged within him instead of the dove.’

5. μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν] These words are put emphatically forward in antithesis to *μὴ κέκτησθαι*. When hunting for some particular knowledge amongst what he possesses and knows, he catches one for another as they fly about: e. g. the arithmetician makes a mistake in regard to number when he seeks in the flock of numbers for that which = $7 + 5$, and takes hold of 11 instead of 12.

impossible
for him not
to know
what he
knows,
i. e. not to
possess
what he
possesses,
but yet he
may mis-
take one
thing that
he knows

The germ of the present metaphor appears in the Euthydemus, 290 C, 291 B: Θηρευτικοὶ γάρ εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι (οἱ λογιστικοί) κ.τ.λ. αὐτοὶ γάρ (οἱ στρατηγοὶ) οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἢ ἐθηρευσαν, ὁσπερ, οἷμαι, οἱ ὀρτυγοθῆραι τοῖς ὀρτυγοτρόφοις παραδιδάσσων . . . ἀλλ' ἦμεν πάνυ γελοῖοι, ὁσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοὺς κορύδονς διώκοντα, ἀεὶ φόμεθα ἕκαστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτίκα λήψεσθαι· αἱ δὲ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέφυγον. Compare also Arist. Met. I. 5. 1009 b: Τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζητεῖν ἀνεἴη τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

7. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ] The difficulty of the sentence lies in these words. They probably refer to *οἱ κέκτηται . . . δέ οἰδε* above. For it is difficult to imagine that *ἀπ' αὐτοῦ* and *περὶ αὐτοῦ* above do not refer to the same thing. If this be so, the meaning is, that he makes a mistake concerning some general subject, e.g. concerning number in general, when he takes one particular thing contained in it for another. *τούτον* therefore has a narrower reference, and means, ‘of this particular thing,’ viz. which he is in search of. For a similar use of *τούτον*, without anything to which it immediately refers, cp. supr. 180 A: Καν τούτον ζητῆσ λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴρηκε. Infr. 202 C: Τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον δυναῖ τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον

for another
that he
knows,
when, fail-
ing in this
after-
search, he
takes the
wrong
knowledge
in hand.

πετομένων ἀνθ' ἐτέρας ἐτέραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβη,— ὅτε ἄρα p. 199.
τὰ ἔνδεκα δώδεκα φήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἔνδεκα ἐπιστή-
μην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβών, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον
φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Ὄταν δέ γε ἦν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβη, ἀψευ-
δεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι
ἀληθῆ τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὡν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ε-
ἔδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίγνεσθαι; ἵσως οὖν
10 μοι συμφήσεις. ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι
ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἀ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτῆσθαι οὐ-

ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου (sc. οὐ ἀν μὴ δύνηται, κ.τ.λ.). διαπετο-
μένων is genitive absolute, in
partial construction with ἐτέραν.
The words ἀπ' αὐτοῦ have been
questioned by many critics.
Ast's τῶν ἀφ' αὐτοῦ is the most
plausible of the conjectural
emendations.

1. ὅτε ἄρα . . . φήθη εἶναι, . . .
λαβών] We pass from ὅταν to
ὅτε ἄρα, because reference is
now made to the case actually
in question. The participle
λαβών is epexegetic to the verb
understood in what precedes.
'He has hold of something
else: that is (in the case above
adduced) taking the knowledge
of eleven for that of twelve.'
As if ἔχειν . . . οἷον τε were τάχ'
ἀν ἔχοι. The change to the
nominative is partly occasioned
by ὅταν λάβη coming in between.
ἄρα = 'as in our illustration.'

For a similar exegesis cp.
Lcgg. 3. 690 E: 'Αγνοήσαντες
τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὀρθότατα λέγοντα ὡς
τὸ ημίσυ τοῦ παντὸς πολλάκις ἐστι

πλέον ὁπόταν ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅλον λαμ-
βάνειν ξημιῶδες, τὸ δὲ ημίσυ μέ-
τριον, τότε τὸ μέτριον τοῦ ἀμέτρου
πλέον ἥγήσατο, ἄμεινον δὲ χεί-
ρονος.

6. ἀψευδεῖν] In construction
with φαμέν, supr.

12. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν . . . μέντοι]
'For indeed we have got rid of
the trouble of men not knowing
what they know . . . notwithstanding
there is a still worse
danger which now looks in
upon us.'

ἐπίστανται] So the Bodleian
with all the other MSS. except
pr. Ven. II. This is hardly suf-
ficient authority for the change
to ἐπίσταται. The transition from
singular to plural is not more
remarkable than that from the
3rd person to the 1st in κεκτή-
μεθα, infr. It may be accounted
for by the fact that Socrates is
speaking generally, and no
longer with reference to the
individual case supposed above.
Compare especially Rep. 7.
537 E and v. rr.

p. 199. δαμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδῆς γε- 5 νήστεται ποτε δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνη ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ· ἔπειτα ἔτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαν παραγενομένην γνῶναι τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαι ποτέ τινα 15 ποιήσει.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Ισως γάρ, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς ὅρνιθας ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην 20

But, if it is
Knowledge
that he has
in hand,
how can he
mistake it?
How can
Knowledge
be the oc-
casional
error?

Perhaps
there were
ignorances
flying
about
amongst
the knowl-

2. παραφαίνεσθαι] As it were, 'looking in at the window.' The reading παρεμφαίνεσθαι (Ven. Ξ etc.) deserves mention.

5. Εἰ . . γενήσεται] εἰ with the fut. ind., as usual after δεινόν, expresses alarm or indignation, 'to think of such a possibility!'

8. τό τινος] These words depend immediately on δεινότερον, in common with εἰ ἡ τῶν . . δόξα: but πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία also has reference to them.

9. ἀγνωμοσύνη] Used here in its most literal sense, = τῷ μὴ γιγνώσκειν, 'from being unacquainted.'

τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ] Viz. which he possesses, οὐ τι δὴ ἔχει τε καὶ κέκτηται, referring to ἔχοντα.

11. πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία] The clause which follows this is a more particular statement or explanation of that which precedes. Compare the structure of Rep. 4. 445 B: Τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτου φέξωμεν φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται, ἐάν πέρ τις ποιῇ δὲν βούληθῇ ἄλλο πλὴν τοῦτο ὄπόθεν κακίας μὲν καὶ ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγήσεται, κ.τ.λ., supr. 144 A.

19. ἀνεπιστημοσύνας] Cp. the Charmides, 166 E, etc.

ledges, and
he has
taken one
of them.

λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι, p. 199.
ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ
ἐπιστήμῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ ράδιόν γε, ὡς Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε.
5 δὲ μέντοι εἶπες, πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς
λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδῆ p. 200.
μέν, φῆσ, δοξάσει. ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δή που καὶ ἡγήσεται γε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.
10 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται περὶ
ῶν ἔψευσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἴήσεται τεθηρευκώς ἔχειν,
15 ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν
πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος
γελάσας φήσει. Πότερον, ὡς βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας 20
τις εἰδὼς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἦν
οἶδεν, ἐτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεται τινα εἶναι ὃν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐ-
δετέραν αὐτοῖν εἰδώς, ἦν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἐτέραν ὃν
οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν δ' οὔ, ἦν οἶδεν, ἦν μὴ
οἶδεν; ἢ ἦν μὴ οἶδεν, ἦν οἶδεν ἡγεῖται; ἢ πάλιν αὖ

But if he
has the ig-
norance *in*
hand, how
can he mis-
take it for
knowledge?
After mak-
ing a long
circuit, we
are again
at fault.

Unless we
have re-
course to

4. Οὐ ράδιόν γε, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates
is again charmed by the dialec-
tical readiness of Theætetus,
and yet is compelled to refuse
his suggestion. Cp. supr. 184
C, infr. 204 E: Ἀνδρικῶς γε,
κ.τ.λ. Phædo, 62 E: Ἡσθῆναι
τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγ-
ματείᾳ, κ.τ.λ.

17. ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν
ἀπορίαν] ‘We find ourselves

again confronted with the same
difficulty which encountered us
at first.’ Cp. Phil. 13 C: Πά-
λιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον,
ὡς Πρώταρχε.

18. δ . . ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος] Supr. 165, 195 C, 197 A.

20. ἦν οἶδεν, κ.τ.λ.] Supr. 188
B, 192.

22. αὐτοῖν] Most MSS. have
αὐτήν, from the preceding line.

p. 200. μοι ἐρεῖτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν ἡ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρεξας, ἔως περ ἀν κεκτήται, ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε εἰς ταύτὸν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες; Τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινούμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ὡς παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὄρθως ψευδῆ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες; τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι, πρὶν ἀν τις ἐπιστήμην ίκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οὔεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω.

3. γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν] It would be rash to infer from this ridicule that the image is not Plato's own. Is Socrates never made to accuse himself of absurdity? Rep. 1. 354 A: Οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστιάμαι δι' ἔμαυτὸν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ. Prot. 340 E: Εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἱατρός. He is here speaking dramatically in the person of the ἐριστικὸς ἀνήρ, who is bent on exposing their weak points. Cp. supr. 162 D, 166 A.

5. καὶ οὕτω δῆ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. esp. Charm. 167 foll., and, for the 'ad infinitum' argument, Parm. 132 E foll.

11. ὁ λόγος] Either this particular argument, or rather the

the image
of another
cage or
waxen
block, con-
taining the
Know-
ledges of
the know-
ledges and
ignorances,
and go on
thus to
infinity, 'in
wandering
mazes lost.'

10

15

The truth
is, we have
no right to
be search-
ing for false
opinion un-
til we have

discussion generally, in the form of an imaginary disputant. Supr. 195 D.

13. ἐκείνην] ψευδῆς δόξα is the subject immediately in hand, hence ἐκείνη stands for ἐπιστήμη as the more remote.

τὸ δέ] Sc. ψευδῆς δόξα τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

15. ίκανῶς λάβῃ] Supr. 145 E.

19. που is the reading of Ven. Π., and is probably right. (Cett. πω.) Schanz reads οὐ γέ πω ἀπεροῦμεν. This is partly confirmed by the scribe of the Bodl. MS. having begun to punctuate after ἀπεροῦμεν, and in then adding γέ πω, having forgotten to accentuate the last syllable of ἀπεροῦμεν.

found
Know-
ledge. And,
though
we can
attempt
nothing
better than
our last an-
swer, per-
haps if we
return and
examine it,
the object
of our
search may
show itself.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡκιστα, ἐάνπερ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύσῃς. p. 200.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί ἀν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἥκιστ’ ἀν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ ε 5 πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀνα-
μάρτητόν γέ πού ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ’
αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται.

10 ΣΩ. Ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὡς Θεαίτης,
ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ίόντες ἐρευνῶμεν,
τάχ’ ἀν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήνει τὸ ζητούμε- p. 201.
νον, μένουσι δὴ δῆλον οὐδέν.

1. ἀπαγορεύσῃς] So T pr. Vat. Coisl. Zitt. The Bodl. has ἀπαγορέύης with an erasure. Schanz reads ἀπαγορεύῃς. The usual aorist form is ἀπείπης.

8. καὶ τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα] True opinion guides to right action, but it is a blind guide. See esp. Rep. 6. 506 C: Οὐκ ἔσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί, κ.τ.λ.

10. Ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν] ‘The man who had to show where the river was fordable is reported (*ἄρα*) to have said, Go on, and you will find.’ For the expressions αὐτὸ δείξει, τάχ’ ἀν αὐτὸ φήνειε cf. Phileb. 20 C: Προιὸν δ’ ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει. Protag. 324 A: Αὐτό σε διδάξει. Cratyl. 402 C: Τοῦτο γε δλίγου αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι πηγῆς ὄνομα ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστί. Hipp. Maj. 288 B: Εἰ δ’ ἐπιχειρήσας ἐσται καταγέλαστος, αὐτὸ δείξει. The Scholiast says: Δείξειν αὐτό. ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ πείρας γιγνωσκομένων. κατιόντων γάρ τινων εἰς ποταμὸν πρὸς τὸ διαπερᾶσαι ἥρετο τις τὸν

προηγούμενον εἰ βάθος ἔχει τὸ ὕδωρ. δὲ ἔφη, αὐτὸ δείξει.

The explanation is probable, though the authority is uncertain.

See above, πλείω ἀεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα . . τὸν ἔξ ἀρχῆς λόγον; and cp. Rep. 5. 453 D: Ἐάν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἔάν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πελαγος μέσον, ὅμως γε νεῦ οὐδὲν ἥττον.

12. τάχ’ ἀν..ζητούμενον] Either (1) (Heindorf), ‘Perhaps by giving us trouble, it may of itself bring to light that of which we are in search,’ or (2) ‘Perhaps the very thing we are in search of may come in our way and show itself,’ or (3) taking ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον with τοῦτο and αὐτὸ φήνει τὸ ζητούμενον as a new sentence. ‘If we proceed with this inquiry, perhaps, through its giving us trouble,—the very object of our search may show itself.’ In (2) ἐμπόδιον is used with a forcing of the derivation, like πρόχειρον *supr.*, ‘amongst

p. 201. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἵωμέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή; καὶ τίς αὗτη;

5

ΣΩ. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσι ρήτοράς τε καὶ δικαιικούς. οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν οὐδεὶς διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἢ ἀν βούλωνται. ἡ σὺ οἵει δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες 10 ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο βιαζόμενοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ίκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;

A brief examination is sufficient here. The rhetoric of the law-courts proves that true opinion is not knowledge.

For in cases where the evidence of the senses is alone sufficient,

our feet.' Both in (2) and (3) the idiomatic use of *δείκνυμι* is extended to *φαίνω*.

ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον] 'Coming in our way,' i.e. giving us trouble. Those fording the river were feeling the bottom with their *feet*. Compare the way in which justice 'turns up' in the Republic, 4. 432 D: Πάλαι, δὲ μακάριε, φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν κυλινδόμενον. Prof. Jowett translates, 'We may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for.'

3. βραχείας σκέψεως] Sc. εὑρεῖν. Cp. Rep. 3. 414 C: Πεισται δὲ συχνῆς πειθοῦς.

4. αὐτό] Sc. τὸ εἰρημένον, i.e. δόξα ἀληθῆς.

6. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν] The irony is almost as transparent as in Polit. 266 C: Γένει τῷ τῶν ὄντων γενναιοτάτῳ καὶ ἄμα εὐχερεστάτῳ. Cp. Phædr. 260 C sqq., Gorg. 462 C, alib. μεγίστων is masc. antec. to οὓς. (ἢ om. Bodl.)

In what follows the Bodleian

MS. gives *τούτοις* with Vat. Δ. Ven. II. This is better than *τούτους*, which can be defended only by supposing the plaintiff to plead his own cause. Trans. 'Or do you suppose there are such clever teachers in the world, as to be able to convey to others the reality of what happened to men, of whose being robbed or otherwise assaulted the hearers were not eyewitnesses?' Schanz reads, from Naber's conjecture, εἰ μὴ .. τούτους ...

12. πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρόν] κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ρέον. Supr. 172 D. The ῥήτωρ professed to instruct the court. Cp. Hyperid. Euxen. 25: Τοὺς δικαστὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ πράγματος τὰ δίκαια διδάξαι.

Failing to conceive of false opinion, we return to examine the theory of Knowledge which identifies it with true opinion. We have not to search far; for in the familiar case of judicial evidence, a true opinion may be

the court
may be
brought
to give a
true ver-
dict. The
judges,
then, in
such a case
have true
opinion
without
knowledge.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μέν. p. 201.

ΣΩ. Τὸ πεῖσαι δὲ οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὃν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὅοτα πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀν, ὡς φίλε, εἴ γε ταῦτὸν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθῆς τούτης δικαστήριατ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὁρθά ποτ' ἀν-

formed by the judges without the possibility of knowledge; since in questions of fact nothing short of personal observation ensures certainty. The definition 'Knowledge is true opinion,' is therefore inadequate. And the example given is calculated to suggest the next definition—δόξα ἀληθῆς μετὰ λόγου.

The question returns, Are the above conceptions and images Plato's own, or is he repeating in them some contemporary theories? The comparison of other dialogues and the close examination of the passage itself tend to the conclusion that although they may have been suggested to him from without, they may be fairly regarded as his own creation. See especially the passage in Phil. 44 C foll., in which, after certain men have been brought forward as 'soothsayers' or 'allies,' there follows the analysis of the pleasure derived from Comedy, which is one of the most original and 'modern' passages in Plato. The image of the 'im-

pressions' on the wax has not only been revived in speculation, but perpetuated in common language. And that of the aviary has probably been less fortunate only from its greater boldness and subtlety.

i. πεῖσαι μέν] The implied antithesis is διδάξαι δὲ οὐ. Cp. Rep. 5. 475 E: Οὐδαμῶς, εἰπον, ἀλλ' ὅμοίοντο μὲν φιλοσόφοις. Τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις; Soph. 240 B: Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' ἐοικός μέν.

ii. τούτης δικαστήριατ] Several MSS. read δικαστήριον. These words were rejected by the older critics, except Buttmann, who conjectured καὶ δικαστική, very aptly for the sense, if the word can be made to signify 'worthy of a good judge.' See the words εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν .. ὁρθά ποτ' ἀν δικαστῆς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν. It is in Plato's manner thus ostensibly to restrict himself to the case in point. Cp. 152 C: "Ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. 204 D: "Ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστιν.

Possibly (i) καὶ δικαστοῦ ἀξία may be the true reading. Cp.

p. 201. δικαστὴς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἐκάτερον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Ο γε ἐγώ, ὡ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος του

III. Theætetus now remembers to have heard that

Apol. 18 A: Δικαστοῦ γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή. And see Phileb. 13 C, where the Bodl. has πειρόμεθα for πειρασόμεθα. Ib. 36 E, where παραφροσύναις in the same MS. is a correction for πάσαις ἀφροσύναις, which the first hand wrote. Or (2) κατὰ δικαστήρια, a conjecture adopted by Prof. Jowett (or κατὰ δικαστήριον)—‘in the judicial sphere,’ ep. supr. 153 D: Κατὰ τὰ ὅμματα πρῶτον (‘In the sphere of vision’). Tim. 19 C: Κατὰ τε τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις πράξεις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διερμηνεύσεις πρὸς ἑκάστας τῶν πόλεων. The mode of expression in this case approaches still more nearly to that of infr. 204 C, supr. 152 C,—the passages quoted above. But (3) it is after all conceivable that δικαστήρια may be the feminine of an adjective not found elsewhere, except in the neuter substantive δικαστήριον. (This suggestion is also made by Madvig, Adv. 1. 377, and adopted by Schanz.) Or (4) as Wohlrbab suggests, καὶ δικαστήριον should be transposed to after δικαστὴς ἄκρος, ‘A good judge or court-full of judges.’ The second of the above conjectures (2) seems, on the whole, the most probable.

To resume the argument from 195.

Viewing the mind as a reeptacle of impressions (or ideas), we said that to think falsely was to fail in identifying present impressions with the ideas already existing in the mind. And thus it seemed impossible

to be mistaken about these ideas themselves apart from impressions from without. But in fact we do mistake in things independent of sensation. E.g. a scientific calculator, who possesses the knowledge both of 11 and 12, will sometimes say that the sum of 7 and 5 is 11. We resort therefore to a less simple conception of knowing, and to a more complex image. To know is to possess knowledge. We may possess it without having it in hand. We therefore imagine to ourselves false opinion thus. We have caught, as it were (in learning), various species of knowledge, some gregarious, some domestic, some noble and solitary, (i.e. highly abstract), and have caged them in the mind, like birds. We try to take in hand one of these birds which we possess, and as they flutter about, we take hold of another instead of it. But then, if we have this one in hand, how can we mistake it for the other? How can Knowledge be the means of error? Perhaps (Theætetus suggests) there were ignorances flying about amongst the knowledges, and we have taken one of them. But if I have an Ignorance in hand, how can I take it for a Knowledge? Must we imagine another eage or waxen block to eontain the Knowledge of the knowledges and ignorances? This would be endless.

3. "Ο γε . . . ἐπελελήσμην] ‘A distinction, Soerates, which I

true opinion, unless accompanied with an account of its object, is not knowledge.

ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν p. 201.
μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὡν μὲν μή ἔστι λόγος,
οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὐτωσὶ καὶ ὄνομάζων, ἀ δ' ἔχει,
ἐπιστητά.

Socrates identifies the saying thus quoted with what he himself has heard from certain 'as in a dream'; viz. that

ΣΩ. Ὡς καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα
καὶ μὴ πῇ διῆρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα σύ τε
κάγὼ ἀκηκόαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἔξευρήσω· λέγοντος μέν-
τὸν τὰν ἑτέρου, ως ἐγῶμαι, ἀκολουθήσαμι.

ΣΩ. Ἀκουε δὴ ὅναρ ἀντὶ ὄνείρατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ

once heard expressed in a way which until this moment I had forgotten.'

I. τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν] Cp. Meno, 97 E, 98: Καὶ γὰρ
αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν χρόνον παραμένωσι, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα,
καὶ πάντα τάγαθα ἔργαζονται. πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν,
ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ
ἄξιαι εἰσιν, ὡς ἂν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ
αἰτίας λογισμῷ. . . ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται,
ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη δρθῆς δόξης ἐστί, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ
ἐπιστήμη δρθῆς δόξης. See the whole passage. Also Polit. 309 C: Τὴν . . ὄντως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν
μετὰ βεβαιώσεως. Symp. 202 A: Ἡ οὐκ ἥσθησαι ὅτι ἔστι τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; τί τοῦτο; τὸ
δρθὲλα δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἰσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι
οὔτ' ἐπίστασθαι ἔστιν ἀλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἀν εἴη ἐπιστήμη; οὔτε
ἀμαθία· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον πῶς ἀν εἴη ἀμαθία; ἔστι δὲ δὴ που τοιοῦτον ἡ δρθῆ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. Rep. 6. 506 C: Οὐκ ἥσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστή-

μης δόξας, ως πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὡν
αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί· ἡ δοκούσι σοί
τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν δρθῶς
πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθέες τι
δοξάζοντες;

4. οὐτωσὶ καὶ ὄνομάζων] I. e. using this strange term ἐπιστητά. Infr. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα. (For the participle cp. Gorg. 493 B: Τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων, Sophocl. Phil. 64.) ἐπιστητός, like αἰσθητής and ποιότης, supra, 160 D, 182 A, is a novel word, and is formed on the analogy of αἰσθητός.

6. Ὡς . . λέγεις] 'Truly, that is fortunate.' 'A timely recollection, indeed!' Gorg. 447 C.

7. εἰ ἄρα] 'That I may know whether.' Cp. supr. 192 C: Εὰν ἄρα . . μάθω.

εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα σύ τε κάγὼ
ἀκηκόαμεν] Had they both heard from the same source? Or is Plato here, as in the beginning of the dialogue, weaving together two distinct theories? If infr. 206 C is to be construed strictly, the latter is true. (See Introduction.)

11. ὅναρ] Cp. Phileb. 20 B:
Λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας

p. 201. ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οίονπερεὶ

^E στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τἀλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι· αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἔκαστον ὄνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατὸν

p. 202. οὐθ' ὡς ἔστιν, οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ηδη γὰρ ἀν οὐσίαν ἥ 5. μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, *δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἔκεινο μόνον τις ἔρει. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἔκεινο οὐδὲ τὸ ἔκαστον οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον οὐδὲ τοῦτο προσοιστέον, οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα.

ὅναρ . . . νῦν ἐννοῶ . . . Phaed. 6 I D: 'Αλλὰ μὴν κἀγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς . . . λέγω. It suits Plato's humour to speak in this distant fashion of a school towards which he felt an 'imperfect sympathy.' What Socrates has heard carelessly, as well as that which Theætetus once heard but had forgotten, is compared to a dream.

1. ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν] 'I heard in my dream.'

τὰ πρῶτα οίονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα] 'The first rudiments, so to speak, of things.' In what follows it is vain to distinguish between different senses of *στοιχεῖον*. The word is here regarded by Plato as a generic term, of which the denotation of the letters of the alphabet is only the most familiar use. 'Everyone will acknowledge that musical notes are also *στοιχεῖα*' (206 B). In fact the unit of apprehension in every subject is the *στοιχεῖον* of that particular subject-matter. The word *συλλαβή* is similarly generalized, so that in passing from language to other things there is no change in the meaning of the word. Cp. infr. 202 E: Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖα τε καὶ συλλαβάς, ἡ οἵει ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἀ λέγομεν.

the elements of all things cannot be expressed in a proposition, but can only be named. You cannot give them any attribute, since even such common *prædicables*

For such figurative generalization, which is different from poetic metaphor, ep. esp. Legg. 7. 823 B: Θήρα γὰρ πάμπολύ τι πρᾶγμά ἔστι, κ.τ.λ. See some valuable remarks of Prof. Jebb's on the use of metaphor in Pindar, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 3. 1. 167.

3. αὐτὸ γὰρ . . . εἴη] 'For that each element in its proper self-existence can only be named.' Cp. especially Soph. 251 B: Χαίροντιν οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον.

4. προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν] 'But it is impossible to go on to predicate anything of it (the element), either affirmatively or negatively. For in so doing there is added the idea of existence or non-existence: but nothing must be added, seeing that you can only speak of the element by itself.'

5. ηδη γάρ] Sc. ἐὰν ἄλλο τι προσείπῃ τις.

9. οὐδὲ τοῦτο] This has given needless trouble. Heindorf thought the article was required as with the other words, and inserted it. Buttmaun objected to *τοῦτο* being so far separated from *ἔκεινο*, and ingen-

as 'this' and 'that' are separable from the things to which they are applied. As the elements are combined in Nature, so definition is a combination of names. That which is named is

ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, p. 202.
 ἔτερα δόντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν
 δυνατὸν αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγου,
 ἀνεν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον
 5 εἶναι δότιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ρήθηναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ^β
 αὐτῷ ἄλλ' ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον· δόνομα γὰρ μόνον
 ἔχειν· τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἥδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ
 πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα
 λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι
 10 λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ

ously conjectured οὐδὲ τὸ τό. Both objections are obviated by observing that αὐτὸν, ἐκεῖνο, μόνον, occur in the preceding lines. For this reason they are put first, and with the article, and οὐδὲ τοῦτο... οὐδὲ ἄλλα πολλὰ τουατα is added afterwards. Cp. supr. 157 B: Τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἔξαιρετέον . . . οὐ δεῖ . . οὔτε τι ἔνγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οἵτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν δόνομα δὲ τι ἀν ίστη. Accordingly in the reference to this passage, 205 C (which Buttmann must have overlooked), the article is introduced—οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο.

1. περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι] Cp. supr. 197 D: 'Ενίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἀν τύχωσι πετομένας. Rep. 3. 402 A: Τὰ στοιχεῖα . . ἐν ἀπασι . . περιφερόμενα. Polit. 278 D; Phil. 15 D.

2. εἴπερ ἦν δυνατὸν αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι] αὐτό is not emphatic. 'If it could be spoken of,' λέγεσθαι is the emphatic word. λόγος is here equivalent to 'predication.'

6. αὐτῷ] Bonitz conjectures αὐτό. But the dative suits better with ἔχειν following.

7. ἥδη] I.e. 'when we come to them.'

9. ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν] Cp. Sophist, 262D: where it is described more accurately as συμπλέκων τὰ ρήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. See the whole passage.

A passage of Aristot. Metaph. 7. 3. 1043 b, is closely parallel to this. He has just shown that sensible reality (*αἰσθητὴ οὐσία*) consists of matter or potentiality (*ὕλη, δύναμις*), and form or actuality, (*μορφή, ἔνεργεια*): "Ωστε ἡ ἀπορία ἦν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὔτως ἀπαίδεντοι ἡπόρουν, ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, διτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τι ἔστιν δρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγου εἶναι μακρόν), ἄλλὰ ποιὸν μέν τι ἔστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον τι μὲν ἔστιν, οὐ, ὅτι δὲ οἶν καττίτερος. ὥστ' οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἦς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὅρον καὶ λόγον, οἶνον τῆς συνθέτου, ἔάν τε αἰσθητὴ ἔάν τε νοητὴ ἦ. ἔξ δὲ αὗτη πρώτων, οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴπερ τι κατά τινος σημαίνει δὲ λόγος δὲ δριστικός, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφήν. (See Introduction.)

Locke's 'simple ideas' are not very different from the meaning of *στοιχεῖον* here.

p. 202. ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ρήτας καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξη δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, σε ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δ' οὐ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. Οὗτος σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτη, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

Δ ΣΩ. Ἄρ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὗτος τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ

1. τὰς . . . συλλαβάς] This word, like *στοιχεῖα* supr., is of course to be taken in the figurative sense, for the ‘combinations of simple objects or ideas.’

2. καὶ ρήτας] There is possibly an allusion, as in ἀλογον supr., to the mathematical use of the word. Cp. Rep. 8. 546 C: Πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ρήτα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν. Ib. 7. 534 D: Ἀλόγους ὀσπερ γραμμάς. But the immediate reference is to ρήθηναι λόγῳ, ‘Capable of expression.’

4. ἀληθεύειν . . . περὶ αὐτό] ‘Is exercised truly with regard to it.’

6. περὶ τούτου] Sc. οὐτοῦ μὴ δύνηται δοῦναι λόγον. Cp. supr. 199 A.

7. δυνατὸν . . . ταῦτα πάντα] Sc. ἀληθεύειν καὶ γιγνώσκειν καὶ δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. On this kind of pronominal expression see Riddell’s Digest, § 55 and §§ 17 foll.

Contrast with this Arist. Phys. Ausc. 1. 1 (who points out that the elements, or simple ideas, are known not by sensation, but by analysis; and that definition distinguishes, while the name signifies an undivided whole):

Ἐστι δ' ἡμῶν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον ὕστερον δὲ ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦνται ταῦτα. . . . Τὸ γὰρ δῶλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, γνωριμώτερον. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου, δῶλον τί ἐστι. Πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. Πέπονθε δὲ ταῦτὸ τοῦτο τρόπον τινα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον. Ὁλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος· ὃ δὲ δρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα.

11. Ἀρέσκει . . . σε] Supr. 172 D.

14. νῦν οὗτος] I. c. ‘in a casual conversation.’ Supr. 142 E.

the object of Sensation; the combination of these elements is alone the object of Knowledge. For that impression deserves not to be called knowledge, which cannot be expressed in a proposition.

Knowledge then is true opinion giving an account of

itself. Let this be our third answer.

Can we prove it true?

1. The answer may be a true one, and yet the theory on which we have based it may be unsound. This therefore is examined first.

εἰλήφαμεν ὃ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες p. 202.
πρὸν εὐρέων κατεγήρασαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ρῆθεν.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὗτος ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ ἀν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὄρθῆς δόξης; ἐν μέντοι τί με τῶν ρῆθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή;

ΣΩ. Ὁ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα· ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος γνωστόν.

E

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὄρθως;

ΣΩ. Ἰστέον δή· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα 15 ταῦτα.

1. καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν]
'Many a philosopher.' καὶ πολύς, like καὶ μάλα, is an intensive form. Rep. 8. 562 C.

5. αὐτὸ τοῦτο] 'The definition itself,' whatever may be said of the theory that has been stated as a ground for it. Heindorf's conjecture, εἰκός γ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, would give a different turn to the sense. 'It is natural to suppose that we have said well.'

9. λέγεσθαι κομψότατα] 'To be the cream of the whole theory.'

10. τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος]
The 'complex mode' is a natural class or genus, which these philosophers suppose themselves to have discovered. Cp. infr. 206 B: Τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος.

13. Ἰστέον] Symp. 217 C.
Cp. τάχ' εἰσόμεθα, Euthyphro, 9 E.

ὥσπερ . . . ὁμήρους] So that if we put them to the torture, we may bring him (*τὸν λόγον*) to terms.

14. τὰ παραδείγματα] Cp Polit. 277 E, 278 D, where the same example, that of letters, is introduced to illustrate the nature of Example: "Οτι τῶν στοιχείων ἔκαστον ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ ῥάσταις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἰκανῶς διαισθάνονται . . . μεταπιθέμενα δ' εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μὴ ῥάδιας συλλαβὰς ταῦτα ταῦτα πάλιν ἀγνοεῖ.

H. Schmidt observes that παραδείγματα here are rather archetypes (Vorbilder) than examples (Beispiele). And it is true that the argument from letters is not so much an illustration as the very foundation of the theory.

εἰπε] Se. the person from whom Socrates and Theætetus are supposed to have heard

p. 202. ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα δή.

ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάσ. ἡ οἵει ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἀ λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰς ταῦτα.

p. 203. ΣΩ. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὗτως ἡ οὐχ οὗτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ἅρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβὰ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Ισως.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὔτωσί, ^Ω Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἔστι σῶ, τί ἀποκριωεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Οτι σῆγμα καὶ ω̄.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εγωγε.

^β ΣΩ. "Ιθι δή, οὗτως εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σῆγμα λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δή, ω̄ Σώκρατες, τό τε σῆγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἔστι, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώτ-

It soon appears that we were right in saying the element cannot be defined.

10

the theory 'in a dream.' Cp. supr. 201 C: Εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας. Infr. 206 E.

6. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτά] 'Let us take and examine them, or rather let us put the question to ourselves.' The image of hostages, whom we may treat as we please, is kept up.

μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς] This is done more fully by and by, 206 A; cp. supr. 155 A.

7. οὗτως ἡ οὐχ οὗτως] For εἴτε omitted ep. supr. 169 D.

15. λόγον is predicative. 'You have this for an account.'

18. Καὶ πῶς . . . στοιχεῖα]

'How is one to spell each single letter?'

19. τό τε σῆγμα . . . τοῦ δὲ αὐτῆτα] For τε followed by δέ cp. Rep. 3. 394 C.

Theætetetus extemporeizes the theory of phonetics, which is given more fully in Phil. 18 B foll. Sigma is a semivowel.

20. οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης] This mode of definition reminds us of the Antisthenian saying quoted by Aristotle—ποιὸν μέν τι ἔστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, κ.τ.λ.; and also of Euclides' objection to definition by comparison.

της· τοῦ δ' αὐθὶ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν p. 203.
πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι
αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὅν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἑπτὰ
φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδὲ ὄντων.

5 ΣΩ. Τουτὶ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἐταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ^{2.}
ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαινόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, σ
ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβήν, ἀρ' ὁρθῶς ἀποδείγμεθα;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ
ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ἢ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα,
ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἴδεαν γεγονοῦνταν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἄπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν.

15 ΣΩ. Ὁρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σῆγμα καὶ ὡ. ἀμφότερά
ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἔμοῦ ὄνοματος. ἄλλο τι
ό γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ σῆγμα καὶ τὸ ὡ ἄρα γιγνώσκει.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐκάτερον ἀρ' ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον
εἰδὼς ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;

3. ἐναργέστατα] Bodl. ἐνεργέ-
στατα, sed ex em., the second ε
being in rasura.

9. ἀποδείγμεθα] Heindorf
conjectured ἀποδεδέγμεθα, for
which MS. authority (Coisl. et
Par. E. ex corr.) has since been
found; and it has been re-
ceived by Bekker. But Stall-
baum rightly defends ἀποδε-
δέγμεθα in the sense 'we have
declared our opinion'; in
which meaning the pf. pass. is
used by Xenophon and Lysias.
Cp. supr. 180 D: Ἀποδεικνυ-

μένων, 195 D: Τὸ νῦν ἀποδειγ-
μένον. Cp. however infr. 205
C: Ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέ-
γεσθαι. But this refers to a
part of the theory which has
been accepted in the words
τοῦτο μὲν . . . κατωρθώκαμεν.

11. τὴν συλλαβήν] Arist. Met.
7. 3. 1043 b: Οὐ φαίνεται δὴ
ζητοῦσιν ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοι-
χείων οὖσα καὶ συνθέσεως.

The word συλλαβή is used
probably not without the con-
sciousness of its etymology.

2. But is it
therefore
unknown?

First, How
is the com-
plex related
to it?

E.g. is the
syllable the
same with
the letters
of which it
is com-
posed? If
so, they
must be
equally
known
with it.

p. 203. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἐκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἰπερ ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος 5 ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἔξαίφνης.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἵσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' ἔξ 10 ἐκείνων ἐν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ιδέαν μίαν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἔτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.

Or is it
something
by itself
resulting
from them?

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχα γ' ἀν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἡ ἐκείνως ἔχοι.

ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον, καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.

15

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

p. 204. ΣΩ. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ιδέα ἔξ ἐκά-

In that case
it cannot

5. ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται] The image is that of the disappearance of a favourite slave (Prot. sub init.). Compare with the humorous pathos with which this is spoken Phaed. 89 B: Τήμερον, ἔφη, καγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτῆσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ' ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἴην καὶ με διαφύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἄν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖον, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν πρὸν ἄν τικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίον τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον.

10. εἶδος, ιδέαν] εἶδος is here rather more concrete, ιδέα more abstract; but ιδέα is used for εἶδος a few lines below. Generally, εἶδος is more logical, implying distinction; ιδέα more metaphysical, imply-

ing unity. (See Appendix D.)

15. μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον] In these words, as in the figure of the dream, and in κομψότατα supr. 202 D, the Socratic irony is manifest. For μέγαν ep. Phædo, 62 B.

17. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ιδέα] There is no occasion to suspect the reading, or to conjecture μίαν ιδέαν. ἔχέτω ὡς =ἔστω δ . . . , and the whole clause μία . . . συλλαβή is in apposition to ὡς . . . φαμέν. Cp. Rep. 7. 517 B: Τὰ δ' ἐμοὶ φανόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταίᾳ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ιδέα καὶ μόγις ὀρᾶσθαι.

'Let the case be then as we have now put it, that the syllable or complex (whether of letters or of anything else in the world) is a simple form

have parts :
unless we
regard
every
whole in
the same
way as
something
different
from all
its parts,
although
resulting
from them.

στων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἡ p. 204.
συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἐν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἄπασιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. "Οτι οὖν ἀν ἡ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα
μέρη εἶναι. ἡ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γε-
γονὸς ἐν τι εἶδος ἔτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν ;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταύτον
καλεῖς ἡ ἔτερον ἑκάτερον ;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις
προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι
ἔτερον.

ΣΩ. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ὥρθή· εἰ δὲ καὶ
ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ δέ γε δή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἀν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς
20 ὁ νῦν λόγος ;

arising out of each combination of harmonious elements.' The words 'Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς take up the thread of τάχ' ἀν μᾶλλον οὗτως ἡ ἐκείνως ἔχοι. In the conjectural reading the words ἔχέτω . . . μίαν ἰδέαν would of course refer to ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸν ἔαντον ἔχον. Schanz reads ἔστω. But the anacoluthon is not more harsh than in *supr. 173 D: Σπουδαὶ δὲ ἔταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχάς, κ.τ.λ.* Soph. 218 E: Τί δῆτα προταξιάμεθ' ἀν εὐγνωστον, . . . οἷον ἀσπαλιευτής; Apol. 21 C: Διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, . . . ἔδοξέ μοι. See Ridgell's Digest, §§ 270, 271.

For μία ἰδέα = εἶδος ἰδέαν μίαν

ἔχον cp. *Euthyphr. 6 D*: Τὸ εἶδος φέπαντα τὰ ὅστια ὅστιν; ἔφησθα γάρ που μιᾶς ἰδέας τὰ τε ἀνόστια ἀνόστια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅστια ὅστια. *Infr. 205 C*: Μία τις ἰδέα . . . συλλαβὴ ἀν εἴη.

18. Δεῖ δέ γε δή] Sc. καὶ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὥρθην εἶναι.

19. τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός . . . τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν] Cp. Ar. Met. 4. 26. 1024 a: "Υδωρ γάρ καὶ ὅστια ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀριθμὸς πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, δλος δ' ἀριθμὸς καὶ δλον ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἀν μὴ μεταφορᾷ. πάντα δὲ λέγεται, ἐφ' οἷς τὸ πᾶν ὡς ἐφ' ἐνί, ἐπὶ τούτοις πάντα ὡς διηρημένοις πᾶς οὗτος δ' ἀριθμός, πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ μονάδες.

p. 204.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθ' ὁ τι διαφέρει; οἶον ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἐν, δύο, τρίᾳ, τέτταρᾳ, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἐὰν δὶς τρίᾳ ἢ τρὶς δύο ἢ τέτταρά τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἐν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι 5 τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸν ἢ ἔτερον λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτόν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἑκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ¹⁰ εἰρήκαμεν;

5. ἢ τρίᾳ καὶ δύο καὶ ἐν] The words ἢ πέντε καὶ ἐν, which were introduced by Cornarius, are anticipated in the simple enumeration ἐν, δύο, etc. They do not occur in the Bodleian or any other MS.

10. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἑκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν;] So far the MSS. give a meaning perfectly clear and natural. The words which follow are not so clear. The only way in which it seems possible to construe them as they stand in the MSS., viz. πάλιν δὲ οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες, is by laying an unnatural stress on ἐν in οὐδέν. ‘Again, while we speak of all (in the plural), is there no *one* thing of which we speak?’ This is brought out more distinctly by C. F. Hermann’s conjecture, οὐχ ἐν.

In my former edition I proposed to substitute πᾶν for πάλιν. But πάλιν is probably to be retained. Cp. Symp. 183D: Εἰς δὲ ταῦτά τις αὖ βλέψας ἡγήσαιτ’ ἀν πάλιν, κ.τ.λ. Phil. 14 D: Πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν. And I now think the most probable

But can we go so far as to distinguish All, in the singular, from All, in the plural?

It is evident that ‘all of six’ is the same as ‘all six.’

solution is to suppose πᾶν to have dropped out from its similarity to πάλιν. H. Schmidt justly observes that this line of conjecture is more logical than that followed by Heindorf and others, who substitute the awkward expression πᾶν τὰ ἕξ for πάντα τὰ ἕξ in the previous line. ‘Do we not repeat something when we say τὰ πάντα’ is not a satisfactory sense. The present passage is one in which a reader of Plato will expect extreme clearness and minuteness of logical sequence. And to put πᾶν τὰ ἕξ in the beginning of the argument would be to assume bluntly that which it is intended to prove, viz. that an aggregate may be regarded as one thing. With this object it is necessary to reason from the plural to the singular, and to do so gradually. The above argument might lead to the substitution of τὸ πᾶν for τὰ πάντα (a suggestion adopted by Schanz, and in part by Wohl-rab, who reads τὸ πᾶν αὐτά). ‘In counting six, we said “all

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

p. 204.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δέ, *πᾶν οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

5 ΣΩ. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἔξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτὸν ἄρα ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἔξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί, ^δ τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἄπαντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

10 ΣΩ. Ὡδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταῦτον. ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ωσαύτως.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

six" (in the plural). Again, in speaking of *all*, in the singular, is there nothing which we express? 'There must be.' 'And is not this six?' 'Yes.' But there is needless obscurity in the logical inversion by which, after reasoning *from* the number, we should then reason *to* it. The required sequenee is restored by reading as in the text. The passage may then be rendered, 'Have we not, then, in each expression, spoken of all the six?' 'Yes.' 'But again, while speaking of them all, is there no one thing *all* of which we express?' 'There must be.' 'And is that anything but the six?' 'Nothing.' This gives much greater force to the inference here and in E. Compare with the resumption of the previous admission in *τὰ πάντα λέγοντες*, Soph. 238 E: Οὐκοῦν τό γε

εἶναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος ἐναντία τοῖς πρόσθεν ἔλεγον; Φαίνει. Τί δέ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὡς ἐνὶ διελεγόμην; After ἀνάγκη, we must understand πᾶν τι λέγειν. Compare Symp. 192 E: Οὐδὲ ἀν εἰς ἔξαρνηθείη . . . ἀλλ' οἴοιτ' ἀν (se. πᾶς τις), κ.τ.λ. alib. The reasoning of Parm. 144 C may be advantageously compared. See also Aristot. Poet. 1451 a. And for the abrupt form of the question with οὐδέν ερ. Gorg. 474 D: Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα . . . εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάστοτε καλά;

7. Ταῦτὸν . . . προσαγορεύομεν] 'We give the names πᾶν and πάντα to the same thing.'

10. λέγωμεν] Several MSS. have λέγομεν. If λέγωμεν is right, it refers, not to the present sentence, but to the argument which it introduces about the relation of parts to a whole.

p. 204. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὃν πᾶν ἔκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστίν.

But all
(plural) im-
plies num-
ber, and
number im-
plies parts.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ἔκάστων ἀριθμὸς μῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ μέρη 5
εἴστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἀν εἴη;

Therefore
all (singu-
lar) also im-
plies parts.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἰναι ὁμολογεῖ- 10
ται, εἰπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἐσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὗτως.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ὄλον ἄρ' οὐκ ἐστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ
ἀν εἴη, τὰ πάντα ὃν μέρη.

Therefore
if all (singu-
lar) and
the whole
are differ-
ent, the
whole is
without
parts.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Μέρος δὲ ἐσθ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν
ἢ τοῦ ὄλου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ παντός γε.

p. 205. ΣΩ. Ἀνδρικῶς γε, ω̄ Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ
οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῆ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστίν;

But this
is absurd.

2. ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμός] I.e. ὁ ἀριθμὸς
πᾶς ἔκαστον ἐστὶ τὸ ὃν πᾶν ἔκαστον.
'The number of each taken
altogether is each real thing
taken altogether,' or 'each
taken altogether so far as it
exists.' Stallbaum's conjecture,
ἔκαστον, would be more con-
venient, but we cannot venture
to say that ἔκαστον is wrong.
τὸ ὃν .. ἔκαστον=ἔκαστον, ὁ ἐστιν.
Cp. Rep. 6. 490 B: Αὐτοῦ ὁ
ἐστιν ἔκαστον τῆς φύσεως. It
must be admitted, however,
that the text becomes more
uncertain in the last few pages
of the dialogue.

5. Ὁ δὲ ἔκάστων ἀριθμός] The

word ἀριθμός implies plurality.
Hence ἔκάστων, unless it is cor-
rupt. We are now reasoning
from singular to plural, as be-
fore from plural to singular.

10. ὁμολογεῖται] ὡμολόγηται, the
reading of T, is of nearly equal
authority.

16. Μέρος δὲ ἐσθ' ὅτου .. ὄλον]
Cp. Parm. 147 C, Soph. 245 A.

19. Ἀνδρικῶς μάχει] Viz. for the
θέσις he has chivalrously taken
up, 204 B: Παρακινδυνεύων λέγω
ὅτι ἔτερον.

20. αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστί] Is this
very thing *all*, just as above,
ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστίν. πᾶν, being pre-
dictive, does not need the article.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

p. 205.

ΣΩ. Ὁλον δὲ οὐ ταῦτὸν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὖν ἀν μηδαμῆ μηδὲν ἀποστατῆ; οὖν δέ ἀν ἀποστατῆ, οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἀμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὖν ἀν μέρη ἥ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

10 ΣΩ. Πάλιν δή, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἥ ταῦτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς βόμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

2. Ὅλον] To be taken predicatively, like *πᾶν* immediately above.

3. οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν] Sc. ἔσται γενόμενον. ‘Will have become at once not-whole and not-all.’

4. ἀμα γενόμενον, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Being changed in the same instant from forms which are identical to other forms which are likewise identical.

ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ] Viz. ὅλον=οὐν ἀν μηδὲν ἀποστατῆ=πᾶν.

τὸ αὐτό] Viz. οὐχ ὅλον=οὐν πᾶν.

‘Both equally lose their entirety of nature.’ (Jowett.)

7. ἐλέγομεν] The argument is resumed from 204 A: “Οτι οὐν ἡ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι.

10. Πάλιν δὴ .. ἀνάγκη] ‘Then I may repeat, what I was trying to suggest a little while ago, that if the syllable is distinct from the letters, they are

not its parts; else, if they are, it must be indistinguishable from them, and no more knowable than they are.’ In fact it was shown that the knowledge of the letters was a condition of syllables being known. Supr. 203 D, 204 A: Προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεία ἀπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μελλοντὶ ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, .. οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

12. ἡ ταῦτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς βόμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι] For the turn of the sentence compare Rep. 6. 490 A: ‘Ηγέντο δ’ αὐτῷ, εἰ νῷ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἥν διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει ἡ ἀλάζονι ὅντι μηδαμῆ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς. Ib. 503 A: ‘Ἐλέγομεν δ’, εἰ μνημονεύεις, δεῖν .. τὸ δόγμα τούτῳ μήτ’ ἐν πόνοις μήτ’, ἐν φόβοις .. φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας ἡ τὸν ἀδιννατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον. Ib. 7. 525 B: Διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτέον εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι ἡ μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι.

We cannot therefore view the whole as different from the all. But, if the whole is all the parts, the complex, if distinct from its elements, is not the whole of which they are the parts.

p. 205. ΣΩ. Ούκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γενιγται, ἔτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δ'; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλ' ἄττα εἰπεῖν, ἀ μέρη μέν ἐστι συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖα γ' ἐκείνης;

And it can have no other parts.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὡς Σώκρατες, μόρια ταύτης συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα iέναι.

Therefore it can have no parts.

ΣΩ. Παντάπασι δή, ὡς Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβῆς ἀν εἴη.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εοικεν.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὡς φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἥγούμενοι εὑρέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν ἔκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο, ως ἔτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὗτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἀλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸς ποιοῖ;

But that which has no parts is uncompounded, i.e. an element, and therefore (by our hypothesis) unknown.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνημαι.

20

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἡ αὗτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονειδέσ τι καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸν εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ ἄλλην.

11. συλλαβῆ] The absence of the article marks our familiarity with the word, and also gives it a certain indefiniteness: as in the expression πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρωπος. Cp. Rep. 2. 369 B: Γίγνεται τοίνυν . . πόλις . . ἐπειδή, κ. τ. λ.

21. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις] 'And is not this same thing (viz. that it is uncompounded) the cause of its having a simple form without parts?'

The same cause makes it to be unknowable and without parts. Therefore if the 'sylable' or complex is without parts, it must be unknowable. Bonitz objects to the logic of this and reads τό for τοῦ. This is tautological, and Bonitz' reasoning is rightly rejected by H. Schmidt. See below, E. For illogical conversion in Plato cp. supr. 152 B C, 159 A.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.

p. 205.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταύτον ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβῆ
εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν
ἰδέα;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μεν οὖν.

If then the complex is an aggregate of simple parts, it and they are equally known and describable. If it is one and without parts, it and the elements are equally indeterminable and unknown.

Therefore it is untrue to say that the complex is known, but the simple unknown.

And we have experience to the contrary: for we learnt our letters before we could read,

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβῆ ἐστὶ καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἱ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ρήταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταύτον ἐφάνη.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε ἐν τε καὶ ἀμερέσ, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβῆ, ὥσαύτως δὲ στοιχείον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἀγνωστον· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ αὐτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν.

15 ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, ὃς ἀν λέγῃ συλλαβῆν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ρήτον, στοιχεῖον δὲ τούναντίον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ; τούναντίον λέγοντος ἄρ' οὐ μᾶλ- p. 206.
20 λον ἀν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύνοισθα σαντῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. 'Ως οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ

3. [εἶδος] Used here without reference to the sense in which it occurs above. Cp. 148 D: 'Ἐνι εἴδει περιλαβεῖν.'

[ἐκείνῳ] 'Sc. τῷ τῶν πρώτων εἴδει,' Heindorf. Rather ἐκάστῳ τῶν πρώτων. Cp. περὶ αὐτοῦ, supr. C.

15. μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, ὃς ἀν λέγῃ] For this common use of ὃς ἀν without antecedent cp. esp.

Soph. Ant. 35: 'Αλλ' ὃς ἀν τούτων τι δρᾷ, | φόνον προκεῖσθαι δημόλευστον ἐν πόλει.'

16. [γνωστόν] ἀγνωστον Bodl. pr. sed ā erasum.

23. [οὐδὲν ἄλλο] 'That in learning you continued doing nothing else but endeavouring to distinguish, etc.' Cp. Men. 80 A: "Οτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς."

p. 206. ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἔκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν ^π ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἔκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακο- 5 λουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἴη· ἀ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἀν ὁμο- λογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. ^τΩν μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροί ἐσμεν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ ^{ιο} εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργε- στέραν τε τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἔκαστον μά- θημα, καὶ ἐάν τις φῇ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, ἄγνω- στον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παιζεῖν ¹⁵ ἡγησόμεθ' αὐτόν.

[15. ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παιζεῖν]
‘That he is either playing with us, or talking nonsense.’

The tendency of the present passage is to rise from the conception of elementary objects of sense (simple ideas of sensation) to that of abstract ideas, (universals, predicables), as the true elements of Knowledge.

Cp. Ar. Met. 1 a, 995 b:
Πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη ἐστιν ἢ εἰς ἀ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχοντα ἔκαστον.

This may be illustrated from the frequent use by Plato of the example of letters, elementary sounds, etc., to represent the Ideas and the mode of becoming acquainted with them.

The following passage,—Rep. 3. 402,—is an instance of this:—

“Ωσπερ ἄρα . . γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἰκανῶς εἴχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοι-

and our
notes be-
fore we
could play
the lyre.

From this
it appears
that the
element is
more
known
than the
syllable,
the simple
than the
complex.

χεῖα μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὀδίγα ὅντα ἐν ἄπασιν οἷς ἐστὶ περιφερόμενα, καὶ οὕτ' ἐν σμικρῷ οὕτ' ἐν μεγαλῷ ἡτιμάζομεν αὐτά, ὡς οὐ δέοι αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ προύθυμούμεθα διαγιγνώσκειν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσόμενοι γραμματικὸν πρὶν οὗτως ἔχοιμεν. Ἀληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, εἴ που ἢ ἐν ὕδασιν ἢ ἐν κατόπτροις ἐμφαίνοντο, οὐ πρότερον γνωσόμεθα, πρὶν ἀν αὐτὰ γνῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ μελέτης; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὗτως οὐδὲ μουσικὸν πρότερον ἐσόμεθα, οὔτε αὐτοὶ, οὔτε οὖς φαμὲν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας, πρὶν ἀν τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἰδῆ καὶ ἀνδρεῖας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ἐναντία πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν σμικροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγαλοῖς ἀτιμάζωμεν,

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

p. 206.

This need
not, how-
ever, affect
the truth of
our third
answer.

ΣΩ. Ἐλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἀνταὶ φανεῖεν εἰποδείξεις, ως ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα δι' αὐτὰ ιδεῖν, ὃ τι δή ποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰώμεθα τέχνης εἰναι καὶ μελέτης;

At the same time it is hinted that the sensible elements, so far as each of them can be regarded as one individual thing, are also objects of Knowledge.

Cp. Ar. Met. 1 a, 994 b: "Ἐπιτὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἀναροῦσιν οἱ οὐτως λέγοντες (viz. τὸ ἀπειρον λ.) οὐ γάρ οιόν τε εἴδεναι πρὶν ἢ εἰς τὰ ἄτομα ἐλθεῖν.

To resume the argument from 201. Thætetus has heard it said that true opinion with a reason was knowledge: and that nothing which had not a reason could be known. This reminds Socrates of a theory which said that of the elements (or alphabet) of things no account could be given—they could only be named. But of their combinations an account could be given, and these could be known. Knowledge according to this consists in being able to give an account of anything. This, however, may be true, and yet the theory on which we have based it may be unsound. Testing this by the example of letters, we find that of the syllable $\bar{\sigma}\bar{\omega}$ an account can be given (it can be analysed), but not of its constituents σ and ω . But is the syllable known, the letter unknown? If so, in what way are we to conceive of the syllable? As all the letters? How then can I know them all, and yet

none singly? Or is it a simple unity formed out of them? It cannot then be related to them as a whole to its parts,—unless we can establish a distinction between whole and all. But all (singular) cannot be distinguished from all (plural); and this, containing all the parts, can scarcely be distinguished from the whole. Hence whole and all are indistinguishable. Therefore either the syllable has parts, and, consisting of things unknown, must be itself unknown; or, not having parts, it is uncompounded, and therefore itself, according to the theory, unknown. But our own memory ought to teach us that we first learnt to know the letters, and then the syllables and combinations of them.

Though the theory is rejected, we gain through criticising it the notion of a complex whole.

2. κἀνταὶ φανεῖεν ἀποδείξεις] The train of thought here broken off is resumed in the Sophist, where the $\deltaσώματα εἰδη$ are treated as elements, and combinations of them are shown to be possible; also in the admission of θάτερον. Cp. Phileb.

4. ὃ τι δὴ . . γεγονέναι] There is here a beginning of the formal or pedantic rhythm which is more common in the Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus. Indeed the manner of Socrates in this part of the Thætetus bears a close resemblance to that of the Eleatic Stranger.

p. 206. μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὄραν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν σημαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἐν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν. 5

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνων δή;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἴη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ρήμάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὑδωρ τὴν δόξαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ρόήν. ἢ οὐ το δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θâττον ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκάστου 15 αὐτῷ, ὁ μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι ε τι ὄρθὸν δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὄρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μη-

4. τί ποτε βούλεται] The subject is either ὁ ταῦτα λέγων (cp. infr. E: Τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὁ νῦν σκοπούμεν), or ὁ λόγος, viz. τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

τὸν λόγον . . σημαίνειν] Id. qu. τὸν λόγον εἰπῶν σημαίνειν. ‘What are we to understand by the term λόγος?’ Three meanings are put forward as possible: (1) Expression in words. (2) Analysis. (3) Definition.

9. ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον] Cp. Phileb. 38 D: Καν τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῇ, τά τε πρὸς αὐτὸν ῥηθέντα

What is meant in it by ‘giving an account?’
One of three things.
Either, III. a. The reflexion of thought in speech.

But this is not peculiar to those who know.

ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀν πάλιν φθέγξαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;

10. ἐκτυπούμενον] ‘Imaging.’ Cp. the saying of Democritus, λόγος ἔργου σκιῆ.

For τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ρόήν cp. Tim. 75 E: Τὸ δὲ λόγων νῦν ἔξω ρέον καὶ ὑπηρετοῦν φρονήσει καλλιστὸν καὶ ἄριστὸν πάντων ναμάτων. Soph. 263 E.

14. Οὐκοῦν] Ven. II. and another MS. give οὐκοῦν αὐ.

21. καταγιγνώσκωμεν] ‘Accuse in our minds.’

τὸ μηδέν] ‘Nothing at all,’

Or, III. β.
The enumeration of
the elementary parts
of the complex whole.

δὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὁ νῦν p. 206.
σκοποῦμεν. ἵσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ
τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἔκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρι-
σιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ. p. 207.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οἷον τί λέγεις, ὢ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ
ἔκατὸν δέ τε δούραθ' ἀμάξης. ἂν ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἀν
δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἷμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ· ἀλλ' ἀγαπῶμεν
ἄν ἐρωτηθέντες ὃ τί ἔστιν ἄμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν
το τροχοί, ἄξων, *ὑπερτερία, ἀντυγεις, ζυγόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Ο δέ γε ἵσως οἴοιτ' ἀν ήμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἀν τὸ
σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ
συλλαβῆν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὥρθως μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ
λέγοντας ἂλλοι λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι
καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεα-
τήτου ὄνόματος λόγον. τὸ δὲ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως

i. e. 'utter nonsense.' Cp. supr.

180 A: Ἡττον . . . ἡ τὸ μηδέν.
Tim. 77 B: φ . . νοῦ μέτεστι τὸ
μηδέν. This is better than to
take the article with the infinitive,
because the sense passes
on more smoothly from καταγ-
γνώσκωμεν, than if this word
were used quite absolutely.

Otherwise expressed, μὴ . . .
καταγιγνώσκωμεν τοῦ . . ἀποφηνα-
μένου, ὡς τὸ μηδὲν εἰρηκεν.

3. τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα, κ.τ.λ.] This
is suggested (*μαεντικῶς*) by the
preceding argument (206 A B).

6. Οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος] Op. et
D. 454: Φησὶ δὲ ἀνὴρ φρένας
ἀφνεῖος πήξασθαι ἄμαξαν, | νῆπιος,
οὐδὲ τὸ οἰδ', ἔκατον δέ τε δούραθ'
ἀμάξης.

Cp. Arist. Met. 2. 3 998 b:
Ἐτερος δὲ ἔσται διὰ τῶν γενῶν
δρισμὸς καὶ διὰ λέγων ἔξ αὖ ἔστιν

ἐνυπαρχόντων.

10. *ὑπερτερία] The MSS.
have ὑπερτηρία, or ὑπερτήρια.

12. 'Ο δέ γ' ἵσως οἴοιτ' ἀν ήμᾶς]
ο δέ, sc. ο λέγων, supr. The
apodosis is deferred, as is often
the case when an illustration
has been introduced with ὥσ-
περ. It is resumed with οὖτω
τοίνυν. Cp. Rep. 3. 402 A :
"Ωσπερ ἄρα . . γραμμάτων πέρι . .
Ἄρ' οὖν, διάλεγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὗτος
οὐδὲ μουσικοί, κ.τ.λ.

14. γελοίους εἶναι(sc.οἴοιτο)be-
longs equally to the protasis
and to the suppressed apodosis.
Cp., for a similar interweaving
of the illustration with the case
illustrated, supr. 147 A C.

17. τὸ δὲ οὐκ εἶναι] 'Whereas,
he would say, it is impossible.'
Cp. 157 B: Τὸ δὲ οὐ δεῖ, and
note.

p. 207. οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὸν ἀν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἔκαστον περαίνῃ τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν που ἐρρήθη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὄρ- 5 θὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἑκείνων δυνά-
с μενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο,
λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ
δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἀμάξης
οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα. 10

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοί, ὡς ἐταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἡ καὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἔτι ἀλογίαν, τοῦτό μοι λέγε, ἵν' αὐτὸς ἐπισκοπῶμεν. 15

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὄντινοῦν ὄτουοῦν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸς ὅτε μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῆ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτερού, ἡ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἐτερού, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτερον δοξάζῃ; 20

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εἴτα ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μα-
θήσει κατ' ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας
αὐτά;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν 25

2. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν] 206 Α: 'Ως οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας, κ. τ. λ.'

11. εὖ] Sc. οἵεσθαι, from οἴοιται, supr. A.

12. Εἰ σοί] εἰ is interrogative, depending on τοῦτό μοι λέγε.

15. αὐτό] 'Your answer.'

17. Πότερον, κ. τ. λ.] Cp. Soph. 228 Α.

18. τὸ αὐτὸς ὅτε μὲν . . .] E. g. thinking τ to be the first letter both of τε and θε. For the construction cp. Phaed. 59 Α, supr. 192 D.

19. τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μέν] E. g. thinking the first letter of θε at one time θ, at another τ.

24. αὐτά] 'What I have de-
scribed.'

έτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἔτερον ἡγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ p. 207.
αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην^E
τιθέντας συλλαβήν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δι' οὐ τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδέ γέ πω
ἡγούμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὗτως ἔχοντας.

But I may perform this rightly in the case of Theætetus' name, and yet mistake in the first syllable of Theodorus', though it is the same in both. This is not to know the syllable.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητον γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἴ̄ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, καὶ αὖ Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ καὶ p. 208. 10 εἴ̄ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἀρ' ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων συλλαβήν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἄρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὗτως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι.

15 ΣΩ. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὗτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν γέ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψει Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὁρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἔξῆς 20 γράφῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον δή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὕν, ὁρθὰ δὲ δοξά-^B
ζων, ως φαμέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

7. ἐν.. καιρῷ] Sc. κατ' ἀρχὰς τῆς τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσεως.

17. Οὐδέν γέ] Sc. κωλύει. 'Certainly not.' γέ assents to the meaning of the question. Cp. Phil. 38 A: Οὐδέν γέ. ἀλλ' ἄπερ ἀκούω λέγω.

18. Ἄρ' οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] 'Soc. Then in writing out correctly the word *Theætetus*, he will do so not only with right opinion, but with command of the enu-

meration of elements; will he not? Th. Clearly he will. Soc. And that while still without knowledge, though with right opinion. Is not that what we say? Th. Yes. Soc. And yet with definition added to right opinion. For he wrote with command of the way through the elements; and this we admitted to be knowledge.'

p. 208. ΣΩ. Λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὥρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἢν δὴ λόγον ὡμοιογήσαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ω̄ ἐταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὥρθὴ δόξα, 5 ἢν οὕπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ὄναρ δή, ω̄ς ἔοικεν, ἐπλούτήσαμεν οἰηθέντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. ἡ μήπω κατηγορῶμεν; ἵσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο τις αὐτὸν ὀριεῖται, 10 ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ω̄ν ἐν γέ τι ἔφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὄριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὥρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθῶς ὑπέμνησας· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὥσπερ εἴδωλον, τὸ δ' 15 ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅπερ ἀν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ω̄ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἷον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν;

D ΣΩ. Οἷον, εὶ βούλει, ηλίου πέρι ἰκανὸν οἶμαί σοι

Or, lastly,
III. γ. The
power of
adding a
mark which
distingui-
shes it
from all
other
things. I.e.
Definition
by the
characteristic
difference,
or by the

8. Ὄναρ... ἐπλούτήσαμεν] Cp. Polit. 277 D: Κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἔκαστος οἰονδύναρ εἰδὼς ἄπαντα, πάντ' αὖ πάλιν ὥσπερ ὑπαρ ἀγνοεῖν. 278 E: Ἰνα ὑπαρ ἀντ' ὀνείρατος ἡμῖν γίγνηται. Lys. 218 C. The expression is proverbial, and there is no distinct reference to the ‘dream’ of Socrates. supr. 201 D.

9. ἐπιστήμης λόγον] λόγος is used here in a double sense. (1) ‘Definition of Knowledge.’ Cp. 148 D: Ἐνι λόγῳ προσειπεῖν. (2) That ‘account’ of a thing which (with right opinion) constitutes Knowledge. The play

of words may be preserved: ‘when we thought we had found the most indubitable “account” concerning Knowledge.’

10. τις] Viz. the nameless author of our theory.

18. Ὅπερ ἀν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν] The two former were inferences from different meanings of λέγειν;—‘to express’ and ‘to enumerate.’ See 206 D: Τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸν δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν.

20. ἰκανὸν... ἀποδέξασθαι] ‘Sufficient to obtain your assent.’ ἀποδέξασθαι is an epexegetic infinitive.

sum of the distinctive elements.

εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἔστι τῶν κατὰ p. 208.
τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λαβὲ δὴ οὖν χάριν εἴρηται. ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι
5 ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἑκάστου ἀν λαμβάνης
ἡ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὡς φασί τινες, λήψει.
ἔως δὲ ἀν κοινοῦ τινὸς ἐφάπτη, ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται
ὁ λόγος ὃν ἀν ἡ κοινότης ἥ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω· καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον ε
10 τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. ‘Ος δ’ ἀν μετ’ ὄρθης δόξης περὶ ὄτουοῦν τῶν
ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ αὐτοῦ,
ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς ἔσται οὖν πρότερον ἦν δοξα-
στής.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὗτως.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δῆτα, ὡς Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε
ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ
λεγομένου, ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν. ἔως δὲ ἀφεστήκη
πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετό τι μοι λέγεσθαι.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Φράσω, ἐὰν οἵσις τε γένωμαι. ὄρθην ἔγωγε p. 209.
ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τὸν

4. Λαβέ] I. e. μάθε. ‘Let me explain to you.’

6. ὡς φασί τινες] The *tines* are certainly Soeratics, and probably the Megarians are meant. (See Introduction.)

12. αὐτοῦ,] This punctuation appears preferable when it is observed that there has been a tendency in the last few pages to accumulate genitives. τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων, ‘Its distinction from other things.’ Others join αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων.

13. δοξαστής] Cp. 160 D:

Ἐπιστήμων ἀν εἶην, ὁνπερ αἰ-
σθητής.

17. σκιαγραφήματος] Cp. Phæd. 69 B: Μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιάντη ἀρετή. Rep. 2. 365 C, 7. 523 B, 10. 602 D, Soph. 235 E, Parm. 165 C. The illusion of *σκιαγραφία* depended on distance, and the picture would seem unmeaning from close at hand. Soph. Fr. 773 (N.): Πόρρω δὲ λεύσσων, ἐγγύθεν δὲ πᾶς τυφλός.

20. Πῶς τί τοῦτο] ‘What do you mean? and why is it so?’

Even this
disappoints
us on a
nearer
view.

p. 209. σὸν λόγον, γιγνώσκω δή σε, εἰ δὲ μή, δοξάζω μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Λόγος δέ γε ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἐρμηνεία.

5

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. 'Ηνίκ' οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἀλλο τι φέταν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

10

ΣΩ. Τῶν κοιωνῶν τι ἄρα διενοούμην, ὃν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει.

β ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διόσ. πῶς ποτὲ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἡ ἄλλον ὄντων; θέσ γάρ με 15 διανοούμενον ως ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἀν ἣ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔχῃ ρῦνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὗτο δὴ ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἡ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον; 20

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γάρ;

For unless I can distinguish Theætetus from Socrates and every one else, how can I be said to have a right opinion of him? If then by the comprehension of a true

1. δὴ] According to the hypothesis.

(ἔχεις) is attracted by τις ἄλλος.

4. ἦν] 'Is,' according to the hypothesis.

20. τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν]

τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος] 'Of your differentia.' Plato affects this abstract termination. Cp. esp. δικαιότης, Prot. 331 B, Gorg. 508 A.

The phrase Μυσῶν ἔσχατος is strengthened by the insertion of the article. The earlier editors (under protest from Buttmann) read τὸ λεγόμενον. There is no reason for this. Cp. supr. 173 D: οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες. Arist. Eth. N. 8. 3: Δεῖ γὰρ τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλλας συναναλῶσαι. In the examples quoted by the Scholiast the proverb is used to express contempt. Here it rather conveys the notion of indifference.

7. φέταν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενός] It occurs to Socrates while speaking that the 'Difference' of one person from another is not one but many. Hence the inexact correlation.

12. ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει] The verb

account
is meant
'right
opinion of
the distinctive
difference,' this
is a necessary part
of right
opinion.

ΣΩ. Ἐλλ' ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ρῆνα καὶ p. 209.
όφθαλμοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἔξ- c
όφθαλμον, μή τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἐμαυτὸν ἢ
ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ἐλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν
ἔμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἀν ἡ σιμότης αὗτη τῶν ἄλ-
λων σιμοτήτων ὥν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον
παρ' ἔμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη καταθήται,—καὶ τάλλα οὕτως
io ἔξ ὧν εἰ σύ,—[ἢ] ἐμέ, καὶ ἐὰν αὔριον ἀπαντήσω,
ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὁρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὁρθὴ δόξα D
ἀν εἴη ἐκάστου πέρι.

2. τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἔξοφθαλ-
μον] Supr. 143 E. In Xen.
Cyr. 1. 9 ἔξοφθαλμος is opposed
to κοιλόφθαλμος. But in Ar.
H. A. 1. 8. § 5 the words ἔκτος
and ἐντός seem rather to refer
to the position of the eyes.

8. μνημεῖον . . . ἐνσημηναμένη] Cp. 191 D, 192 A, 194 C, 196
A. The theory which has been
rejected is still permitted and
intended by Plato to leave an
impression on the mind.

10. εἰ σύ,—[ἢ] ἐμέ, καὶ] Bodl.
εἰ σὺ ἐμὲ καὶ: Ven. Ξ. et pr. II.
εἰ σὺ ἡ ἐμὲ καὶ: Ces. εἴση ἐμὲ καὶ:
Ven. Ξ. γρ. οἴση ἐμε: cett.
εἴση ἐμὲ καὶ. The reading is
uncertain. That adopted in
the text is the most plausible
which can be said to rest on
MS. authority. ἡ refers back
to αὗτη ἡ σιμότης, passing over
τάλλα οὕτως ἔξ ὧν εἰ σύ, which
is added διὰ μέσου and answers
to ἔξοφθαλμον in the previous
sentence.

Heindorf's conjecture, ð, re-

ferring to μνημεῖον, is unsatisfactory, because it is rather the object of sense, which, by fitting the μνημεῖον, would be said to remind. Hence ἡ ἐμὲ καὶ (adopted by Wagner) would seem a fair emendation. But a still simpler line of conjecture is to suppose, as in my former edition (1861), ἐμὲ καὶ in the Bodleian reading to have been transposed from καὶ ἐμέ. This gives the same meaning (the sentenee as usual passing out of the relative construction), and accounts naturally for the corruption. If this emendation is right, the sentenee must be supposed to revert by a conversational licence to the indicative mood. Cp. supr. 149 D: Ποιεῖν καὶ . . . ἀμβλίσκουσιν, and note. Schleiermacher's conjecture, ἡ ἐμέ, κ.τ.λ., leaves the subject of ἀναμνήσει doubtful. That of the Zurich editors, εἴσει σὺ ἐμέ, καὶ ἐμέ, introduces an abrupt and awkward inversion.

p. 209. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαινεταί γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὄρθῃ δόξῃ τί ἀν ἔτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἥ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίγνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

5

ΣΩ. Ὡν ὄρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν ἥ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὄρθὴν δόξαν ἥ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἥ εὐπέρου ἡ ὅτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἀν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ παρακέλευσις ἀν 10 καλοῦτο δικαιότερον· τὸ γάρ, ἣ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἢ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκοτωμένῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ***††εἴ γε δή τι νῦν δὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου;

And the use of *οἶδα* in this sense is questionable.

9. ὑπέρου . . περιτροπῆ] ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ποιῶντων πολλάκις καὶ μηδὲν ἀνύντων, ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν ταχέως τι πραττόντων. μέμνηται δὲ αὐτῆς Φιλήμων ἐν "Ἡρωσὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα Πλάτων. (Sehol.)

10. οὐδὲν ἀν λέγοι] I.e. λῆπος ἀν εἴη. Cp. Phædo, 72 B, Legg. 3. 698 A: Λέγοντες ἔργους ὅτι λῆπος πρὸς χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρόν ἔστιν ἔκαστοτε τὰ λεγόμενα τίμια καὶ καλὰ κατὰ πόλιν.

12. πάνυ γενναίως . . ἐσκοτωμένῳ] Cp. esp. Rep. 8. 558 C: "Ἡ δὲ συγγράμμη . . αὐτῆς"—Πάνυ, ἔφη, γενναία.

14. ***††εἴ γε δή] So the Bodleian MS. (but with no accents by the first hand.) Ven. T. has εἰπέ, with the rest, except Vat. Δ, which has εἰ δέ. The Bodleian continues without punctuation from ἐσκοτωμένῳ, and accents as above. But the accents appear to have been added by a later hand. Is it possible

But if it means, 'Knowledge of the distinctive difference,' the term Knowledge remains still unanalysed.

some words may have slipped out? such as Τί οὖν δή; εἴ γε δή τι —'Well, what then?' If, as I presume, your question just now' (supr. D) 'prepared the way for some announcement.' The reading of Vat. Δ (εἰ δὲ δή . . τί, κ.τ.λ.) admits of being rendered, however: 'Well, but if,— what were you just now going to say, when you asked the question?' Most of the editors give Εἰπέ. The question referred to is τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν . . τί ἀν ἔτι εἴη; This is a little difficult; and Badham, reading Εἰ δέ, most ingeniously conjectures τί νῦν δὴ ὡς ἐτερον ὑπέθου, i. e. 'what was the suppressed alternative implied by your use of μέν?' But ὑποτίθεσθαι elsewhere refers to a distinctly expressed postulate or condition (Rep. 1. 346 B), and if it could be used of something merely implied, the imperfect tense would be required in such a reference. πνθέσθαι and

ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὡς παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κε- p. 209.
λεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἥδū χρῆμ' ἀν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν ἔστιν. ἢ γάρ; p. 210.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθείσ, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὁρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη κατ' ἔκεīνον.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. "Εοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παντάπασί γε εὔηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὁρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὄτουοῦν. οὕτε ἄρα αἴσθησις, ὡς Θεαίτητε, οὕτε δόξα ἀληθῆς οὕτε μετ' ἀληθοῦς 15 δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἀν εἴη. B

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ὡς οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὡδίνομεν, ὡς φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εἴρηκα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖα φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ἐρέσθαι are nearly synonymous in Plato. Theætetus very properly recalls Socrates from his unwonted discursiveness. Mr. Paley reads *εἴλα δῆ, τί νῦν δή, κ.τ.λ.*

2. ἥδū χρῆμ' ἀν εἴη τοῦ] The genitive is due to a sort of attractive ethical force in ἥδū, cp. ἀτοπα τῆς σμικρολογίας above. Soph. Phil. 81 : 'Αλλ' ἥδū γάρ τοι κτῆμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν.

'An amusing sort of creature

does our fairest of the accounts of knowledge prove!'

7. ἀποκρινεῖται] Sc. ὁ λόγος.

12. φάναι] ἔκεīνον sc. The absurdity is in fact the same as in Theætetus' first attempt, supr. 147 B.

17. For the 1st pers. plural cp. supr. 154 D. It may be called the good physician's figure,—*σχῆμα ἰατρικόν.*

19. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε πλείω]

Though Theætetus has brought forth more than he knew was in him, the art of Socrates has hitherto rejected all.

p. 210. ΣΩ. Ἐὰν τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπι-
ο χειρῆς γίγνεσθαι, ὡς Θεαίτητε,—έάν τε γίγνη, βελτιό-
νων ἔσει πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, έάν τε κενὸς
ἡ̄ς, ἥττον ἔσει βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος,
σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἀ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον 5
γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ
τι οἴδα ὡν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄν-
δρες εἰσί τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μαιείαν ταύτην
ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν
γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι 10
καλοί. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ
βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἦν με
γέγραπται· ἔωθεν δέ, ὡς Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαν-
τῷμεν.

καὶ πλείω, ‘even more:’—ναὶ μὰ
Δι’ ἔγωγε is interposed.

I. Ἐὰν .. έάν τε .. έάν τε] For this hypothesis within hypothesis cp. supr. 147 A, and note. έάν τε .. έάν τε are correlatives.

‘Then, Theætetus, should you go about hereafter to conceive afresh,—whether you do conceive, your state will be the more promising for what you have now gone through, or whether you remain barren, you will be gentler and less offensive to those about you, for you will be too modest to think that you know what you do not know.’

9. ἐκ θεοῦ] θεός is here generalised. Cp. supr. 149 B, 150 C.

But the youth is cured of thinking that he knows what he does not know.

10. ὅσοι καλοί] Supr. 185 E: ‘Ο γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλός τε κά-
γαθός. The word accentuates Socrates' satisfaction with Theætetus. Cp. supr. 142 C: Πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν.

11. τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν] Indictments for impiety were laid before the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, who was the representative of the ancient kings in their capacity of High-Priest, as the Rex Sacrificulus was at Rome. (Smith's Dict. of Ant.) It is at this point that the Euthyphro is supposed to open.

13. ἔωθεν δέ, κ.τ.λ.] These words may have originally belonged to the dialogue without implying the promise of a continuation. Cp. Lach. sub fin,

A P P E N D I X A.

Heraclitus and Parmenides.

As after-ages saw amongst Plato's contemporaries distinctions which were only partially developed in his time, so in a less degree, and with the difference which his genius implies, Plato viewed the past through a generalization and an antithesis. Heraclitus and Empedocles, and from another point of view Protagoras, were the representatives of one tendency, Parmenides and his followers, of the contrary one. The opposition between them is that between rest and motion, unity and diversity, absolute and relative, universal and particular, finite and infinite, positive and negative, between knowledge and opinion, ideas or conceptions and impressions.

In endeavouring to conceive what Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Protagoras really were, it is necessary to divest our minds of this contrasted form under which we are led to think of them in reading Plato.

It would only be an approximation towards a true estimate to say that Parmenides represents the idea of unity, being, or rest, Heraclitus that of dualism, of a process, or motion, and Pythagoras that of harmony and order, or definite proportions, as intermediate between the other two.

Philosophy was yet too near its origin for its streams to have diverged very far. As we come nearer to those early thinkers, we find that they had more in common than we supposed. They have a common mythological element, the atmosphere in which their thoughts move, and which they strive to pierce, although it veils their meaning partly from themselves; inhaled by some in the Greek and Sicilian valleys, by some, perhaps in earlier purity, on the Eastern plains, but in all finding its highest sensuous embodiment in the Sun or Fire. The notion of $\Delta\kappa\eta$ is common to Heraclitus and Parmenides, the $\epsilon\mu\alpha\rho\mu\acute{e}\nu\eta$ of the one is paralleled by the $\grave{\alpha}\nu\grave{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\eta$ of the other.

The endeavour to pierce this veil of language¹ is accompanied in all of them by a melancholy scepticism and contempt for the common opinions of men. The words of Plato in the Phædo, *οἱ πολλοὶ ψηλαφῶντες ὥσπερ ἐν σκότῳ*, might have been applied by any of the earlier philosophers to the condition of men, who believe the testimony of their senses before that of reason, and cling to their own narrow thoughts instead of being conformed to the law of Nature or Being.

With this scepticism is combined in all of them what may be termed an ideal Pantheism: the speculative and religious intellect filling the void of observation with the intensity of its own early thought². All that is particular owes its being to Wrong, in the universal alone is harmony and righteousness and peace. The world of opinion is a world of ‘nought and night;’ the fulness of being is absolute, and commensurate with thought. The nature of things, says Philolaus, belongs to divine, and not to human knowledge.

Such being the ground colours more or less discernible throughout the philosophy of the sixth century B.C., what were the distinguishing features by which they were relieved? It is now proposed to consider this in the case of Heraclitus and (more briefly) of Parmenides; and it may be remarked in passing, that, historically speaking, it does not seem very probable that either of these philosophers pursued his reflections with direct reference to the other. The idea of the History of Philosophy is a little apt to intercept our view of the History itself. As a Platonist sees in the Ienian and Eleatic two opposite poles, so the Hegelian is tempted to trace the progress of thought from Parmenides to Heraclitus, while a Kantian may view the Eleatic transcendentalism as the higher. Such thoughts may supply a valuable theory, but they are not strictly historical. Parmenides and Heraclitus were nearly contemporary, Heraclitus being the earlier of the two: they lived far apart, and were subject to different influences.

Heraclitus. I. Heraclitus of Ephesus was an Eastern Greek, and it is not merely fanciful to find an analogy between his thoughts and the more dreamy speculations of the remoter East. But they have a greater interest for the student of philosophy, not only as having contributed primarily to the speculative impulse of the Greek mind, but as permanently valuable in themselves, and anticipating some of the most fruitful of modern ideas. Bacon drew

¹ Cp. Parmen. : ‘Ουσάμεναι κροτάφων ἀπὸ χερσὶ καλύπτεις.

² Τὸ γὰρ πλεον ἔστι νόημα, Parmen.

from them some of his happiest expressions ; and Hegel professed to have embodied in his own Logic every principle which they contained. ‘The voice of the Sibyl,’ says Heraclitus, ‘although its notes be harsh and rude, yet penetrates to a thousand years.’ This pregnant saying may be well applied to the obscure utterances of Heraclitus himself. Half understood even by his own followers, imperfectly appreciated by Plato and Aristotle, he exercised a wide-spread influence, second only to that of Parmenides in its intensity. Caught up afresh by the Stoics and Neo-platonists, and by the Fathers of the Christian Church, and read by them in the light of deeper wants, his words received a new interest from their sublime spirit of awe and sadness. And thus many of them have been preserved to us; and reveal in dim and broken outline the proportions of a most noble and far-seeing intellect.

It is the common fate of great thinkers in an early time, that for the most part only the negative side of their teaching ‘lives after them.’ One reason is, that it is the most distinct and intelligible to themselves and their contemporaries. Deep intuitions, but unsubstantial, though clothed in palpable imagery; anticipations, vague and unsupported by proof, of the human mind, dreaming on thoughts to come, partly become engulfed by time, partly remain dead and fruitless and unknown, until their meaning is revealed by the development of cognate thoughts in distant ages, and a late sympathy detects what is hidden there in germ. So the doctrine of Heraclitus, which undoubtedly contained an element of order and unity, if not of rest, and had been as ideal as any, was degraded to be the support of the doctrine of sense, although it again enters to restore the balance of philosophy when in danger of being bound fast in the Eleatic One¹.

Heraclitus himself had followed in the wake of previous thinkers. As the emigrant Xenophanes had ‘looked up to the vault of heaven and said that the One was God,’ so Thales had looked forth on the expanse of the Aegean and said that Water was the All, with a vague sense that Nature must be simple and all-pervading. The tendency of his successors had been towards the idea of an homogeneous Infinite. Heraclitus rose to the conception of Nature as a universal ever-acting Law.

He felt deeply the falseness and contradictoriness of sensation and opinion, not because he contrasted their objects with that of knowledge, but because he felt that these are presented as being

¹ Thus the dialectic of Plat. Rep. 6 is a sort of δόξας ἀνω κάτω μία. See also the Sophist and Parmenides.

something in themselves,—‘not fluctuating but fixed,’—and not as moments in the Universal Process. This is itself unseen, but is symbolised in several ways. ‘The Order that embraces all things is an everliving Fire, Eternal, Uncreated, kindling itself by measures and extinguishing itself by measures;’ i.e. The Idea of the universe implies at once absolute activity and perfect law. This Idea is also represented as ‘the invisible harmony’ which is ‘better than the visible,’ as the ‘Thought which guides all through all,’ as the ‘Universal Word’ or ‘Reason,’ as the ‘One Wisdom,’ as ‘Time,’ as ‘Righteousness,’ as ‘Fate,’ as the ‘Name of Zeus.’ This Eternal process, which is at the same time a law or harmony, is inseparable in the mind of Heraclitus from the notion of dualism. The process is from This to That and back again, the harmony is between opposites, which do not cease to be opposites, although the one passes into the other. This was not lost upon Plato. ‘The universe is ever drawn asunder and together at once, says the muse of firmer tone,’ viz. the Ionian : Plat. Soph. 242. It is implied in the blunt words, ‘War is the Father of all things:’ and in a saying of more doubtful meaning, Παλίντονος ἄρμονή κόσμου, ὅκωσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξου¹. Different interpretations of this have been suggested. Perhaps it might be paraphrased, ‘As the arrow leaves the string, the hands are pulling opposite ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cp. Plato, Rep. 4. 439), and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and retention; the secret of the Universe is the same².’ Thus Homer is blamed for praying that strife may be no more, since without strife there can be no harmony. ‘The Deity is Day and Night in one, winter and summer, war and peace, fulness and hunger.’ Each thing is ever producing or passing into its opposite—evil into good, and good into evil: light into darkness and darkness into light. This Eternal process is the world: ‘All coming out of one, and one arising out of all.’ Its nature is to reveal itself in contradictions: Συνάψειας οὐλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὐλα³, κ.τ.λ. ‘Ἐν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἔθέλει καὶ ἔθελει, Ζηνὸς οὐνομα⁴.

But it is more particularly described as the way upwards and downwards, which is the same. In everything there is contrariety, and the action of the all-embracing, all-dividing fire. But there is a more general contrariety between the fire itself and its grosser forms, i.e. between the absolute process itself and

¹ Fr. 56 (Bywater).

² Hor. Epist. 1. 12. 19: ‘Quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors.’

³ Fr. 59.

⁴ Fr. 65.

the elements which are at once the subjects and the products of its Law. Fire is becoming all things, and all things are becoming fire;—the things are typified as air and water and earth. Here it is more difficult to separate the symbol from the thought. There is an effort made to give greater outward reality to the process, and the language becomes more sensuous accordingly. The way upwards is the way from earth through water and air to fire, the way downwards is from fire through air and water to earth. Both processes are ever moving on together; and each element has its own harmony or law. There is then not only contrariety and harmony in the world, but also a lower and a higher. This is more simply expressed by the distinction between the moist and dry exhalations; e.g. the clouds and the sun: the one dark, the other light; the one tending downwards, the other upwards. These are, as it were, the body and soul of the world. The death of either is the other's life. The Universal Process is perpetually circling between them. At this point we return to the world of sensible things. They exist only by perpetual strife, life and death work together in them; their birth is a death, their death or absorption into the higher region is the true life; the only harmony amongst them is due to war. But is there war in heaven? Is there no escape from this region of conflicting elements? Is the fire itself, the origin and goal of the struggle of existence, torn asunder by a similar struggle? We may possibly imagine the primordial activity and its law (*πῦρ, μέτρα*) as two coexistent and opposite principles, the balance of which is order (*κόσμος*); but it is probably nearer the truth to say, that the fire is inseparable from the world, and therefore from the conflict of things: as these in their war are ever coming into existence and absorbed again, so the fire is ever parted asunder so as to become all things, and at the same time united out of them¹, quenched into the lower forms and kindled into itself again. But then this process is all-embracing; not isolated like the war of particular things: and for each thing to rise from earth to fire, that is, from particular existence to the Universal Process, is to attain to peace. This seems to be implied in the notice of Diog. L. (9. 8): Τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων τὸ μὲν εἰς γένεσιν ἄγον καλεῖσθαι πόλεμον καὶ ἔρω, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ὀμολογίαν καὶ εἰρήνην². On the other hand, that which is wearied with the 'Eternal process moving on,' is carried downwards by a weak desire of rest and of particular being; and to this is

¹ Διαφερόμενον δεὶ συμφέρεται. ² ἐποίησεν ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν,—κάματος ἀνά-

πανσιν.

attributed the origin of the individual soul. (See Lassalle, Her. vol. i. pp. 123 sqq.)

What is the bearing of this theory on the mind, on human knowledge, and on human life?

1. The universal law or process may be conceived of as a continued act or utterance of mind (*γνώμη ἡ κυβερνήσει πάντα, τὸ ἐν σοφόν, θεῖος λόγος*). This, though more or less personified (as *Ζεύς, Δίκη, Θεός*), is nowhere distinctly personal. The act or utterance itself is the soul of the World, not exactly ‘immanent,’ but ever moving throughout all, passing into everything and returning into itself again. Yet while thus pervading all things, it essentially holds the upper ethereal region, and embraces all, being opposed to the things beneath it as universal to particular.

2. Knowledge therefore is the acquaintance and union with this universal and pervading mind or law. That human mind is the best, which most partakes of it; that which lives in its own world of particular impressions and notions, is ‘nearer earth and less in light.’ This idea finds a symbolical and also an abstract expression. ‘A dry soul is the wisest and best, flashing through the body as lightning through a cloud’ (cp. *ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις*). ‘The soul that is moist (e.g. with wine) “embodies” itself like a gathering cloud’ (cp. *ὑγρὰ ἀναθυμίασις*). ‘The Law of things is a law of universal Reason, but most men live as if they had a wisdom of their own.’ ‘To live in the light of the universal Order is to be awake, to turn aside into our own microcosm is to go to sleep.’ ‘Most men even when they hear are as though they heard not, their speech bewrays that though present they are absent mentally.’ It is an obscure question, and one which Heraclitus probably did not distinctly ask himself, by what path, according to this theory, the mind passes from sense to knowledge, from the darkness of the particular into the light of the universal. The answer would probably be little more than that the eye of the soul is opened. As the faculty of sight is quenched in sleep, so the mind is quenched while it is concerned only with the things surrounding it. But if a man is awake, the fire within him finds its kindred fire, and flashes through the clouds of the sensible world. Thus living in the universal order he becomes a partaker of the mind which follows all through all. Sensation is not annihilated, but is absorbed into the grander movement of the mind, and becomes the transparent medium of true vision. (See the expression *κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίειν*, where the transition from sensible to mental perception is not marked.) While the mind is thus acquainted with the universal

law, it must also follow the swiftness of the universal motion (Plat. Cratyl. 412 : *Διὰ τὸν λόντος ἵέναι παντός*), distinguishing all things into their true elements (*διαιρέων ἔκαστον κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει*¹), perceiving their transformations, comprehending their unseen harmony (*πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθόν κρινέει καὶ καταλήψεται*²). Heraclitus could not be unconscious that this was an ideal state for man, who ‘lights a taper for himself in the night,’ and ‘is but an ape to compare with God.’ The subtlety of Nature far exceeds the subtlety of man’s intellect, and her energy far exceeds his power to grapple with it. Hence as in the Heaven of Heraclitus there is no rest, so in his philosophy there is occasionally a despairing tone. This, however, never occurs in speaking of the Eternal process, but only of its comprehension by man.

3. For in comparison with the grandeur of the Universal Law, human life becomes a very little thing, if it be not more fitly called a death. Indeed, as in all things else, so in man, life and death are ever working together. His body is ever absorbed into his soul, his soul is ever dying into his body; his birth into the world is the entombment of a higher life, the death of what is earthly in him is the awaking of the God. As the Reason is but a small part in any man, so the good amongst men are few, and misunderstood (for dogs also bark at him they know not). Even the philosopher is like the gold-digger, who toils much and finds little³, and often his truest wisdom is to know himself, and to feel the nothingness of his individual Being in the presence of the Universal Order. Yet public law is to be zealously maintained, as more general than the private will, the excesses of which are to be quenched as a dangerous fire⁴.

Such is the bare outline of a thought the grandeur of which was far beyond the comprehension of that time. The *Λόγος* or Law of Heraclitus was not exactly a law of progress, for his elements are ever circling in one round, yet it is as near an approach to that Idea as is to be found in Ancient Philosophy. A still nearer approach is made to the conception of the infinity and simplicity of Nature. And while we feel that the metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle owe much of their strength and reality and perfection to the One Being of Parmenides, and in part also to the Pythagoreans, in whose philosophy finite and infinite were already combined, it is im-

¹ Fr. 2.

² Fr. 26.

³ Cp. Plat. Rep. 5. 450.

⁴ "Ὕβριν χρὴ σβεννύειν μᾶλλον ἢ πυρκαϊῆν, Fr. 103.

possible not to recognise in Plato a nearer kindred to Heraclitus than to any other of his predecessors. The union of Imagination and Reason, the plasticity of mind, the tendency at once to soar and to roam, may be mentioned as some of the points of communion between them. Many scattered thoughts, as well as the spirit pervading whole passages, might be quoted in confirmation of this. It is not surprising therefore if Plato grasped the thought of Heraclitus more firmly than the dark philosopher's own followers had done¹.

The fate of Heraclitus' teaching at Ephesus² reminds us of his own picture of the soul that is too weak to follow the Universal motion, and falls away from it to take an individual shape. The very multiplicity of his symbolism seems to have contributed to this result; each disciple interpreting the whole theory by the figure which was most intelligible to himself: one fastening on the Fire, another on the Sun, another on the dry exhalation, another on the more abstract Righteousness, or the ruling Mind, while some appear to have seized upon his habit of teaching by strange outward signs, if there be any truth in what Aristotle gravely asserts, that Cratylus at length

¹ The two passages in which this appreciation appears most distinctly are, Sophist. 242: Διαφερόμενον γάρ (sc. τὸ ὄν) ἀεὶ ξυμφέρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν (with which contrast Sympos. 187, where the saying is explained away), and Cratyl. 412: "Οσοι γάρ ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοιούτον τι εἶναι, οἷον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ή χωρεῖν, διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναι τι διεξίν, δι’ οὖν πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι. εἶναι τοῦτο δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον· οὐ γάρ ἀν δύνασθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦτο ίέναι παντός, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατον τε ἥν, ὅστε αὐτὸν μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον, ὅστε χρῆσθαι ὕσπερ ἔστωσι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν ἐπιτροπεύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαιόν, κ.τ.λ.

² This may be illustrated by the continuation of the passage of the Cratylus just quoted, Μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα, δὲ νῦν δὲ ἐλέγομεν, παρὰ πολλῶν δμολογεῖται τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. ἐγὼ δέ, ἦ Έρμόγενες, ἀτε λιπαρῆς ὅν περι αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέπυσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, ὅτι τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον—δι’ ἣ γάρ γίγνεται, τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον—καὶ ίδια καλεῖν

ἔφη τις τοῦτο δρθῶς ἔχειν διὰ ταῦτα· ἐπειδὰν δ’ ἡρέμα αὐτοὺς ἐπανερωτῶ δικούσας ταῦτα μηδὲν ἥπτον, Τί οὖν ποτ’ ἔστιν, ὥσθε, δίκαιον, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; δοκῶ τε ἡδη μακρότερα τοῦ προστηκούτου ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἀλλεσθαι. ίκανῶς γάρ μέ φαστε πεπύσθαι καὶ ἀκηκοέναι καὶ ἐπιχειροῦσι, βουλόμενοι ἀποπιμπλάναι με, ἄλλος ἄλλα ἡδη λέγειν, καὶ οὐκέτι συμφωνοῦσιν. ὁ μὲν γάρ τις φησι τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον τούτον γάρ μόνον διαίσθαι καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὰν οὖν τῷ λέγειν αὐτὸν ἀσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκόως, καταγελᾶς μου οὗτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτᾷ, εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἷμα εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἥλιος δύῃ. λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ δὲ τι αὖ ἐκεῖνος λέγει, αὐτὸν τὸ πῦρ φησί· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ βρδίσιν ἔστιν εἰδέναι· δὲ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸν τὸ πῦρ φησίν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. δὲ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελᾶν φησίν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο. αὐτοκράτορα γάρ μόντον ὄντα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον πάντα φησὸν αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ίόντα, ἐνταῦθα δη ἐγώ, ὃ φίλε, πολὺ ἐν πλείονι ἀπορίᾳ εἰμὶ δὲ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι μανθάνειν περὶ τοῦ δίκαιου, δὲ τί ποτ’ ἔστιν.

only moved his finger. These divided members of Heraclitus continued after him a partial and spasmodic life, and the system ended consistently in a kind of war.

Until the end of last century the fragments of the early Greek philosophers were only accessible to the few scholars whose reading extended over a large field. These of Heraclitus were first collected by Schleiermacher in 1807. But the discovery of the *Philosophumena* in 1851 gave materials not previously accessible. For Hippolytus, or whoever wrote that treatise, sought to discredit Noëtus by identifying his teaching with that of the old Ephesian, and to this pious wish we are indebted for several fresh quotations from the Περὶ Φύσεως. The sentences containing these additional fragments were carefully re-edited in 1854 by Jacob Bernays, by whom the study of Heraclitus has been otherwise greatly advanced (*Heraclitea*, 1848, etc.). More recently, in 1869, there appeared from the same acute and learned pen *Dic Heraclitischen Briefe, ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und religiengeschichtlichen Litteratur*, a memorable essay towards determining the complex question, ‘What kind of evidence can be obtained from spurious writings?’ In this work, and also in his *Heraclitea*, Prof. Bernays has pointed out many echoes of Heraclitus in subsequent literature.

Mr. Bywater¹ has conceived the design of presenting in one view the substance and the shadow of Heraclitus, of letting us hear the ‘voice of the Sibyl’ and its reverberations; not by weaving the scattered fragments into a complete whole with the help of unlimited conjecture, as was done by Lassalle (more theologian than scholar) in 1858, and more recently by Schuster in a laborious effort of ‘constructive criticism’ (Teubner, 1873), but by displaying the relevant facts, including the citation of authorities, with as much exactness and with as little admixture of conjecture as possible.

The citations throw considerable light both on the interpretation of Heraclitus and on the history of his influence. An obscure phrase often becomes clearer when we see how it was quoted (see esp. Fr. 60); and even the names of the authors are instructive. We are reminded by them how a secondary phase of Heraclitus’ doctrine came to be woven into the philosophy of Plato; how

¹ *Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae*. Recensuit I. Bywater, Coll. Ex. Soc. Oxon. 1877. Some of the remarks

which follow here were printed in an article for the ‘Academy’ of that year.

the dark speaker was compelled by Aristotle to render up his logical account, as Locke and Leibnitz are by our Hegelians at the present day; how the Stoics gave him fresh currency, having been attracted to him both by the austerity of his spirit, and by the kindred nature of his symbolism ($\pi\hat{\nu}\rho$, $\epsilon\kappa\pi\hat{\nu}\rho\omega\sigma\tau$); lastly, how the Fathers of the Church employed him as they did other heathen writers, now wresting him to their side for the condemnation of Pagan superstition, now seeking to overthrow an adversary by comparing him with the infidel philosopher.

The reproach of obscurity was more deserved by Heraclitus than that of melancholy, which became proverbial perhaps in consequence of his association with Stoicism, although it is true that the philosophy of change, which saw ‘man kindled and extinguished like a spark in the night’ (Fr. 77), was in close accord with the sadness which had characterised much of the earlier Ionian reflexion (Mimnermus, Fr. 2; Hdt. 7. 46). But it may be questioned if he were more obscure than other prophets of the mind, who in the sixth century B.C., perhaps unconsciously moved by some Oriental influence, strove to catch the universe in aphorisms. And if his $\Pi\epsilon\rho\iota\Phi\hat{\nu}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ were now extant, abrupt and disjointed as it would probably still appear (not, as Bacon thought, outweighing Plato), it might be more intelligible to us than it was either to Aristotle or to the Stoics.

The ‘transcendent Pantheism,’ whether of Heraclitus or Parmenides, is an open secret to the student of Descartes and Spinoza. The Hegelian, for whom the true individual is the true universal, and all thought proceeds by collision of opposites, can understand his master’s saying that he had taken up the philosophy of Heraclitus into his own. And some of our modern $\phi\hat{\nu}\sigma\iota\omega\lambda\delta\gamma\omega\iota$ might be surprised to find, in what they supposed to be a fistful of air, the expression of principles which they have verified, such as the permanence of the sum of energy, the interchangeableness of energy and heat, the reciprocal transmutation of elementary forces, the transience of phenomena, the permanence of law, the relativity of perception to the organs of sense (Fr. 37), and might acknowledge that ‘Anticipatio Naturæ’ was less a term of opprobrium than they had imagined. But the wonder would be all on their side, for Heraclitus would have wondered at nothing so much as if these things had turned out otherwise.

The scholar might find germs of Platonic thought and expression (Frr. 115, 114; cp. Rep. 2. 376, 7. 540); the general critic, unconscious

coincidencies with remote literatures, like that between Fr. 69, ‘Time is a child at chess,’ and the well-known lines of Omar Khayyám. The agnostic and the mystical theologian might both find meaning in the deep saying, ‘God at once reveals and hides himself;’ while the religious reformer would rejoice to see that Greek no less than Hebrew prophets felt the abomination and absurdity of sacrifice. ‘They think to purge their sins by polluting themselves with blood’ (Fr. 130). So rich in germinal expression was this prophetic soul, who, in clinging to a seeming paradox, was really presaging thoughts of many generations.

The character of Heraclitus came nearer than that of Socrates to Plato’s description of the great mind born in a little State and despising her birthplace, but soaring aloft to survey things in Heaven and Earth. The pride shown in his contempt for Pythagoras and Xenophanes, and his grudging praise of Bias, may help to account for the conceit which Plato noted in his followers: but there is a Socratic loftiness in the tone in which he speaks of death (as an emanation, Fr. 37, a sloughing-off of the body, Fr. 85), and in his outburst on behalf of Hermodorus we see a trace of underlying kindness and of the passion for justice which is the best note of the philosophic spirit. We gather from Fr. 73 that he was more austere in his habits than Xenophanes.

II. The sublime thought of the Eternal movement of an infinite law was not, however, destined to be the final conception of the Greek mind. While life and death and the succession of phenomena were thus idealized on the Eastern shores of the Ægean, a different, though parallel impulse was preparing elsewhere, it is said at Elea in Magna Græcia: an impulse equally if not more sublime, yet by itself no less incapable of giving rise to such a philosophy as Plato’s. Xenophanes had already said—

‘There is one God above all in heaven or earth, not like to mortals either in form or mind.’ ‘He is all sight, all thought, all hearing.’ ‘He ever abides immovable in one stay: nor does it become him to waver to and fro.’

Inspired with this thought Parmenides rose at once into an ideal world of mind and being, not seeking there an explanation of the sensible universe, nor endeavouring to grasp its law, or idealize its continual process, but dwelling solely on the all-sufficient object of Absolute and Perfect Being. From

the world in which his thought reposed, growth and decay were exiled far, into a region which Pure Being did not enter, a world of nothingness, which yet seemed to satisfy the minds of ordinary men, who trusted in the blindness of opinion and sense, and lived amongst contradictions. For in this lower world of opinion, opposite principles ever strove, light and darkness, heat and cold. But Pure Being is one, a rounded whole, perfect and full, identical with the Absolute Mind. The only symbol of Parmenides is the Perfect Sphere.

The main effort of Plato's dialectic, as is well known, is to bring these opposite poles of thought, the Eleatic and Ionian, into organic and well-balanced harmony. In its most abstract conception it is the problem of the one and the many (*τῶν λόγων ἀγήρων πάθος παρ' ήμūν*), or of motion and rest. In this effort he was assisted by the Pythagoreans, who had already found a sort of middle term in Number.

The doctrine of Parmenides does not enter directly into the *Theætetus*, from which the discussion of it is expressly excluded: but his influence is notwithstanding present in the Megarian method, which was in part derived from Zeno (see Introduction), in whose hands the One had acquired a negative power, and was used rather to distinguish than to comprehend, so becoming rather the form than the sole object of thought. This Eleatic influence appears chiefly (1) in the relentless way in which sensation and motion are reduced to nothingness, and because they have no unity are shown to present no object to the mind: (2) in the crowning point of the dialogue, where it is admitted that there are universal perceptions of pure mind, and that Being is the principal of these: (3) in the paradox about false opinion, which is similar to that of Zeno about motion,—not ‘it is impossible for a thing to be in two places at once,’ but ‘it is impossible to know and not to know at the same time,’—and is solved in the same way by reverting to the conception of degrees: (4) in the form of argument with which this paradox is enforced, δέν γέ τι ὁρᾶν δέν τι ὁρᾶ; (5) in the question about the whole and its parts, pp. 203, 204.

APPENDIX B.

**Ανθρωπος μέτρον.*

PROTAGORAS, who gives to the inquiry in the *Theætetus* its subjective turn, and some part of its dramatic interest, had died at the age of seventy, some ten or twelve years before the trial of Socrates, which is the supposed date of the conversation. The real share borne by him (or by his Shade) in the dialogue is less than appears at first sight. It is to his ‘disciples’ that the doctrine of sense based on that of motion is attributed, and though he is made to bear the brunt of the attack, because the guardians whom he has left will not defend his ‘orphan’ theory, yet when challenged to meet him upon his own ground, Socrates falls back upon the saying quoted at first, ‘Man is the measure of all things,’ and the explanation of it, ‘Things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.’ The same words occur also in the *Cratylus*. This, then, is nearly all that we can with any certainty point to in this dialogue as Protagorean, except the name of his treatise *Ἀλήθεια*, the sceptical fragment about the existence of the gods, and perhaps one or two rhetorical words, such as *μεγαλειοτέρως*, *πολυνάρατος*. For it is evident that the doctrine of motion and becoming, which he is said to have entrusted to his disciples ‘in a mystery’ (cp. *Cratyl.* 413), cannot have been extant in his writings. It is therefore surprising to find Sextus Empiricus representing the tenets of Protagoras in language closely resembling that used in the *Theætetus*. The wonder is abated, however, if we reflect that there was really a very close affinity between Protagoras and the Cyrenaics, and that of this affinity Plato is in this dialogue the interpreter. Aristotle follows Plato in identifying the theories of Protagoras and Heraclitus. And there are thus three sources, independent of Protagoras, from which the account of Sextus may have been derived: the Cyrenaics, the *Theætetus*, and Aristotle. The similarity of the language in which different sensationalist theories are described in later times may possibly indicate

the influence of this very dialogue in fixing the terminology of that aspect of thought.

It is therefore the more interesting to examine the one saying of Protagoras which is here preserved: Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώποι εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι. Might not this seem at first sight to imply something less than the absolute relativity of knowledge? Might it not even be interpreted to mean, ‘quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus?’ In answer to this it may be remarked, first, that Protagoras appears so far at least to have interpreted his own saying, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοὶ, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί. But it may be added, secondly, that the distinction between the race and the individual, between the general term ‘man,’ and the singular term ‘this man,’ was probably not distinctly present to his mind. When we reflect on the absence of any abiding consciousness of the universal and of the distinction between abstract and concrete, exhibited, for instance, in the first answer of Theætetus, or in the attempt of Meno to define virtue, it becomes evident that the term *man*, thus barely used by a popular teacher, would naturally call up the idea, not of human nature or of the human mind, nor of the race collectively, but of ‘a man,’ ‘this or that man,’ an individual, ‘you or me,’ not, however, conceived of as an individual, nor consciously distinguished from any abstract or generic notion of man, but simply present to the imagination¹.

Protagoras saw that men were weary of systems which had no reference to human life, and seemed to make knowledge unattainable. He saw persons teaching astronomy and the nature of Being to those who wanted to learn how to become able and successful citizens. Like other popular teachers, he had a keener eye for the immediate wants of those who came to him than for abstract truth. The theory of Parmenides, which had its warm advocates at Athens, was one purely objective; although beginning and ending in the mind, it was wholly independent of any human standard: the highest aim for man was to rise by pure thought into the world of being.

Protagoras felt, like Socrates, that the truth which man requires is relative to man, but, unlike Socrates, he made this the end and not the starting-point of his inquiry, and instead of searching by reflection for that one truth by which man ought to live, lie

¹ Cp. *τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, Thuc. I. 140, which does not correspond to the modern generic use of the word.

was contented with inferring that truth was variable, according to the common notion, ‘many men, many minds.’

As embodied in the Theætetus, the above doctrine receives some fresh characteristics, first, as being made the type of a contemporary theory, and being interwoven with that of Heraclitus; secondly, as holding one side of an antithesis, which gives a sharpness and precision to the term *ἀνθρωπός*, as equivalent to *ἐκαστος ἡμῶν*, which it probably had not when first used; and, thirdly, by being pushed to its minutest results, according to the Megarian method,—not only ‘man’ but ‘each man,’ not only so, but ‘every creature,’ and even the same person at different times.

APPENDIX C.

Protagoras and Mr. Grote¹.

I. KNOWLEDGE is relative in two senses, not wholly unconnected with each other, which in ancient philosophy were not yet clearly distinguished. There is the relation of subject to object, and the relation of the universal to the particular. For the sake of clearness, these different aspects of the relativity of knowledge may be treated separately, although the study of either involves the consideration of both.

(1) Knowledge is relative to the mind. But here also there is a distinction which must not be overlooked. For there is a general and a particular subjectivity. (a) There can be no knowledge apart from the mind which knows. An object of knowledge without a subject is inconceivable. Or rather, knowledge cannot be conceived except as the joint working of the mind and of that which is external to the mind. All knowledge is necessarily in this sense subjective. But this condition in no way limits or impairs the certainty or perfection of knowledge. Relativity of this sort is not inconsistent with the existence of Absolute Truth. (b) It is otherwise with the peculiar subjective conditions of individual minds. These modify and render defective the knowledge of particular men, ‘who see and know but in part, and have different prospects of the same thing according

¹ From an article in the Quarterly Review for January, 1856.

to their different positions to it¹. Yet even this partial knowledge, in so far as it is *knowledge*, has an objective and universal reality.

Now, although it is mere nonsense to talk of eliminating the subjective element, if by object-without-subject is meant knowledge *minus* mind, there is no such absurdity in supposing that knowledge, while remaining under the conditions of mind, may become perfect through being purified from the effect of bias. Nor is it chimerical to hope that to this ideal an indefinite approximation may be made in the growth of science, in which every forward step is the relinquishment of that which some have thought, for that which all who understand the proofs must think. This process is, in effect, the enlightenment or enfranchisement of individual minds. The aim of every scientific inquirer is to come forth from the den and stand under the open heaven; to correct the inequality of the mirror of a particular mind by a method valid for all minds; to shake off the idols of the tribe and theatre, and become the denizen and pupil of the universe, and no longer of a country or of a sect only. Such are the images, borrowed from the old philosophy, in which Bacon described the progress of knowledge. Those who believe in the reality of inductive science will hardly maintain that they are illusory. And they point to an idea of knowledge as something wholly different from individual opinion; as containing what, in contradistinction to the particular subjective, may be called the subjective-universal.

Closely parallel to this, if account be taken of the intellectual circumstances of the time, was the idea of knowledge which Plato derived from Socrates. He looked for a definition that should hold universally, an irrefragable hypothesis, an opinion which could not be shaken by examination. In other words, he sought for that which is true, not for the individual thinker only, but for all who think. He everywhere acknowledges, however, or rather insists, that general truths cannot be attained or imparted except through the awakening of individual minds. There is no vision until the eye is turned in the direction of the light. It is only the coarse Thrasymachus who imagines that he can take and thrust his notions bodily down his hearer's throat. And Socrates, in attempting to answer him, is unable to say anything but what he individually thinks. The Socratic dialogue represents the meeting-point of a particular conscious-

¹ Locke's *Conduct of the Understanding*, § 3.

ness with universal reason, and the process which results is an approximation on the part of two individuals to a universal truth. In none of the dialogues in which Socrates is the chief speaker is there any element of authority; but they are equally removed from sanctioning an arbitrary or capricious ‘private judgment.’ No testimony is admitted but that of the respondent’s own mind; no persuasion or enforcement, except that of argument, is applied. The single duty recognised is that of obeying reason. But there is no dispensation from this duty. Except in passages which are clearly playful or ironical, mere verbal juggling and all opinionativeness are earnestly deprecated, and the speakers simply endeavour, by means of dialectic, to obtain and exhibit Truth. ‘We must use our own faculties, such as they are, and say what we really think¹.’ ‘We must follow, at all risks, whithersoever reason guides².’ ‘No logical puzzles can frighten us from pursuing the path of knowledge³.’ ‘We have to consider, not who said this, but whether that which is now said be true⁴.’ ‘It is my way, Crito, to yield to no influence of those surrounding me, but to the reason, which, when I think, seems to me the best⁵.’ This is the reply of Socrates, when urged to escape from prison: and so in the same prison he advised his friends. ‘Care not for Socrates, but care much rather for the truth⁶.’ This position was contrasted by Plato with that of Protagoras, who asserted the subjectivity of all knowledge without distinguishing the universal from the particular subject. His formula was rude, but intelligible: ‘Man is the measure; that is to say, things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.’ This Plato understood as the denial of that belief in a common measure or universal truth which was implied in the work of Socrates, and he joined issue with Protagoras accordingly. Mr. Grote has given fresh life and interest to this ancient controversy by taking the part of Protagoras against Plato. Himself holding that while the subjective feeling of belief is universal, the object or matter of belief varies in each particular case, and apparently thinking that this radical imperfection is incurable; not distinguishing, as it would seem, between the propositions, ‘My belief is my belief,’ and ‘My belief depends wholly upon my individual peculiarities’—or, at least, not recognising the difference between belief

¹ *Theæt.* 171 D.

⁴ *Charm.* 160.

² *Rep.* 3. 394 D.

⁵ *Crito*, 46.

³ *Theæt.* 197 A; *Men.* 81 E.

⁶ *Phæd.* 91 C; cf. *Soph.* 246 D.

grounded on sufficient and insufficient reasons—he can imagine no alternative between a blind dogmatism and the entire relativity of truth. Either one individual opinion is the infallible standard by which all other opinions are to be judged, or else every opinion is alike valid, not indeed for those who question that opinion, but for the person holding it. But is not a third case possible? That which is different need not be wholly different¹; and may there not be in all human experience, however diverse, a common element? If belief is universal, so also is the process of reasoning. May not the exercise of this on the facts of experience bring men gradually to the acknowledgment of universal truths—not such as have been laid down by dogmatists, but such as are found, at least approximately, after long inquiry, when out of many ingenious hypotheses some have been verified beyond the possibility of doubt? It is not necessary that these should be dogmatically taught. Indeed, they cannot be imparted thoroughly unless the learner is led to repeat the process of invention. His curiosity must be aroused and satisfied, his reason must be awakened to perceive and solve the difficulties surrounding each hypothesis. Otherwise, he may believe, but cannot know.

Mr. Grote accuses Plato of first misrepresenting Protagoras and afterwards following him, and of misrepresenting him in two ways: in identifying his doctrine with another and a different doctrine, that knowledge is sensible perception, and in having suppressed the characteristic addition ‘to me,’ ‘to you,’ as if Protagoras had said that relative truth was absolutely true.

The weight of the former charge depends on the intention of Plato in blending the two theories, and on the exact signification of the term which we translate Sensation or Perception. Now it should be observed that the word *Aesthesia* is expressly said to include, according to the theory, the feelings of pleasure, pain, desire, and fear², and apparently also the distinction between good and evil³. The common characteristic of these impressions and of knowledge, according to this theory, is that of constituting the experience of an individual at a particular moment (*τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος*). Such present impressions are regarded as more certain than the fainter repetition of the same in memory⁴; and the active operation of the mind, in reviewing and reasoning over her impressions, is supposed to be

¹ See Theæt. 158 E.

² Ibid. 152 B.

³ Ibid. 157 E.

⁴ Theæt. 166 A, compare Hume.

left out of view¹. Protagoras might possibly have exclaimed at this, and said that the individual was the measure to himself in thought as well as in sensation. But he seems to have drawn his examples from the facts of sense²; and Plato's object is to show that while the impressions of sense and feeling have in themselves only a momentary value, it is not so with the reasonings of the mind by which these are compared and generalised, and which are often justified not at the moment, but long afterwards in the actual experience of those who did not share them at the time.

This brings us to the other accusation, that Plato has suppressed the words ('to me,' 'to you,') which mark the essential relativity of Protagoras' 'Measure.' He has certainly not forgotten them, for he has been at some pains to illustrate this very point, where it is shown how the theory justifies the illusions of a sick palate³; and, again, where it is observed that the opinion of the true prophet proves not less true for those who did not believe him. If Plato is unfair to Protagoras, it is in making an addition, which may or may not have been consciously implied in the formula, 'Each man is the measure of what is true to him.' To this Plato adds in effect, 'and there is no other standard of true being.' But this negative aspect of the doctrine necessarily becomes explicit, when the statement is viewed as having a controversial import. The assertion 'Man is the measure' is unmeaning, unless this measure is brought into competition with some other, such as the Eleatic Being. Now, if the formula is thus interpreted, there are two less exact modes of expressing the same thing. Either 'nothing is true' (i. e. absolutely), or

¹ The difference between ancient and modern philosophical language is repeatedly exemplified in this discussion; what Mr. Grote calls 'compared facts of sense,' e. g. weighing, measuring, etc. (ii. 364), Plato would probably have treated as the conclusions of the mind on reviewing her passive impressions.

² Theat. 152 B: Ἐπακολούθσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.

³ They are true to the sick man during his sickness. Mr. Grote says (ii. 353), 'Socrates imputes it as a contradiction to Protagoras—"Your doctrine is pronounced to be false by many persons; but you admit that the belief of all persons is true; therefore your doctrine is false." Here also Plato omits the qualification an-

nexed by Protagoras to his general principle—Every man's belief is true—that is, true *to him*. That a belief should be true to one man, and false to another, is not only no contradiction to the formula of Protagoras, but is the very state of things which his formula contemplates.' Plato is more wide awake than Mr. Grote imagines. He points out that Protagoras did not hold the principle of relativity to be only relatively true; otherwise he must have admitted that all the world, who differed from him, were not to themselves measures of truth, and that he himself in their judgment, that is in relation to them, was not a measure, so that his principle was not applicable to them.

'everything is alike true' (i. e. relatively). Either 'there is no absolute,' or 'the relative is the only absolute.' Both forms of expression are found in the *Theætetus*¹. But it is not fair to infer from this that Plato has argued 'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.' The same cavil would apply at least with equal force to the language of Protagoras himself, who called his treatise 'Αλήθεια, real (not phenomenal) truth.

'There can be no discussion without reference to a common ideal standard.' 'There can be no discussion without reference to individual belief.' Mr. Grote's whole argument proceeds on the implied assumption that these two propositions are irreconcileable. Hence he charges Plato with inconsistency in at one time appealing to an imaginary expert or wise man (the *βασιλεὺς τεχνικός* of the *Politicus*), the personified ideal of knowledge, and at other times repudiating all authority except that of the consciousness of the respondent in the dialogue, and thus upholding what Mr. Grote characteristically styles the 'autonomy' of the individual reason. But the whole spirit of Plato's dialectic lies in bringing together the individual and the universal consciousness, and if cross-questioned on the point he would probably have said, as he has said of the kindred antithesis of the one and many, that this union is essentially inherent in the nature of thought, *τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατον τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος*². Those beliefs, however, which are more particularly the respondent's own, which he derives from natural idiosyncrasy or from previous intercourse, are invariably shaken and removed by Socrates, and much also of what is evoked during the conversation by his suggestive art, is in turn criticised and cut away. That which is allowed to remain as the result of the discussion (though still open to further examination) is certainly the present belief of the respondent; but is different in kind from the belief with which he entered on the argument. He began with loose impressions gathered from hearsay or from his own half-reasoning; he ends with a conviction which has been evolved by an active exercise of the reason, in which reference has been made at every step to an ideal standard of knowledge. This result is not adequately described by saying that the beliefs and convictions of one person are modified by another. Plato appeals at once to the requirements of the argument, and to the consciousness of the individual reasoner, and, whether his position is tenable

¹ *Theæt.* 152, 166, 167; cp. 179 B. The former expression, 'Nothing is true,' is however more frequently assigned to *Gorgias*.

² *Phil.* 15 D.

or not, he cannot be accused in this of alternating between opposite points of view. If the two appeals are mutually destructive, he makes them, not alternately, but together. The horns of Mr. Grote's dilemma pass harmlessly on either side of Plato. Even one who professed to have found absolute truth, might hold that this could only be communicated by awakening gradually the individual mind. But Plato in most of his dialogues professes to be still seeking for the truth in whose reality he believes, and invites others to help him in the search. He views universal truth as neither hopelessly lost, nor actually found, but in continual process of discovery¹. He certainly does hold inquiry to be a real endeavour, and not a mere mental exercise, and believes (in spite of difficulties which he keenly appreciates) that the distinction between truth and error has a value that is independent of human opinions. And it is here that he parts company with his English critic. Mr. Grote urges, in language nearly similar to that with which Socrates in the *Theætetus* affects to defend Protagoras²: ‘To say that a man is wise, is to say that he is wise in some one’s estimation, your own, or that of some one else³.’ This is undeniable: but then every such estimate must be either true or false, nearer to or farther from a perfect estimate. Of this difference, indeed, no man is an infallible judge, though one man can judge more correctly than another, as experience proves. God, not man, is the measure, as Plato himself has said⁴. But it is not less clear on this account that the degree of approximation is something real, and that he who judges more correctly of this is in reality the better judge. Mr. Grote admits that, in his own opinion, in matters involving future contingency most men judge *badly*⁵: only a few persons, possessed of sufficient skill and knowledge, judge *well*. He believes the distinction to be real and important, and allows that most other persons believe the same. He adds, ‘In acting on this distinction, I follow out my belief, and so do they. This is a general fact, respecting the conditions which determine individual belief. Like all other causes of belief, it

¹ Phæd. 75 E: “Ο καλοῦμεν μαθά-
νειν, οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν
ἀν εἴη.

² Theæt. 166, 167.

³ Vol. ii. p. 352.

⁴ Legg. 4. 716 C.

⁵ This language, like that in the defence of Protagoras (Theæt. 167), seems to be adopted (unconsciously)

to avoid the words true and false. But it is at least as arbitrary to withhold the terms true and false from judgments, as to apply them to pleasures, which Plato has been censured for doing in the *Philebus*. See also vol. ii. p. 351, where the question of degrees of mental force is substituted for the question of truth or reality.

operates relatively to the individual mind.' (Vol. ii. p. 355.) This is indisputable: but those who believe the distinction to be real and important, believe in a measure of truth, which they do not suppose to alter with the variations of belief. They believe the distinction to be important for others as well as for themselves. 'When a man speaks of truth, he means what he himself (along with others, or singly, as the case may be) believes to be truth:' he does not mean only what is true to him. Once more, Mr. Grote says, 'You pronounce an opponent to be in error: but if you cannot support your opinion by evidence on authority which satisfies his senses or his reason, he remains unconvinced. Your individual opinion stands good to you, his opinion stands good to him. You think that he ought to believe as you do, and in certain cases you feel that he will be brought to that result by future experience; which of course must be relative to him and his appreciative powers. He entertains the like conviction in regard to you.' (Vol. ii. p. 515.) This is freely admitted—and amounts to this, that each (either truly or falsely) believes his own opinion to be true. When Mr. Grote says he thinks the doctrine of Protagoras respecting pleasure 'nearer to the truth' than that of Gorgias, and that of the Republic 'utterly at variance with the truth,' does he mean nearer to and at variance with what is true to him? No man ever held fast an opinion merely as his opinion, but as the truth. And this implies reference to a standard which is independent of individual judgments. But to confound mere individual belief with belief grounded on evidence, or rather not to admit the difference between them, would take us back to Pyrrho and the ancient sceptics. Nor is there any modern theory of knowledge, whether that of Locke or Kant or any other, on which such a doctrine, which is really the denial of knowledge, is tenable. The same misunderstanding may be made apparent by analysing a favourite expression of Mr. Grote's, viz. 'individual reason.' Granted that nothing is true for me but what I in my own person believe—that it is impossible, even were it desirable, to force conviction—that when I yield to an authority, I exercise my private judgment in pronouncing the authority sufficient,—still the question may be asked, wherein differs the assent of the individual *reason* from impressions of sense or creations of fancy? And it would be difficult to find any distinguishing note, except the consciousness that the object of assent cannot be otherwise, and claims the belief of all who think. Mr. Grote will say that this con-

sciousness often proves delusive, and that the case of sensation is exactly parallel¹. Those whose minds are constituted alike have similar thoughts, as those whose organs are alike have similar perceptions². To this Plato would answer that but for the hope which lay at the root of the endeavour of Socrates, that differing minds may be brought by dialectic nearer to one another, by being brought nearer to unchanging principles of truth, and that the eye of reason may be thus purged to see the light, philosophy would be an idle pursuit, the turning of an oyster-shell or a scytalē, a cycle without the hope of progress, an endless process never moving on, a ‘purpose’ not ‘increasing through the ages,’ but terminating in failure and despair³.

How far Plato ever viewed universals as wholly objective is a question which cannot be determined without taking into account the differences of ancient and modern thought. The distinction between the mind and external objects had not yet been clearly made. Both poles (the objective and subjective) were absorbed in the antithesis of Being and Phenomena, which the Eleatics had placed far asunder, leaving their reconciliation as the great problem of the succeeding age. The tendency of the early speculation had been to give to psychological problems what in modern language must be called an objective treatment, in saying which we ought not to forget that we are applying a distinction which was then unknown⁴. Parmenides and Heraclitus were not unconscious of the working of the mind, but their thought did not assume the form of self-reflection. The unity or the energy of scientific intelligence appeared to them as the Permanent Substance or the Law of Change, which constituted the Universe.

¹ Vol. ii. p. 361, note.

² See a curious note in vol. ii. p. 285, where it is said that the controversy between Mr. Mill (who holds the common attribute of many objects to be one) and Mr. Spencer (who says that the same abstract word denotes one attribute in subject A, and another exactly similar in subject B) illustrates forcibly the extreme nicety of the question between the one and the many, under certain supposable circumstances. Also vol. ii. p. 329. ‘The Entia Rationis exist relatively to Ratio, as the Entia Perceptionis exist relatively to Sense. You do not, by producing the fact of innate mental intuitions, eliminate the intuent mind; which must be done in order to establish a negative to the

Protagorean principle.’

³ Mr. Grote sometimes speaks of reason in language which appears to us happily inconsistent with his argument in the present discussion. See for instance his touching and impressive words on the death of Socrates (vol. i. p. 302, note). ‘He contemplates death with the eye of calm reason; he has not only silenced “the child within us who fears death,” . . . estimating all things then as before, with the same tranquil and independent reason.’ Was his estimate really true? Or was Socrates really pitiable to those who pitied him?

⁴ See for instance the verse of Parmenides, *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸν νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι*.

But the theory of Protagoras, and the more potent influence of Socratic inquiry, gave to philosophy what may with equal propriety be called a reflex or subjective turn, and side by side with Existence and Appearance, or Becoming, rose the corresponding difference of Knowledge and Opinion, or Sense. Now Knowledge, according to Socrates, is of Universals, and these Universals Plato identified with Being. He often speaks of general ideas, and especially of the Idea of Good, in language which implies that their reality is independent of particular minds, but yet when Socrates suggests, in answer to Parmenides, that they are of the nature of thought¹, he gives utterance to a mode of conceiving them which is never entirely absent, but is latent even where not expressed. This frequently appears from phrases dropped by the way, as when the form (*εἶδος*) is identified with the definition (*λόγος*²), or when, in the midst of a poetical description of the ideal world, it is said that the human soul must have seen the forms of Truth, because it is necessary that Man should comprehend the meaning of general terms³. And in the well-known passage of the Republic, where the highest truth is set over against the highest knowledge, they are both viewed in relation to the mind, which, through intercourse with the Existent, begets Thought and Truth⁴; and the Idea of Good is regarded not only as the transcendent Form of Being (*ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*) but as the crowning study or act of intelligence⁵. A transition is thus made from what at first appears a fanciful ontology towards a true psychology, which in the Theætetus, Sophistes, Philebus, and the seventh book of the Republic, is seen to have made considerable progress in the analysis of mind⁶.

(2) The question of Subjectivity has already led us to distinguish between particular and universal, between the modifications of the individual consciousness and true knowledge, in which these differences are lost. And we have seen that this distinction corresponds nearly to that made by Plato between the transitoriness of Phenomena and the permanence of Being, and, still more closely, to his antithesis of Sensation or Opinion and Science. But the knowledge of universal truths would

¹ Μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἔκαστον γίγνεται πόνημα, *Parm.* 132.

² *Theæt.* 148 D.

³ *Phædrus*, 249 B.

⁴ Γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, *Rep.* 6. 490 B.

⁵ Μέγιστον μάθημα, *Rep.* 6. 505 A; ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταίᾳ, *Rep.* 7. 517 A.

⁶ See esp. *Theæt.* 185, 186, 189 E, 194; *Soph.* 261-2; *Phileb.* 33-43; *Rep.* 7. 523-4.

be of less value, if these were not applicable to particular facts. And hence the inductive, generalising process, is followed by one deductive and specialising. But this is not merely a return to the subjective particular from which the mind set out. For a phenomenon seen in relation to other phenomena by the light of general laws, is different from the same phenomenon, when at first presented to the inexperienced and unreflecting sense. Therefore the particular modification of the individual subject is to be distinguished from the true particular, which has objective as well as subjective reality. Now as Plato, in the infancy of Induction and of Moral Science, had a notion of universal knowledge, which he believed in but could only partially realise, through an imperfect method of hypotheses and exclusions—so in the absence of any adequate means of verification, he saw the necessity of connecting the universal forms of knowledge with particular facts. The powerful impulse which he received from the Eleatic philosophy tended to the sublation of all diversities of existence, as well as thought, into a merely abstract Unity. But on the other hand, the method of Socrates, whose generalisations were sifted through examples, and the genius of Plato himself with his manifold affinities to the world, required the Muse of Philosophy to descend from these heights, even into the den if necessary¹, and to hold intercourse again with the objects of sense and with mankind. Plato sometimes speaks, especially in his more imaginative moods, as if he wished to repeat the Eleatic contrast of Being and Phenomena in a new form: as if the real and apparent, the Ideal and the Actual, were separated by an impassable chasm. This way of speaking has become stereotyped in what is called the Platonic theory of ideas, including the doctrine of reminiscence: a theory which, in seeking to account for the knowledge of phenomena, creates new difficulties, which it fails to solve. But in those which Plato probably regarded as his more exact writings, the half-mythical crudities of this hypothesis have disappeared, the necessity as well as the difficulty of reconciling the abstract with the concrete, the Ideal with the Actual, is clearly recognised, and more than one dialogue is chiefly devoted to this task. An approach is made to a new and larger idea of knowledge, not merely as the Universal in which subjective peculiarities are done away, but as the Union of all permanent relations in the contemplation of

¹ Rep. 7. 519.

the mind¹. A change of this kind, especially when made gradually by a writer who often ironically half reveals and half conceals his thought, is apt to expose him to the charge of inconsistency. That Plato, in falling into Mr. Grote's hands, has not escaped this fate, is partly due to those who have hitherto represented the philosopher as a mere transcendentalist. But Mr. Grote sometimes speaks as if knowledge could not comprehend the universal with the particular, as if generalisation and specialisation were incompatible. He says (vol. ii. p. 253): 'It is inconsistent in Plato, after affirming that nothing can deserve the name of art except what is general—capable of being rationally anticipated and prescribed beforehand: then to include in art the special treatment required for the multiplicity of particular cases.' He finds fault with the examples drawn from facts of sense to illustrate knowledge in the *Theætetus*², and truth and falsehood in the *Sophist*³. See also a passage in the chapter on the *Politicus* (vol. ii. pp. 471–3), where the relative or specialising aspect of Plato's doctrine is very forcibly characterised. We may notice, as affording a point of transition towards the same mode of thought, a passage of the *Philebus*, where, besides the abstract knowledge of measures, numbers, and forms, the knowledge also of concrete existence is allowed to be necessary for the perfect life 'if a man is to know the way to his own door.' But it is not fair to accuse Plato of returning to the doctrine which he had rejected that 'sense is knowledge,' because he admits that knowledge is related to particulars, any more than it is fair to speak of the argument of the *Theætetus* as the rejection of individual reason (vol. i. p. 295). He has not relinquished his belief in the immutable nature of true knowledge. 'Where there is not absolute permanence there can be no reason' is an emphatic statement of the very dialogue which asserts the relativity of the ideas⁴. Here we repeat that if Plato holds contradictory opinions, he holds them not alternately, but together. While expatiating on the 'plain of truth,' he speaks of general notions as passing from many sensations to a unity comprehended by reasoning⁵. And after describing the happiness of the philoso-

¹ See esp. *Sophist.* 259 C; *Polit.* 72 A, 285 B.

² Viz. the facts of a case of assault or robbery. Plato purposely chooses the simplest examples. But when Mr. Grote represents him (vol. ii. p. 382) as saying that to be personally present and look on is 'essential to

knowledge or cognition,' there is a qualification suppressed. It should be 'knowledge of a concrete fact.'

³ 'Theætetus is sitting—Theætetus is flying.'

⁴ *Sophist.* 249 C.

⁵ *Phædrus,* 249 B.

pher who knows nothing of his neighbour but studies the universal nature of man, he speaks of the mind as abstracting and generalising from her impressions¹. The Phædrus, as Mr. Grote has observed, combines the extreme of generality with the extreme of specialty. But the special is supposed to be enlightened by the general, and this position, whether tenable or not, is in no sense a return to the mere subjective relativity of Protagoras. The Parmenides, Theætetus, Sophistes, Politicus, and Philebus, do, however, show a change or growth in Plato's theory of knowledge, which may be briefly stated thus. The difficulty of finding a way down from the Ideas to sensible things is clearly stated in the Parmenides, and again touched slightly in the Philebus, where, however, the Ideas are conceived somewhat differently as unities amidst plurality, and knowledge, as we have already noticed, is made to include particulars. The Theætetus presents a similar class of difficulties from the subjective side, arising from the co-existence, not of Being with phenomena, but of Knowledge with sensation and opinion. It is natural to suppose that Plato was led by these difficulties towards the modified view which he has expressed in the Sophistes² and Politicus, where the ideas appear as logical wholes, standing in relation to each other, genera comprising species and species individuals under them; where the distinction of absolute and relative, or, in Greek language, of rest and motion, disappears in the notion of a complexity of fixed relations, and universal and particular meet in an all-embracing harmony or law (*μέτρον*).

APPENDIX D.

εἶδος, ἵδεα.

§ 1. THE words *εἶδος* and *ἵδεα* are throughout nearly synonymous in Greek, but there is a tendency observable to a difference in their use, perhaps in some way connected with the difference of gender.

εἶδος seems earlier to have shaken itself clear of metaphor, and to have settled into an abstract meaning. Thus in Thucyd. 2. 20

¹ Theæt. 175–186.

² The important word *μέθεξις*, 'participation in the idea,' occurs only in

the Parmenides and Sophistes in Plato. See Ast's Lexicon, s.v.

τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου means simply the nature of the disease, but in 2. 21 *τουαύτη ἥν ἐπὶ πᾶν τὴν ἰδέαν*, ‘was such in its general phenomena:’ *ἰδέα* calls up a picture, while *εἶδος* simply designates a class or kind of thing. So *πᾶσα ἰδέα . . θανάτου*, Thuc. 3. 81, is not ‘every kind of death,’ but ‘death in every form.’

§ 2. The word *εἶδος* occurs frequently in Plato in its ordinary sense. Thus in Theæt. 157 C: “*Ανθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ καθ' ἔκαστον ζώον τε καὶ εἶδος*, the word is scarcely more abstract than in Herodotus, 1. 94: *Τὰ . . τῶν παιγνιέων εἴδεα*.

A more philosophical application of the same use occurs 181 D, where we have the δύο *εἴδη κινήσεως*.

§ 3. But it occurs also in a more abstract sense, which we may possibly be right in attributing to Socrates, as a distinctly logical term. *εἶδος* then means a class, or species, as that to which particular things are referred, which contains them, and marks them off from others, and which itself answers to their definition. See Theætetus, 148 D: *Ταῦτας πολλὰς οὐσίας ἐνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες*. 205 D: *Εἰς ταῦτὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ*.

§ 4. It may be doubted whether in Plato the word *εἶδος* ever loses entirely the association of its earliest meaning (in which he frequently employs it) of outward appearance, form. (See Ast, Lex. sub voc.) But as it approaches to its technical use in his philosophy, it tends to regain metaphorically the association of visible shape, which in a literal sense it has cast off. The metaphor is not perfect, however, until the word has been changed to *ἰδέα*. Or if we choose to put it so, *εἶδος* expresses the general shape and contour of a thing; *ἰδέα* implies also the colour and the whole appearance. *εἶδος* is a colourless *ἰδέα*. See Theæt. 203 E: “*Ἐν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον*. And there is a real difference underlying the figurative one. For a comparison of passages tends to prove that *εἶδος* is applied to the universal forms of existence as they are distinct from one another; *ἰδέα* rather as each of them has a unity in itself. Thus in Theæt. l. c. we have *ἐν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἔτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων*¹. Again, 204 A: *Μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἔκαστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη*. Ib. A.: “*Ἐν τι εἶδος ἔτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν*. 205 C: *Μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἄν εἴη*. 205 D: *Καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα*. Cp. 184 D: *Εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν . . συντείνει*.

It should be noticed, that in the above passages the use of both words is in a transition state, assuming rather the form of an adapt-

¹ Cp. Rep. 544 C: “*Η τινα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἢ τις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινι κεῖται*.

ation of the ordinary use, than of technical phraseology. Plato may perhaps be teaching the doctrine of ideas by example; but he does not avowedly give to the words the 'second intention' with which they are used in many passages to express the eternal forms of Being. There is also an intermediate transition noticeable in the use of *iδέa*, from the abstract to the concrete, i.e. it passes, by a kind of *synecdoche*, from meaning the sum of the attributes to mean that to which they belong. So in Thuc. l. c. *πᾶσα iδέa θανάτου=θάνατος πάσης iδέas*. And in Theæt. 184, 205, *μία iδέa* is used synonymously with *ἐν εἶδος, iδέav μίav αὐτὸν ἔχον*. It is more to the purpose, however, to observe generally, that the word *εἶδος* tends to a use at once more logical (*ἔτερον εἶδος, διττὰ εἴδη, κατ' εἴδη διῆστάς, κατ' εἴδη τέμνειν*) and more concrete—(the *iδέa* is spoken of as inherent in it): the word *iδέa* to one more metaphysical (*εἰς μίav iδέav συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῆ διεσπαρμένα, μίav iδέav δὺν πολλῶν πάντῃ διατεταμένην ἵκανῶς διαισθάνεται*), more abstract, and at the same time more figurative.

The word *iδέa* is a fair symbol of the union of reason and imagination in Plato.

APPENDIX E.

The Theætetetus and Aristotle.

ONE chief source of difficulty in the Theætetetus to the modern reader is the imperfect development which it presents of the conception of the Proposition¹. In the earlier part, the ever-varying succession of phenomena, bound up with the ever-varying impressions of sense, are only dimly felt to belong to any Subject. Indeed as the argument proceeds, the unity of that which is the subject of different impressions or qualities is expressly denied. At a further stage, where the question arises, How is false opinion possible? there appears indeed a sort of consciousness that all predication implies a subject (188: *Οὐτε περὶ τῶν ὅντων οὐτε αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτό*), and that to think is to say to oneself, 'This is that';—which first shows itself in the example, 'I think Theætetetus is Socrates,' and is afterwards more distinctly expressed where it is said that

¹ Συλλογισμός in the Theæt. (186) is nearly equivalent to 'abstraction and generalization.'

thought is the mind's silent discourse¹. But that which remains unnoticed is the relation of subject to predicate in any proposition. Thus it is assumed that when one predicate is substituted for another (as when, in the propositions, 'Yonder man is Socrates,' or 'Thersites was handsome,' the terms 'Socrates' and 'handsome' have been substituted by mistake for 'Theætetus' and 'ugly'), this is the same thing as if the terms so confounded were predicated of each other (thus, 'Theætetus is Socrates,' 'What is ugly is handsome').

The relation between the terms of a proposition where the subject is something immediately perceived by sense, is brought out afterwards by the image of the waxen block; but the same indistinctness still hangs about abstract propositions. The line is not clearly drawn between saying, 'the sum of 7 and 5 is 11,' and saying '11 is 12.'

Lastly, when it is asserted that the combination of names in speech corresponds to the combination of elements in the object of knowledge, we are still left in the dark as to the exact relation between words or things which is implied in either combination.

This confusion between subject and predicate is, in other words, to use Aristotelian language, the confusion of matter with form, and of *δύναμις* with *ἐνέργεια*. The subject is all its predicates *δυνάμει*, and is that which, together with the new attribute, becomes *τόδε τι*. Thus *Καλλίας ἀμονσός* becomes *μονοτικός*: hence Callias is in one sense the material part.

It may be said, therefore, that in the earlier philosophy, when the matter changes from one form to its opposite, or from a privative to a positive state, it is lost sight of that the form cannot properly be said to change, and that the matter or subject, as such, remains unchanged, while assuming different forms.

1. It is this aspect of the questions raised in the Theætetus which is taken up by Aristotle, who follows Plato in pointing out that the views of Heraclitus and Protagoras meet in one. Their views are thus identified and criticised at length in two very similar passages of the Metaphysics (3. 1005 b-1012 b, 10. 1061 b-1063 b), in both of which Aristotle is engaged in defending the principle of contradiction.

The theory of Heraclitus is stated in its most abstract and logical form, 'Everything at once is and is not.' This is at

¹ A close study of this passage (189, 190) will afford convincing proof of the indeterminate state of the science of logic at this time, and the necessity of *getting behind* Aristotle (if the expression may be permitted) in order to understand Plato.

first put forward with the qualification, ‘Some (i.e. Plato?) think that Heraclitus means this’; but afterwards it is made to figure as the Heraclitean theory, ‘adopted by many physical philosophers.’ The theory of Protagoras is shown to come to the same thing; for if every man’s impression is true, then contradictories are true (and not true) together.

Aristotle does not profess to use direct proof in defence of what he assumes to be self-evident and the basis of all reasoning, but he brings forward a number of indirect arguments, which throw considerable light upon the nature of the question. These are intended for such persons as really feel the difficulty: there are others for whom a more summary method is required (*οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθόουσι δέονται, οἱ δὲ βίας*¹). Amongst these arguments there are two which deserve especial notice here, as being of a different kind from any which are to be met with in the dialogue.

(a) ‘We will not say that the act of predication must either *be* or *not be* something, lest they should accuse us of begging the question; but we will say, that every predicate *means* something, and that its meaning is one, and not indefinitely various; otherwise language and even thought is destroyed. And to predicate it in this one meaning of a particular subject is either true or false. Hence, “man” and “not man” cannot be truly predicated together of the same subject.’

(b) ‘The difference between the same man’s impressions at different times regards not the quality, but the subject of it. Sweet and bitter are the same to the sick as to the healthy man: it is the wine that appears to him at one time sweet and at another bitter. The idea of sweet is the same to him in the past, present, and future.’

There are other points in which the discussion is characteristic of Aristotle (as where it is said that the principle of motion rests on a too narrow induction; or that if all creatures having sensation were destroyed, the universe would still exist; or where he points out that the admission of degrees, e.g. ‘nearer and farther from the truth,’ necessitates a standard of truth to which the approach is made); but the influence of this dialogue and of the discussions (Megarian and Platonic) which preceded and followed it is also very apparent. The following points of coincidence are worth mentioning:—

¹ Cp. Hom. Il. 2. 188–199: “Οὐτινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κιχεῖν, | τὸν δ’ ἀγανοῦς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε

παραστάς | . . . “Ον δ’ αὖ δήμου τ’ ἄνδρα ἵδοι βοῶντά τ’ ἐφεύροι, | τὸν σκήππρῳ ἐλάσασκεν, δμοκλήσασκε τε μύθῳ.

(1) It is assumed, as part of the theory, that everything is thus and not-thus (*οὗτως καὶ οὐχ οὗτως*). But this is nearly the last point to which the principle of motion is reduced in the Theætetus (183 A B). Aristotle proceeds to infer that everything must be infinite ; and this in two ways : first, as ‘not-this’ means ‘everything but this,’ it follows that everything must be everything else¹; and, secondly (with Plat. Theæt. loc. cit.), if *οὗτως καὶ οὐχ οὗτως* is true, then its contradictory (*οὐθ' οὗτως οὔτε οὐχ οὗτως*) must also be true ; and this, he adds, must go on to infinity. The theory gives an indefinite, that is, a purely negative account of Being (*τὸ μὴ δν λέγει*).

(2) Further, in reference to Protagoras it is shown that, in making all impressions true, he makes them also false,—his own theory amongst the rest.

(3) The Heraclitean or Protagorean philosopher is seen to avoid tumbling into a ditch. It is evident therefore that he acknowledges the distinction between good and bad. Everything then is not equally indifferent. And if there are impressions to which the theory does not apply, so much has been conceded. Or, ‘as Plato puts it,’ with regard to the future, the physician is a better judge of what will prove wholesome than a chance person.

(4) Aristotle further points out the absolute relativity of the doctrine. They cannot say, ‘What appears, is,’ but ‘What appears to me, is to me.’

The following scattered touches may be quoted without comment:—

‘The theory of Protagoras is called *ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια*.’

‘My eyes may each receive a different impression from the same thing.’

‘The doubt about the criterion of knowledge is like the question whether the waking or the dreaming life is real.’

‘Socrates is not a different person for every different attribute.’

‘When a pleasant thing appears bitter, this is in consequence of a manifest defect, viz. disease. The one state then (i.e. the healthy one), and not the other, is to be held the measure of things.’

‘Language is made impossible.’

‘The man thinks thus and not thus: i.e. it is equally true that he is not thinking as that he thinks. He is reduced to the condition of a vegetable.’

(5) Lastly, Aristotle, like Theodorus, remarks upon the difficulty of reasoning with the men, because they will not lay down anything to start with, and allow it to remain firm.

Aristotle’s view may be summarily described by saying that he

¹ Καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου, δμοῦ πάντα χρῆματα. Aristotle thinks that if this argument had been put to

Heraclitus himself, he would have been compelled to acknowledge its force.

meets the indefiniteness of the physical and sophistic theories by asserting the distinction between form and matter and the eternity of form.

2. But he does not deny that a continual process takes place between them, or that there is a world in which growth and decay, generation and corruption, are ever going on, viz. the world of sensible things, which in Aristotle reasserts its reality, as being inseparable from the natural forms, and perhaps even from the relations expressed in mathematics.

This is not the place for the discussion of Aristotle's theory of becoming. It is enough to notice (1) that he adopts from the early philosophers, whom he classes together as upholding the material cause, on the one hand the dualism, and on the other the indeterminateness of matter (*Phys. Ausc. 1*), and points out that therefore it can only be the object of knowledge 'by analogy,' with reference to the form. And (2) his conception of sensation as a realization of mental life is very similar to that expressed in the *Theætetus* and *Timæus*. The *ἐνέργεια αἰσθήσεως*, which is inseparable from the *ἐνέργεια αἰσθητοῦ*, is the meeting point of active and passive elements in motion. (In modern language it is a process between object and subject.) But the *φαντασία* or mental image, which accompanies sensation but is separable from it in thought, in the *Theætetus* is merged in sensation, although the term as here used is simply the noun of *φαίνεσθαι* (*φαντασία ἡρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταῦτον*), but is clearly distinguished from it by Aristotle. The distinction is made the ground of an argument for the possibility of error¹.

3. The same distinction between matter and form is also applied to the solution of the doubt, whether the complex whole is one or many, e.g. whether the syllable is all the letters combined, or something above and beyond them. Aristotle shows that neither

¹ (*Met. I. 1010 b*: Οὐδὲ ἡ αἴσθησις where the *φαντασία* is false the δόξα ψευδῆς τοῦ ἴδιου ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἡ φαντασία may be true. *De Somn. 3*. *Cp. de οὐ ταῦτὸν τὴν αἴσθησιν.*) Again, even *An. 3. 3.*

The difference between Aristotle and Plato (in this dialogue), on this point of psychology, may be illustrated by the following tabular view:—

Aristotle thus traces the gradual ascent of the human mind from sense to knowledge :	Plato distinguishes
7. σοφία.	μνήμη
6. ἐπιστήμη.	δόξα
5. τέχνη.	from
4. ἐμπειρία.	These two are in some cases inseparable.
3. μνήμη.	{ μνήμη } each of which is
2. φαντασία.	{ δόξα } accompanied by
1. αἴσθησις.	{ αἴσθησις. } φαντασία.

the parts nor their arrangement can create the form of the whole : much rather it is this mould which determines the arrangement of the parts. It is prior to them, and is eternal and uncreated. They affect the nature of the compound thing only by being capable of receiving a certain form.

At this point Plato (in the *Theætetus*) and Aristotle seem almost to touch one another, except that in Aristotle the conception of the *end* (*τὸν οὐδὲνεκα*) is bound up with that of the form.

As the tendency in the *Theætetus* is to rise from the ordinary notion of an element to that of elementary Ideas, so Aristotle points out that the universal is in one sense an element: (i.e. logically.) (Met. 4. 1014 b.)

4. Among the germs which the *Theætetus* (like most of Plato's dialogues) contains of Aristotelian formulæ, the most remarkable is the distinction between possessing and having Knowledge, which obviously corresponds to Aristotle's distinction between Knowing and Contemplating (*ἐπίστασθαι, θεωρεῖν*),—his favourite illustration of the difference between possession and use, or between a potential and an actual state. No such general application is made of it by Plato. The notion enters into the *Theætetus* only as a last ineffectual attempt to reconcile the existence of Knowledge with the possibility of error, and it is expressed through an imaginary symbol. But the distinction latent in the image—between the potential and the actual—is the same by which Aristotle afterwards solved this and other difficulties, if not finally, yet with admirable completeness.

APPENDIX F.

Platonic Idioms in the Theætetus.

'Αλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἷμα, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἣ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὅν ἔγώ ἔώρακα διάφορόν τι μυημένον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη καταθῆται, *Theæt.* 209 C.

The words of Socrates, it is said in the *Euthyphro* (11 B, 15 B), are like the words of Dædalus ; they are endued with motion. This image expresses the most characteristic peculiarity of Plato's style, the source of much both of its beauty and of its difficulty. His thoughts are not fixed and dead, like specimens in a museum

or cabinet, but flying as he pursues them, doubling, hiding, reappearing, soaring aloft, and changing colour with every change of light and aspect.

The reader of the *Theætetus*, for example, is disappointed, if he looks for perfect consistency with the *Republic*, or if he expects to find the logical statement of a definite theory. The ground is shifted several times. One line of inquiry is abandoned, and yet the argument presently returns from a new starting-point upon the former track. A position is assumed and then relinquished ;—the figures are erased,—and yet the subsequent discussion is not without reference to the hypothesis which has been demolished. The doctrine of sense, for instance, is wholly negatived, and yet it cannot be said that we are not intended to gather something from it.

Plato's metaphors are 'living creatures' rather than figures of speech ; he regards them not as airy nothings, but as realities ; he recurs to them with fondness, as Lord Bacon does. But no expression is ever merely repeated in Plato. If an image is recalled, it is with some additional or altered feature : if a conception is resumed, it is not merely copied, but a fresh picture is drawn from the life. Even in recapitulating, some modification is often made, or the argument is carried further. Thus the photograph, as it has been called, of the connection is apt to be blurred, from the thought moving as we read. Even in the same passage, where an ordinary writer would be contented with referring to an example or illustration just adduced, Plato surprises the reader with a different one, which perhaps gives a new direction to the current of thought. A fair instance of this occurs in *Theæt.* 169 A, where Thcodorus says : 'It was mere nonsense in me to hope that you would excuse me and not compel me to strip for the contest, as the *Lacedæmonians* do. You are rather to be compared to *Sciron* : for they tell one either to strip or go away ; but you are rather like *Antæus* in your way of doing business, for you will let no man go till you have *stripped him* (like Sciron) and *compelled him to wrestle with you* (like Antæus).'

The argument itself ($\delta\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$) is continually personified and is spoken of under a Protean variety of figures.

It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or who runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish away 'like a tale.' More frequently it has power over us, like a General commanding us, like a sea in which we must swim for our lives, while it rolls its successive waves over us, like a wind which carries us we know not whither. Sometimes 'its name is legion,' and

it is multiplied into a swarm or an impetuous throng. Or it takes a milder form, as the raft, or dolphin, on which we seek to escape from a sea of doubt, or the wall behind which we screen ourselves from the driving shower. The Argument talks with us, it goes through a subject, takes up a position, hides its face from some threatening objection and passes on. It rebukes us for unfair treatment of itself, it can be insulted, it stands in need of help, it has a father, and guardians of its orphanhood.

This movement or plasticity of ideas, which penetrates the whole of Plato's writings, is closely connected with their conversational form, and manifests itself in what may be called his poetical use of language.

The observation of both these elements of Plato's style is of importance to the student, because it saves him from the necessity of resorting to some forced construction, or flying to conjecture, upon each occasion of grammatical perplexity.

I. Conversationalisms. In Plato we often meet with irregularities of construction, which in an oration or set treatise would be referred to looseness or inelegance of diction, but which only make the dialogue more easy and lively and natural.

a. Changes of construction. The following are a few out of several instances in the *Theætetus* :—

(1) 144 A : Τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα . . πρᾶον αὐτὸν εἶναι . . ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτε
ἀν φόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε δρῶ γιγνομένους. Theodorus begins by simply expressing his surprise, but proceeds to dwell upon his previous anticipations and experience to account for it.

(2) 153 B : 'Η δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις . . κτᾶται τε μαθήματα, κ.τ.λ. Cp.
173 D : Σπουδαὶ δ' ἔταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχás . . οὐδὲ ὄντας πράττειν
προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.

The emphasis on the first words causes the sentence to begin vaguely, and the construction is determined as it proceeds.

(3) 167 B : Πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς.

Here, unless something is corrupt, a transition is made to the reflexive pronoun, as if *ψυχή* were the subject of *δοξάζοντας* : a transition from the persons who think to the mind which thinks.

(4) 172 B : Οὐκ ἀν τολμήσει φῆσαι (δ λόγος) . . . ἐθέλοντων
ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. He passes from what the argument would say, to what certain persons do say. So elsewhere there is often a transition from the indefinite singular to the indefinite plural.

To this may be added the occasionally difficult use of the cases of nouns : c. g. *Theæt.* 147 C : 'Εν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει, without *περί* :

just as we might say in conversation, ‘the mud-question,’ for ‘the question about the mud.’

β. Resumption. A thought is frequently resumed in the same sentence, for the sake of modifying it, or of particularizing the aspect in which it is considered, or merely for the sake of clearness. The introduction of the pronoun *aὐτός*, to recall a noun which has been thrown back for the sake of emphasis, is a familiar instance of this.

E.g. 155 D : Ἐάν σοι ἀνδρῶν . . τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν . . συν-
εξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν ;

Perhaps the most marked instance of resumption in the Theætetus occurs 171 B : Μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπό γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τἀναντίᾳ λέγοντι ἔντοντι ἔντοντι λέγοντι ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ δὲ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται.

γ. Redundancy. There are other ways in which regularity of construction is sacrificed to fulness of expression.

E.g. 153 C : Ἐτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύσι, τὰ δὲ ἔτερα σώζει.

172 D : Τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νῦν τρίτον ἥδη λόγου ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κάκεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ.

199 B : Μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἶόν τε, ἀλλ’ ἐτέραν ἀντ’ ἐκείνης, ὅταν . . ἀνθ’ ἐτέρας ἐτέραν ἀμαρτὼν λάβῃ, ὅτε ἄρα τὰ ἔνδεκα δώδεκα ωγήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἔνδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβών, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.

An occasional consequence of this fulness of expression is the deferred apodosis, which sometimes occurs, especially after *ώσπερ* : e.g. Rep. 3. 402 B : Ὡσπερ ἄρα . . . Ἀρ’ οὖν, ὁ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὗτως, κ.τ.λ. Theæt. 207 A : Ὡσπερ ἀν . . οὕτω τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ.

δ. Also connected with the conversational form of Plato’s writings, and the plastic, growing condition of his thoughts, is the imperfect kind of argument which he sometimes employs. It is a saying of Aristotle’s that Dialectic deals tentatively with those subjects on which Philosophy dogmatizes (*ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὃν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική*) ; and Bacon speaks of a Socratic induction. To this, and to a certain economy used towards the respondent, is to be attributed the frequency of the argument from example (the example often covering more ground than is quite fair), and of the inference, by means of simple conversion, from particular to universal.

The immaturity of the science of logic no doubt renders this mode of reasoning more easy and natural than it could be in a later age, but it is not explained without allowing for the fact that the inquiry is conducted, at least on the part of the respondent, in a tentative and inductive spirit.

An instance occurs in the *Theætetetus*, 159 A, when it is argued that if what is different is dissimilar, then whatever is dissimilar is wholly different, and what is similar is the same. That Plato was fully aware of the inconclusiveness of the form of argument thus ironically adopted, appears from *Protag.* 350 C, where Socrates is checked for it by Protagoras, who says, "Εγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ οἱ ἄνδρειοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἄνδρειοι, οὐκ ἡρωτήθην" εἰ γάρ με τότε ἥρου, εἰπον ἀν ὅτι οὐ πάντες.

And sometimes, even where an instance is really meant to cover a large conclusion, its power is ostensibly limited with persuasive modesty: as in *Theæt.* 152 C: Φαντασίᾳ ἄρα καὶ αἰσθησις ταῦτὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. . . Αἰσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ ἔστι.

Ib. 204 D: Ταῦτὸν ἄρα ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστι, τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἀπαντα.

ε. It is difficult to separate between the conversational and the poetical element in Plato. Their combination gives him the power of 'saying anything.' Just as there is a freedom of expression possible in conversation, which we feel to be impossible in writing, or as the poet can express with grace and dignity what by other lips were better left unsaid.

II. This leads us to the *Poetical use of language*. Plato's words have frequently a different value from any that could be given them by a mere prose writer. The language as well as the thought is instinct with a creative power, which gives it a dramatic vividness and refinement; at times even a dithyrambic cadence, or a lyrical intensity. The poet whom Plato most resembles in this is Sophocles; but his style may be regarded as the mirror of all Greek literature.

a. Poetical use of single words.

(1) Choice of a more sensuous expression (*πρὸ δημάτων ποιεῖν*).

150 D: Ἐναργὲς ὅτι for δῆλον ὅτι ('as clear as day').

155 A: Ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα.

156 B: Συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη.

160 D: Μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ.

162 A: Διωλύγιος φλυαρία.

165 B: Σφαλεῖς γάρ ἥττον ἀσχημονήσει.

169 B: Μαλ' εὖ ἔνγκεκόφασιν.

171 D: Ταύτη ἀν . . ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον.

172 E: Ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντιδίκος (wielding coercion).

202 A: Ταῦτα . . περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι.

To which may be added the 'hypocoristic' use of diminutives.

149 C: Φαρμάκια.

195 A: Ἐάν του σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον.

(2) Use of Epic words, the meaning of which is sometimes spiritualized.

149 A: Μαίας γενναίας καὶ βλοσυρᾶς.

162 E: Ἄξιος οὐδέν ἐνδὲ μόνον.

174 D: Πολὺ βδάλλοντα.

189 E: Τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἴνδαλλεται διανοουμένη.

194 E: Ὁταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἢ.

(3) Playing upon a word.

150 C: Εὔρημα. (Cp. Soph. ΟΕd. Tyr. 1108.)

152 A: Τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

181 C: Τοὺς ρέοντας.

194 C: Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ.

208 B: Ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον.

Closely related to this is (4) the etymological use of words: i. e. when, by dwelling upon its etymology, a word is made to express something different from, or more than, its ordinary meaning.

149 B: Ὁτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχεν.

152 E: (perhaps) Ξυμφερέσθων (let them march one way).

160 E: Τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον.

193 C: Ὡσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας.

198 D: Πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ εἰχε τῇ διανοίᾳ.

(5) Poetical use of particles: e. g. the frequent use of *ἄρα*, helping to keep up the idea that Socrates is repeating what he has heard, the occasionally difficult reference with *γάρ* (152 C: οἶα γάρ, and note), the hyperbaton of *καὶ* (154 E: Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε), and generally the dramatic liveliness with which successive clauses are contrasted, as if each were put into the mouth of a different person. Speech thus becomes literally a 'self-dialogue.' See especially 155 B: Ὁ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ὑστερον τοῦτο εἶναι (?): and 190 B: Ὁτι παντὸς μᾶλλον . . ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον . . ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα . . ὡς ἀνάγκη . ., with which the supposed answers of the mind to itself are introduced.

Compare Phil. 38 C: Τί ποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ' ἔσταναι φανταζόμενον ὑπό τινι δένδρῳ.

B. The same poetical energy shows itself in the expansion of

some of the ordinary forms of grammar. In this also Plato reflects the general tendency of the Greek language.

(1) Apposition. The use of the apposition of clauses (as a form of exegesis) deserves to be reckoned among the more striking peculiarities of Plato's style. One example from the *Theætetus* will suffice to indicate what is meant.

175 D: Πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν . . . ίλιγγιῶν τε ἀφ' ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεῖς . . . ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων . . . γέλωτα . . . παρέχει, κ.τ.λ., where another writer would probably have inserted γάρ. (Cp. Lach. 182 B.)

Sometimes a sentence is thus placed in apposition with a pronoun such as *τοῦτο* (189 E ad fin.) or *ὅ* (158 B). Compare the use of *τὸ δέ*, e.g. 157 E. A slightly different use is that of the accusative in apposition to the sentence. Instances of this are 153 C: 'Επὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, κ.τ.λ.; 160 E: Τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ. (Many of the examples of resumption and redundancy above referred to would fall grammatically under this head.)

(2) Attraction. E.g. where a main verb was to be expected, we find a participle. It can be accounted for; but there is reason to believe that it is partly due to the neighbourhood of another participle, or of some word that is usually construed with a participle.

173 B: Τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἡ ἔσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώμεθα; where we should have expected διέλθωμεν.

150 D: Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται . . . καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προιόντης τῆς συνοντίας . . . θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὗτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι: where, but for the proximity of *ὡς* . . ., *ἐπιδιδόντες* would probably have been *ἐπιδιδόσιν*. See also *λαβών*, 199 B, which but for *ὅταν* . . . *λάβῃ* would be *λαβόντα*.

γ. To the same self-consciousness of language which betrays itself in the foregoing instances may be attributed the minuteness of antithesis, which, though common everywhere in Greek, is strikingly so in Plato.

150 E: 'Εμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἡ αὗτοὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες (?).

197 C: Εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὁσπερ, κ.τ.λ.

δ. This power of refining upon language is turned to account in adapting the mode of expression to the exigencies of the argument.

E.g. 152 B, where we are gradually led from the example of the wind, which one man feels cold, and another not, to the position that sensation is the correlative of reality. See also 158 E, 159 B, where, as the argument proceeds, (*ἔτερον*) *ὅλον τοῦτο ὅλῳ ἔκείνῳ* is substituted for *ὅλως ἔτερον*.

ε. The care which is taken of the rhythm is a further peculiarity of Plato's style, and may be treated as a poetical element. This is especially noticeable (1) in the manner in which quotations from poetry are shaded off so as to harmonize with the surrounding prose, and (2) in the occasional elaboration of prose writing to something like a metrical cadence.

(1) 173 E. In the quotation from Pindar, *φέρεται* is probably substituted for *πέτεται* (see note on the passage), the words *τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα* are inserted, and *τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὅλου* is added at the close. Thus the poetical language is interwoven with the sentence, so as to embellish it without interrupting its harmony.

194 C. The substitution of the (early) Attic *κέαρ* for the Homeric *κῆρ* is probably due to a similar motive.

(2) Dithyrambic and lyric cadeuces are more frequent in some other dialogues than in the Theætetus. See especially Sypos. 196, 197, the close of Agathon's speech, especially the last few lines, in which the rhetorical antitheses have more the effect of rhythm than of argument: Phædr. 238, 241, alibi; Rep. 8. 546, 7; 10. 617, 18; and several places of the Timæus, e.g. 47 B: *Ὥν δ μὴ φιλόσοφος τυφλωθεὶς ὀδυρόμενος ἀν θρηνοῖ μάτην*. With such passages may be compared Theæt. 176 A: *Οὐδέ γ' ἀρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὁρθῶς ὑμνήσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ.*

The same power shows itself more slightly in an occasional inversion of the order of words for the sake of emphasis.

158 B: *Οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι.*

160 D: *Κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι.*

ζ. A few words may be added in conclusion on the artificial structure of Plato's dialogues, of which the Theætetus is acknowledged to be a prominent example.

There is a unity in each of them, approaching to that of a living organism:—the spirit of the whole breathing in every part:—a continuity independent of the links of question and answer, by which it appears to be sustained; which may be viewed apart from the scenery and the changes of persons, and the passages of humour and pleasantry by which it seems to be interrupted.

And while it is comparatively easy to distinguish the principal stages of the argument, yet there is such a dovetailing and interpenetration of the parts, that it is difficult to adopt an exact division without doing violence to the real harmony, or even to mark the exact point of transition from one hypothesis to another.

An instance of this is the way in which the reader is prepared

for the argument from the idea of expediency, which may be said to be anticipated as early as 157 D : Ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν. (Compare the anticipation, at the very beginning of the dialogue, 144 E : Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ ἀν εἰ μουσικὸς ὁν λέγει, of the conclusion arrived at 179 B : Σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.) The difficulty of reconciling the ideas of goodness and wisdom with the doctrine of sense appears more distinctly in the defence of Protagoras, 167 A, and presses for solution as an element of the common opinion of men, 170 A : Καὶ ἐν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις . . παρὰ σφίσιν.

These two passages have prepared the way for the statement in 171, 2, of the ‘semi-Protagoreanism’ of those who will not venture to say that every creature knows what is for its own health, nor that every individual and every state knows equally what is expedient in legislation. When a breach has thus been made in the enemy’s lines of defence, a rest is afforded to the reader by the vision of the Divine Life which follows, in which, however, the ideas of wisdom and holiness and righteousness have a direct bearing upon the conclusion towards which we are being carried step by step, and its effect upon the tone of the discussion is apparent in the words 177 D : Πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι· τοῦτο δέ που σκῶμμα ἀν εἴη πρὸς ὁ λέγομεν οὐχί; κ.τ.λ. At this point the argument from Expediency is fully entered into. But it is difficult to say exactly where it began.

A similar gradation may be observed in the development of the difficulty about false opinion.

Note also the artfulness of the transition from sensation to thought, 184–187, and from ‘true opinion’ to ‘true opinion giving an account of itself,’ 201.

And while the earlier part is written with a view to what is in reserve, the previous discussion is not forgotten as the inquiry proceeds. See 194 D : ⁴Α δή ὄντα καλεῖται, compared with 152 D : ⁴Α δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς: and 209 C : Μνημεῖον παρ’ ἔμοι ἐνσημηναμένη καταθῆται,—an application of the (relinquished) conception of the waxen block.

Plato’s philosophy has been compared to a building, of which the Republic is the superstructure, while the other dialogues are the pillars and fretted vaults upon which it rests.

The image fails to give an adequate idea of the perfection of Art, —or rather of Nature conscious of itself,—which gives harmony, but not regularity, a growing, not a fixed, consistency, both to the parts and to the whole.

His writings are the creations of a great master, whose sketches are worked up into the larger monuments of his genius, a cycle surrounding an eternal Epic poem, bound together by the unity not merely of a particular age and country, but of an individual mind.

**Ω θαυμάσιε, ὁ δαιμόνιε, ὁ ἔταιρε, ὁ μέλε.*

These and the like phrases are apt to be slurred over in translating or interpreting Plato, from the frequency of their recurrence and the difficulty of appreciating their exact force in each connection. They belong to that conversational sprightliness and play of fancy which it is impossible to bind to any rule.

Here, as elsewhere, Plato carries further an existing tendency of the Greek language. Such addresses as *δαιμόνιε*, *δαιμονίη*, *ἡθεῖε*, in Homer (Il. 6. 407, 486, 518, 521; cp. Plat. Rep. 344 D, *ὁ δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε*) vary in signification according to the mood of the speaker. The same may be said of *ὁ δαιμόνιε*, *ὁ μέλε*, in Aristophanes.

In Plato the variety of such addresses is much greater, and the variety of their meaning greater still. They can often be more perfectly rendered by a changed expression of the voice or countenance, than by any words. All that can be said of them generally is, that they give an increased intensity to the tone of the conversation at the moment, whether this be grave or humorous, respectful, ironical or familiar.

ὁ θαυμάστε in its simplest use conveys a remonstrance, ‘I wonder at you.’ The most decided instance is in the Phædo, 117 D: *Οἶον, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὁ θαυμάσιοι.* ‘What are you doing! I am amazed at you.’ It may also sometimes convey admiration. But it is frequently used where the subject of wonder or surprise has nothing to do with the person addressed: e. g. Cratyl. 439 C, where it indicates Socrates’ intense interest in the mystery of the Ideas. Compare the use of the form of congratulation *Ἄ μακάριε* (see Aristoph. Nub. 167) to express Socrates’ own delight at some great discovery: e. g. Rep. 432 D, where Justice is discovered; Phæd. 69 A, where Socrates congratulates himself as well as Simmias on the superiority of the philosophic life.—In Theat. 151 C, *ὁ θαυμάσιε* can hardly be rendered except by a note of admiration. ‘Do you know that many have been ready to bite me?’

Nearly the same is true of $\deltaαιμόνιε$, 180 B, though it here retains a slight tone of remonstrance. ‘Disciples, my good sir !’ ‘Disciples, did you say ?’ While in 172 C it wears quite a different expression, conveying Socrates’ genuine admiration for the philosophic life, and is more difficult to render. ‘Ah ! my good friend, this is not the first time I have observed how natural it is that a philosopher should make a poor figure at the bar !’

The affectionate confidence and familiarity expressed in $\epsilon\tauαῖρε$, $\phiīλε$, $\phiīλε \epsilon\tauαῖρε$, acquires, in $\muēλε$, a degree of humorous or triumphant gaiety. Theat. 178 E: $Nὴ Δία, \muēλε$, ‘My dear fellow ! I should rather think he did.’

The use of quaint adjurations and addresses in Shakspeare affords an interesting illustration of this feature of Plato’s style. For example, when Hamlet says, ‘O good Horatio, I’ll take the ghost’s word for a thousand pound,’ the address is prompted not this time by Horatio’s worth, but by the relief caused to his own mind by the discovery of the king’s guilt.

THE END.

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